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This study examines prison peer effects in an adult prison population in the 
United States using a unique dataset assembled from the administrative databases of the 
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. The members of a first-time prison release 
cohort were identified and matched to each of the cellmates with whom they shared a 
double cell. These data were then linked to arrest history data from the Pennsylvania 
State Police. 
Criminological theories of social influence expect unobserved and difficult to 
quantify factors, such as criminality, to affect criminal behavior both independently and 
through intermediate decisions, including the choice to maintain prison peer associations. 
Those theories, therefore, implicitly assume the presence of essential heterogeneity, 
which helps to account for the response heterogeneity observed in studies of social 
influence. This study introduces the concept of essential heterogeneity to criminology and 
is the first to apply a method to address it, local instrumental variables, to estimate causal 
social interaction effects. 
 
The analyses presented in this study demonstrate that there is considerable 
response heterogeneity in prison peer effects. That response heterogeneity is attributable 
to essential heterogeneity, as implicitly expected by criminological learning theories. 
However, the null average effects estimated do not accord with the predictions of 
criminological learning theories, including differential association, balance, and 
prisonization theories, each of which expects peers who are, on average, more criminally 
experienced to exert criminogenic effects.  
The presence of essential heterogeneity indicates that estimating average prison 
peer effects does little to adequately characterize the relationship between social 
interactions with cellmates and releasee reoffending behaviors. Within the null average 
prison peer effect estimates lies tremendous variation in marginal prison peer effects. 
Some marginal prison peer effects are significantly criminogenic, while others are 
significantly crimino-suppressive. That substantial variation in the measured effect of 
prison peers on reoffending persists despite rigorous analysis and the inclusion of robust 
theoretically relevant controls suggests that future work should focus on creating 
constructs more appropriate to the task of determining who is harmed and who is helped 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
Why do average prison effects on reoffending appear null or criminogenic, as 
opposed to crimino-suppressive? To explain why incarceration fails to reduce 
reoffending, Nagin, Cullen, and Jonson (2009) have suggested that prisons have failed to 
exert specific deterrent effects on prisoners. What causes that failure remains unknown. 
Potential explanations include the stigma of the prison experience, defiant responses to 
harsh prison conditions, and criminogenic social influences. With respect to the latter, it 
has been suggested that social interactions amongst prisoners can increase their 
criminality and, thereby, encourage their reoffending (Bentham, 1830; Clemmer, 1940. 
1950; Sutherland & Cressey, 1955; Nagin, et al., 2009; Nagin, 2013).  
The Theory behind Prison Peer Effects 
A plausible theoretical rationale for the presence of criminogenic prison peer 
effects invokes social influence through learning mechanisms. According to Sutherland’s 
(1947) differential association theory, an individual’s criminality or underlying tendency 
to engage in criminal behavior emerges and is exacerbated through interactions with 
other individuals who hold criminal values and have criminal skills that supplement their 
own. These behaviors are acquired through ordinary learning processes such as modeling, 
reinforcement, punishment, and dialogue (Sutherland, 1947; Skinner, 1953; Bandura, 
1962; Burgess & Akers, 1966; Dishion & Dodge, 2005; Akers, 2009). The duration of 
association moderates the effects exerted through these processes, such that longer 
periods of time spent with in association with peers increase peer effects (Agnew, 1991; 
Warr, 1993). Via developmental cascade theory (Masten et al., 2005), peer influence 
operating through the aforementioned processes has also been theorized to affect 
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outcomes for many years after the social interactions have occurred (Dishion, Veronneau, 
& Myers, 2010). 
With respect to social interactions in prison, Clemmer (1940, 1950) argued that 
associating with other inmates leads to varying degrees of assimilation to the prison 
context (i.e., prisonization), a normative socialization process that exacerbates 
criminality. He expected the ordinary learning mechanisms that support normative 
socialization outside prison to operate inside prison as well (Sutherland, 1947; Clemmer, 
1940, 1950; Gold & Osgood, 1992; Jones & Schmid, 2000).  
Clemmer (1950) expected that prisonization would occur particularly through 
social interactions with cellmates. He predicted “a chance placement with a cellmate” 
(Clemmer, 1950, p. 317) to influence the development of prisonization, which proceeds 
primarily through that initial association. Gold and Osgood (1992) confirmed his 
prediction, finding that peer effects were most likely to arise between cellmates in the 
juvenile facilities they studied in Michigan.  
Clemmer (1940) also predicted that the magnitude of prisonization effects would 
increase with time served, just as Sutherland (1947) predicted that peer effects would 
intensify over time. In contrast, Wheeler (1961) and his contemporaries found that the 
degree to which inmates become prisonized follows a parabolic curve such that the 
prisonization effects rise, peak, and later subside as inmates approached their release 
dates (Garabedian, 1963; Wellford, 1967). Wheeler (1961) further found that inmates 




To account for their findings, Wheeler (1961) and his contemporaries 
hypothesized that inmates interact with different reference groups (Merton, 1957) at 
different times during their prison stays, such that time served interacts with prison peer 
characteristics to yield prison peer effects (Glaser & Stratton, 1961), just as duration must 
interact with the characteristics of peers to yield peer effects (Sutherland, 1947). Thus, 
both the duration of association with a cellmate and the timing of that association relative 
to the inmate’s prison stay are theorized to interact with the cellmate’s criminality and 
criminal experience to foment reoffending. 
Even among prison inmates, the characteristics of criminals vary (Clemmer, 1940, 
1950). Criminogenic prison peer effects are theorized emanate from associations with 
inmates with more criminal experience or higher levels of criminality (Sutherland 1947, 
Clemmer, 1940, 1950; Nagin et al., 2009). However, prison peer effects can inhibit 
reoffending in released prisoners just as they can excite it. According to McGloin (2009), 
whether offending increases or decreases after peer interactions depends on the relative 
distance between the criminality and criminal experience of the interacting peers. 
Applying McGloin’s (2009) balance theory to the prison context yields the expectation 
that prisoners in dyadic associations will moderate toward each other in terms of the 
criminal attitudes they adopt and the criminal behaviors in which they engage. Inmates 
with lesser criminality or criminal experience than their cellmates will experience 
criminogenic effects, whereas inmates in possession of more criminality and criminal 
experience than their cellmates will experience crimino-suppressive effects.  
If social interactions with cellmates are to help to explain the average failure of 
incarceration to produce specific deterrent effects, they must exert criminogenic effects, 
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on average, such that indications of increased criminal activity attributable to prison peer 
effects should be observed several years after inmates are released from prison. 
Specifically, after interacting with a relatively more criminal cellmate (i.e., an inmate 
who has, in the parlance of Sutherland, adopted more criminal definitions), an inmate’s 
probability of reoffending should increase. To accord with the prison effect or 
incarceration and reoffending literature, the effects of those prison peer interactions with 
a cellmate then have the potential to influence reoffending outcomes measured at least 
three years post-release (Nagin et al., 2009; Dishion, 2014). 
Prior Evidence of Criminogenic Prison Peer Effects 
In the single published study that examined social interaction effects in an 
incarcerative environment, Bayer, Hjalmarsson, and Pozen (2009) found that delinquents 
housed in juvenile correctional facilities with other delinquents who had committed 
similar offenses were more likely to commit those offenses after their release. Another 
unpublished study tentatively confirms these findings among inmates housed in 
dormitory-style prisons in France (Ouss, 2011). Although this direct evidence of prison 
peer effects is sparse, it supports the notion that prison peer effects are criminogenic 
rather than crimino-suppressive and that they, therefore, can account for some portion of 
the hypothesized failure of specific deterrence.  
Potential Prison Peer Effect Identification Issues 
Identifying whether interactions between social actors produce measurable, causal 
peer effects is a notoriously difficult statistical estimation problem that requires 
consideration of endogenous selection into social associations, reciprocity in the 
outcomes proceeding from those associations, and contextual influences on those 
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outcomes (Manski, 1993). In observational social interaction studies across disciplines, 
the simultaneous nature of social relationships has generally gone unaddressed, as have 
the selection biases and contextual effects that contaminate estimates of social interaction 
effects (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Manski, 1993, 2000; Mouw, 2006; Gangl, 2010; 
Angrist, 2013; Sacerdote, 2014). Thus, while an association between the behaviors of 
social actors is well established in the criminological literature (Warr, 2002; Pratt et al., 
2010), a persistent problem is that those associations are often mistaken for causal effects 
(Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Nichols, 2007). These deficiencies have allowed the 
criminological debate over whether social influence matters in the production of 
behavior, criminal or otherwise, to persist because deniers of social influence can 
convincingly argue that effects attributed to social influence are actually attributable to 
selection, simultaneity, or contextual biases (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Sampson & 
Laub, 2005; Matsueda, 1988; Costello & Vowell, 1999, McGloin & Shermer, 2009).  
While the current study is unlikely to resolve that criminological debate, it both 
offers a novel perspective on the problem of social interaction effect identification and 
employs a more appropriate method to identify those effects. The analysis provides 
insight into the well-known reason why well-controlled studies of social interactions have 
generally produced only meager evidence of their effects (e.g., Osgood & Briddell, 2006; 
Angrist, 2013): average treatment effects estimated through regression techniques 
obscure important response heterogeneity (Nagin, 1999; Heckman, 2000; Heckman & 
Vytlacil, 2005; Loughran & Mulvey, 2010).  
Response heterogeneity is endemic to criminological research. In the framework 
of the current study, response heterogeneity means that observationally equivalent 
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inmates respond to observationally equivalent cellmates differently: some inmates might 
be harmed by prison peer interactions, while other inmates are helped by them. In the 
context of the measurement of peer effects, one reason analyses tend to display response 
heterogeneity is that not all of the factors crucial to the determination of outcomes are 
observed (i.e., there are omitted variables). In a prison peer context, this means that 
reoffending outcomes generated by maintaining cellmate associations are affected by 
factors about which researchers have little or no information. That this unobserved 
heterogeneity or selection on levels plays a role in outcomes is canonical (Heckman, 
1976; Heckman & Singer, 1984; Wooldridge, 2006).  
That selection on levels is only one source of potential bias emanating from the 
unobserved determinants of outcomes is less established (Manski, 2005; Heckman, 
Urzua, & Vytlacil, 2006). Importantly, cellmate associations might be maintained (by 
inmates or correctional officers) for reasons related to their potential to affect inmates’ 
reoffending. Expectations regarding the reoffending outcomes of cellmate associations 
are also unobserved by the researcher (Manski, 2005; Heckman et al., 2006; Brave & 
Walstrum, 2014).  The phenomenon whereby decisions are made based on the outcomes 
they are expected to yield is called selection on gains. Heckman, et al. (2006) call 
response heterogeneity that results from a combination of selection on levels and 
selection on gains essential heterogeneity.  
Analytic techniques that eliminate biases due to selection on levels do not 
eliminate biases due to selection on gains (Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005; Heckman et al., 
2006).  This includes average effect estimates from instrumental variables techniques, 
which have been touted as a panacea for the measurement of social interaction effects 
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(Fletcher, 2009, 2012). The estimates generated through these analytic techniques either 
remain biased or apply only to a small portion of the sample under study.  
The local instrumental variables method (Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005), described 
below, illuminates the potential harm can be caused when estimated treatment effects 
remain biased by essential heterogeneity. In the current context, if essential heterogeneity 
is present in the relationship between cellmate associations and reoffending outcomes 
arising from those associations, average prison peer effect estimates may have little 
meaning because they will not characterize the breadth of responses to those associations. 
More crucially, average prison peer effect estimates may misrepresent the impact of 
cellmate associations for many inmates. Polices based on those averages may harm many 
inmates. 
Data 
The current study was made possible through the creation of an original dataset 
assembled from administrative records maintained by the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections (PADOC) and the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP). A cohort of males 
admitted to PADOC custody for the first time on or after January 1, 2000 and released 
between January 1, 2006 and December 31, 2007 was selected. The inmates who shared 
double cells with those first-time releasees were identified. Record of Arrest and 
Prosecution (RAP) sheets for the releasees and their cellmates were then obtained from 
the PSP. Information from interviews, observations, and surveys of correctional officers 




To translate the data into an analytic framework best capable of estimating causal 
prison peer effects, several operationalizations were made. The first-time releasees have 
no prior prison experience that might contaminate socialization effects in prison 
(Wheeler, 1961; Nieuwbeerta, Nagin, & Blokland, 2009). The longest-duration cellmate 
associations maintained by the releasees enable examination of prison peer effects among 
the cellmate associations (Clemmer, 1940; Gold & Osgood, 1992) most likely to exert 
social interaction effects due to their time intensity (Sutherland, 1947; Warr, 1993).  
Only behavioral indicators of criminality and criminal experience are available in 
the PADOC data. This is a minor limitation, as behavioral peer measures have been 
shown to be predictive of offending outcomes in both the differential association and 
balance theory frameworks (Warr & Stafford, 1991; McGloin, 2009; Pratt et al., 2010). 
The criminality and criminal experience (i.e., social interaction) measures include: an 
indicator of whether the longest-duration cellmate had a prior incarceration, a relative 
releasee-cellmate prior arrest measure, and a relative releasee-cellmate recidivism risk 
(i.e., criminality) measure that was constructed based on PADOC’s Risk Screening Tool 
assessment. Reoffending is measured by rearrest and a more general recidivism measure, 
which is defined as criminal justice system involvement that includes both rearrest and 
reincarceration without rearrest (Maltz, 1984; Grattet, Petersilia, Lin, & Beckman, 2011; 
Grattet, Lin, & Petersilia, 2011).  
The duration of cellmate association differentiates the dyadic pairs that have 
already been identified, as described above. Duration emerged as a potential 
differentiating characteristic because Sutherland (1947) argued that the duration of 
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association moderates peer influence and because prior prisonization research had shown 
that the timing of the acceleration of prisonization, which cellmate associations are 
theorized to foment, varies over the course of a prison stay (Wheeler, 1961; Garabedian, 
1963; Wellford, 1967). The timing of the most stable releasee-cellmate associations also 
indicates that the development of prisonization may be due to the fact that cellmate 
associations may take some time to develop before producing prison peer effects 
(Clemmer, 1940, 1950). Therefore, when during the course of a cellmate association 
prison peer effects are most likely to emerge must be determined. 
The need to explore the evolution of prison peer relationships over time 
introduces a complication because the duration of cellmate association is measured as a 
continuous number of days, whereas celling decisions (i.e., whether to pair two inmates) 
are binary decision processes. To preserve the binary character of the celling decisions, 
duration thresholds (i.e., points at which the duration of cellmate association can be 
dichotomized) are chosen. Those duration thresholds ensure that the releasees who meet a 
particular duration threshold and the releasees who do not are comparable based on their 
observed information. Once the thresholds are chosen, the potential moderating effects of 
duration of association, as predicted by Sutherland (1947), are explored between them.  
To estimate average causal prison peer effects proceeding from cellmate 
associations, the current study assumes a potential outcomes framework (Roy, 1951; Cox, 
1958; Rubin, 1978; Angrist & Pischke, 2009) in which duration of cellmate association 
thresholds are treatment modalities that moderate social interactions, as measured by 
relative criminality and criminal experience, and the prevalence of reoffending is the 
outcome, as measured by rearrest and recidivism. In this framework, two processes 
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sequentially determine releasee reoffending: a binary decision-making process (i.e., an 
inmate’s decision to remain with his longest-duration cellmate) that determines whether 
two inmates maintain their association or not and the process of ongoing social 
interaction that emanates from that decision to produce reoffending.  
These two processes require an analytic framework that includes two models to 
estimate prison peer effects. While common instrumental variables (IV) approaches, such 
as two-stage least squares, fit a two-stage potential outcomes framework and overcome 
the bias introduced by selection on levels (Heckman, 1976; Imbens & Angrist, 1994; 
Fletcher, 2009, 2012; Bushway & Apel, 2010), they do not address the essential 
heterogeneity that includes selection on gains (Heckman et al., 2006). To elicit causal 
treatment effects under essential heterogeneity, Heckman & Vytlacil’s (1999, 2001, 
2005) local instrumental variables (LIV) estimation strategy will be used to examine 
whether cellmates exert social influence that increases reoffending. 
The local instrumental variables method extends the potential outcomes 
framework (Heckman & Vytlacil, 1999, 2005). As is the case in ordinary IV strategies, 
LIV employs exclusion restrictions to estimate a choice model, from which the 
probability that a cellmate association lasts for several months or longer can be predicted. 
This probability is referred to as the propensity score.  The propensity score is a summary 
of an inmate’s probability of opting into a cellmate association duration threshold based 
on the observable information. The propensity score is the main independent variable in 
the second-stage outcome model that predicts reoffending. After the second stage is 
estimated its derivative is then taken with respect to the propensity score to enable 
estimation of marginal prison peer effects on reoffending. This derivative is the local 
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variable to which the name of the method refers (Heckman & Vytlacil, 1999, 2005; 
Heckman et al., 2006).  
Marginal treatment effects are calculated by evaluating the derivative of the 
outcome model across the range of the propensity score and, in the current case, for 
average values of the covariates. Marginal treatment effects are expressed in terms of the 
propensity not to be treated so that the collective contribution that unobserved factors 
make to the outcomes can be quantified. Marginal prison peer effects are generated by 
varying the values of the social interaction variables (prior incarceration, prior arrest, 
recidivism risk) around those means. Integrating the marginal prison peer effects over the 
propensity score generates average prison peer effects.  
Main Results 
That average prison peer effect parameter can be a very misleading summary 
statistic. As is implicit in criminological learning theories, the analysis reveals the 
presence of essential heterogeneity, which leads to variation in reoffending outcomes as a 
function of the probability of celling with a cellmate for several months. Some releasees 
experience criminogenic prison peer effects, while others experience crimino-suppressive 
prison peer effects. Average prison peer effects are null. 
While an average prison peer effect parameter may in many cases be a poor 
representation of the effect of an individual cellmate on his prison peer, it can be used to 
answer the question of whether average prison peer effects help to explain average prison 
effects. On average, social interactions between cellmates do not appear to increase or to 
decrease the prevalence of releasee reoffending, as measured by rearrest or recidivism. 
These null average prison peer effects cannot, therefore, account for average 
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criminogenic prison effects. Moreover, the finding that cellmates who are more 
criminogenic, on average, than the releasees with whom they are paired do not increase 
reoffending in the release cohort, on average, contradicts the predictions made by 
criminological learning theories, including theories of differential association 
(Sutherland, 1947), balance (McGloin, 2009), and prisonization (Clemmer, 1940).  
Main Contributions 
The current study makes both conceptual and methodological contributions. 
Conceptually, essential heterogeneity is introduced to criminology (Heckman et al., 
2006). Essential heterogeneity implies that response heterogeneity is not simply a 
function of unobserved factors that determine outcomes; it is also a function of 
unobserved factors that determine the decisions that also impact those outcomes. 
Moreover, the presence of essential heterogeneity is implied in most, if not all, 
criminological theories. For example, differential association theory expects criminality 
to influence social interactions, which then produce criminal behaviors and attitudes, 
which are also independently affected by criminality. Even previous peer effect estimates 
produced through well-controlled criminological studies of peer influence are likely to be 
biased due to the uncontrolled presence of essential heterogeneity. 
Methodologically, the current study introduces the local instrumental variables 
method (Heckman & Vytlacil, 1999, 2005) and a statistical application of it (Brave & 
Walstrum, 2014) to criminology. Unlike multiple regression and instrumental variables 
techniques, LIV can estimate causal effects in the presence of essential heterogeneity. 
Moreover, the individuals to whom those effects apply can be identified. Therefore, as 
more knowledge about prison peer effects is generated, it may become possible to 
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identify the inmates likely to be harmed by particular prison peer interactions and to 
identify the inmates likely to be helped by them, so that cellmate allocations that are more 
efficient with respect to the prevalence of reoffending can be made.  
Guide to the Current Study 
Estimating the average effect of prison peers on reoffending, as moderated by 
duration, is the subject of inquiry in the current study, which seeks to understand whether 
cellmates matter by asking and answering the following question: Does associating with 
criminogenic cellmates exert time-varying criminogenic effects on released prisoners’ 
reoffending outcomes? That inquiry is organized in the nine chapters that follow.  
Chapter 2 reviews the criminological literature, particularly as it pertains to 
theories of social influence and their application to the study of prison peer effects. 
Differential association theory, balance theory, and prisonization are discussed, with 
particular focus on research related to the evolution of prisonization during a prison stay 
and the potential for those effects to persist post-release. 
Chapter 3 reviews the methods, specifically as they apply to causal identification 
of social interaction effects. Essential heterogeneity is more completely discussed. The 
local instrumental variables method is introduced as a better solution to the problem of 
essential heterogeneity than other currently utilized estimation strategies. 
Chapter 4 integrates the previous theoretical and methodological reviews into a 
theoretically-driven analytical framework that is appropriate for the Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections context, which is described in Chapter 5. The data available to 
characterize that context and to create the arrest and reincarceration based outcomes are 
introduced in Chapter 6. The formal methodological model underlying the LIV 
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framework is outlined in Chapter 7. Limitations of the LIV method, as it is applied in the 
current study are discussed. 
Preliminary analyses are presented in Chapter 8. The analyses presented in 
Chapter 8 lay the groundwork for the prison peer estimates resulting from the LIV model, 
which are presented in Chapter 9. The preliminary analyses included in Chapter 8 are: 
linear probability regression models for the choice and outcome model specifications, 
justification and validation of the exclusion restrictions, exploration of potential duration 
thresholds, and an implementation of Heckman et al.’s (2006) test for essential 
heterogeneity. The prison peer effect estimates presented in Chapter 9 are preceded by a 
discussion of the support of the propensity score and what it implies for estimation of 
treatment effects and delineation of duration thresholds. Chapter 10 critically discusses 
the preliminary analyses and results from Chapters 8 and 9, explores directions for future 




CHAPTER 2: Theoretical Motivation for the Question: Do Cellmates Matter? 
“Very little is known, even by prison workers, of the kinds of social interaction 
which take place among prisoners… [T]here has been a growing concern for 
analysis of this interaction, with the aim of understanding the effects of prison 
social life on inmates... A number of studies of the prison community have been 
made, but there has been no systematic effort to develop a system of prison 
organization based on the results of the studies” (Sutherland & Cressey, 1955, p. 
497). 
 
Since the middle of last century when Sutherland and Cressey (1955) made the 
preceding observation, very little knowledge has been generated regarding the effects of 
social interactions between inmates, including whether prison peer effects impact 
reoffending and how to respond to them to increase public safety. This study hopes to 
spearhead a twenty-first century criminological inquiry into social interactions amongst 
prison inmates and their implications for the broader society. Specifically, this study will 
determine whether associations with cellmates exert criminogenic prison peer effects on 
the prevalence of reoffending in a cohort of first-time releasees from prison.  
Incarceration and Reoffending in Context 
Incarceration has become an increasingly dominant public policy response to 
criminal offending in the United States. It is common knowledge that, in the four decades 
Blumstein and Cohen (1973) observed that incarceration rates appeared to hold steady 
over time, the number of people in U.S. prisons and jails at year’s end increased from 
306K in 1978 to 2.3M in 2010. Over that same period, the incarceration rate increased 
more than 400% from 141 to 731 per 100,000 (Cantwell, 1980; Glaze, 2011).  
The national trend toward the increased use of incarceration to increase public 
safety and control crime was mirrored in Pennsylvania. According to the Pennsylvania 
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Department of Corrections (PADOC), the capacity of the state prison system increased 
by 20%, approximately 12,000 beds, between 2000 and 2007. At year’s end in 2007, 
PADOC alone housed more than 40,000 prisoners.  
This public policy response has come at a considerable cost. A recently released 
National Research Council (NRC) report estimates that states’ spending on corrections, 
exclusive of localities’ spending on jails, rose from $6.7B in 1985 to $53.2B in 2010. In 
2010 dollars, the states on average invested $37,000 per prisoner per year (NRC, 2014, 
pp. 314-315). Pennsylvania’s citizens invested even more in each inmate. In fiscal year 
2010, PADOC had an operating budget of $1.6B, which was overrun by almost half a 
billion dollars, bringing Pennsylvania’s total correctional costs to $2.1B and its per-
inmate investment to more than $42,000 (Vera Institute of Justice, 2012). What the 
citizens of the United States and of Pennsylvania have received in return for their 
investment in incarceration remains unclear. What is clear from a recent national survey 
of the public’s attitude toward the criminal justice system is that those citizens expect to 
endure less crime and enjoy more safety (Pew, 2010).  
Recidivism is one indicator of the success of correctional systems in their 
expected and stated goal to preserve public safety by reducing crime through offender 
rehabilitation and deterrence (Maltz, 1984; Gaes, Camp, Nelson, & Saylor, 2004; Nagin, 
Cullen, & Jonson, 2009; PADOC, 2013a). Reoffending is also tracked at each level of 
formal interaction an individual has with the criminal justice system: rearrest, 
reconviction, and reincarceration. To investigate the effectiveness of incarceration many 
social science researchers have sought to measure its effect on reoffending at each of 
those levels, particularly rearrest, which is viewed as the best indicator of reoffending 
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because it involves the least criminal justice system involvement (Maltz, 1984; Langan & 
Levin, 2002; Gaes et al., 2004; Durose, Cooper, & Snyder, 2014). Unfortunately, while 
that literature has demonstrated that incapacitation effects are real, it has not yet produced 
enough credible evidence to support a consensus regarding what effect incarceration has 
on post-release offending behavior or what might cause that effect (Spelman, 2008; 
Nagin et al., 2009).  
Rote statistics do not suggest that incarceration plays a large role in crime control 
beyond incapacitating offenders. According to a recent Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) 
report on the recidivism of state prisoners released in thirty states in 2005, 67.8% of the 
prisoners released were rearrested and 49.7% were reincarcerated within 3 years. Within 
five years, 76.6% were rearrested and 55.1% were reincarcerated (Durose et al., 2014, p. 
15). Again, the statistics in Pennsylvania mirror the national numbers. According to a 
recidivism report released by PADOC in 2013, six in ten Pennsylvania releasees were 
either rearrested or reincarcerated within three years. Among the 2006-2007 first-time 
releasees, 58.5% were rearrested and 46.3% were reincarcerated within the four-year 
follow-up period. Thus, while it appears that a minority of offenders, approximately one-
quarter to one-third, may be rehabilitated or deterred from future crime by a prison stay, 
the majority is not. Furthermore, determining what portion of the apparent desistance of 
that one-third of offenders is attributable to the prison stay is methodologically difficult, 
if not impossible (Spelman, 2008; Nagin et al., 2009).  
Spelman (2008) described the difficulties associated with identifying a prison 
effect from data on incarceration and crime rates. Those difficulties include selection and 
simultaneity biases. Selection biases can arise from, for instance, comparing individuals 
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who receive prison sentences to individuals who do not because those populations likely 
differ in ways additional to their experience of prison. Simultaneity bias arises from the 
inherent reciprocity in the relationship between crime rates and incarceration rates: crime 
determines incarceration, just as incarceration determines crime.  
Spelman (2008) concluded that only one of dozens of studies that tried to causally 
associate crime and incarceration rates adequately addressed both identification issues, 
but that it did so without actually answering the question of whether incarceration abates 
or augments crime. Levitt (1996) estimated an incarceration effect using exogenous 
judicial release orders as an instrumental variable. Therefore, the effect he identified 
answered the question of whether crime goes up when prisoners are released early, as 
opposed to whether it goes down when they are incarcerated. This is an example of what 
Heckman and Urzua (2010) describe with respect to instrumental variables estimators, 
more generally: they rarely answer the precise policy question being posed.   
Building on a previous systematic review by Villettaz, Killias, and Zoder (2006), 
which found no evidence of either deterrent or criminogenic prison effects, Nagin et al. 
(2009) qualitatively assessed the literature on the impact of incarceration on reoffending. 
Like Spelman (2008), Nagin et al. (2009) concluded that most of the studies they 
reviewed lacked credibility because they also lacked the methodological rigor to account 
for selection and simultaneity biases. They followed Spelman (2008) in arguing that 
instrumental variables approaches provide the best estimates of the causal relationship 
between incarceration and reoffending because they pay “close attention to the 
construction of a counterfactual” (Nagin et al., 2009, p. 164). Each of the instrumental 
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variables approaches they deemed high quality exploits a unique policy environment 
(Drago, Galbiati, & Vertova, 2009; Helland & Tabarrok, 2007). 
Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova (2009) exploited a unique policy event, the 
Collective Clemency Bill, that reduced overcrowding in Italian prisons by releasing 
inmates early, with the caveat that their residual sentences would be served if they 
recidivated. Drago et al. (2009) observed a 1.24% reduction in the propensity to reoffend 
for each additional month of residual sentence. Helland and Tabarrok (2007) estimated 
the effect of being charged with but not convicted of a second, “strikable” offense in 
California, which has a three strikes law that mandates a twenty-five years to life 
sentence after conviction for a third strikable offense. They found that offenders who 
were convicted of a second strikable offense reduced their reoffending by about 20% 
relative to those who were charged with but not convicted of a second strike.  
As was the case with the Levitt (1996) study, the two “high quality” studies Nagin 
et al. (2009, p. 164) described similarly elucidate the inability of instrumental variables to 
answer the exact question being posed, despite the fact that they do answer relevant 
questions (Heckman & Urzua, 2010). Both studies answered the important question of 
whether the threat of incarceration deters reoffending in particular policy regimes, one a 
unique policy event, the other an ongoing policy. Importantly, they did so without 
confounding the effects of deterrence and rehabilitation (Maltz, 1984; Nagin et al., 2009). 
However, both studies also failed to address the root question of whether the experience 
of incarceration suppresses reoffending more generally. Therefore, while these studies 
suggest that specific deterrence is a palpable phenomenon, they do not demonstrate it. 
Moreover, if the specific deterrent effects of incarceration are as substantial as these 
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studies suggest, the question of what about or in the incarceration environment has the 
capacity to subvert them lingers: the question of why incarceration has a “null or 
criminogenic” (Nagin et al., 2009, p. 115) effect on reoffending remains unanswered.  
What Could Explain the Failure of Specific Deterrence? 
Nagin et al. (2009) identified at least three theories that could explain why prison 
might exert criminogenic effects. The first and the one that best fits the context of the 
current study is that prison can be a learning environment. Learning can refer to the 
transfer of skills or attitudes from one person or group of people to another such that 
newer inmates adopt the attitudes and skills of more seasoned inmates by associating 
with them in environments that allow for dialogue, modeling, reinforcement, and 
punishment (Sutherland, 1947; Clemmer, 1950; Akers, 2009). For example, inmates who 
are victimized or see others being victimized in prison might feel more inclined to 
victimize others upon their release, particularly if they see that those behaviors are 
rewarded with an increase in social status (Loftin, 1986; Earley, 2000; Spohn & Holleran, 
2002; Nieuwbeerta et al., 2009). Alternatively, inmates might use substances to ease their 
transition to prison, an adaptation that can be reinforced via social interactions with 
prison peers, and that can create cascading effects in the post-prison domain, as addiction 
may promote continued criminal behavior (Terry, 2003; MacCoun, Kilmer, & Reuter, 
2003; Masten et al., 2005; Staff et al., 2010; Fletcher & Chandler, 2014).  
The second theory, labeling, is rooted in symbolic interactionism (Mead, 1934). 
Labeling theorists argue that individuals in interaction with the social environment begin 
to adopt the judgments made by others regarding them (Becker, 1963; Matsueda, 1992; 
Heimer & Matsueda, 1997). Lemert (1951) argued that antisocial behavior is normative 
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in young people but that society’s reaction to that initial antisocial behavior (e.g., arrest 
and incarceration) saddles the individual with a deviant label that creates secondary 
deviance after the individual identifies with and internalizes the initial deviant label. 
Moreover, labeling or signaling processes are not restricted to initial deviance, nor are 
they necessarily always harmful (e.g., Bushway & Apel, 2012). However, the harmful 
effects of an ex-convict label can have heightened pertinence because former inmates 
suffer both formal and informal collateral consequences, particularly housing and labor 
market discrimination, based on that ex-convict signal or label (Pager, 2003; Western & 
Pettit, 2004; Holzer, Raphael, & Stoll, 2006; Blumstein & Nakamura, 2009). The 
resultant inability of former inmates to apply for school loans, to find a job, decent 
housing, or even a suitable marriage partner, it is argued, encourages individuals to 
persist in, rather than desist from crime because they cannot establish stakes in 
conformity (Toby, 1957; Travis, 2005; Kling, 2006; Pettit & Lyons, 2007, 2009). 
The third theory through which Nagin et al. (2009) allege that prison might lead 
to criminogenic effects is rooted in the origins of criminological thought. Beccaria (1764) 
asserted that punishment should be proportional to the offense committed. Similarly, 
Bentham (1830) argued that “the punishment of imprisonment” is a punishment that, 
“when applied to slight offences” can, instead of “having a certain tendency to deter from 
the commission of crime,” be observed to “have an opposite tendency…to render those 
who undergo them still more vicious” (§ VII). Essentially, severe punishments can 
backfire.  
In prison individuals at low risk of continued criminal behavior might experience 
harsh treatments, which can lead to them to rebel against the perceived unfairness of the 
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system by committing more crime (Sherman, 1993; Gendreau, Goggin, & Cullen, 2000; 
Winerip & Schwirtz, 2014). This potential criminogenic mechanism has been tested 
indirectly by the literature that examines whether inmates commit more misconduct in 
higher security facilities where controls and monitoring are stricter than they are in lower 
security facilities. While that literature offers the theory little support in that serious 
misconducts do not seem to occur more frequently in higher security facilities than they 
do in lower security facilities (Camp & Gaes, 2005; Tahamont, 2013), prison security 
levels are not the only means through which inmates may suffer harsh treatments that 
ultimately incite more recidivism or more within-prison violence. The recent attention 
paid to the vagaries of solitary confinement, for example, reflects this concern, but direct 
tests of its potential harmfulness have not yet been made (Toch, 2001; Metzner & Fellner, 
2010; Mears, 2013; Edge, 2014; NRC, 2014).  
Theories of social influence, particularly learning theories, provide the 
criminological context through which the current econometric analysis of prison peer 
effects, which is described in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4, is shaped. As the preceding 
discussion indicated, mechanisms of social influence are not the only means through 
which the specific deterrent effects of prison might be subverted. They are, however, the 
primary means through which inmates have been theorized to impact each other’s post-
prison behaviors.  
Criminological theories of social influence, notably differential association and 
balance theories, provide guidance with respect to how inmates might be expected to 
generate social interaction effects. They are, therefore, discussed thoroughly in the next 
several sections, which pay particular attention to key concepts of analytic interest as they 
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apply to the prison context. However, this is not a study of the mechanisms through 
which social influence operates in prison. It is a study of the prison peer effects exerted 
during inmate social interactions. The question of interest is whether cellmates generate 
prison peer effects that impact the reoffending outcomes of a first-time release cohort. 
Tests of how, specifically, those prison peer effects might be generated are reserved for 
future work. 
Theories and Mechanisms of Social Influence 
While social interactions between inmates are not the only means through which 
prison might subvert deterrence, they have historically been blamed for the failure, or 
potential failure, of incarceration to reduce reoffending. At the dawn of the use of prisons 
as punishment, for example, Jeremy Bentham (1830) warned that prisons “instead of 
places for reform” could become “schools of crime” if “the indiscriminate association of 
prisoners” were allowed to take place within them (§ VII). Researchers who have sought 
to explain the failure of imprisonment to deter criminal behavior have returned to this 
traditional locus of blame (Clemmer, 1940; Gold & Osgood, 1992; Lerman, 2009; Bayer 
et al., 2009; Nagin et al., 2009). For example, Lerman’s (2009) argument that, "Prisons 
may provide for the transmission of information and skills that make individuals ‘better’ 
criminals” (p. 154), echoes Bentham’s (1830) assertion that prisons are learning 
environments capable of fomenting criminal behavior (Clemmer, 1940, 1950; Sutherland, 
1947).  
Learning theories and the production of criminal behavior through social 
influence. Sutherland’s (1947) seminal criminological theory argues that criminal 
behavior is a result of differential association to antisocial, as opposed to prosocial, 
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norms, which he called definitions (Sutherland & Cressey, 1955; Matsueda, 1988). 
Differential association itself is a “dynamic, ongoing process of interaction that produces, 
among other things, criminal acts” (Matsueda, 1988). Sutherland argued that an 
individual comes to view criminal behavior as favorable because the social group or 
reference group (Merton, 1957) to which that person associates (or wants to associate) 
views criminal behavior as favorable. That is, individuals learn to define situations as 
criminally exploitable when others who are close to them define those situations as 
criminally exploitable. To define or interpret situations as potentially criminally 
exploitable, individuals must be familiarized to the definitions or “motives, drives, 
rationalizations, and attitudes” (Matsueda, 1988, p. 281) favorable toward criminal 
behavior as well as the skills necessary to execute those behaviors.1 In short, they must 
develop their criminality or criminal propensity. Criminality is, therefore, the capacity to 
define or interpret situations as criminally exploitable. The degree to which individuals 
have developed their criminality or criminal propensity is reflected in their behavior 
(Sutherland & Cressey, 1955; Matsueda, 1988; Bushway et al., 2001). Individuals engage 
in crime when their criminal propensity overcomes their anti-criminal propensity 
(Sutherland & Cressey, 1955; Matsueda, 1988).  
Mechanisms of social influence. According to Sutherland (1947), the 
mechanisms through which criminality is developed are the mechanisms that support all 
learning processes. Specifically, he argued that imitation is not the only means through 
                                                 
1
 Adopting Matsueda’s (1988) interpretation of definitions, the current study employs the terms definitions 
and attitudes interchangeably. 
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which the skills and attitudes that motivate criminal behavior are developed (Sutherland 
& Cressey, 1955, p. 79). He further argued that dialogue, both verbal and “of gestures” is 
a key means through which criminality may be augmented (Sutherland & Cressey, 1955, 
p. 77). By invoking a dialogue of gestures, Sutherland (1947) appeared to be referencing 
Mead’s (1934, p. 140-1) “conversation of gestures [in which] what we say calls out a 
certain response in another and that in turn changes our own action.” In other words, 
initial behavior, which may be imitative, is shaped and reshaped through reciprocal social 
interactions that encourage or discourage continued behavior (Bandura, 1962, Matsueda, 
1988; Heimer & Matsueda, 1994).  
Early psychological experiments investigated the mechanisms through which 
social influence encourages and discourages behavior (Skinner, 1953; Bandura, 1962). 
Those mechanisms include punishment and reinforcement. Punishment and 
reinforcement operate similarly, but with different goals: reinforcement encourages 
behavior, while punishment discourages behavior. Both reinforcement and punishment 
can be applied positively (something given) or negatively (something taken away). 
Positive reinforcement encourages behavior through application of a pleasing stimulus; 
negative reinforcement encourages behavior through removal of a displeasing stimulus. 
Positive punishment discourages behavior through application of an undesirable stimulus; 
negative punishment discourages behavior through removal of a desirable stimulus. 
Bandura, Ross, and Ross (1961) observed that adults modeling aggressive 
behavior could incite aggressive behavior in children, even absent the presence of 
reinforcement or punishment of that aggressive behavior. That is, after observing adults’ 
aggressive behavior, the children imitated that behavior. In subsequent experiments, 
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Bandura and his colleagues found that punishment and reinforcement moderated 
children’s tendencies to imitate adults’ aggressive behavior. Children who observed 
adults being rewarded for behaving aggressively more readily reproduced those behaviors 
than children who observed adults being punished for their aggressive behavior (Bandura, 
Ross, & Ross, 1963).  
Importantly, the children for whom the adults modeled behavior in the latter 
experiments did not directly experience the punishment or the reinforcement : they only 
observed it. This suggested that behavior can be reinforced vicariously, meaning 
indirectly, and purely through observation. When people see the behavior of others 
rewarded, they are more likely to engage in that behavior. When people observe 
punishment, they are less likely to engage in that behavior (Bandura et al., 1963; 
Bandura, 1977; Warr & Stafford, 1991; Stafford & Warr, 1993).  
Consistent with Sutherland’s argument about the generality of learning 
mechanisms and building on the earlier early work of Skinner (1953) and Bandura 
(1962), Burgess and Akers (1966) elaborated upon Sutherland’s theory by articulating 
and describing the modeling, reinforcement, and punishment processes that support all 
learning and, with it, the production of criminal attitudes, skills, and behaviors. Imitation 
of modeled (i.e., observed) criminal behavior is reinforced or punished. Reinforcement 
and punishment can take many forms. Among them Burgess and Akers (1966) list “social 
attention, approval, affection, and social status” (p. 133), which can be given or taken 
away. That reinforcement and punishment, particularly when repeated in consistent 
situations, facilitates and cements learning has been borne out in the psychological 
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literature that has emerged the fifty years since Burgess and Akers (1966) outlined their 
initial argument (e.g., Akers, 2009; Kahneman, 2011).  
In contrast to Sutherland (1947), Burgess and Akers (1966, p. 137) argued that 
verbal communication would not, on its own, instigate changes in behavior. They argued 
that verbal communication of skills and attitudes, like modeled behavior, needs to be 
reinforced or punished repeatedly and consistently to affect lasting behavioral change 
(e.g., Skinner, 1953). However, through coterminous dialogue, verbally communicated 
attitudes and skills can be near-concurrently punished, reinforced, or rationalized using 
the socialization mechanisms articulated by Burgess and Akers (1966). This happens 
naturally in group-based and one-on-one conversations as the participants in those 
conversations react to statements made by each other. Those reactions can serve as 
powerful motivators for attitudinal change, as they can punish and reward (Mead, 1934; 
Asch, 1952; Bandura & McDonald, 1963; Bormann, 1972; Shiller, 1995; Hartup, 2005).  
In early replications and extensions of differential association theory, Cressey 
(1952) and Matza (1964) empirically demonstrated that both verbal communication and 
rationalizations of behavior play roles in the development of criminal definitions. 
Rationalizations diminish the notion that one’s behavior causes harm. Verbalizing those 
rationalizations in groups can make impermissible behavior permissible, thus reinforcing 
it. Similarly, dialogue that is intended to evoke deviant behavior, or deviancy talk, has 
been specifically implicated as a vehicle through which deviant attitudes and behaviors 
are both learned and reinforced (Dishion, Spracklen, Andrews, & Patterson, 1996; 
Dishion & Dodge, 2005, p. 397; Dishion & Dodge, 2006, p. 29). By discussing deviant 
behavior, it is encouraged and rationalized, particularly via techniques of neutralization 
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(Matza, 1964), which diminish the perceived harm criminal behavior may do to others 
and to oneself. Through dialogue, modeling, and reinforcement processes, offenders may, 
therefore, learn new skills and adopt new definitions that lead to new criminal behaviors 
or their previously learned skills, attitudes, and behaviors may be reinforced (Matsueda, 
1988; Hartup, 2005). 
Who influences whom? Implicit in Sutherland’s (1947) theory is the notion that 
more criminally experienced offenders influence less criminally experienced offenders. 
To paraphrase, Sutherland argued that criminal behavior is learned, not inherited 
(Sutherland & Cressey, 1955, p. 77). This implies that an individual who does not 
possesses criminal definitions (i.e., attitudes) and the skills to exercise those attitudes 
must, through learning processes like dialogue, modeling, punishment, and 
reinforcement, acquire those skills and attitudes from individuals who already possess 
them. Once acquired, those skills and attitudes can be applied to criminal behavior or not, 
depending both on the degree to which the individual’s criminal propensity is 
countervailed by his anti-criminal propensity and whether he perceives situations in 
which he finds himself to be suitable for criminal exploitation based on those 
propensities.  
Sutherland also suggested that the adoption of criminal definitions and skills 
would lead to ever-more susceptibility to criminality, just as the adoption of prosocial 
attitudes and skills would lead to ever-more susceptibility to prosociality. As Matsueda 
(1988, p. 283) summarized, “Sutherland hypothesized that differential receptivity is 
determined by the person’s current ratio of learned behavior: Those who have learned an 
overabundance of anticriminal definitions will be receptive to additional anticriminal 
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definitions and resistant to procriminal definitions, and vice versa.” This seems to suggest 
a near-unidirectional process, whereby the criminally- inclined become continuously more 
disposed toward criminality after that point of overabundance of criminal definitions over 
anticriminal definitions is reached. In criminology, this unidirectionality had been nearly 
always presupposed (and, according to Hartup (2005), is the more prevalent perspective 
in the psychological literature) until McGloin (2009) presented her theory of delinquency 
balance.  
Delinquency balance theory accounts for the fact that peers can instigate or 
reinforce positive behaviors and outcomes, just as they can negative ones (e.g., Barry & 
Wentzel, 2006; Massey, Gebhardt, & Garnefski, 2008) and that those effects depend on 
the characteristics of the peers in question (Hartup, 2005; Mouw, 2006). McGloin (2009) 
argued that the level of delinquency or criminal experience of an individual matters, as 
does the relative distance between his level of criminal experience and the level of 
criminal experience of the peer with whom he interacts. The potential effect that a peer 
will have on an individual can only be determined relative to the individual, such that the 
individual and his peer moderate toward each other to achieve equilibrium. Thus, 
interactions with the same peer can incite criminality in a less criminally experienced 
individual, while abating criminality in a more criminally experienced individual. 
Through the interaction of their criminal experiences, the outcomes of the individual and 
his peer are determined.  
Delinquency balance theory accords with differential association theory and the 
broader peer literature in that it assumes that peer influence is predicated on the “intimacy 
or importance” (McGloin, 2009, p. 445) ascribed to the peer relationship (Sutherland, 
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1947; Agnew, 1991; Warr, 2002). Sutherland asserted that “[t]he principal part of the 
learning of criminal behavior occurs within intimate personal groups” where the intensity 
or prestige of the relationship plays a role in the transmission of attitudes and behaviors 
(Sutherland & Cressey, 1955). However, there is ample evidence to suggest that, while 
intimacy may moderate or exacerbate peer influence, it is not a necessary precondition of 
it (Clemmer, 1940; Heider, 1958; Hartup, 2005; An, 2011).  
In developing his seminal balance theory, Heider (1958) took a more catholic 
approach to the nature of peer influence, stating, “[t]he tendency toward equalizing the 
fortunes of [an individual] and [his peer] may or may not be concordant with the 
sentiment relations between them” (p. 289). That is, peer influence can emerge in 
relationships characterized by antipathy or indifference, just as it can emerge through 
intimacy and affection (Hartup, 2005; An, 2011). Moreover, the ties between individuals 
do not have to be strong or direct, as argued by Granovetter (1973), for the effects of 
social influence to theoretically emerge. In fact, Hartup (2005, p. 389-91) acknowledges 
that the potential emotional drivers of social relationships and their potential capacity to 
exert social influence are poorly understood. Nevertheless, likely due to Sutherland’s 
seminal influence, the focus of the criminological study of social influence has typically 
been intimate peer groups (e.g., friends, friends of friends, social networks) and dyads, 
where affection or, at the very least, similarity (i.e., homophily, homogamy) are 
presumed to motivate peer interactions and their effects (Gans, 1961; Hirschi, 1969; 
Cohen, 1977; Kandel, 1978; Haynie, 2001; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001; 
Weerman & Smeenk, 2005; McGloin & Shermer, 2009). 
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The dyadic relationships most often explored in the criminological and 
sociological literatures that reference crime and delinquency are best friendships (e.g., 
Jussim & Osgood, 1989; McGloin, 2009) and intimate partnerships (e.g., Haynie, 
Giordano, Manning, & Longmore, 2005; Kreager & Haynie, 2011). Contrary to 
Sutherland (1947) who implied that more intense best friendships would generate larger 
social interaction effects (e.g., Hartup, 2005), Warr (2002) argued that best friends might 
exert lesser social influence because they are more loyal to each other and, therefore, less 
willing to ridicule each other, which he argued is a primary means through which 
behavior is transformed (e.g., Braithwaite, 1989). Rees and Pogarsky (2011) tested 
Warr’s (2002) hypothesis that best friends would not exert as much influence as their 
peer group. They found that both best friends and their peer groups mattered in the 
production of several outcomes: delinquency, smoking, drinking, and fighting. The 
magnitude of the effects associated with both best friends and peer groups was substantial 
and significant, ranging from 10-20% increases for most outcomes.  
The equivocal results of the Rees & Pogarsky (2011) study effectively summarize 
the broader literature related to the relative influence of single peers (e.g., best friends) 
and peer groups. Among studies that compare the influence of best friends to that of their 
social group or network, some have found that the influence of best friends dwarfs that of 
the social group (Urberg, 1992; Hussong, 2002), whereas others have found the effects of 
single peers to be more prominent (Kandel, 1978). Like Rees and Pogarsky (2011), other 
studies, particularly more recent studies, have reported equivocal effects (Weerman & 
Smeenk, 2005) that support peer influence for both types of relationships, but that were 
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also highly context and outcome dependent (Simmons-Morton & Farhat, 2010; 
Brechwald & Prinstein, 2011; Giletta et al., 2012).  
Moderators of learning effects. As alluded to earlier, Sutherland (1947) 
identified characteristics of associations that are likely to moderate their impact on the 
individuals involved in them. He discussed four such characteristics: intensity, frequency, 
priority, and duration. Unfortunately, he did not precisely define these potential 
“modalities of behavior” (Sutherland & Cressey, 1955, p. 78). Nor did he describe how 
they might relate to or be distinguished from each other. In fact, Sutherland asserted that 
duration and frequency “are obvious and need no explanation” (Sutherland & Cressey, 
1955, p. 78). This is unfortunate because both frequency and duration, as commonly 
understood, have the potential to be confounded with priority and intensity, as Sutherland 
loosely described them.  
Sutherland conceptualized priority as associations initiated early in life (or earlier 
than comparative associations), which can clearly be confounded with duration or the 
length of time an association lasts (Warr, 1993). Similarly, the intensity or the “prestige” 
or the “emotional reaction” associated with an association (Sutherland & Cressey, 1955, 
p. 78) can be confounded with the propensity to endure in or leave an association and 
with the willingness interact more or less often with that associate, as the preceding 
discussion of best friends illustrated.  
While duration can be confounded with both intensity and priority, Sutherland 
(1947) also conceived it straightforwardly. Duration is expected to moderate the effect of 
social influences, such that, to paraphrase Warr (1993, p. 33), “exposure to [social] 
influences over prolonged periods has a greater effect than exposure over more limited 
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periods.” This suggests that social interaction effects may be small, even undetectable, at 
first, but that they continue to grow over time. Sutherland did not specifically discuss the 
rate at which social interaction effects might grow or whether they should be expected to 
continue to grow at the same rate as time progresses. Nor has that aspect of duration been 
examined in the criminological or sociological peer literatures. 
Despite its simplicity and the importance ascribed to it in Sutherland’s (1947) 
seminal criminological theory, the average effect of the duration of social relationships 
on the social interaction effects they might generate has only rarely been examined in the 
criminological and sociological literatures. Although the knowledge base is small, it is 
consistent with the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between duration of 
association with peers and the magnitude of social interaction effects. The early work of 
Short (1956, 1958) found moderate (ρ~0.4) correlations between having long-term 
friends who were delinquent and individuals’ self-reported delinquency. Agnew (1991) 
showed that spending more time with delinquent peers increases own delinquency. And 
Warr (1993) found an association between delinquency and the increasing amounts of 
time juveniles spend with their peers as they age.  
Only one other study that specifically examined the effect of relationship duration 
on antisocial behavior was identified through the current review of the literature. Using 
the AddHealth (Harris et al., 2009) data, Haynie et al. (2005) assessed the effect of the 
duration of romantic relationships on minor and serious delinquency. The adolescent 
romantic partnerships they studied lasted on average 9.6 months (SD=10.25). The 
relatively short duration of those adolescent romantic relationships was positively and 
directly related to serious delinquency, independent of the romantic partner’s 
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delinquency, and also indirectly through the interaction with the romantic partner’s 
delinquency. For minor delinquency, relationship duration had a positive impact only 
indirectly through the interaction with the romantic partner’s delinquency. Beyond 
Warr’s (1993) interpretation of Sutherland’s (1947) intent (i.e., a positive relationship 
between duration and social interaction effects) and the limited studies in this review, 
criminological theory provides little guidance regarding the direction and magnitude of 
moderating effects that duration should be expected to generate. There is, however, 
reason to question that duration would exert homogeneous (i.e., the same for all 
individuals) and ever-increasing effects on social influence.  
While McGloin’s (2009) balance theory does not address the potential temporal 
elements of peer relationships, it has implications for them. As an individual and his peer 
seek balance within their relationship, when that equilibrium is reached (i.e., when the 
attitudes and skills and behaviors of an individual and his peer become congruent), the 
empirical implication is that social interaction effects will become undetectable. 
Moreover, as the relative distance between an individual and his peer diminishes, 
evidence of the social interaction effect must also diminish because the distance to be 
traversed is smaller. With respect to duration, this suggests that initially increasing social 
interaction effects will peak and eventually begin to decrease over time until they become 
undetectable: they will have a parabolic or semi-parabolic shape. At the very least, as 
individuals attempt to achieve congruence with their peers, initially increasing social 




How long might peer effects persist? Neither differential association, nor social 
learning, nor balance theories make strong predictions about the persistence of peer 
effects that result from learning mechanisms. That is, criminological theories of social 
influence do not make clear predictions regarding how long peer effects should remain 
detectable. However, the mechanisms of social learning, which upon which the 
aforementioned criminological learning theories rest, have been theorized to generate 
effects that can cascade through multiple contexts, such that they remain or become 
detectable over short (e.g., months) and long (e.g., years, decades, and even generations) 
periods of time (Masten et al., 2005; Masten & Cicchetti, 2010; Dishion et al., 2010; 
Dishion, 2014). In the context of developmental cascades, there is no theoretical time 
limit on the potential for social interactions to exert effects.  
Developmental cascades. As Masten and Cicchetti (2010) define them, 
“Developmental cascades refer to the cumulative consequences for development of the 
many interactions and transactions occurring in developing systems that result in 
spreading effects across levels, among domains at the same level, and across different 
systems or generations” (p. 491, emphasis in original). Cascade theory is rooted 
developmental dynamic systems theory, as developed from the natural sciences literature 
by Thelen (1990), who argued that complex, nonlinear processes of individual interaction 
with the social environment generate individual differences in behavior. The effects due 
to developmental cascades persist because they alter the course of development, such that 
“an early advantage or disadvantage in one…domain influences another later developing 
and high order domain” (Masten & Cicchetti, 2010, p. 492). While, as noted by Masten 
and Cicchetti (2010), the terminology used to describe cascade-like processes varies by 
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discipline, the basic premises that they argue underlies developmental cascade theory are 
present in burgeoning literatures in the social sciences (Cunha & Heckman, 2008; 2010; 
Krohn, Ward, Thornberry, Lizotte, & Chu, 2011). For example, in their synthesis of the 
developmental literature, Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, and Masterov (2006) argue that 
learning process exhibit self-productivity, which means early skill acquisition facilitates 
later skill acquisition, and dynamic complementarity, which means early investments 
facilitate later investments. Together, self-productivity and dynamic complementarity 
explain how learning cascades or, in Cunha et al.’s (2006) parlance, “skill begets skill 
through a multiplier process” (p. 698).  
Developmental cascades and criminological learning theories. Differential 
association and balance theories implicitly invoke cascading effects because they invoke 
learning processes that are theorized to follow cascade processes, whereby skills and 
attitudes acquired at an earlier time in one domain can be applied and augmented at later 
time periods, and across multiple domains (Fry & Hale, 1996; Masten et al., 2005; 
Bornstein et al., 2006; Cunha, et al., 2006; Cunha & Heckman, 2008; 2010; Dishion et 
al., 2010; Dishion, 2014). Differential association theory, which argues that delinquent 
definitions beget delinquent definitions, accords with a unidirectional cascade 
conceptualization in which previous antisocial behavior lays the groundwork for 
continued antisocial behavior (Sutherland & Cressey, 1955; Matsueda, 1988). Learning 
cascades can also be bidirectional (Masten & Cicchetti, 2010), which accords with the 
expectations of balance theory (McGloin, 2009). Furthermore, many cascade-based 
theories, such as Dishion et al.’s (2010) social augmentation hypothesis, rely on the social 
learning mechanisms through which differential association and balance theory expect 
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social interaction effects to arise (Brody et al., 2010; Lansford, Malone, Dodge, Pettit, & 
Bates, 2010). The social augmentation hypothesis of Dishion and his colleagues (2010) 
argues that the development of antisocial behavior is a progressive process that unfolds 
over time and, specifically, through interactions with deviant peers who engage in 
deviancy training. This developmental pathway and its potential to be adapted to the 
prison context to explain the persistence of prison peer effects are discussed later in the 
current chapter. 
Learning Theories in the Prison Context 
“American prisons contribute in some degree to the criminality of those they 
hold” (Clemmer, 1950, p. 311). 
 
While Sutherland (1947) argued that socialization through ordinary learning 
mechanisms could foment criminal behavior outside prison, Clemmer (1940, 1950) 
argued that socialization to prison norms through ordinary learning mechanisms could 
amplify post-prison criminal behavior. He coined the term prisonization, which he 
characterized as “fundamentally a learning process” (Clemmer, 1950, p. 318), to describe 
the socialization of inmates to the prison environment, which he characterized as 
oppositional to prosocial norms (e.g., compliance with correctional officers).  
Clemmer’s prisonization model became known as the importation model because 
he viewed prisonization as mainly a function of the characteristics inmates have upon 
admission to the prison system (Wellford, 1967). Clemmer (1940, 1950) expected 
preexisting inmate characteristics to both create variation in prison environments and to 
help to determine individual assimilation to the norms within it, such that both the 
characteristics of the individual inmates and the characteristics of their prison peers 
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matter in the prisonization process (e.g., Hartup, 2005; McGloin, 2009; Mears, Stewart, 
Siennick, & Simmons, 2013). The attitudinal and behavioral modification processes of 
prisonization “breed” criminal behavior that is exhibited after prisoners are released 
(Clemmer, 1950, p. 318), such that prisoners “go forth in tragic numbers to engage in 
crime again… [and] the later crimes of those who have been in prison are frequently 
more sophisticated or heinous than the offenses for which they were first committed” 
(Clemmer, 1950, p. 313).  
Mechanisms of prison peer influence. While it is generally assumed that 
opportunities for modeling criminal behavior and skills may be more limited in the prison 
context, both ethnographic evidence and empirical studies of prison misconduct suggest 
that there is no shortage of criminal activity inside prisons. Prison misconduct studies 
report that about one-third of prisoners are convicted of serious misconduct offenses that 
have parallels in the outside environment such as assault, arson, threatening correctional 
officers, drug trafficking, extortion, and bribery (Camp & Gaes, 2005; Tahamont, 2014). 
The prevalence of these serious misconduct convictions suggests that even in highly 
structured and closely monitored prison contexts, opportunities for criminal and 
antisocial behaviors can arise frequently, which further suggests that opportunities for 
criminal behavior, its punishment, and its reinforcement, whether experienced directly or 
observed vicariously (Skinner, 1953; Bandura, 1962; Burgess & Akers, 1966), are 
prevalent in the prison environment. However, even if opportunities for explicitly 
modeling criminal behavior and technical skills are more limited inside prison than they 
are outside it, attitudes can still be modeled and reinforced and criminal skills and 
behaviors can be discussed and reinforced, as described by Earley (2000).  
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 “Most convicts, I soon learned, try to avoid trouble and simply do their time as 
easily as possible. But about twenty percent of the inmates operate inside the 
prison much the same as they did on the streets. They deal drugs, extort money, 
bankroll card and dice games, pimp, and run scams on other inmates. These 
inmates are known predators. Their victims are called lops. The line between the 
two groups shifts daily” (Earley, 2000, p. 38). 
 
Even if opportunities for modeling behavior are more limited in the prison context 
than they are outside prison, criminality can still be transmitted via dialogue. Clemmer 
(1940, p. 87) argued that communication, “the method by which ideas are exchanged 
through language (speech and writing)” is another a primary means through which 
prisonization occurs. Moreover, criminological studies have also shown that in closed, 
incarceration-like environments, social interactions between program participants have 
impacted their criminal attitudes, later criminal behavior, and other deleterious behaviors, 
such as substance abuse and mental health (McCord, 1978; Gold & Osgood, 1992; Tita et 
al., 2010).  
McCord’s (1978) 30-year follow-up of the Cambridge-Somerville study found 
that the programmatic interventions meted out to groups of male juveniles harmed them 
later in life by increasing their mortality, substance abuse, and other negative physical 
and mental health outcomes. Her work, in combination with short-term findings 
indicating that a group-based delinquency prevention program in North Carolina harmed 
its participants, prompted the observation that concentrating groups of delinquent 
individuals together for treatment purposes might backfire and, ultimately, increase their 
criminality (Dishion, McCord, and Poulin, 1999; See also: Gold & Osgood, 1992; Tita et 
al., 2010). To account for this phenomenon, Dishion and his colleagues developed 
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deviant peer contagion theory (Dishion & Dodge, 2005; Dodge, Dishion, & Langford, 
2006).  
Deviant peer contagion theory argues that a reciprocal process of reinforcement of 
antisocial behaviors and attitudes that operates through dialogue can undermine the 
therapeutic aims of group-based interventions, especially those that take place in 
correctional environments. As such, deviant peer contagion is fundamentally a learning 
theory that operates through ordinary learning mechanisms, particularly a form of 
dialogue called deviancy talk. Deviancy talk is dialogue that promotes deviant behavior 
by reinforcing (Skinner, 1953; Bandura, 1977) and rationalizing (Matza, 1964) it. 
Moreover, deviant peer contagion theory is rooted in modern observations, such as that of 
Gold & Osgood (1992) below, which echo Bentham’s (1830) near-200 year-old 
concerns.  
“It is generally assumed that peer influence among incarcerated offenders is 
likely to interfere with attempts to bring about their reform” (Gold & Osgood, 
1992, p. 15).  
 
While they did not directly test the as-then undeveloped theory, Gold and 
Osgood’s (1992) work with juveniles in Michigan’s correctional facilities suggests the 
presence of deviant peer contagion. They found general increases in deviance despite the 
boys’ participation in a program that was designed to combat negative peer influences in 
therapeutic group settings. More recent studies suggest that deviant peer contagion may 
be offense-specific, rather than a process that affects behavior more generally (Lee & 
Thompson, 2009; Bayer, et al., 2009; Mennis & Harris, 2011). For example, Bayer et al. 
(2009) found crime-specific effects whereby juveniles housed in facilities with other 
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juveniles who committed similar crimes were more likely to recidivate with the same 
offense than were juveniles housed in facilities with fewer similar offenders.  
 “Every inmate talks freely only with some other inmate. Each knows the other’s 
crime. There is no reticence over the discussion of crime. Everyone feels 
unashamed where everyone else has the same cause of shame. No matter how 
diverse the crimes may be, they are cast into a common pool of 
shamelessness…this hardening of the conscience, which has its origin in a 
popular boasting of crimes committed and a brazen bragging of new crimes 
planned for the first opportunity of freedom” (Higgins (1920) as cited in 
Sutherland & Cressey, 1955, p. 505). 
 
Although typically applied to juveniles, deviancy talk and deviant peer contagion 
may also operate among adults. That is, among adults, deviancy talk may become 
criminality talk, as suggested by Higgins (1920) when he alluded to a “hardening of the 
conscience” that appears akin to techniques of neutralization theorized by Matza (1964). 
Moreover, there may be more opportunities for criminality talk and fewer opportunities 
for inmates to be shamed or ridiculed (Warr, 2002) out of antisocial and into prosocial 
behavior. That is, inmates may be in a “common pool of shamelessness” where that type 
of ridicule either does not arise or cannot arise due to oppositional prison norms that 
reject prosocial values such as cooperation with correctional officers (Clemmer, 1940, 
1950; Sykes, 1958).  
Who influences whom in the prison context? The differential in differential 
association implies that differences between associates generate the differences in 
criminal skills, attitudes, and, ultimately, behaviors observed within populations, even 
prison populations. However, prison peers who are more experienced can be challenging 
to differentiate in the prison environment where, by virtue of their common status as 
inmates, all potential prison peers have been convicted of at least one, and generally 
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multiple, crimes. As Clemmer (1950, p. 319) put it, “Most persons admitted to prison 
already possess ‘criminality’ in various degrees.” Still, based on their incarceration 
histories, arrest histories, and background characteristics (e.g., employment, substance 
abuse, education, and age) inmates who have more criminal experience and inmates who 
are more likely to pose a higher risk of recidivating (i.e., evince higher degrees of 
criminality) can be differentiated from inmates with lesser criminal experience and lower 
risk of recidivating.  
Associations with more criminally-experienced and criminal offenders, in terms 
of their offending histories and observed criminality (i.e., risk of recidivism), are the 
inmate relationships hypothesized to generate criminogenic social interaction effects on 
the members of the first-time release cohort under study. Even though they do not 
directly or completely measure it, the criminal behaviors and general life circumstances 
of an inmate are related to his underlying criminality, or propensity to engage in criminal 
behavior as a result of his differential association to more experienced offenders and 
offenders with higher levels of criminality from whom he may acquire criminal and 
antisocial skills and attitudes (Sutherland, 1947; Matsueda, 1988; Gottfredson & Hirschi, 
1990; Bushway et al., 2001; Gaes et al., 2004).  
Prior prison sentences are both indicative of serious prior criminal behavior and 
the failure of punishment to deter continued criminal behavior. This combination 
suggests both more criminal experience and a higher degree of criminality on the part of 
inmates with prior prison sentences. By virtue of the fact that it incurred the most 
stringent sentence society can impose, the behavior that resulted in a prior incarceration is 
likely to have been serious, whether it was a single very serious offense (e.g., 
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manslaughter) or a persistent pattern of repeating lower-level offenses (e.g., petty theft). 
Continued criminal behavior that leads to reincarceration suggests heightened criminality 
or a pronounced overabundance of criminal definitions because it demonstrates resistance 
or imperviousness to the deterrent or reforming effects of the prison sanction (Sutherland, 
1947; Blumstein et al., 1986; Anwar & Loughran, 2011). Potential exceptions are 
sentences imposed on drug offenders (Reuter, 1992; Sevigny, 2009). The harsh 
punishments meted out to drug offenders during the study period between 2000 and 2007 
were and are considered controversial and may reflect moral panic or political pressures 
to appear tough on crime, rather than truly serious criminal offending (Blumstein & 
Beck, 1999; Caplow & Simon, 1999; Raphael & Stoll, 2009; NRC, 2014).  
In the prison context, more criminally inclined inmates with one or more prior 
incarcerations on record might also have particular influence over first-time releasees due 
to their status or, as Sutherland characterized intensity, prestige in the prison context 
(Clemmer, 1940, 1950; Sutherland, 1947, p. 79). According to Clemmer (1950, p 316), 
all men become prisonized to some degree. Cellmates with prior prison experience, 
therefore, are more likely to have assimilated to the prison culture, which Clemmer 
(1950) observed to be non-cooperative, oppositional to societal norms, and assaultive in 
nature (Wheeler, 1961).  Reincarcerated inmates are also more likely to assume 
leadership roles in the prison social hierarchy, roles through which criminal attitudes and 
skills may more readily be transmitted (Clemmer, 1938; Schrag, 1954; Wellford, 1973; 
Crewe, 2007; Skarbek, 2014). In fact, Wellford (1973) observed that prison leaders, 
defined as inmates with more social connections than other inmates, are more likely to be 
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prisonized than are other inmates, as were inmates who had committed more prior 
offenses.  
Even if they are not prison leaders or have not been formerly incarcerated, some 
inmates can still have more experience committing crimes than do others. Inmates who 
have committed fewer crimes may be less criminally connected to sources of attitudes 
and behaviors that facilitate those crimes, while inmates who have committed more 
crimes may be more criminally connected to those influences. Gangs and informal social 
networks, both within prison and outside prison, can provide the influences that tend to 
lengthen criminal records (Jacobs, 1973; Haynie, 2001; Fleisher & Decker, 2001; Pyrooz, 
Decker, & Fleisher, 2011; Skarbek, 2014). Similarly, more experienced inmates (i.e., 
those who have been arrested or incarcerated more frequently) may also be more 
ingrained in an external criminal culture that they import to the prison context, where 
their criminal values influence less experienced criminals (Clemmer, 1950; Wellford, 
1967; Anderson, 1999; Mears, et al., 2013). By interacting with individuals who possess 
more of these kinds of personal criminal capital, first-time inmates may more readily 
develop the technical skills, personal charisma, and the social contacts to commit more 
crime after their release (McCarthy & Hagan, 2001).  
“[Halfpint] was the wisest prisoner I ever knew. I compared myself with him and 
saw the difference. He was a con man, who at one sweep of his hand could make 
enough dough to live on for the rest of his life, while I, a petty thief, could hardly 
steal enough to live on…I could see that among criminals he was respected and a 
hero. I felt humiliated inwardly, and made up my mind to get a racket that would 
bring me good returns. Halfpint promised to help me in working out my plans, 
and I had a whole year to do it in…I planned to pull off a pay-roll job at a firm 
where I had worked…I figured I’d make one big haul and then be sitting on top of 




This seemed to have happened for Stanley, a low-level robber in Shaw’s (1966) 
seminal ethnography. He observed what differentiated himself from his more experienced 
cellmate, Halfpint, both in terms of Halfpint’s criminal experience as a more 
sophisticated con man and his stature in prison, which presumably proceeded in part from 
his criminal experience. Stanley wanted to emulate both Halfpint’s criminal endeavors 
and his ability to command respect. Over the course of his prison stay, Stanley began 
learning how to commit more sophisticated crimes from Halfpint, going so far as to plan 
a crime on the inside that would take place on the outside.  
“When new [inmates] come into prison … they are really educated by their 
peers,” said Slack, “[M]ost hook up with someone and find out the unwritten 
rules---where to eat in the dining room, who’s a snitch, who they can trust. We 
are both caught in the same world where there are rules and then there are rules” 
(Earley, 2000, p. 231, emphasis in original). 
 
Prison peer influence and first-time inmates. As Shaw (1966) and Earley (2000) 
reported, ethnographic evidence suggests that first-time inmates learn how to conduct 
themselves in the prison environment primarily by observing the behavior more 
experienced inmates who have already assimilated to that context and excelled socially 
within it (Nelson, 1933; Clemmer, 1938; Wellford, 1973; Earley, 2000; Jones & Schmid, 
2000; Santos, 2006). By modeling the non-cooperative, oppositional, and/or assaultive 
behavior of their prison peers, first-time inmates can more readily integrate into the 
prison context (Bandura, 1961, 1962; Clemmer, 1938, 1950; Adams, 1992). To echo 
Burgess and Akers (1966), the attitudes and behaviors inmates display may be rewarded 
with varying degrees of the prison equivalents of “social attention, approval, affection, 
and social status” (p. 133). As a result of receiving these social rewards, first-timers may 
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develop greater criminal propensity, particularly if their behavior is rewarded in close 
association with a more experienced cellmate, whose influence is theorized to be greater 
(Sutherland, 1947; Clemmer, 1950; Bandura, 1963; Gold & Osgood, 1992; Kahneman, 
2011). These general processes may explain Nieuwbeerta et al.’s (2009) finding that first-
time inmates committed more crimes relative to similarly-situated offenders who were 
not subject to incarceration, as described by Wheeler (1961). 
“If the process of prisonization is operating effectively we should be able to 
observe its effects over shorter time periods. And we would expect the effect to be 
present particularly for offenders serving their first term in an adult penal 
institution” (Wheeler, 1961, p. 702). 
 
Prison peer effect predictions. Differential association and balance theories 
predict that less criminal inmates, such as those have never been incarcerated or who 
appear to have committed fewer crimes, will experience attitudinal shifts toward and 
acquire technical skills related to the criminal behavior of the more criminal prison peers 
with whom they interact. The criminal behavior of the inmate with lesser experience will 
be exacerbated. In contrast to differential association theory, balance theory also makes a 
clear prediction regarding the behavior of the inmate with more criminality: his 
criminality should be reduced after interacting with less criminal inmates (i.e., he should 
equilibrate toward his less criminal prison peer).  
Differential association is less clear about what to expect of the behavior of the 
inmate with more criminality because the theory offers no explicit prediction regarding 
whether individuals can unlearn criminality. A prediction can, however, be inferred. 
Sutherland (Sutherland & Cressey, 1947, p. 78) predicted that individuals whose criminal 
definitions exceed their anti-criminal definitions will “become” delinquent. He also 
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predicted that individuals who have acquired some criminality are prone to acquiring still 
more criminality (Matsueda, 1988). However, recognizing that learning processes apply 
to all behaviors, and not just to criminal behaviors (Sutherland & Cressey, 1947, p. 79), 
means recognizing that anti-criminal behaviors can be accumulated just as readily as 
criminal behaviors can. An implication of that recognition is that the balance between 
criminal and anti-criminal definitions may experience periods of both stability and 
change, such that the balance of definitions in the criminal or in the anti-criminal 
direction shifts. Moreover, although the tendency may be to extend the advantage of 
whichever class of definitions, criminal or anti-criminal, dominates that tendency does 
not imply that that the weaker class of definitions cannot itself be strengthened and 
eventually overwhelm the dominant class. Therefore, even in a differential association 
framework, less criminal prison peer influences should produce crimino-suppressive, as 
opposed to criminogenic prison peer effects.  
Duration, prisonization, and prison peer effects. The concept of time is 
implicitly connected to prison effects and, hence, to prison peer effects, for the obvious 
reason that inmates are sentenced to prison for particular periods of time. In their review 
of the incarceration and reoffending literature, Nagin et al. (2009) specifically focused on 
the failure of criminologists to provide dose-response estimates of the effect of 
incarceration on reoffending. That is, the question of whether increasing amounts of time 
served exert criminogenic or crimino-suppressive effects had gone unanswered. Since 
2009, several dose-response estimates of the effect of incarceration on reoffending have 
been provided. Each of those estimates relies on propensity score matching designs and 
each confirms that shorter sentences have null effects on reoffending (Loughran, et al., 
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2009; Snodgrass, Blokland, Haviland, Nieuwbeerta, & Nagin, 2011; Meade, Steiner, 
Makarios, & Travis, 2013). One suggests that sentences longer than five years may have 
crimino-suppressive effects (Meade, et al, 2013).  
Like prison effects, prison peer effects have been theorized to be time-dependent. 
Clemmer (1940, 1950), like Sutherland (1947), predicted a positive relationship between 
duration of association and socialization. He expected that longer spells of incarceration 
would increase the degree of prisonization of inmates. In the dose-response parlance of 
Nagin et al. (2009), as the dose of time in prison increases, the criminogenic reoffending 
response should increase.  Moreover, according to Clemmer (1940, 1950), differential 
association with other inmates is the main mechanism through which prisonization 
operates (Wheeler, 1961; Wellford, 1967).  Clemmer (1940) expected prison peers to 
promote prisonization, such that evidence of prisonization should emerge slowly and 
continue to grow over time as incoming inmates assimilate into the prison social milieu. 
Duration and prisonization. In a cross-sectional study designed to examine the 
relationship between prisonization and time spent in prison, Wheeler (1961) presented 
young adult (aged 16-30) inmates with hypothetical vignettes intended to elicit their level 
(high, medium, or low) of adherence to the oppositional (to societal norms and 
correctional officer expectations) and antisocial inmate subculture observed by Clemmer 
(1940) and Sykes (1958). For example, he asked inmates whether they would approve of 
working hard, revealing other inmates’ escape plans, and hiding contraband from 
correctional officers. Inmates’ agreement with antisocial and oppositional norms was 
taken as evidence of prisonization. The inmates’ degrees of prisonization were then 
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related to the amount of time each had been in prison and to the amount of time he had 
left to serve. 
As expected, Wheeler (1961) observed a time-dependent process of assimilation 
that results in “internalization of a criminal outlook” (Wheeler, 1961, p. 697), as 
individuals acclimated to and, in most cases, developed relationships in the prison 
community (e.g., Sutherland & Cressey, 1955, p. 503). However, contrary to Clemmer’s 
(1940) expectation that prisonization would continue over the course of prisoners’ stays, 
Wheeler (1961) also found that prisonization eventually decreased with respect to time 
served. Thus, Wheeler (1961) found an inverse U-shaped relationship between time spent 
in prison and prisonization,2 such that prisonization appeared to peak near mid-sentence, 
and then subside as an inmate approached his release date. This shape applied to both 
first-timers and recidivists, although as predicted by Clemmer (1940), recidivists both 
entered and exited prison evincing higher levels of prisonization.  
Like Wheeler (1961), Wellford (1967) found a significant relationship between 
time spent in prison and prisonization, with a weakening association between 
prisonization and time served as inmates’ neared the ends of their sentences. However, 
Wellford (1967) also found that an inmate’s criminal social type (anti-criminal, pro-
criminal, or unclassifiable) exerted an effect on prisonization that was both stronger than 
and independent of the duration of incarceration. As a result, he ascribed paramount 
                                                 
2
 Wheeler (1961) and his contemporaries measured not prisonization with respect to antisocial norms, but 
adherence to prosocial norms (i.e., staff expectations), so they found a U-shape, meaning a dip in prosocial 




importance to the “characteristics of the individual prior to his commitment,” which he 
asserted “chiefly determined” his “level of prisonization” (p. 202-3).  
Glaser and Stratton (1961) added an additional insight that accords with 
Wellford’s (1967) hypothesis. In contrast to Wheeler (1961), who argued that time to 
release from prison, not time spent in prison, was the determining factor in prisonization, 
Glaser and Stratton (1961) argued that time spent in prison did not independently affect 
prisonization. Instead they emphasized the interaction between time spent in prison and 
prison peer influences in producing prisonization effects. 
Echoing Sutherland (1947) and Merton (1957), Glaser and Stratton (1961) 
implicated the reference groups toward which inmates orient themselves at different 
points in their prison stays. They hypothesized that inmates refer to other, presumably 
antisocial, inmates upon entering and during the process of acclimating to prison. As they 
approach their release dates inmates orient toward, presumably prosocial, reference 
groups exterior to the prison (Glaser & Stratton, 1961, p. 389). Therefore, just as Warr 
(1993) found that spending more time with delinquent peers increases delinquency on the 
outside, Glaser and Stratton (1961) argued that spending more or less time in association 
with other inmates may help to determine the evolution of prisonization during a prison 
stay. Wheeler’s (1961) findings supported their hypothesis: he found less evidence of 
prisonization and shallower prisonization curves among those inmates who reported 
spending less time with other inmates.  
The work of Wheeler (1961) and his contemporaries offers insight into how 
socialization processes in the prison context may unfold. Specifically, they unfold over 
time and in a nonlinear fashion, which is consistent with a nonlinear developmental 
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cascade that accelerates and then decelerates as the process of prisonization unfolds. 
While those mid-twentieth century studies (Wheeler, 1961; Glaser & Stratton, 1961; 
Garabedian, 1963; Wellford, 1967) examined prisonization and how it shapes attitudes 
over time, as opposed to social interactions and how they shape behavior over time, their 
results and the interpretations thereof are both relevant and instructive for the simple 
reason that social interactions with other inmates, particularly cellmates, are the primary 
means through which Clemmer (1940, 1950) theorized prisonization would occur.  
Prisonization and prison peer effects. As Glaser and Stratton (1961) and 
Wellford (1967) presaged, current conceptualizations of social interaction effects refer to 
their constituent contextual, selection, and simultaneity effects and expect the shared 
social context to contribute to socialization processes (e.g., Jussim & Osgood, 1989; 
Manski, 1993; Hartup, 2005; Mouw, 2006; McGloin, 2009; Durlauf & Ioannides, 2010; 
Sacerdote, 2014). In the current study, the shared prison environment contributes to 
prisonization processes that operate primarily through social interactions between 
inmates who bring their own pre-prison proclivities to those interactions (Clemmer, 1940; 
Wellford, 1967). In addition, prior prisonization studies highlighted the potential 
importance of the duration of exposure to the prison environment and, specifically, to the 
other people in it.  
By today’s standards of longer prison sentences (Blumstein & Beck, 1999; 
Raphael & Stoll, 2009; NRC, 2014), the prison sentences and time periods examined by 
Wheeler (1961), Wellford (1967), and Garabedian (1963) were short, but nevertheless 
comparable to those of the first-time releasees from PADOC who served just over two 
years on average, but who may have served up to seven years. Wheeler (1961) examined 
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inmates (n=204) serving, on average, three-year sentences who had not yet been 
incarcerated for six months, those who had been incarcerated for at least six months, but 
who had more than six months left to serve, and those who had less than six months left 
to serve. Garabedian (1963) followed Wheeler’s (1961) early, middle, and late 
operationalization in his examination of 335 inmates, whose sentence lengths he did not 
report. Wellford (1967) also examined inmates (n=120) in early, middle and late phases 
of their up to six-year prison stays, but chose to delimit the early and late phases at nine, 
rather than six, months after admit and prior to release.  
Each of those studies found that, on average, inmates in the middle phase were 
more prisonized in that they, on average, revealed higher preferences for antisocial 
behavior and lower preferences for prosocial behavior than inmates in the early (within 
six or nine months of commitment) or late (within six or nine months of release) phases.  3  
Thus, on average, evidence of prisonization took some time (at least six months) to 
emerge and appeared to dissipate as an inmate’s release date approached but, as predicted 
by Clemmer (1940, 1950), inmates appeared more antisocial upon exiting prison than 
they did upon entering it. Based on the sentence lengths, the zenith of that parabola is 
likely to have occurred near the middle of inmates’ prison stays, so at approximate 
average of one and a half to two years for both samples, as only 29 men in Wellford’s 
(1967) sample served more than four years.4 
                                                 
3
 Wheeler (1961, p. 709) reported variation in prisonization patterns, as does Garabedian (1963), who 
attributes this variation to social types (e.g., Wellford, 1967). 
4
 In later work that was also cross-sectional, Wellford (1973) found no evidence of this U-shaped curve. He 
suggested that a longitudinal analysis, such as the one undertaken in the current study , would better serve to 
evaluate the prisonization process. 
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As noted by Wheeler (1961, p. 709), each of these studies is similarly limited in 
that it employed a cross-sectional design. Inmates were not followed longitudinally to see 
if their individual prisonization trajectories followed the same parabolic pattern observed 
cross-sectionally (Wellford, 1973). Each is also limited in that the responses of inmates 
were taken at face value: the authors did not consider that the effects they attributed to 
anticipatory socialization may have, in part, been representative of inmates’ desire to 
appear (rather that actually be) less prisonized near their release dates, so as not to impact 
their potential for release (Glaser & Stratton, 1961; Wellford, 1973).  
Despite their shortcomings, the prior prisonization studies suggest that the 
evolution of inmate relationships may help to explain the degree to which inmates exhibit 
prisonization with respect to time served. In particular, the timing of the most stable 
cellmate relationships (i.e., those that last the longest amount of time) suggests that these 
longest-duration associations may help to explain the trajectory of the prisonization 
process over time.  
According to the prior prisonization studies, PADOC inmates should not become 
maximally prisonized before six or nine months in prison, which is about when (at ten 
months, on average) they enter into their most stable, longest-duration cellmate 
association. As detailed in Chapter 5, upon entry into the prison system, PADOC inmates 
spend about three months in initial classification, then another three to nine months 
cycling through cellmates in their assigned facility before finally settling on a cellmate 
with whom they spend the most time (approximately six months) during their slightly 
more than two-year average prison stays. As their most stable associations develop and 
dissolve, on average, somewhere near one and a half to two years after the releasees’ 
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commit dates, the PADOC releasees may become maximally prisonized as a result of the 
ongoing influence of their longest-duration cellmate. Given that the releasees are first-
timers, the trend toward acquisition of antisocial attitudes and behaviors may occur 
because they are celled with more criminally experienced cellmates, as argued above. 
The continued adoption of antisocial attitudes and behaviors may also diminish as 
releasees become more congruent with their cellmates over time, as suggested by balance 
theory (Heider, 1958; McGloin, 2009). Nevertheless, the first-time releasees should, on 
average, exit prison evincing higher degrees of criminality than when they entered 
(Clemmer, 1950; Wheeler, 1961).  
The potential emergence and subsidence of prison peer effects. The temporal 
dependence of prisonization may be mirrored in a temporal dependence of prison peer 
effects. After some period of adjustment to their cellmates, releasees may experience the 
most intense prison peer effects. Before that period, evidence of social influence may not 
be detectable because the cellmate relationship is burgeoning. After a period of 
development during which prison peer effects might become and stay detectable, the 
eventual congruence between the behavior and attitudes of the releasee and his cellmate, 
which is predicted by balance theory, implies that evidence of social influence will again 
become undetectable. That cellmates reach a point in their relationship at which there is 
little associational conflict to resolve and at which once detectable prison peer effects 
become undetectable was suggested by Clemmer (1940) who observed that “there is not 
much talk between men who have been in a cell for some time [because within] a few 
months they have told each other as much of their life histories as they wish to” (p. 102). 
Therefore, evidence of the transmission of antisocial values via cellmate associations 
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may, like prisonization itself, follow a parabolic trajectory through time, as the relational 
distance between a releasee and his cellmate closes. 
Peer effects in prison may take some time to emerge partially because social 
relationships take time to develop. That social interaction effects may take some time to 
emerge is typically not considered in the literature that examines social interactions. This 
is most likely because the social relationships typically studied are established 
relationships, including those between friends, romantic partners, and classmates. 
Moreover, even if the studied relationships are not already established, the impetus for 
them to form (i.e., homophily or common interest), is generally implicitly assumed to 
stimulate immediate or near-immediate social interaction effects (Hartup, 2005).  
In the prison context the assumptions that social relationships among inmates are 
preexisting, ongoing, or predicated on intimacy, affection, or even a shared desire to 
share space with each other clearly cannot be made. Prison inmates, particularly first-time 
inmates, are systematically celled together without their consent. Moreover, although 
PADOC inmates can select into cellmate associations, they might select into those 
associations for reasons ancillary to the characteristics of potential cellmates. For 
example, as discussed in Chapter 5, inmates may end up with cellmates based on a 
desired cell location or the availability of a bottom bunk (personal communication, 2013). 
Thus, while inmate associations could be predicated on the similar characteristics, shared 
interests, or emotional ties that are assumed to generate social interaction effects in other 
contexts, they cannot be assumed to be (Clemmer, 1940, p. 104-5; Earley, 2000). Nor, 




The inability to make assumptions about the impetus for and nature of cellmate 
associations highlights the role of duration as something more than a simple modality or 
moderator of associations in the prison context. Specifically, as associations develop and 
dissolve there may be distinct durations of association wherein social interaction effects 
are detectable and those wherein they are not. Evidence of prison peer effects stemming 
from inmate interactions may take some time to become detectable. Moreover, they may 
subside, once again becoming undetectable as inmates anticipate their withdrawal from 
those associations due to their impending release (Glaser & Stratton, 1961) or an 
impending cell move, which might be due to a cellmate’s impending release or transfer 
(e.g., Earley, 2000). Alternatively, congruency between cellmate attitudes and behaviors 
may be achieved or nearly achieved after some time, which suggests that social 
interaction effects are detectable only when there is ongoing incongruence in the 
association (Clemmer, 1940; Heider, 1958; Jones & Schmid, 2000; McGloin, 2009). The 
duration of cellmate association, therefore, needs to be examined, not solely as a 
moderator, but as a potential delimiter of where in the context of the duration of these 
particular social relationships social interaction effects may be evident. 
The potential for prison peer effects to persist long enough to account for 
prison effects. If prison peer effects are to account for a portion of the null or 
criminogenic prison effect, they must persist for at least as long as long as the standard 
follow-up period in the literature that examines post-incarceration reoffending and reports 
prison effects. Three to five year follow-up periods are standard in the incarceration and 
reoffending literature (Langan & Levin, 2002; Helland & Tabarrok, 2007; Nagin et al., 
2009; Nieuwbeerta et al., 2009; Nagin & Snodgrass, 2013; Durose et al., 2014).  To 
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accord with that literature, the prevalence of reoffending is to be measured at four years 
post release.  
It is consistent with the broader peer literature to expect social interactions to 
impact temporally distant outcomes well within the range of four years. Many studies of 
peer influence that use the AddHealth data, for example, exemplify the implicit (i.e., 
atheoretical) expectation that peer effects can persist for many years. Wave I of the 
AddHealth study occurred in 1995, Wave II in 1996, Wave III in 2001, and Wave IV in 
2008. Studies have attributed peer influences in Wave II to Wave III outcomes (a 
temporal distance of five years) and peer influences in Wave III to outcomes in Wave IV 
(a seven-year difference). Those studies examine temporally and contextually distal 
outcomes attributable to peer influence as diverse as fertility (Balbo & Barban, 2014), 
human capital acquisition (Babcock, 2008), suicide (Abrutyn & Mueller, 2014), and 
substance use (Ali & Dwyer, 2009). It is, thus, consistent with the empirical literature on 
social interactions to expect peer effects to persist over time.  
It is also consistent with the, albeit scant, empirical evidence related to 
prisonization to expect prison peer effects to persist. Wheeler’s (1961) prisonization 
study provides some evidence that prison peer effects endure. As Clemmer (1950) 
predicted, Wheeler (1961) found that inmates who had previously been incarcerated 
were, on average, more prisonized than first-time inmates at the same stage in their 
current spell of incarceration. This suggests that the effects of prisonization, which 
operate through social influence, may linger.  
The cascading potential of prison peer effects. Developmental cascades can 
support the argument that prison peer effects persist while simultaneously accounting for 
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Wheeler’s (1961) finding that prisonization is a nonlinear process. One of many possible 
developmental pathways that might account for the persistence of cellmate social 
interaction effects over a period of several years, during which many social interactions 
subsequent to the cellmate (i.e., prison peer) interaction occur, is that social interactions 
that take place between cellmates in prison can generate spillover effects (i.e., cascades), 
which influence the outcomes of prison releasees as they reenter society (Masten et al., 
2005; Masten & Cicchetti, 2010; Krohn et al., 2011).  
If a social interaction with a cellmate exerts causal influence on reoffending 
outcomes, all subsequent social interactions, plus any other outcomes intermediate to 
reoffending, can be viewed as emanating from that single cellmate interaction (e.g., 
Lorenz, 1972; Sherman & Harris, 2013). This principle underlies cascade theory, a 
popularized example of which is the well-known butterfly effect, which attributes a 
tornado in Texas to the flap of a butterfly’s wings in Brazil (Lorenz, 1972). It also 
underlies the logic of Sherman and Harris’s (2013) explanation of their finding that a 
single arrest of a suspect for domestic violence could negatively impact the mortality of 
their victims more than twenty year later: transient experiences, both positive and 
negative, can have long-lasting consequences. In the current context of prison peer 
effects, the argument being made is that prison peer effects can impact post-prison social 
relationships and behaviors.  
To make this argument more concrete in the context of social interactions that 
occur during incarceration, an hypothetical cascading model of the persistence of prison 
peer effects can be adapted from Dishion et al.’s (2010) model of problem behavior 
amplification. Dishion et al. (2010, p. 606) developed a peer dynamics cascade model 
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whereby childhood problem behavior leads to social and academic failure at ages 11 and 
12, which facilitates gang involvement (i.e., deviant peer association) at ages 13 to 14, 
through which deviancy training at ages 16 to 17 operates to engender violent behavior in 
early adulthood when young adults are aged 18 to 19 and entering the transition to 
adulthood. With respect to timing, note that the deviant peer associations observed by 
Dishion et al. (2010) occurred five years before the observed violent behavior, whereas 
the prison peer associations to be observed in the current study occurred, on average, at 
about the same temporal distance. 
A cascade model can explain how prison peer effects might generate lasting 
criminogenic effects for the members of the PADOC first-time release cohort who 
entered into the prison system, encountered and remained with a particular cellmate, and 
thereafter continued along a path to increased reoffending that would not have been 
followed, were it not for the social interaction with that cellmate. That hypothetical 
developmental pathway might be: criminal behavior leads to imprisonment, which 
necessitates living with a cellmate. Via learning mechanisms, particularly deviancy or 
criminality talk, social interactions with that cellmate increase prisonization, which 
engenders continued criminal behavior when the more prisonized inmate is released 
because that inmate’s attitudinal shift toward more criminality influences each of his 
subsequent interactions (Clemmer, 1940, 1950). Thus, like peer effects that result from 
deviant peer interactions can be theorized to endure over a period of many years and 
through shifting social and developmental landscapes, so can prison peer effects due to 
cellmate associations be theorized to persist over lengthy time periods, during which 
other associations may occur. In short, prison peer effects on reoffending can be 
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attributed to prior peer interactions, per cascading processes (Sutherland, 1947; Lorenz, 
1972; Masten et al., 2005; Cunha et al., 2006; Cunha & Heckman, 2008, 2010; Dishion et 
al., 2010; Sherman & Harris, 2013). 
While cascading processes can explain the persistence of prison peer effects over 
many years in the post-prison domain, it is important to re-emphasize that the current 
study is not testing developmental cascade theory or the criminological learning theories, 
such as differential association and balance theories, which are consistent with the 
application of cascade theory. In the current study, the object is to determine whether 
prison peer effects can account for prison effects that have emerged at a four-year follow-
up. Developmental cascades have been discussed solely as a potential justification for 
why prison peer effects can be expected to persist for four years, not as a theory of that 
persistence that is to be tested via the current analysis.   
Prison peer criminal experience and criminality metrics. Once it is determined 
where in time to look for prison peer effects with respect to their onset and persistence, 
those effects can be identified by examining interactions between the criminality of the 
releasees and the criminality their cellmates, as indicated by their criminal experience and 
their assessed potential to commit new crimes inside and outside the prison context. In 
the prison context, criminal experience and criminality can be indicated through multiple 
measures. Those measures include, but are not limited to, prior incarceration, prior arrest, 
and risk of recidivism and misconduct. While these measures have weaknesses in that 
they fail to directly capture attitudes (Matsueda, 1988), behaviors such as these have 
routinely been used to indicate attitudes and may better capture differential associations 
even if they do not truly measure them (Warr & Stafford, 1991). 
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Cellmates with prior incarcerations should be more criminogenic and generate 
more criminogenic effects on releasees than cellmates who do not. As previously 
discussed, this may be because they hold more criminal attitudes and have acquired more 
criminal skills, because they are more criminally connected, or because they garner more 
respect or prestige in the prison environment. The adoption of differentially more serious 
criminal behaviors and attitudes is revealed by differentially more serious behavior. For 
similar reasons, cellmates with more arrests are likelier than cellmates with fewer arrests 
to generate criminogenic effects because they are likelier to commit more offenses 
themselves (Sutherland, 1947; Clemmer, 1950; McCarthy & Hagan, 2001; Mears et al., 
2013; Skarbek, 2014). The notion that some inmates are likelier to recidivate or 
misbehave in prison is reflected in actuarial risk assessment tools that are routinely used 
to classify offenders in terms of their need for services, their potential to commit future 
crimes inside and outside prison (Feeley & Simon, 1992; Kleiman, Ostrom, & Cheesman, 
2007; Monahan & Skeem, 2013; Starr, 2014). As such, they reflect, although they cannot 
perfectly measure, criminality. The process of constructing a risk score measure that 
reflects the measurement of criminality in the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections is 
described more fully in Chapters 4 and 6.  
Direct and Indirect Evidence of Prison Peer Effects 
“… [E]xcept for the inmates purposefully ostracized by other inmates, even the 
“ungrouped” inmates are seldom isolated. They do associate with other inmates--
-cell mates, work companions, recreation team mates, eating partners, and so 
forth…” (Sutherland & Cressey, 1955, p. 503). 
 
Although it is clear that social interactions among inmates have been cause for 
concern for nearly two centuries, only a handful of prior studies have examined peer 
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effects in incarcerative environments. As was described above, Drago and Galbiati 
(2011) estimated prison peer effects by exploiting a unique policy event in Italy that 
reduced overcrowding in Italian prisons by releasing inmates early, with the caveat that 
the remainder of their sentence would be served if they recidivated. The social interaction 
effects they estimated suggest that inmates with peers who have longer residual sentences 
recidivate less. Those indirect peer effects were as large as the direct effect of own 
residual sentence on recidivism.5  
Bayer et al. (2009) and Ouss (2011) estimated prison peer effects directly. Unlike 
Drago and Galbiati (2011), they did not rely on a non-reoccurring policy shift (i.e., an 
instrumental variable) to gain causal inference. Bayer et al. (2009) exploited exogenous 
variation in peer group composition relative to the date of admission to facilities to 
estimate peer effects at the facility level for juveniles in Florida (e.g., Hoxby, 2000). 
They found no evidence that juveniles appear to be learning new crimes as a result of 
social interactions. They did, however, find small reinforcing effects for some crimes. 
When juveniles convicted of burglary, larceny, assault, drug, and sex offenses shared a 
facility with similar offenders, they were more likely to reoffend with the same crime. 
The Ouss (2011) study estimated social interaction effects resulting from dormitory 
assignments. The preliminary results from her unpublished study of short-term stay 
                                                 
5
 Note that inmates with longer residual sentences were not necessarily more serious offenders. That some 
inmates had longer residual sentences implies only that, at the time of the Collective Clemency Bill, the 
inmates with the longer residuals had served lesser portions of their sentences. Releasees with peers who 
had more unserved (i.e., residual) time were deterred more than releasees with peers with less unserved 
time. The peer effect estimated by Drago and Galbiati (2011), therefore, reflects evidence of a deterrent 
effect of punishment that somehow spilled over from peers. It does not reflect the counterintuitive 
interpretation that the influence of deviant peers led to less recidivism on the part of releasees. 
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facilities in France concurred with the Bayer et al. (2009) findings in that they indicated 
that reinforcing effects for some crimes, notably theft and drugs.  
Who are Prison Peers?  
The prior prison peer effect literature examined direct prison peer effects for 
groups of inmates. The Bayer et al. (2009) study measured peer effects at the facility 
level. Similarly, Lerman (2009) attributed her findings to peer effects at the facility level. 
Wellford (1973) and Gold and Osgood (1992) found that more proximal associations 
matter more. Wellford (1973) examined social interactions at the “cottage” or cellblock-
equivalent level, whereas Gold and Osgood (1992) found that prison peer effects are 
determined and most likely to operate at the cellmate level, as predicted by Clemmer 
(1940, 1950).  
Despite this prior research that focused on groups of inmates, there are conceptual 
reasons to begin an analysis of prison peer effects at the dyadic cellmate level. In testing 
her balance theory, McGloin (2009) used data on best friends in the AddHealth (Harris et 
al., 2009) data set. She argued that focusing on best friend dyads, rather than a peer group 
was, “a particularly reasonable decision because Heider’s conception of balance 
discussed an individual actor and his/her relationship with two objects (i.e., another 
person and an idea/belief/etc.)…and it is wise to first establish whether a relationship 
exists at this dyadic level before moving to larger contexts” (p. 451). Her guidance, in 
combination with the insight of Clemmer (1940, 1950) and Gold and Osgood (1992), is 
taken in the current study: dyadic releasee-cellmate pairs are examined for their potential 
to exert criminogenic effects.  
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The decision to examine prison peer effects between paired cellmates is 
appropriate for several reasons. First, this is an initial investigation into the potential for 
cellmates to generate prison peer effects, so it is prudent to follow McGloin (2009) in 
examining core dyadic associations before evaluating larger groups. Gold and Osgood’s 
(1992) observation that cellmates are the likeliest locus of prison peer influence further 
supports the decision to examine inmate pairs. Finally, adopting a dyadic framework 
comports with the contextual structure of the prison system.  
The primary structural relationship in the prison context is between an inmate and 
his cellmate. The vast majority, more than 90%, of PADOC prison beds are housed in 
double cells, which means that the majority of PADOC inmates live in a cell with one 
other inmate. Naturally, however, inmates share cells with more than one cellmate during 
their prison stays.  
Criminological theory points to a single cellmate most likely to generate peer 
effects: the cellmate with whom the releasee spent the most time. Sutherland (1947) 
expected duration to moderate the effect of deviant peers. Clemmer (1950) similarly 
expected that prisonization would increase with time spent in association with other 
inmates. Several empirical investigations have confirmed these expectations (Wheeler, 
1961; Agnew, 1991; Warr, 1993; Haynie et al., 2005), so it is reasonable to expect that 
the cellmates who spend the most time with each other will exert detectable prison peer 
effects, even if it is also possible that the effect of that cellmate will decrease after 
increasing (Wheeler, 1961). 
The PADOC data include up to the minute information on the duration of 
cellmate associations. Variation in the duration of the longest cellmate relationship can be 
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explored to see if it moderates prison peer effects due to criminogenic cellmates and to 
determine whether those effects are ever-increasing, subject to diminishing marginal 
returns, or parabolic. Specifically, the longest-duration cellmate associations provide the 
widest range over which to explore when prison peer effects might emerge, how they 
might evolve, and whether and when they might subside and, potentially, become 
undetectable over the course of a cellmate association. 
From the data it is clear that the release cohort spent more time celled with some 
cellmates than they did with others; considerably more time, in fact. The PADOC 
releasees spent an average of 29 (SD=41) days with each of their cellmates, but an 
average of 182 (SD=144) days, or about one-quarter of their time in prison, with their 
longest-duration cellmates. Moreover, each releasee celled with ten cellmates on average 
before finally settling into this stable, longest-duration association. Twenty-five percent 
of the releasees remained in their most time-intense association until they were released.  
Duration of cellmate association information can be used to differentiate stable 
cellmate associations from unstable ones and to explore variation within those stable 
associations. While the eventual stability of some cellmate associations may be 
contextually induced in that correctional officers may disallow cell moves, stability 
nonetheless differentiates a releasee’s most stable cellmate association from his 
associations with each of his other cellmates because the most stable association persists 
for a longer period of time. The implications of that persistence can be explored in the 
current study, as can its relationship to less stable cellmates.  
Whether single social actors, such as best friends, or broader peer groups are more 
likely to be socially influential is an unresolved issue in the peer literature (Hartup, 2005; 
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Payne & Cornwell, 2007; An, 2011; Rees & Pogarsky, 2011). This is even truer in the 
prison context where, as Sutherland and Cressey (1955) noted, social interactions 
between inmates have rarely been studied. In the current study, dyadic relationships 
between cellmates are of primary interest due to the dyadic structure of the prison 
environment and for the reasons articulated by McGloin (2009) and Gold and Osgood 
(1992). Of secondary interest is how the effects of dyadic associations on reoffending 
compare to the effects of prison peer groups on reoffending (e.g., Rees & Pogarsky, 
2011). To make those comparisons, each of the cellmates with whom an inmate shared a 
double cell can be identified, so prison peer group (i.e., primary group or reference 
group) effects can be controlled and their contribution to prison peer effects can be 
estimated via the analytic framework described in Chapter 3.6 
In Summary 
To explore one reason why incarceration might increase reoffending, the current 
study attempts to demonstrate that persistent prison peer effects are a real, detectable, and 
measurable phenomenon among first-time releasees from the Pennsylvania Department 
of Corrections. The preceding discussion identified a key means through which prison 
peer effects might operate: differential association with more criminally experienced or 
criminally able individuals may foment criminal behavior. That discussion also 
highlighted the potential importance of the duration of cellmate associations in producing 
that behavior.  
                                                 
6 Prison peer groups may also extend beyond cellmates. Section (i.e., unit) level effects also have the 
potential to be controlled although, as described in Chapter 8, they could not in the current study because 
the sample sizes associated with the sections in the dyadic data were too small.  
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Duration and prisonization are implicitly connected because inmates are 
sentenced primarily with respect to time and because prisonization is theorized to operate 
through interaction with cellmates. However, the duration of association may affect 
individuals differently in the prison context than in the non-prison context. In the prison 
context, social interaction effects may evolve, take some time to emerge as inmates 
assimilate into the prison environment, grow as their relationships with each other 
develop, and dissipate as they anticipate their reentry back into the community. 
Cellmates, in particular, cannot be assumed to have had prior relationships or to have 
connected emotionally. Therefore, there is a need to determine how long inmates might 
need to interact with each other to generate detectable prison peer effects.  
The choices to examine the outcomes of a first-time release cohort and a longest 
duration cellmate create a strong framework in which to detect and explore the evolution 
of prison peer effects. First-timers are untainted by prior experiences with incarceration 
that are hypothesized to increase criminality (Clemmer, 1950; Wheeler, 1961; Jones & 
Schmid, 2000; Nieuwbeerta et al., 2009). Moreover, even if inmates “become somewhat 
more conforming to conventional norms” upon their return to the community (Glaser & 
Stratton, 1961, p. 388), Wheeler (1961) showed that returning inmates have higher levels 
of criminality than do first-timers.  
Within a dyadic relationship, the longest duration cellmates provide the widest 
range of time over which to explore the onset of and shifts in prison peer effects as 
cellmate associations unfold over time. An inmate’s most stable cellmate association is, 
of course, situated in the context of a broader prison stay. While the timing of the 
initiation of this association generally comports with timing of the onset of prisonization 
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effects, the effects of that association may be dependent on the amount of time a releasee 
expects to be in prison after that relationship is initiated (Wheeler, 1961; Glaser & 
Stratton, 1961; Wellford, 1967). As discussed in Chapter 6, this element of a releasee’s 
prison stay can also be deduced.  
Unfortunately, for reasons that will be described in more detail in Chapters 4 and 
6, adjudicating between the different potential theories of social influence (i.e., 
prisonization) and the different potential mechanisms through which social influence 
might counteract specific deterrence in the prison environment is both beyond the scope 
of this study and beyond the support of the unique cellmate assembled dataset. If effects 
on reoffending proceeding from social interactions with other inmates are detected, this 
study cannot and will not determine how they were generated. The mechanisms of social 
influence, including whether or not developmental cascades can account for the 
persistence, acceleration, or deceleration or prison peer effects, will remain elusive. 
Nevertheless, this study makes a valuable existential contribution that must precede the 
expositional step that future work will take: it attempts to detect causal prison peer 
effects.  
Only if prison peer effects on four-year reoffending outcomes are shown to exist 
will they need to be explained. If persistent prison peer effects are shown to exist, the 
current study will serve as fodder for a second step through which the mechanisms of 
social influence among cellmates can be explored with the goal of better understanding 
the etiology of prison peer effects. Therefore, while any prison peer effects detected by 
this study will be interpreted in the context of theoretical framework outlined in the 
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current chapter, it should be recognized that those interpretations are merely hypothetical 
narratives intended to contextualize and clarify the results of the analyses.  
The next chapter details the difficulties of estimating social interaction effects, 
more generally, and then describes how current statistical methodology based on 
economic theory can overcome those difficulties to estimate prison peer effects. Chapter 
4 overviews the synthesis of the criminological theory discussed in this chapter and 
statistical methodology discussed in Chapter 3 into an operational framework that 
respects the limitations of the data and characterizes the process through which inmates 
become cellmates and, hypothetically, generate prison peer effects.   
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CHAPTER 3: The Need for Methodological Innovation to Estimate Prison Peer 
Effects 
 There is clear theoretical and empirical motivation for asking whether social 
interactions amongst prison inmates increase their propensity to reoffend (Clemmer, 
1940; Sutherland & Cressey, 1955; Bayer et al., 2009). In particular, there is reason to 
assume that criminogenic prison peer effects emerge after a releasee interacts with a 
cellmate who has more criminal experience than he does. Moreover, those effects are 
expected to take some time to emerge as inmates who are celled together acclimate to 
each other and to vary based on how much time inmates ultimately spend with each 
other. This study seeks to causally identify the effects of prison peer interactions on 
reoffending, without seeking to explain the mechanisms that drive those effects. 
 Causal identification of social interaction effects is a substantial estimation 
problem that is endemic to the social sciences. This chapter reviews the challenges of 
causal identification of social interaction effects and introduces a new methodological 
framework, local instrumental variables (Heckman & Vytlacil, 1999, 2005), which has 
the potential to help researchers interested in social interaction effects to overcome some 
of those challenges.  
Estimation of Causal Social Interaction Effects 
Nichols (2007, p. 507) writes, “[E]stimating…[a] ‘treatment effect’ is the goal of 
much research, even much research that carefully states all findings in terms of 
associations rather than causal effects.” With its focus on establishing whether social 
influence causes criminal behavior, the vast majority of criminological research on social 
interaction or peer effects falls squarely into that category (for reviews see Warr, 2002; 
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Pratt et al., 2010). However, careful attention to the conditions under which causality can 
be established in observational studies has often been lacking in the criminological 
literature (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 2000; Bushway & Apel, 2010; Loughran & Mulvey, 
2010). This is particularly true in the peer effects literature wherein authors make 
statements such as, “we believe our statistical controls for selection are at least as strong 
as those in any previous research on peer effects for delinquency” (Haynie & Osgood, 
2005, p. 1119). Such statements want for both proof and precision. Thus, what has been 
established, over and over again, is that there is a clear correlation between the behavior 
and characteristics of people and the behavior and characteristics of their peers (Glueck 
& Glueck, 1950; McPherson, Smith, & Cook, 2001; Warr, 2002; Weerman, & Smeenk, 
2005; Mouw, 2006; Pratt et al., 2010).  
Whether social interaction effects can be causally implicated in the behavior of 
individuals remains a contentious issue across disciplines (McPherson et al., 2001; 
Hartup, 2005; Mouw, 2006; Gangl, 2010; An, 2011; Angrist, 2013; Sacerdote, 2014). For 
example, Angrist (2013) asserted that “the recent empirical work implementing robust 
peer effects research designs…has uncovered little in the way of causal effects” (p. 21). 
Similarly, Osgood and Briddell (2006, p. 160) concluded that “deviant peer influence is 
not as potent a force as some have argued.” More circumspectly, Sacerdote (2014) 
observed that context appears to moderate estimates of social interaction effects greatly 
(e.g., Hartup, 2005), which calls into question the generalizability of peer effects 
estimated in one context to any other context (Horney, Tolan, & Weisburd, 2012). 
However, he ultimately concurred with Osgood and Briddell (2006), who succinctly 
summarized that “peer influence is genuine, but modest” (p. 160). 
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Nearly since the inception of modern criminological thought, criminologists have 
been similarly preoccupied with the debate over whether social influence matters in the 
production of reoffending. That debate pits static (or population heterogeneity or 
ontogenetic) arguments against dynamic (or state dependence or sociogenetic) arguments 
(Paternoster et al., 1997; Thornberry et al., 2012). The former, of which Gottfredson and 
Hirschi (1990) are the primary modern advocates, denies social influence and adopts the 
position of Glueck and Glueck (1950) who famously noted that “birds of a feather flock 
together” (p. 164). In contrast, proponents of the latter argue that social influence is a 
major avenue through which criminality develops (Sampson & Laub, 1993, 2003; Akers, 
2009; Thornberry & Krohn, 2005). This debate has persisted largely because definitive ly 
demonstrating that estimated peer effects are not selection artifacts is extremely difficult 
(Hirschi & Gottfredson, 2000; Manski, 1993; An, 2011; Angrist, 2013).  
Manski (1993) formally described the difficulties associated with identification 
social interactions effects. At its core, the problem is one of disentangling a “peer effect” 
from confounding effects due to simultaneity (i.e., “the reflection problem,” to which the 
title of his article refers), selection (i.e., the “birds of a feather” or the tendency toward 
homophily that human relationships display), and the contextual effects generated by the 
shared social environment. A peer or social interaction effect is an effect, isolated from 
the aforementioned confounding effects, exerted on an individual under study by other 
individuals with whom the studied individual interacts (Jussim & Osgood, 1989: Mouw, 
2006). Typically, a peer effect is evidenced by some measurable change in behavior, but 
it could also be a measured change in attitudes or beliefs or opportunities (Matsueda, 
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1988, 1992; Warr & Stafford, 1991; Osgood, Wilson, O’Malley, Bachman, & Johnston, 
1996; Warr, 2002; Pratt et al., 2010).  
In the present study, the members of a first-time release cohort from the 
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections are the individuals under study and their 
cellmates are their peers. The cellmates are expected to exert an effect on the reoffending 
outcomes of the releasees through social influence. Only the prison peer effects can be 
detected: the mechanisms through which prison peer influence operates can be inferred 
but not demonstrated or tested.    
Overcoming the bias associated with each of the potential confounders of peer 
effects is a considerable task. As described by Spelman (2008) and Nagin et al. (2009), 
simultaneity plagues the incarceration and reoffending literature. Fortunately, in the 
context of this study, the reflection problem is not a problem because, while it is context-
dependent, there is a clear temporal order associated with the potential for incarceration 
to impact reoffending: social interactions that occur in the prison context are expected to 
affect criminal behavior in the post-prison context, several years after the social 
interactions have taken place.  
Social interactions that occur in one context have previously been shown to affect 
later outcomes in another, wholly disparate, context. For example, high school peer 
interactions have been shown to impact academic achievement in college and social 
interactions in college have been shown to impact post-graduation employment (Fletcher 
& Tienda, 2010; Bifulco, Fletcher, & Ross, 2011). In the current study, the cellmate 
social interactions expected to generate prison peer effects take place within prison, but 
the reoffending outcomes are observed after those social interactions have ended. The 
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construction of the problem, therefore, eliminates simultaneity bias. Selection bias, 
however, certainly remains.  
The social interactions literature, particularly in economics, provides some 
guidance with regard to statistical means of overcoming selection bias. Cellmates are 
akin to college roommates, who have been studied extensively in the domain of social 
interaction effects. In his seminal college roommate study, Sacerdote (2001) 
demonstrated that Dartmouth College roommates were assigned randomly, after five 
characteristics (gender, smoking, cleanliness, study, and sleep habits) were taken into 
account.  This pseudo-randomization of roommates into pairs overcomes the selection 
problem (Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003; Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner, 2006).  
Like college roommates, cellmates appear to be pseudo-randomly assigned to 
share living space in the PADOC prison context. As described in Chapter 5, initial 
assignment to a cell is contingent mainly upon race and medical limitations, with age 
playing a secondary role. However, the current study does not need to solely rely on 
assumptions regarding pseudo-randomization for identification. The first cell assignment 
can still be leveraged, but additional exclusion restrictions or instrumental variables can 
be identified (Imbens & Angrist, 1994). Those potential exclusion restrictions include 
characteristics of the cell environment and the timing of the placement with respect to the 
cellmate’s prison stay. In a two-stage framework, valid exclusion restrictions eliminate 
selection biases due to unobserved heterogeneity or omitted variables because they 
difference out the levels of the covariates in order to identify gains from treatment, as 
described below (Heckman, 1976; Imbens & Angrist, 1994; Bushway & Apel, 2010). 
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The exclusion restrictions employed in the current study will be described, conceptually 
defended, and empirically validated in Chapter 8.  
Even if pseudo-random assignment and exclusion restrictions address selection 
biases in the current identification problem, there remains the problem of common social 
environments. Actors in the same social environment are subject to the same contextual 
effects, which can bias effect estimates (Manski, 1993; Fletcher, 2009, 2012; Durlauf & 
Ioannides, 2010; Horney et al., 2012; Aliprantis, 2013; Sacerdote, 2014).  
“In our view, unobserved group effects represent the most difficult hurdle to the 
construction of persuasive evidence of social interactions because, unlike self-
selection, there is typically no economic reasoning to facilitate modeling the 
influences” (Durlauf & Ioannides, 2010). 
 
As Durlauf and Ioannides (2010) suggested, ideal solutions to the problem of 
empirically handling contextual effects are in short supply. Fletcher (2009) argued that 
instrumental variables (i.e., exclusion restrictions) in concert with contextual fixed effects 
can identify social interaction effects. He presented evidence that suggests that studies of 
social interactions that did not use instrumental variables in concert with contextual fixed 
effects likely overstated the magnitude of the influence of social interactions. Angrist 
(2013) made a similar argument. He described a model wherein an individual’s 
probability of being treated or not is determined by the saturation of treatment in a 
particular context (e.g., an individual’s probability of receiving job training depends on 
the capacity of the local job training center). In that situation, the contextual effect equals 
the average treatment effect and any discrepancy between the contextual and average 
treatment effects equates to a peer effect (Moffitt, 2001; Angrist, 2013; Crepon, Duflo, 
Gurgand, Rathelot, & Zamora, 2013).  
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While innovative, Fletcher’s (2009, 2012) solution and others like it (e.g., Moffitt, 
2001; Angrist, 2013) do not address the recent literature that demonstrates the fragility of 
the instrumental variables method with respect to the real-world situation where 
individuals’ decisions are affected by the unobserved outcomes they expect as well as by 
their unobserved characteristics (Manski, 2005; Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005; Heckman, 
Urzua, & Vytlacil, 2006). Heckman and his colleagues call this situation essential 
heterogeneity.  
Causal Inference and Essential Heterogeneity7  
When subject to the same treatments, individuals who are observationally 
equivalent from the perspective of researchers have routinely been shown to display 
heterogeneous outcomes, including those related to various criminal behaviors (e.g., 
Heckman, 2001; Laub & Sampson, 2003; Manski, 2005; Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005; 
Loughran & Mulvey, 2010). This phenomenon, which is known as response 
heterogeneity, is generally attributed to selection on levels, or differences in the 
unobserved characteristics of the individuals being evaluated, and their environment. 
However, response heterogeneity may also be attributable to selection on gains or choices 
made based on the unobserved and imperfect information individuals have about the 
potential benefits and detriments of their treatment options (Heckman et al., 2006).  
Essential heterogeneity. Heckman et al. (2006) coined the term essential 
heterogeneity to refer to the response heterogeneity in outcomes that arises as a result of 
                                                 
7
 The non-technical discussion in this section borrows heavily from Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) and 
Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006). The reader is referred to those pieces for technical proofs of the 




some combination of selection on gains and selection on levels. Selection on levels, 
which is also called selection bias, omitted variables bias, or unobserved heterogeneity, is 
a kind of information asymmetry: individuals make treatment decisions based on 
information that researchers do not have about those individuals, their environment, and 
the treatment (e.g., peers, cellmates) itself. In the case of social interactions in prison, 
information researchers do not have about the treatment decision might include 
personality characteristics and behaviors that inmates use when selecting their cellmates 
or that correctional officers use when assigning inmates to cells (i.e., celling inmates); 
information that also plays a role in inmates’ post-prison decisions to commit crime.  
Particularly relevant to criminology is the unobserved characteristic of criminal 
propensity or criminality. In criminology, criminality is often equated with self-control or 
a high discount rate (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Bushway, Piquero, Broidy, Cauffman, 
& Mazerolle, 2001; Nagin & Pogarsky, 2001; Hirschi, 2004), but differential association 
theory adopts a broader perspective of criminality wherein the accumulation of criminal 
attitudes, beliefs, definitions, and rationalizations inspire criminal behavior. As such, 
criminal behavior often serves as a proxy for criminality in criminological studies (Warr, 
2002; Pratt et al., 2010). Since Matsueda’s (1988) criticism of the practice of using 
criminal behavior as a proxy for criminal attitudes, eliciting information about criminal 
propensity has consumed much of the criminological literature related to differential 
association and social learning theories more generally (Pratt et al., 2010). Necessarily, 
however, criminal propensity remains unobserved, either in part or in whole, and either 
because it is unmeasured or because it cannot be completely measured (e.g., Matsueda, 
1988; Duckworth, Tsukayama, & Kirby, 2013). Unobserved criminality is theorized to 
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influence outcomes indirectly through the intermediate decisions that also contribute to 
those outcomes (i.e., selection on levels) and also directly through selection on gains.  
Selection on gains refers to the potential for individuals to have information about 
the expected outcomes of treatment (e.g., enhance crime committing capabilities), as 
opposed to the treatment itself (e.g., characteristics of cellmates), upon which they base 
their treatment decisions. In education, for example, selection on gains can arise when 
individuals forego current earnings and select into more education (i.e., college) in the 
hopes of earning higher wages when that educational process completes. Selection on 
gains can also happen in the production of criminal behavior in prisons. This is exactly 
the learning mechanism that “schools of crime” proponents postulate about the 
relationships formed between prison inmates: inmates select into cellmate relationships 
based on what they can learn from those cellmates about criminal opportunities and 
methods (e.g., Bentham, 1830; Clemmer, 1950; Nagin et al., 2009).  
Prior approaches to causal inference under response heterogeneity. Heckman 
and Vytlacil (2005) describe two main approaches that have been used to estimate 
treatment effects, a structural approach and a treatment effect approach. Both have been 
used to estimate social interaction effects (e.g., Warr, 1993; 1998; Haynie & Osgood, 
2005; Hoxby & Weingarth, 2005; Payne & Cornwell, 2007; Fletcher, 2009, 2012). 
Structural approaches only rarely address selection on levels. Treatment effect 
approaches address selection on levels but rarely answer the precise question being asked 
(Heckman & Urzua, 2010). Neither approach identifies causal effects under essential 
heterogeneity (Heckman et al., 2006).  
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Structural approaches. Structural approaches, which are also called selection or 
control function approaches, attempt to model decisions and to predict the outcomes of 
those decisions based on theory. While Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) focus on economic 
theory, this description applies equally to a criminological framework in which 
reoffending outcomes are viewed as a consequence of decisions made by social actors. 
A commonly-employed criminological approach to structural modeling in the 
presence of response heterogeneity is group-based trajectory modeling (GBTM). Rooted 
in finite mixture modeling, GBTM applications assume that individuals can be better 
described as following differing developmental pathways or trajectories rather than a 
single pathway. That is, multiple curves or effects, rather than a single curve or effect, 
can better describe and explain response heterogeneity (Heckman & Singer, 1984; Nagin, 
1999; Bushway, Thornberry, & Krohn, 2003; Haviland & Nagin, 2005; Piquero, 2008; 
Thornberry et al., 2012). True to Heckman and Urzua’s (2010) assertion that structural 
models are theory-based, GBTM is highly connected to theoretical debates in 
criminology. For example, GBTM has been used to contrast Moffitt’s (1993), taxonomic 
theory of crime in which offenders follow multiple dynamic developmental pathways, 
with Gottfredson and Hirschi’s (1990) static general theory of crime, which relies on a 
uniform age-crime curve (Nagin, Farrington, & Moffitt, 1995; Laub, Nagin, & Sampson, 
1998).  
Manski (1993) outlined the main problems associated with applying structural 
approaches to the study of social interaction effects: selection, simultaneity, and 
contextual effects confound peer effect estimates. In short, studies that employ structural 
models often lack internal validity, meaning the effect estimates they produce fail to 
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accurately characterize the sample under study (Imbens, 2009). In addition to the 
aforementioned threats to internal validity, structural models have also been attacked for 
their overreliance on arbitrary and untenable functional form assumptions and for their 
failure to test fundamental assumptions regarding the decision processes being modeled 
(Spelman, 2008; Nagin et al., 2009; Angrist & Pischke, 2009: Heckman & Urzua, 2010; 
Heckman, Humphries, Veramendi, & Urzua, 2014). These critiques apply to 
criminological GBTM approaches, which assume a curvilinear trajectory (i.e., second-
order polynomial) functional form and presuppose, generally without testing for, the 
existence of groups (e.g., Haviland & Nagin, 2005; Brame, Paternoster, & Piquero, 2012) 
As Heckman and Urzua (2010) write, “After 60 years of experience with fitting 
structural models on a variety of data sources, empirical economists have come to 
appreciate the practical difficulty in identifying and precisely estimating the full array of 
structural parameters that answer the large variety of…questions contemplated ” (p. 27). 
Identifying, measuring, and modeling the key variables and processes that generate 
treatment and outcome decisions is difficult and for some “fundamentally unanswerable” 
questions can be impossible (Angrist & Pischke, 2009, p.5). Although structural models 
have value because they apply theory to pose pertinent questions, they often lack internal 
validity because they are generally not sufficient to convincingly identify causal effects in 
the presence of selection on levels or unobserved heterogeneity. To address unobserved 
heterogeneity, strategies that rely on exclusion restrictions must be employed (Heckman, 
1976; Spelman, 2008; Fletcher, 2009, 2012; Nagin et al., 2009; Angrist, 2013).  
Treatment effect approaches. Treatment effect, or causal, approaches (Imbens, 
2009) attempt to identify causal effects of treatment from observational data using 
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exclusion restrictions. Instrumental variables (IV) approaches fall into this category 
(Imbens & Angrist, 1994). The most common IV approach, two-stage least squares 
(2SLS), employs variables called exclusion restrictions to characterize a treatment 
decision and to estimate the effect of that decision on outcomes. The first stage is called a 
choice model because it characterizes the decision to be treated or to remain untreated. 
The second stage is called an outcome model because it characterizes how the treatment 
decision determines outcomes. Exclusion restrictions (or instruments) are variables that 
predict the treatment decision (i.e., belong in the choice model), but do not predict 
outcomes except through treatment (i.e., do not belong in the outcome model). Variation 
in treatment that is attributable to variation in the exclusion restriction (i.e., instrumental 
variable) is leveraged to identify the effect of the treatment on the outcome.  
IV estimation strategies identify gains from treatment by differencing out the 
levels of the covariates at specific decision points. Differencing out the levels can 
eliminate biases due to simultaneity and selection on levels or unobserved heterogeneity 
(Spelman, 2008; Fletcher, 2009, 2012; Nagin et al., 2009). This ensures that the causal 
effect estimates from IV methods have high internal validity (Imbens, 2009).  
Apel, Bushway, Paternoster, Brame, and Sweeten (2008) provided a 
criminological example of an IV implementation that yields causal effects. Apel et al. 
(2008) leveraged exogenous variation in state child labor laws to determine that laws that 
increase the number of hours teenagers can work encourage them to drop out of high 
school, while also discouraging them from engaging in delinquent behavior. In the choice 
model, child labor laws predicted hours worked, which in the outcome model, predicted 
delinquency and high school completion as a function of those additional hours worked. 
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Although IV estimates may have high internal validity, their external validity can 
be very limited: the effect estimates they produce, while efficient and unbiased, may not 
extrapolate beyond the portion of the sample to which they apply. IV techniques do not 
ordinarily identify average treatment effects (ATE), which apply to the entire sample. 
Instead, they identify local average treatment effects (LATE), which do not apply to the 
entire sample.  
A LATE equates to an ATE only in the rare circumstance when responses to 
treatment are homogenous. In the more common case of response heterogeneity, LATEs 
apply only to those individuals who switch from the untreated to the treated condition in 
response to variation in the instrument. This might happen as a result of a policy. The 
Apel et al. (2008) study, for example, showed that when teenagers work more, as 
compared to fewer, hours as a result of the age cutoffs imposed by child labor laws they 
are more likely to drop out of high school and to engage in less delinquency. The policy 
that allowed teenagers to work more hours both caused them to drop out of high school 
and inhibited their delinquency. Importantly, only the teens who worked more hours as a 
result of the policy change were affected. 
LATE estimates from IV models are often informally considered policy relevant 
treatment effects (PRTE) because, as the Apel et al. (2008) study exemplifies, IV 
techniques are often applied to identify the effect of treatment on those induced to accept 
it via a policy shift (e.g., Bushway & Apel, 2010, p. 607; Loughran & Mulvey, 2010). 
However, a PRTE is a very special case of a LATE that answers a very specific question 
related to that policy: What is the effect of the policy on those to whom it applies?  
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In addition to lacking external validity, most LATEs are either not policy relevant 
or not entirely relevant to the research question being posed (Heckman & Vytlacil, 2001; 
Heckman & Urzua, 2010). For example, the aforementioned Levitt (1996) and Drago and 
Galbiati (2011) studies answered a policy-relevant research question: What happens to 
the reoffending behavior of inmates released early due to judicial orders or policies 
intended to reduce prison crowding? They did not, however, answer the actual question 
of interest: How does the experience of incarceration affect reoffending?  
Heckman and Urzua (2010) also note a different kind of problem with LATE 
parameters: the populations to which LATEs apply may not be immediately obvious or 
ever discernible. Akin to difference- in-difference estimators, IV methods remove the 
endogenous observed covariate information (i.e., the levels) to identify the gains or losses 
from treatment (i.e., the slopes). As a result, the information contained in the differenced-
out covariates cannot later be used to determine which individuals are affected by the 
LATE. That is, the characteristics of the treated individuals are not recoverable. 
Therefore, even if a LATE answers the actual research question of interest, to whom the 
LATE applies remains unclear. Again, this is a consequence of differencing out the levels 
of the characteristics that contribute to behavior in order to identify changes in behavior.   
Finally, the conceptual issues related to answering the exact research question 
being asked and to determining the individuals to whom detected treatment effects apply 
do not exhaust the shortcomings of IV strategies. Heckman et al. (2006) show that even 
though instrumental variables approaches can eliminate unobserved heterogeneity, they 
break down under essential heterogeneity. When individuals select into treatments based 
on the potential gains to be had from them, the possibility that they end up at similar 
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decision points through different processes emerges, which implies that their responses to 
treatments delivered at those decisions points may vary.  
An explanation of why IV breaks down in the presence of selection on gains 
requires some knowledge of the assumptions upon which causal identification of a LATE 
through IV rests. The two main assumptions are, first, that the instrument be correlated 
with the treatment variable and, second, that it be correlated with the outcome only 
through the treatment variable, meaning the instrument cannot be correlated with any 
unobserved information captured in the error term associated with the outcome.8 If 
selection on gains is present, meaning unobserved information about the outcome 
determines whether treatment is received, then the treatment will be correlated with the 
outcome in ways unknowable to the researcher and, thereby, captured in the error term. 
Any instrument that manipulates receipt of that treatment will then also be correlated 
with the outcome through the unknown information in that error term. This violates the 
second IV assumption.9 
The local instrumental variables method. Heckman and his colleagues argue 
for the unification of the treatment effect and structural approaches because the structural 
approach focuses on answering relevant theoretical questions, while the treatment effect 
approach provides a means of answering those questions efficiently and without bias 
(Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005; Heckman & Urzua, 2010). Bringing those two approaches 
                                                 
8
 The additional assumption of monotonicity is not necessary for this line of reasoning. In Imbens and 
Angrist’s (1994) work, the monotonicity assumption ensures that individuals at the same value of an 
instrument respond to treatment in the same way. Monotonicity is not required in Heckman et al.’s (2006) 
specification.  
9
 For a technical exposition, see Heckman et al. (2006, p. 393-7). 
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together encourages answering relevant theoretical questions in the most rigorous 
possible manner.  
“The MTE is a choice-theoretic building block that unites the treatment effect, 
selection and matching literatures” (Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005, p. 679).  
 
In a series of papers, Heckman and Vytlacil (1999; 2001; 2005) developed a 
method they call local instrumental variables (LIV), which estimates marginal treatment 
effects (MTE) and shows how to convert them into all other treatment effects of interest 
(e.g., ATE, LATE, PRTE, etc.). They define the MTE parameter in terms of the 
unobserved utility an individual derives from treatment, then demonstrate that it connects 
the structural and treatment effect approaches, as asserted above. Heckman et al. (2006) 
build on that work to show how LIV can be used to estimate causal effects in the 
presence of essential heterogeneity. 
The LIV approach is an extension of the potential outcomes framework, which 
models binary treatment decisions and the results of those decisions.10 Like the IV 
application of the treatment effect approach, LIV is a two-step process in which the first-
stage treatment choice model relies on exclusion restrictions for identification. Although 
it employs instruments, the choice model is a structural model. It must be correctly 
specified to reflect the decision process being modeled. Additionally, the exclusion 
restrictions must meet the IV assumptions. If the choice model is correctly specified and 
the exclusion restrictions are valid, each individual’s observed probability of opting into 
                                                 
10
 Both the potential outcomes framework and the method of local instrumental variables can be extended 
to multiple treatments (Heckman et al., 2006; Heckman & Urzua, 2010). However, only a binary treatment 
decision is considered here.  
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treatment can be predicted after the choice model is estimated. To put this process into an 
applied framework, after estimating a probit choice model using Stata’s probit routine, 
the probability of being treated can be predicted using Stata’s pr post-estimation routine. 
The probability of being treated based on the observable information in the choice model 
is referred to as the propensity score. 
In standard IV implementations such as 2SLS, the estimates from the first stage 
choice model are fed directly into the second stage outcome model. In the LIV method, 
the propensity score (i.e., probability of being treated) is the main estimator in the second 
stage outcome model. Outcomes are predicted as a function of the propensity to be 
treated based on the observable information.  
The outcomes estimated as a function of the propensity score are not treatment 
effects. To calculate the treatment effects, the derivative of the predicted outcome 
equation is taken with respect to the propensity score. This derivative is called the local 
instrumental variable (Heckman et al., 2006, p. 397). Marginal treatment effects are the 
evaluation of this derivative at each value of the propensity score, along its range from 
zero to one. The intervals along the propensity score can be infinitesimal, depending on 
the granularity required of the estimates. As is the case with post-estimation of 
categorical dependent variable models, the MTEs may also be calculated at particular 
levels of the covariates, depending on whether the covariates were interacted with 
propensity score and, thus, remain in the derivative (Long, 1997; Basu et al., 2007).  
Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005) derived formulas to convert the estimated 
MTE parameters into all other treatment effect parameters. For example, average 
treatment effects can be calculated by integrating the MTEs over the range of the 
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propensity score provided the propensity score distribution is supported, as described 
below and in Chapter 7. Other treatment effect parameters can be estimated using weights 
derived from the data. Heckman and Vytlacil (2005, pp. 680-681) show how to derive 
those weights and provide the formulas to calculate local average treatment effects, 
policy relevant treatment effects, and all other commonly estimated effects, for example, 
the treatment on the treated (TOT) and intention to treat (ITT) parameters.  
The propensity score and its role in LIV. The insight of Heckman and Vytlacil 
(1999, 2005), which was highlighted by Heckman et al. (2006), is the role played by the 
propensity score. The propensity score is generated through a structural choice model that 
characterizes a decision maker’s binary decision to opt into or out of treatment. The 
choice model leverages observable information (i.e., the data) to yield the propensity 
score, which is a measure of the probability that a decision maker will accept treatment 
based on the observed utility he expects to derive from that treatment. Like all 
probabilities, it ranges from zero to one. 
Using the propensity score to estimate outcomes is advantageous for at least two 
reasons.11 First, the support of the propensity score distribution in the data characterizes 
the completeness of the information contained in the data so that assessments about the 
comparability of the treated and untreated individuals can be made. As is the case for all 
propensity-score based methods, balance on the observed characteristics between the 
                                                 
11
 A third major advantage of using the propensity score, particularly a score generated by leveraging all the 
available information via multiple exclusion restrictions, to estimate the outcome equation, is tha t it always 
generates positive weights that preserve directionality of the treatment effects , thereby obviating the need to 
assume monotonicity. Basu et al. (2007) show that this is not always true in the case of a single 
instrumental variable. Since weights are not calculated for this study, however, this point is not discussed 
herein. Heckman et al. (2006) provides a technical discussion.  
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treatment and control groups can be achieved, thereby enabling more valid comparisons 
between groups that have not been randomly assigned (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983, 1984; 
Apel & Sweeten, 2010b). Second, through the MTE parameters the propensity score, 
which summarizes the observed information as it pertains to a treatment decision, allows 
for the characterization of the contribution made by the unobserved information to 
treatment decisions and outcomes (Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005). The propensity score is 
inversely related to the collective contribution of the unobserved determinants of the 
outcomes.  
The ability to retrieve information about the effect that unobserved information 
exerts on outcomes is a unique advantage of the LIV method. In common estimation 
strategies such as multiple regression and instrumental variables techniques, only the 
contributions of the observed determinants of outcomes are retrieved. By characterizing 
marginal treatment effects in terms of the collective contribution made by the unobserved 
information to outcomes, the LIV method provides otherwise irretrievable information 
about whether and how much unobserved factors contribute to the outcomes.  
Support of the propensity score. Multiple regression and instrumental variables 
techniques leverage information in the sample under consideration in order to produce 
average or local average treatment effect estimates. However, some individuals in the 
sample may not be comparable to any other individuals in the sample. In other words, the 
sample might include outliers. Including outliers in the analysis is akin to the adage of 
comparing apples to oranges. Generating estimates of each individual’s probability of 
opting into treatment enables direct comparison of the treated and untreated groups given 
their propensity scores, so that apples can be compared to apples.  
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Although propensity scores are assigned to individuals, a characteristic of the 
study sample is the level of support of the propensity score distribution by treatment 
group. The propensity score distribution is said to have full support when, across the 
distribution of the probabilities of being treated in the sample, there are individuals with 
the same propensity score, some of whom are treated and some of whom are not. In other 
words, the treated and control groups are balanced given the observable information that 
is summarized in the individuals’ propensity score. Apples can be compared to apples.12  
If the propensity score distribution does not have full support, average treatment 
effect estimates cannot be estimated either because there are individuals in the treatment 
group who cannot be compared individuals in the control group, because there are 
individuals in the control group who cannot be compared individuals in the treatment 
group, or there are treatment probabilities about which the sample contains no 
information (i.e., no individual in either group has a particular propensity score). These 
                                                 
12
 To visualize full support, imagine an American football field, which is 100 yards long. Across the width 
of the field are lines marking each yard. The field represents the potential values of the propensity score, 
demarcated at 0.01 intervals. Each team, call one team “Treated” and one team “Untreated,” is lined up on 
its sideline, getting ready to play. The players stand in order by their propensity scores (i.e., numbers on 
their jerseys), which reflect their probability of being on the “Treated” team based on their observed 
characteristics. These are large teams. Each team has 100 players, such that, on each sideline, there is a 
player standing on every yard line, from goal line to goal line. This is what full support of the propensity 
score can look like: the Treated and Untreated teams are balanced, given their propensity scores. Full 
support does not imply, however, that the teams are equal or that their distributions are the same. If there 
are 1,000 Treated players and 300 Untreated players dispersed randomly on their sidelines, the propensity 
score still has full support as long as each yard line is populated.  
Propensity scores can have partial support. If the Untreated players below the 20-yard line are 
reassigned propensity scores so that they are now elsewhere on the sideline, the Treated players below the 
20-yard line can no longer be compared to any Untreated players. The propensity score only has support 
above the 20-yard line (i.e., above a 20% probability of being on the Treated team). Propensity score also 
lack support if there are no observations. If the Treated and Untreated players originally assigned  to the 80-
yard line and above are reassigned to the 50-yard line, no information about either team is available above 
the 80-yard line (i.e., above an 80% probability of being on the Treated team.) 
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concepts are clarified in Chapter 8, which evaluates and discusses the support of the 
propensity score.  
Marginal treatment effects, the propensity score, and information. The LIV 
method identifies marginal treatment effects over the support of the propensity score 
distribution (i.e., by comparing the outcomes of treated and untreated individuals with 
similar propensity scores). In addition to providing a means of assessing the amount and 
the quality of the information contained in the data, the propensity score enables the 
characterization of the contribution that unobserved information makes to treatment 
decisions and to outcomes.  That characterization stems from Heckman and Vytlacil’s 
(2005) definition of the marginal treatment effect parameter. 
According to Heckman and Vytlacil (2005), the MTE is the return to individuals 
who are indifferent between being treated and remaining untreated. This definition may 
seem strange, but it is implicit in an experimental framework. In experiments (i.e., 
randomized controlled trials), indifference between treatment options is achieved 
mechanically. Subjects are randomized into treated and untreated conditions, such that 
neither the preferences of the subjects nor the preferences of the researchers are 
considered in the determination of the treatment condition. Potential outcomes from 
treatment are theoretically predicted, but unknown until the results of the experiment are 
analyzed.  
In experimental data, indifference between treatment options is fully determined 
and expressed by an observed variable: the assigned treatment. In observational data, that 
indifference is a function of both observed and unobserved factors. If an individual is 
indifferent between treatment options, the observed factors pushing him toward the 
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treated state must be perfectly balanced by unobserved factors pulling him toward the 
untreated state and vice versa. In addition to reflecting indifference to treatment options, 
MTEs can also be interpreted as indifference in the willingness to pay for treatment: the 
treated and untreated states offer the decision maker equal utility (Heckman & Vytlacil, 
1999, 2005).  
In the context of the current study, a releasee’s decision utility is the value he 
places on continuing his relationship with his cellmate; it reflects his willingness to stay 
with that cellmate. If a releasee is indifferent between remaining with or leaving his 
cellmate, the observed and unobserved components of his decision utility balance, such 
that at a high propensity to select into a longer duration cellmate relationship based on 
observables, there is also a high propensity to select out of that relationship based on 
unobservables.  
LIV and essential heterogeneity. When essential heterogeneity is not present, the 
local instrumental variables method could be used to estimate treatment effects, but it is 
not necessary. Under simple unobserved heterogeneity or selection on levels, the LATEs 
returned by instrumental variable techniques equate to ATEs. Likewise, if selection on 
levels is not present, ordinary least squares regression or matching techniques return 
ATEs (i.e., there is no response heterogeneity). Furthermore, those ATEs equate to all 
other treatment effect parameters (Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005; Heckman et al., 2006).  
When essential heterogeneity is present, the LIV method, unlike multiple 
regression or instrumental variables techniques, is able to isolate causal treatment effects. 
LIV allows for estimation of marginal treatment effects as a function of the propensity to 
not be treated, which like the propensity score (i.e., propensity to be treated) ranges from 
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zero to one. Defining the MTEs in terms of the propensity not to be treated may seem like 
an unnecessary obfuscation. It is not. As described earlier, when defined in this way the 
MTEs provide otherwise unavailable information about the collective contribution of the 
unobserved information to the outcomes. 
Unlike multiple regression techniques that return only a single summary average 
treatment effect for the sample, and unlike instrumental variables techniques that return a 
local average treatment effect for only one point or interval on the propensity score 
continuum, LIV allows for estimation of treatment effects at all points along the 
continuum of the propensity to not be treated. Those intervals or points at which MTEs 
are estimated can be theoretically-driven, have policy-relevance, or be exploratory in 
nature. Furthermore, those MTEs can be converted to all other treatment effects of 
interest including LATEs and ATEs (Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005, p. 680-681).  
With the information in the propensity score, treatment effects can be mapped to 
the individuals to whom they apply based on what is known about them. That is, 
treatment effects can be generalized to individuals based on their observed characteristics 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983, 1984). While unobservables also play a role in outcomes, 
understanding how the observed covariates impact individuals’ treatment decisions may 
help researchers to improve upon or avoid harmful outcomes, particularly when specific 
observable factors dominate treatment decisions and/or outcomes. For example, if only 
particular racial groups are affected negatively by a prospective shift in public policy, 
whether to implement that shift can be considered with more clarity (e.g., Reitz, 2009).  
Limitations. The LIV method leverages the power of exclusion restrictions in a 
theoretically driven framework that assumes that individuals make decisions about 
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treatment options that in turn determine their outcomes. It leverages the strengths and 
overcomes the weakness of both the structural and treatment effect approaches to 
inference. Still, every method has its limitations, as formulated and particularly when 
applied to different situations. The main limitation of the LIV method as formulated is 
that the choice model must be correctly specified. This limitation is discussed in this 
section. A further limitation of the LIV method as it is applied to detecting social 
interaction effects is discussed in Chapter 7. That limitation concerns potential stable unit 
treatment value assumption (SUTVA) violations.  
Heckman et al. (2006) make clear that the choice model that identifies the 
propensity score must be specified correctly to causally identify marginal treatment 
effects and all other treatment effects that derive from them. “Correct specification” of 
the choice model from which the propensity score is predicted can, as Basu et al. (2007) 
observed, seem to imply a revisiting of the problems attributed to structural models: 
threats to internal validity, particularly unobserved heterogeneity, render the estimates 
implausible (Imbens, 2009).  
Threats to interval validity in the specification of the choice model are less of a 
concern because omitting exclusion restrictions is not akin to omitting variables. 
Identification of the choice model rests on the exclusion restrictions. Although different 
exclusion restrictions generally return different effect estimates because they apply only 
locally, the correct specification requirement necessitates only that all included 
instruments are valid. From LATEs, as from MTEs, other treatment parameters can be 
retrieved (Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005). Omitting exclusion restrictions from the choice 
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mode will reduce the efficiency of the estimates it yields, but their omission will not bias 
those estimates (Basu et al., 2007).  
The utility of global treatment effects. While all other treatment effects can be 
derived from marginal treatment effects, Heckman and his colleagues argue that their 
retrieval may be superfluous. Global treatment effects, such as average treatment effects, 
are often not the treatment effects of most interest. While average treatment effects are 
the outputs of most multiple regression techniques, response heterogeneity suggests that 
they have little meaning with respect to characterizing how populations and 
subpopulations respond to treatment. Similarly, local average treatment effects estimated 
through instrumental variables may apply to only a very narrow and potentially 
unidentifiable portion of the population.  
Policymakers, in particular, may be concerned with the potential for variability in 
the direction and magnitude of local average treatment effects that apply only to the 
specific individuals affected by those policies. They may also be concerned with being 
able to identify the individuals to whom those marginal effects might apply (Heckman & 
Vytlacil, 1999, 2005; Heckman et al., 2006; Basu et al., 2007; Heckman & Urzua, 2010). 
This concern is reflected in the criminological literature that employs group-based 
trajectory modeling to try to understand response heterogeneity and to target 
interventions to the particular individuals who need them (Nagin, 1999; Haviland & 
Nagin, 2005; Piquero, 2008; Brame, et al., 2012).  
The work of Heckman and his colleagues may offer a viable alternative to GBTM 
strategies.  In particular, the LIV method offers researchers the opportunity to avoid two 
problems associated with GBTM methods: the assumption that there are analytic groups, 
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which can be confounded with actual categories of people, and the assumption that 
trajectories are necessarily curvilinear across behaviors (Brame et al., 2012). With LIV, 
MTEs can be assessed at minute increments where there is support of the propensity 
score, which delineates individuals by their observed propensity to be treated. In 
principle, MTEs can also assume any functional form. Moreover, the LIV method also 
allows researchers to assess the impact of the things they cannot observe (or simply do 
not know) in the production of outcomes because those unobservables are related directly 
to the propensity score. Finally, the LIV method enables researchers to identify the 
individuals to whom the MTEs apply.  
In Summary 
This study introduces Heckman et al.’s (2006) concept of essential heterogeneity 
and Heckman and Vytlacil’s (1999, 2005) local instrumental variables technique to 
criminology. More generally, it is also the first study to apply the concept of essential 
heterogeneity and the LIV method to the study of social interactions.   
Essential heterogeneity arises when observed determinants of a decision affect 
both the decision itself and the outcomes of that decision. Like ordinary instrumental 
variables techniques, the LIV method can eliminate selection biases due to unobserved 
heterogeneity. It can also eliminate selection biases due to essential heterogeneity. This 
happens not by gathering more observable data, but by recognizing that there are 
observed predictors of the decision that do not directly predict the outcome. The 
information in the instrumental variables or exclusion restrictions can be leveraged to 
identify treatment effects even when information regarding the determinants of the 
decision and its outcomes is incomplete, as it often is in observational studies. This is 
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particularly true when the structure of the decision process is well-defined (Heckman & 
Vytlacil, 1999, 2005), as it is in the current study, per Chapters 6 and 7.  
The LIV method unifies instrumental variables and structural approaches to 
estimation to provide precise answers to well-posed research questions. In this study, the 
well-posed research question is: Do cellmates matter? Specifically, this study estimates 
the social interaction effects on rearrest and recidivism, defined as rearrest or 
reincarceration without rearrest, that are generated when releasees interact with 
criminogenic cellmates. The next chapter will synthesize the theoretical framework 
developed in Chapter 2 with the analytical method described in this chapter to outline the 




CHAPTER 4: Prison Peer Effects from Theory to an Analytic Framework  
The primary goal of the current study is to answer the question of whether 
interactions with cellmates influence the reoffending of prison inmates, not how 
interactions with cellmates influence releasee reoffending. More specifically, the question 
is whether criminogenic cellmate associations can be causally implicated in the 
prevalence of the reoffending outcomes of the male members of a first-time release 
cohort from the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (PADOC). Both criminological 
theory and statistical methods necessarily inform the current analysis. To properly inform 
the analysis, both criminological theory and the analytical method must comport with the 
underlying process being modeled, inasmuch as possible given the limitations of the data 
and currently available analytic methods.  
The underlying process being modeled in the current study is a decision. At its 
core, that decision is whether or not two inmates should cell together, as described in 
Chapter 5. Celling decisions might be made by inmates who request cellmates, by 
correctional officers who assign inmates to cells, or by counselors who recommend 
inmates for particular prison programs that require particular cell assignments. Likewise, 
many factors, including (but not necessarily limited to) inmate characteristics, the 
composition of the institutional population, prison policies, the physical environment, and 
correctional officer and administrative preferences might influence what is fundamentally 
a binary decision. Two inmates either end up living together in a cell or they do not. 
Expected to result from that binary decision-making process are intermediate processes, 
notably social interactions, and the recidivism outcomes those intermediate processes are 
predicted to produce.  
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The local instrumental variables (LIV) method (Heckman & Vytlacil, 1999, 2005) 
presented in Chapter 3 and the Roy (1951) model upon which it was based can 
approximate binary decision-making processes. Unlike a basic Roy (1951) model, the 
LIV method can detect and, if necessary, control for the essential heterogeneity that 
criminological theory expects to influence that decision. To be clear, the local 
instrumental variables method eliminates bias due to the influence of the unobserved 
characteristics of releasees, their cellmates, the prison environment, and any other 
unmeasured factors that may influence both celling decisions and the recidivism 
outcomes that result from them.  
The operationalization of the LIV model with respect to the nature of the cellmate 
interactions generated by the cellmate assignment decision is informed by the 
criminological framework and empirical evidence discussed in Chapter 2. That model, 
which is developed in this chapter, begins the process of translating the cellmate 
assignment decision process into a theoretically informed analytical model that can yield 
causal social interaction effects. It is meant to be illustrative, rather than exhaustive.  
The discussion below is intended to take the first step of demonstrating that 
essential heterogeneity and the local instrumental variables method can be applied to the 
current criminological inquiry and to many other criminological inquiries. Only specific 
variables (e.g., criminality, criminal experience, reoffending, and duration of cellmate 
association metrics) and data limitations relevant to the model are discussed in the current 
chapter because they highlight how key prison peer effects questions will be answered in 
subsequent chapters. Other available variables and more general limitations of the data 
are discussed in Chapter 6. Similarly, an exposition of the local instrumental variables 
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method and its limitations is saved for Chapters 7 and 9, while a discussion of the 
potential instruments and variables relevant to the choice model described in this chapter 
will be undertaken in Chapter 8.  
Introduction to a Roy Model of Prison Peer Effects under Essential Heterogeneity 
Criminological theory predicts the presence of essential heterogeneity in the 
relationship between social interactions with cellmates and releasee reoffending. To see 
this, a Roy (1951) model of prison peer effects will be considered and extended to exposit 
the implicit presence of essential heterogeneity (Heckman et al., 2006) in the current and 
many, if not most, other criminological inquiries. The extended Roy (1951) model can 
then be adapted to consider the effect of social interactions with a cellmate on 
reoffending in the context of the criminological framework outlined in Chapter 2 and the 
local instrumental variables (LIV) method (Heckman & Vytlacil, 1999, 2005) described 
in Chapter 3.  
Roy (1951) developed a simple model to characterize a labor market participation 
decision and the outcomes of that decision. The Roy (1951) model remains a fundamental 
approach to modeling self-selection, as described for a general audience in Autor (2009). 
Quintessential Roy models consider the effect of education on wages in which wages are 
related to schooling decisions, particularly the decision to attend college (e.g., Heckman 
et al., 2006; Heckman & Urzua, 2010; Brave & Walstrum, 2014). In the parlance of the 
potential outcomes framework, education is the treatment and wages are the outcome. 
After translation to multiple regression notation, the Roy model schooling decision, 
therefore, looks like: 
Wages = A + B(Attended college) + E     [1] 
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The preceding model ([1]) is typically a binary schooling decision (e.g., attend 
college or not) that is used to predict a continuous outcome (e.g., the log of wages), 
which means it is typically estimated via ordinary least square (OLS) regression. 
However, the model can be generalized to other treatments and outcomes that reflect 
different kinds of decision processes. In the current study, the decision process to be 
modeled is whether to cell two inmates together. Only after that decision is made can 
prison peer effects between cellmates begin to emerge.  
Setting aside the need to operationalize the cellmate assignment decision for a few 
pages, a simple adaptation of the preceding Roy (1951) model to prison peer effects on 
reoffending resulting from the decision to cell two inmates together would look like: 
Reoffending = A + B(Cellmate assignment) + E    [2] 
As written, this simple model leaves considerable unobserved heterogeneity (E) in 
the cellmate assignment decision. In education models like the typical Roy (1951) model, 
unobserved heterogeneity is often attributed to ability or motivation (e.g., Duckworth, 
Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly, 2007; Todd & Wolpin, 2003). In crime models like the 
current one, an analogous unobservable is criminality or criminal propensity, which 
might influence the propensity of inmates to request cellmate associations or the 
probability that correctional officers cell particular inmates together (e.g., Gottfredson & 
Hirschi, 1990; Bushway et al., 2001; Gaes et al., 2004). This concern is indicated on the 
bed assignment surveys presented in the appendix to Chapter 5, which revealed 
correctional officer preferences to avoid predation by and victimization of inmates. 




Reoffending = A + B(Cellmate assignment) +  
C(Criminality) + E        [3] 
 
As was discussed in Chapter 3, unobserved heterogeneity is not the only type of 
heterogeneity that criminological theory predicts will enter into the relationship between 
releasee rearrest and celling decisions. The aforementioned unobserved characteristic, 
criminality, might influence celling decisions (i.e., which treatment is chosen) just as it 
influences reoffending outcomes. For example, inmates with heightened criminal 
propensity who want to learn how to commit different kinds of crimes (or how to commit 
the same kinds of crimes more efficiently) from their cellmates might seek to be assigned 
to more criminally experienced cellmates or to spend longer amounts of time with those 
types of cellmates (Clemmer, 1940, p. 104-5; Shaw, 1966). Unfortunately, an inmate’s 
motives, while perhaps indicated by certain observable characteristics, are in large part 
unobservable. In this simple model, they are summarized in his criminality. Note that 
criminality is not the only potential unobservable in this equation. Other unobserved 
information might include correctional officer preferences, motivations, and behaviors 
that both influence celling decisions and, potentially, outcomes. Correctional officer 
behaviors might influence outcomes if, for example, inmates are treated harshly and their 
tendencies toward defiance are provoked as a result (e.g., Bentham, 1830; Sherman, 
1992). 
The situation wherein unobserved heterogeneity influences both the independent 
and dependent variables in the Roy (1951) model is called essential heterogeneity 
(Heckman et al., 2006). Under essential heterogeneity the current criminological Roy 




Reoffending = A + B(Cellmate assignment) + C(Criminality) + 
D(Cellmate assignment*Criminality) + E      [4]  
 
Criminological theory routinely and implicitly predicts the presence of essential 
heterogeneity in the production of criminal behavior, the adoption of criminal attitudes, 
and the augmentation (or abatement) of criminality (Sutherland, 1947; Becker, 1968; 
Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Bushway et al., 2001; Giordano, Cernkovich, & Rudolph, 
2002; Nagin, 2013). For example, rational choice theorists expect both the costs and the 
benefits of criminal activities to be weighed when the decision to commit crime is 
considered (Bentham, 1789; Becker, 1968). That decision, particularly in the deterrence 
and perceptual deterrence literatures, is weighted by a discount rate (Nagin & Pogarsky, 
2001; Nagin, 2013), or one’s level of self-control, which the general theory of crime 
argues lies at the root of criminal behavior and all intermediate decisions leading to those 
behaviors (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Hirschi, 2004).  
As the self-control example illustrates, the implicit presence of essential 
heterogeneity is not limited to criminological theories favored by economists. Critical to 
the current study, essential heterogeneity is implicit in the differential association 
framework presented in Chapter 2. Sutherland (1947) argued that the acquisition of 
criminal definitions, or criminality, breeds more criminality, which leads to criminal 
behavior (Matsueda, 1988). The concept of essential heterogeneity is, therefore, intrinsic 
to the criminological learning theories that motivate the current inquiry into the effect of 
prison peer effects on reoffending. In the current inquiry, criminality is expected to 
influence recidivism outcomes (Sutherland, 1947; Clemmer, 1950; Gottfredson & 
Hirschi, 1990; Bushway et al., 2001). And, as the model in [4] illustrates, criminality is 
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also expected to influence the cellmate interactions that play a role in the production of 
those outcomes (Bentham, 1830; Clemmer, 1950; Nagin et al., 2009; Mears et al., 2013). 
A Limitation of the Data that Impacts the Criminological Roy Model 
The main limitation to modeling the cellmate assignment process as it has been 
described is the structure of the data. As Chapter 6 will indicate, the data that support this 
study are organized in releasee-cellmate pairs. Each member of the 2006-2007 first-time 
release cohort is paired with the single cellmate with whom he spent the most time, so 
each releasee has, by design, already been paired with his cellmate. To maintain the 
dichotomous nature of the underlying cellmate assignment process being modeled, an 
additional relationship criterion is needed to differentiate the pairs. Adding that criterion 
means the choice model, instead of answering the question: this cellmate association or 
not, will answer the question: this kind of cellmate association or not? 
In a criminological framework, differentiating characteristics of cellmate 
associations might be the characteristics of each pair that reflect their collective 
criminality or their collective criminal experience (e.g., their relative criminality). 
However, the discussion of the extant criminological literature in Chapter 2 indicated 
that, in this primary investigation into prison peer effects, the initial differentiating 
characteristic of cellmate associations should be their duration.  
That duration of cellmate associations should be explored first is necessitated by 
the uncertainty regarding when prison peer effects can be expected to emerge from 
cellmate associations and for long they might remain detectable. Expectations about how 
much time it will take for prison peer effects to emerge and whether they might remain 
detectable can be made based on previous criminological research. Previous 
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criminological research suggests that prison peer effects will vary with the duration of 
cellmate associations and their timing within releasees’ prison stays, such that social 
interaction effects amongst cellmates may take some time to become detectable before 
peaking and then dwindling a bit as the releasees approach their release dates (Clemmer, 
1940, Wheeler, 1961, Glaser & Stratton, 1961).  
While the prediction that prison peer effects will relate nonlinearly to duration 
comports with balance theory (McGloin, 2009), it conflicts with differential association 
theory’s prediction of a universally increasing relationship between duration of 
association and evidence of peer influence (Sutherland, 1947; Warr, 1993). Nonetheless, 
the parabolic curve that has been attributed to prisonization is the best available prior 
criminological research upon which to base expectations regarding prison peer effects 
because prisonization itself is expected to occur through inmate social interactions and 
cellmates are the inmates expected to exert the most social influence on releasees 
(Clemmer, 1940, 1950; Wheeler, 1961; Wellford, 1967; Gold & Osgood, 1992).  
Incorporating the duration of cellmate association into the current model yields 
the following adaptation: 
Reoffending = A + B(Time with cellmate) + C(Criminality) + 
D(Time with cellmate*Criminality) + E     [5] 
 
The preceding choice model and its resultant outcomes can now be adapted to a 
two-stage local instrumental variables framework. 
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Adaptation of the Criminological Roy Model to the Local Instrumental Variables 
Framework  
Most modern criminological studies of peer influence are longitudinal in that they 
compare the behavior of individuals and their peers in the current time period with 
individual and peer behavior in one or more prior time periods (e.g., Haynie, 2001; 
Haynie & Osgood, 2005; Haynie et al., 2005; McGloin & Shermer, 2009). Although prior 
peer behavior is essentially a decision to engage in antisocial behavior, most studies of 
peer influence do not attempt to explain the prior decision to engage in antisocial 
behavior. Instead, the prior peer behavior, which is expected to influence future behavior 
in the framework of a Roy (1951) model, is taken at face value and used to estimate 
individual outcomes via ordinary multiple regression methods. 
As researchers who have implemented instrumental variables strategies to 
estimate social interaction effects have demonstrated, the failure to explicitly characterize 
the prior behavior misses an opportunity for causal inference because unobserved 
heterogeneity is likely to bias estimates from simple multiple regression analyses of Roy 
models, whereas two-stage frameworks can control for unobserved heterogeneity (e.g., 
Heckman, 1976; Imbens & Angrist, 1994; Fletcher, 2009, 2012; Imbens, 2009; Bushway 
& Apel, 2010). In the context of essential heterogeneity, which is likely to permeate most 
social interaction effect studies, that missed opportunity becomes even more salient 
because there are likely to be two sources of bias to combat: bias due to unobserved 
heterogeneity and bias due to essential heterogeneity (Heckman et al., 2006). Estimates 
from instrumental variables techniques like two-stage least squares may still be subject to 
bias due to essential heterogeneity, as was discussed in Chapter 3.  
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If prison peer effects are to be identified independent of bias due to essential 
heterogeneity as well as bias due to unobserved heterogeneity, the Roy (1951) model 
presented in [5] must be adapted to a two-stage framework in which the formation of the 
cellmate relationship is modeled and the choice of instrument does not impact the 
external validity of the estimates (Heckman et al., 2006; Basu et al., 2007; Heckman & 
Urzua, 2010). The two-stage framework employed in the current study is the local 
instrumental variables framework of Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005). 
The first stage. As previously discussed, the current study is limited in that it 
cannot model the formation of the releasee-cellmate association: that association is taken 
for granted in the dyadic structure of the data. However, the duration that differentiates 
releasee-cellmate associations is not taken for granted. The current study can, therefore, 
model a first-stage that predicts a dichotomous choice regarding the persistence of prison 
peer relationships. Whether a cellmate association persists long enough to meet a 
particular threshold of time (e.g., 180 days) or falls short of it is, therefore, the choice of 
interest in the current criminological Roy (1951) model that becomes the first-stage 
equation in the LIV framework.  
As Clemmer (1940, p. 302) noted, “The speed at which prisonization occurs 
depends on the personality of the man involved, his crime, age, home neighborhood, 
intelligence, the situation into which he is placed in prison, and other less obvious 
influences.” Criminological theory, therefore, supports the use of demographic, criminal 
history, institutional, and prison peer variables, as described in Chapter 6 and Chapter 8, 
to how long cellmate associations last and the degree to which they engender reoffending 
(i.e., the choice and outcome models). From the first-stage duration threshold choice 
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model, the probability that a releasee will be celled with a cellmate for at least a 
particular number of days or not can be predicted.  
Time with cellmate =A + B(Instruments)  + C(Criminality) +  
D(All other variables) + E       [6] 
 
As indicated by [6] and described in the preceding chapter, the LIV 
implementation requires one or more exclusion restrictions or instrumental variables, the 
choice of which is discussed and validated in Chapter 8. 
The second stage. In the local instrumental variables framework of Heckman and 
Vytlacil (1999, 2005), the predicted probability of being celled with a cellmate for a 
particular amount of time (i.e., the propensity score) serves as the independent variable in 
the second-stage outcome model. This second-stage outcome model identifies causal 
prison peer effects with respect to the releasee’s reoffending outcomes.  
Reoffending = A + B(Probability of time with cellmate) + 
C(All other variables) + 
D(Probability of time with cellmate*All other variables) +  
F(Potential polynomial terms) + E      [7] 
 
Through the outcome model, interactions between releasee and cellmate 
criminality and criminal experience measures can be explored to see if, for example, the 
relative distance between the criminality and criminal experience of the releasee and his 
cellmate matter in the production of rearrest or more general reoffending, as predicted by 
McGloin (2009). The intricacies of the model and the means of exploring the influence of 
prison peer effects through it will be described in more detail in Chapters 7, 8, and 9.  
A note on interpretation. The construction of the current LIV implementation 
presents a bit of a problem for terminology. Strictly speaking, the marginal and average 
treatment effects identified through the LIV model reference the duration of cellmate 
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association. While discerning whether and when treatment effects due to duration emerge 
is an important aspect of this study, it is not the primary question of interest. The primary 
question of interest is whether or not prison peer effects emerge through cellmate 
associations. As described in Chapter 2, prison peer effects are expected to emerge 
through the interaction of releasee and cellmate criminal experience and criminality 
characteristics (i.e., social interaction variables), the measures of which are discussed 
below and in Chapter 6. Although the treatment effects identified by the LIV model will 
necessarily be discussed first because they are expected to indicate when during prison 
stays prison peer effects will emerge, the goal of the current study is to identifying prison 
peer effects, which can be attributed to the social interaction variables described below.  
Prison Peer Effect Questions to Be Answered through the Current Study 
Through the application of criminological theory to the local instrumental 
variables method described in the previous chapter, the current chapter, and in Chapter 9, 
the current study will causally identify prison peer effects. This analysis will take place in 
two stages, through which several questions will be addressed.  
1. Identify duration thresholds wherein prison peer effects might be detected. 
a. Do prison peer effects vary with the duration of cellmate association? 
b. When do cellmate associations begin to produce detectable prison peer 
effects?  
c. For how long do cellmate associations continue to produce detectable 
prison peer effects? (That is, do prison peer effects persist?) 
d. Does the relationship between prison peer effects and duration of cellmate 
association follow a parabolic pattern, as the relationship between 
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prisonization and time served has been shown to do, and as balance theory 
seems to imply? 
2. When those promising duration thresholds are identified, explore each of them to 
examine whether social interactions between cellmates produce criminogenic 
prison peer effects. 
a. Do releasees celled with cellmates with prior incarceration records commit 
more crimes after their release than releasees who are celled with 
cellmates who have not been incarcerated previously? 
b. Do releasees celled with cellmates who have more extensive arrest records 
commit more crimes after their release than releasees who were celled 
with cellmates who have less extensive arrest records? 
c. Do releasees celled with cellmates who have a higher risk of recidivating 
commit more crimes after their release than releasees who were celled 
with cellmates who have a lower risk of recidivating? 
The primary questions of interest are those answered by exploring whether the 
criminal experience and criminality characteristics of the cellmates (i.e., prior 
incarceration, prior arrest, and recidivism risk) produce discernible prison peer effects on 
releasees’ recidivism outcomes. Before the presence of those effects can be discerned, 
however, it is necessary to determine where (in time) to look for them.  
Key Variables and Their Operationalizations 
 To answer the questions enumerated in the preceding section, the following 
operationalizations have been made. Those operationalizations comport with the celling 
decision process described above and in Chapter 5, adhere to the theoretical framework 
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and the analytical model described in Chapters 2 and 3, and work within the limitations 
of the data.  
Outcome variables. The main outcome variable is a dichotomous indicator of 
whether a releasee was rearrested for any crime within four years after his release. Prison 
effects are generally measured at three to five years post-release. A four-year follow-up 
period is, therefore, necessary to evaluate the hypothesis that interactions with prisons 
peers can account for criminogenic prison effects. While criminological learning theories 
do not make strong predictions about whether peer effects can endure for several years, 
the developmental literature does. Following that literature, prison peer effects are 
theorized to persist in the post-release period via cascading processes, as described in 
Chapter 2 (Masten et al., 2005; Dishion et al., 2010).  
In addition to the rearrest measure, an additional reoffending measure was derived 
from the data. The second reoffending measure, termed a recidivism measure, includes 
both rearrest and reincarceration without rearrest. To the best of the ability of the data, 
the recidivism measure reflects whether a releasee reoffended because the recidivism 
measure captures reoffending in terms of whether a releasee experienced either criminal 
justice sanction that is observable in the current data during the four-year follow-up.  
Both the rearrest and the recidivism measures necessarily include the agency of 
the criminal justice system, which must detect the individual behavior that instigates the 
recording of a rearrest or reincarceration event. This means that the reoffending measures 
are inseparable conglomerates of offender behavior and the behavior of the criminal 
justice system. The implications of this duality for the estimation of peer effects are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 10. 
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Relative to reconviction or reincarceration, rearrest has traditionally been 
considered the best indicator of reoffending because it reflects the fewest successive steps 
taken by the criminal justice system. In the domain of official recidivism measures, 
rearrest is, therefore, considered to be the clearest indicator that an action prohibited by 
the state was undertaken or an action proscribed by the state was not (Maltz, 1984; 
Thornberry & Krohn, 2000; Gaes, et al., 2004; Nagin et al., 2009). However, according to 
the cross-tabulations in Table 1, 18% of releasees who have been reincarcerated appear 
not to have been rearrested during the four-year follow-up (n=877). Releasees who were 
reincarcerated without being rearrested are likeliest to have violated their parole in some 
way, although some arrests that resulted in reincarceration may have gone unrecorded by 
the Pennsylvania State Police (i.e., there could be measurement error).  
Parole violations may be a result of new criminal offenses or they may be a result 
of failures to comply with the provisions of parole (Petersilia, 2003; Grattet et al., 2009-
2011; Maruschak & Bonczar, 2013). During the most recent years for which the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics collected data (2012), 82% of parolees were on “active status,” 
meaning they needed to maintain regular contact with their parole officers (Maruschak & 
Bonczar, 2013). Accordingly, absconding, which means that the parolee’s whereabouts 
are unknown for a period of time, is common with approximately 10% of parolees 
absconding in any given year. Also common are revocations for failed drug tests, with as 
many as 16% of parolees in a sample being revoked for failing drug tests (Bonczar, 2008; 
Maruschak & Bonczar, 2013). These numbers and recent reentry research suggest that the 
most common technical reasons for revocation (i.e., reincarceration) without rearrest are 
likely to be drug test failures and absconding (Harding, Morenoff, & Herbert, 2013). 
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However, recent work by Grattet and his colleagues (2009, 2011) also suggests that 
parole revocations without rearrest have become increasingly common and may be a 
result of more serious criminal offenses.  
With the current combined PADOC and PSP data, it is impossible to know 
whether the individuals who were reincarcerated without being rearrested had committed 
new crimes or technically violated their parole. However, even technical parole violations 
are reflective of forms of behavior prohibited by the state. As such, they reflect outcomes 
similar to criminal behavior that can be sanctioned with arrest. Drug use, in particular, 
remains illegal in Pennsylvania. Releasees who engage in drug use, therefore, commit 
crimes. Moreover, the argument can be made that absconding is a reasonable measure of 
reoffending because it is essentially the opposite of trespassing or violating a restraining 
order: instead of being somewhere prohibited, a parolee who absconds fails to be 
somewhere proscribed.  
The recidivism outcome variable, better than the rearrest outcome variable, 
differentiates those who appear to have had no formal contact with the criminal justice 
system from those who have had some form of contact with the criminal justice system. 
Conceptually, releasees who have had continued involvement with the criminal justice 
system are objectively different than releasees who have had no observed interaction with 
the criminal justice system for the simple reason that the former have engaged in 
behavior that has resulted in a sanction, while the latter have not. It is, therefore, prudent 
to create an additional outcome measure to delineate releasees who have evidence of any 
reoffending (rearrest or reincarceration without arrest) from those who have no evidence 
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of it, in addition to the traditionally accept rearrest measure (e.g., Maltz, 1984; 
Thornberry & Krohn, 2000; Gaes et al., 2004; Nagin et al., 2009).  
 
*** [Table 1 here] *** 
 
Social interaction variables. Per McGloin’s (2009) balance theory and 
Sutherland’s (1947) differential association theory, a releasee’s own criminal experience 
is likely to moderate the prison peer effects generated by the criminal experience of his 
cellmate. The inmates’ criminal experience and criminality varies by prior incarceration 
(cellmates only), prior arrests, and recidivism risk, as measured by a derivative risk score 
based on PADOC’s Risk Screening Tool. These main social interaction variables are the 
characteristics through which prison peer effects are expected to operate. They are 
created to reflect levels of and the relative distance between inmate criminal experience 
and criminality, which can be interacted in the LIV model.  
While these social interaction and outcome variable operationalizations are 
consistent with the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2 and the variable 
definitions, as presented in Chapter 6, they are not entirely consistent with differential 
association theory, upon which prisonization and balance theories are based, because 
differential association theory expects definitions or attitudes to be the key means through 
which criminality is developed (Sutherland, 1947; Matsueda, 1988). For example, 
although PADOC uses the risk score generated by the RST as a measure of criminality 
(i.e., risk of recidivism or the proclivity to reoffend), it includes none of the attitudinal or 
perceptual information included in other actuarial measures of criminality, such as the 
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LSI-R (Andrews & Bonta, 2000). Similarly, prior incarceration and prior arrest are 
behavioral measures thought to be indicative of an offender’s level of criminality, but 
they do not measure definitions, rationalization, motives or attitudes. Moreover, because 
they are official measures, they reflect the behavior of criminal justice system actors in 
addition to the behavior of the individual inmates under study.  
Although it would be advantageous to have attitudinal treatment measures, they 
simply are not available in the current PADOC sample, as described in Chapter 6.13 This 
is a minor limitation for at least two reasons. First, while criminological theory motivates 
it, the current study does not attempt to test criminological theory. The purpose of this 
study is to determine whether cellmates exert prison peer effects on releasees. For that 
purpose, behavioral treatment and outcome measures are likely to outperform attitudinal 
measures because, in non-incarcerative environments, peers’ attitudes toward delinquent 
behavior have been shown to have less influence on behavior than peers’ behaviors do 
(Warr & Stafford, 1991; Pratt et al. 2010). Second, the association between inmates’ 
behaviors and their attitudes may be less relevant than criminological learning theories 
presume. In the context of incarceration, Wellford (1973) employed a peer nomination 
strategy similar to that used in the AddHealth study to examine the relationship between 
inmates’ degrees of prisonization (i.e., adherence to prison social norms) and their social 
involvement (i.e., clique member or isolate) with other inmates. He found no relationship 
between the two and concluded that “[t]here is a significant body of research that 
                                                 
13
 The LSI-R, which PADOC uses, does include attitudinal measures, but the LSI-R data are too incomplete 
for the current sample to be included in the operationalization. Future work may be able to exploit more 
complete LSI-R data to execute a better test of differential association theory.  
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suggests that the relationship between subjective orientation and behavior is not as 
relevant an association as we have theorized, except in orientational extremes” (p. 115, 
emphasis added).  
 
Duration: detecting and moderating treatment effects. As has been previously 
discussed, the duration of cellmate association may delineate the emergence, persistence, 
and subsidence of prison peer effects. Duration may also moderate prison peer effects. 
After they emerge, whether prison peer effects will continuously build, as predicted by 
differential association theory (Sutherland, 1947; Warr, 1993), be subject to diminishing 
marginal returns, or have a parabolic shape, as is implied by balance theory (McGloin, 
2009) is unclear. Moreover, as suggested by the empirical prisonization literature, the 
effect of prison peers may be overwhelmed by anticipatory socializat ion to prosocial 
influences (Merton, 1957) as inmates near their release dates (Wheeler, 1961; Glaser & 
Stratton, 1961; Wellford, 1967).  
Prior criminological research provides guidance regarding how long it might take 
for prison peer effects to emerge, peak, and later subside. Although that guidance rests on 
evidence that includes only three studies that were undertaken fifty years ago, each of 
those three studies reported similar findings with respect to the evolution of prisonization 
(Wheeler, 1961; Garabedian, 1963; Wellford, 1967). Wheeler (1961), Garabedian (1963), 
and Wellford (1967) found only minimal evidence of prisonization after inmates had 
been incarcerated for six to nine months. After (on average and approximately) one and a 
half to two years of incarceration, prisonization appeared strongest, then decreased again 
as inmates approached their release dates (Wheeler, 1961; Wellford, 1967). The six-
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month duration of relationship threshold might, therefore, be particularly important, as 
might the nine-month threshold that Wellford (1967) examined. However, duration is 
also expected to moderate prison peer effects, not just to delineate where they might be 
detected. It is, therefore, worthwhile to consider how duration is measured and what that 
measurement implies with respect to the analytic framework.  
As described in Chapter 6, duration with cellmates is measured in days. In 
interaction with cellmate characteristics, a daily measure of duration implies that each 
additional day exerts an effect that might be positive, subject to diminishing marginal 
returns, or negative depending on how prison peer effects evolve over time. Moreover, 
that moderating effect of duration would likely be very small, so small that it might be 
undetectable with current statistical methods.  
To have a better chance of detecting duration effects it is, therefore, prudent to 
initially consider whether larger blocks of time spent with cellmates have the potential to 
impact releasees’ rearrest outcomes. By first exploring larger blocks of time, it can be 
determined whether smaller blocks can or should be delineated later. If effects are not 
discernible within these larger blocks, which include larger sample sizes, it is unlikely 
that they will be discernible (or credible) within smaller blocks that include less robust 
sample sizes. Given that prisonization did not seem to emerge until inmates had been in 
prison for about a year, and given that PADOC releasees encounter their most stable 
cellmates around that time, it seems reasonable to begin to examine monthly (30-day) 
increments to determine whether or not prison peer effects among stable cellmates are an 
emergent phenomenon and how they evolve (e.g., linearly or nonlinearly) as those 
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associations persist through time. That is, it may be possible to more precisely determine 
the zenith of prisonization as a result of prison peer interactions.  
Criminological Theory Cannot Be Tested Via This Framework 
Criminological theory informs the analysis that will be undertaken in the current 
study. However, as the previous enumeration of the questions to be explored through this 
study indicates, the current analysis cannot formally test the criminological theories upon 
which it is primarily based. Matsueda (1988, p. 285) referred to “definitions of law 
violation” (i.e., criminal attitudes, rationalizations, and motives) as “the crucial variable” 
in differential association theory. The current study cannot formally test differential 
association for the simple reason that attitudinal measures that reflect this crucial variable 
are not available in the administrative data collected from PADOC. Only behavioral 
measures that must be assumed to reflect those attitudes are available. The current study, 
therefore, adopts the hypothesis that more criminally experienced cellmates are more 
likely than less criminally experienced cellmates to excite more criminality in releasees 
(Warr & Stafford, 1991). While, as Matsueda (1988, p. 285) also pointed out, “some 
definitions favoring law violation are learned from nondelinquents and some definitions 
favoring conformity are learned from delinquents,” the precedent for adopting this view 
of the transfer of criminality, as measured by behavior, from more to less experienced 
criminals abounds, both in the literature prior to Matsueda’s (1988) analysis and in the 
literature that followed it (e.g., Warr & Stafford, 1991; Pratt et al., 2010). The current 
study also recognizes, however, that the reverse process (i.e., interactions with less 
criminal cellmates are likely to yield crimino-suppressive effects) is also a possibility 
(McGloin, 2009).  
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McGloin’s (2009) balance theory has also motivated the current analysis. Again, 
unfortunately, the data as currently constructed do not support a strict test of her theory. 
Post-prison outcomes were not available for more than 40% of the cellmates in the 
sample. Relative outcomes that measure changes in pre and post prison criminal behavior 
between releasee and cellmate pairs cannot, therefore, be constructed. While a specialized 
sample of releasees and cellmates who have been released can be constructed to support 
future work, an assessment of balance theory is beyond the scope of the current study.  
In Summary  
The Roy (1951) model provides a useful framework in which to consider the 
impact of decisions on outcomes. The current decision under study is whether to cell two 
inmates together for a particular period of time. That decision is expected, over time and 
through the interaction of the two inmates celled together, to generate prison peer effects 
that persist for several years post-release.  
The decision to cell two inmates together is predicted by criminological theory to 
be subject to essential heterogeneity: unobserved aspects of the cellmate assignment 
decision-making process may affect both celling decisions and their outcomes. The local 
instrumental variables framework (Heckman & Vytlacil, 1999. 2005) is an extension of 
the Roy (1951) model that can be employed to eliminate bias due to essential 
heterogeneity.  
While criminological theory motivates this study in that it predicts that more 
criminally experienced cellmates with more criminality will exert criminogenic prison 
peer effects (Sutherland, 1947) on relatively less criminal inmates and vice versa 
(McGloin, 2009), the current study cannot explicitly test those theories. Prison peer 
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CHAPTER 5: The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Prison Context 
This chapter describes the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections prison system. 
It includes an overview of the facilities and an outline of a typical day in the life of a 
PADOC prisoner. The paths taken by the 2006-2007 first time release cohort through the 
system are described, including an overview of the process correctional officers use to 
assign inmates to cells and a description of the means through which PADOC inmates 
may choose their own cellmates.  
The structural and facility level data in this chapter come from a variety of 
sources. State audits of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections are available from 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s website. Monthly population reports from January 
2000 forward can be downloaded from the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 
website, as can documents detailing PADOC policies on topics ranging from inmate 
abuse to inmate safety. Additionally, Bret Bucklen and Nikki Bell in the Office of 
Planning, Research, and Statistics at the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 
provided special request data on the location, structure, and operational programming of 
each of the state correctional institutes (SCIs).  
With respect to facility operations, particularly cell assignments, no current 
publicly available literature describes the process that correctional officers use to assign 
inmates to cells, either in the PADOC system or any other prison system. To begin to 
understand that process, a survey was distributed through PADOC’s Office of Research, 
Planning, and Statistics to each of the twenty-seven PADOC SCIs in operation in 
September of 2012. That bed assignment survey, which appears with its results in the 
appendix associated with this chapter, asked the correctional officers in charge of making 
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bed assignments to list the factors they use to determine who to cell with whom, to 
describe the cell assignment process, and also to provide copies of any written procedures 
they use to guide that process. The survey asked about both initial placements (assigning 
cells to inmates who are arriving at the institution) and within-facility moves. Unit 
managers at twenty-six of the twenty-seven facilities responded to the survey. While 
some provided demographic data on their populations, none of them supplied the 
requested written procedures, which suggests that none exist.   
The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Prison System 
Pennsylvania operates the one of the largest state prison systems in the United 
States. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, Pennsylvania housed 36,847 inmates 
at year’s end in 2000. By the end of 2008, when PADOC housed 49,215 prisoners, the 
PADOC system had grown from the 9th largest in the United States in terms of number of 
prisoners to the 7th largest (West, 2010). 
Currently the PADOC prison system consists of twenty-six facilities that are 
distributed throughout the state with multiple facilities in some counties. (See Figure 1.) 
However, between 2000 and 2007, the time period of the current study, the structure of 
the prison system differed slightly. In January 2000 Pennsylvania operated twenty-five 
facilities. During the period in which the releasees were housed in the PADOC system, 
twenty-seven facilities were operational for at least some of the time. Of those twenty-
seven facilities, twenty-five housed men, while two housed women. For reasons 
described below, the current study excludes women, whose prison contextual 




*** [Table 2 here] *** 
 
A majority (ten) of the 2000-2007 PADOC facilities that housed men are 
designated as medium security facilities or have a dual designation that includes medium, 
such as minimum-medium (two additional facilities) and medium-maximum (one 
additional facility). Of the remaining facilities, three are designated as close (i.e., between 
medium and maximum), six are designated as maximum, and one (the voluntary boot 
camp at SCI-Quehanna) is minimum security. Table 2 lists the PADOC SCIs and their 
characteristics.  
Some of Pennsylvania’s state correctional institutes have specified secondary 
purposes (their primary purpose being confinement) and have therefore been customized 
for particular populations. The maximum security institution at SCI-Pine Grove, for 
example, houses and treats mainly young adult offenders. Similarly, the medium security 
institutions at SCI-Chester, SCI-Laurel Highlands, and SCI-Mercer respectively have 
facilities and programs customized to inmates with substance abuse problems, geriatric 
and mentally ill inmates, and inmates within twenty-four months of their exit dates.   
 
*** [Figure 1 here] *** 
 
The sizes of the populations housed at PADOC facilities vary considerably. 
Individually, smaller facilities house between 300 and 1000 inmates, whereas larger 
facilities house several thousand. The capacity of the prison system was expanded 
between January 2000 and December 2007, as single cells were converted into double 
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cells (e.g., at SCI-Retreat) and facilities were built to accommodate the growing 
population of prisoners in Pennsylvania. Nevertheless, capacity constraints remained a 
problem throughout the 2000 to 2007 period during which the first-time releasees were in 
PADOC custody.  
According to the monthly population reports available on the PADOC website, 
7,957 beds were added to the PADOC facilities that house men, 3,890 between January 
2000 and December 2003 and 4,067 between December 2003 and December 2007.  
Despite this non-negligible capacity increase of 20% over seven years, most of the 
facilities continuously operated beyond their capacities. In January 2000, only four 
facilities were operating at or below capacity. In fact, the system as a whole was 
operating at 143% of its capacity. Ten facilities operated at 150% of their capacity or 
more, with some facilities housing almost double the number of inmates they were 
intended to house (e.g., SCI-Rockview and SCI-Smithfield). From a system-wide 
perspective, the situation became somewhat less dire by December 2003 when the system 
operated at 122% percent of capacity. Still seven facilities were operating at greater than 
150% capacity and only five facilities were operating at or below their capacity. By 
December 2007, nearly all facilities continued to operate above capacity. While the 
system wide overages declined to 111% above capacity, only five facilities operated at or 
below their capacities. Nevertheless, those overages were 110-120% in 2007, as opposed 
to 140-200%, which they were in 2000.  
General population housing units held 81% of the beds across the PADOC system 
in 2000 and expanded through 2007 to encompass 90% of all PADOC beds. In addition 
to general population housing units, some units are dedicated to programming (e.g., 
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therapeutic communities, typically for substance abuse, but also for sex offenders), while 
some units are dedicated to control or punishment (e.g., restricted housing units, 
diagnostic and classification units), and still other units are dedicated to providing basic 
services (e.g., infirmary, mental health, and special needs units). There is some variation 
across institutions with respect to the volume of inmates the general population and 
specialized units can hold. Not all institutions have each of the units.  
Each of the SCIs in the PADOC system offers some programming meant to 
address the needs of offenders. While each SCI offers a different mix of specific 
programs, similar kinds of programs that address similar needs of offenders operate 
throughout the system. For example, there are programs to treat sex offenders, to address 
the alcohol and substance abuse problems offenders may have, to curb violence, and to 
encourage thoughtful reflection and decision making through cognitive behavioral 
therapy. Additionally, as Figure 1 shows, fifteen of the male SCIs have prison industries 
that are not commissary distribution centers. There are metal, wood, and print shops, 
laundry facilities, and industries that produce mattresses, optics, textiles, and soap.  
According to PADOC’s monthly population reports, less than 0.3% of the inmates 
in male PADOC facilities are in the infirmary (about 120 male inmates in all facilities) at 
any given time. A similar number of inmates are housed in beds specifically for the 
mentally ill. Far more inmates are housed in therapeutic communities (n~1,500), on 
special needs units (n~1,500), and in administrative (n~750) or disciplinary custody 
(n~1600) at any given time. The special needs populations are not evenly distributed 
across the SCIs. At some facilities, services for inmates with special needs dominate. For 
example, over the study period about half of SCI-Chester’s population participated in 
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therapeutic communities. In general, inmates housed in mental health or special needs 
units make up at most 10% of the facilities’ populations (e.g., at SCI-Pittsburgh, SCI-
Laurel Highlands, and SCI- Waymart).  
Movement of Releasees through the PADOC Facilities 
Based on their bed assignments, the 2006-2007 first-time release cohort 
(n=10,131) entered into the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections system mainly 
through two facilities, SCI-Camp Hill (32.05%, n=3,247) or SCI-Graterford (44.31%, 
n=4,489).14 Upon entry into the PADOC system, first-time admits must be evaluated and 
classified. The evaluation process unfolds at PADOC’s centralized diagnostic and 
classification center, which is located at the facility at Camp Hill, a city across the 
Susquehanna River from Pennsylvania’s capital city of Harrisburg. Releasees who were 
initially housed in SCI-Graterford, which is 35 miles from Philadelphia, were typically 
convicted in Philadelphia and held at SCI-Graterford while awaiting transfer to SCI-
Camp Hill, which is generally at capacity. Therefore, initial assignments to facilities at 
SCI-Graterford and SCI-Camp Hill are part of the initial classification process.  
During the diagnostic and classification process, inmates are medically, mentally, 
and psychologically evaluated. According to PADOC policy, inmates are assigned a 
custody level within five days. Custody levels, which range in ascending order of 
                                                 
14
 According to PADOC policy, any SCI can receive inmates, who will then be transferred to SCI-Camp 
Hill. In practice, about a quarter of the releasees entered the PADOC system in this manner. SCI-
Pittsburgh, the western intake facility, received 9.70% (n=983) inmates. SCI-Albion received 6.56% 
(n=665) inmates. SCI-Greene received 7.34% (n=744) inmates. Laurel Highlands and Waymart received 
two releasees and one releasee, respectively. Although SCI-Pittsburgh is the western intake facility, less 
than 10% of the releasees entered the PADOC system through that institution. That may be because SCI-
Pittsburgh was closed from January 2005 until July 2007, during which time many of the first -time 
releasees were received. 
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seriousness from one to five, reflect the potential for an inmate to pose custodial 
challenges. An inmate’s custody level helps to determine the facility to which he will be 
permanently assigned and the kind of work he is cleared to do (e.g., custody level two 
inmates can be assigned outside work). Included in the evaluation are assessments about 
whether inmates are particularly assaultive, suicidal, pose an escape risk, or are in need of 
separation from all or only particular inmates. Inmates are also introduced to institutional 
life at SCI-Camp Hill. They receive information about the prison system, prison policies, 
the services available to them, and their rights and responsibilities (PADOC, 2011).  
Whether they began their stays there or not, nearly all of the releasees spent at 
least some of their prison stays at SCI-Camp Hill; only fifteen of the 10,131 first-time 
releasees do not have at least one recorded stretch in a double cell at SCI-Camp Hill.15  
Of the 6,884 inmates who did not begin their stay at SCI-Camp Hill, 6,864 were 
transferred there after being received at another facility (i.e., SCI-Camp Hill was the 
second facility to which they were assigned). The releasees spent on average 136.4 
(SD=169.1) days in the initial classification process, with the modal time spent in that 
process being 94 days or about three months. For comparison, the average first-time 
releasee’s prison stay lasted just over 2 years, at 27.8 (SD=18.5) months or 847.3 days, 
with the modal stay being 22 months (663 days). Thus, the process of initial 
classification, assignment to a permanent facility, and movement to that permanent 
                                                 
15
 Twelve of these fifteen appear to have filtered from SCI-Graterford into other facilities. The other three 
appear to have entered either directly or via other SCIs into SCI-Laurel Highlands, which is a special needs 
facility.   
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facility takes about three months and consumes about one-eighth of a typical releasee’s 
prison stay. 
According to PADOC policy, inmates are assigned to facilities based on their 
custody level, program needs, separations, behavior at SCI-Camp Hill, and bed space. 
Most releasees stayed in two (27.03%) or three (55.68%) facilities, including the initial 
classification facility. Twelve percent (n=1,271) of the releasees stayed in four or more 
facilities including those at Camp Hill and Graterford, with the maximum number of 
facilities per releasee being one releasee who stayed in eleven different SCIs. Less than 
five percent of the releasees stayed in more than four SCIs, including SCI-Graterford and 
SCI-Camp Hill. Each of the 27 facilities operating during the 2000-2007 period housed at 
least some of the releasees. Beyond initial classification, the SCIs at Houtzdale, Forest, 
Mahanoy, Somerset, Chester, Coal Township, Albion, Rockview, and Dallas housed the 
most 2006-2007 first-time PADOC releasees.16 
Inmates’ custody levels should play a large role in determining the level of 
facility to which they are assigned. Custody level two inmates should dominate in 
security level two facilities; custody level three inmates should dominate in security level 
three facilities; and so on such that inmate custody and facility security levels should be 
                                                 
16
 The releasees who appeared to stay in only diagnostic and classification facilities (n=523) may be 
missing subsequent bed assignments, may have had short mins, or may have been housed only in 
dormitories after SCI-Camp Hill. To try to understand which (if any) of these scenarios might dominate, 
these releasees’ stays and their stretches relative to their stays (i.e., bed coverage) was examined. No clear 
patterns emerged. There were inmates with short stays and long stays, ranging from 1 to about 81 months 
(mean=20 months). Additionally for these inmates, coverage in terms of the amount of the stay accounted 
for in stretches in double cells ranged from about 18% to about 100%, with high mean (~90%) coverage. 
Therefore, some inmates do appear to stay at SCI-Camp Hill for their entire stay. Discerning why is not 
possible with these data. In addition, there is variability in coverage with respect to double cells. Some 
inmates may have been assigned to dormitories or the RHU in facilities not SCI-Camp Hill or SCI-
Graterford. Finally, there are inmates with short stays who spend them in diagnostics.  
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highly correlated. However, in practice, there is considerable mixing of inmates with 
differing custody levels across facilities of differing security levels. For all bed 
assignments, the correlation between facility security levels and inmate custody levels for 
releasees is only =0.22, indicating a weak correlation. The correlation, =0.24, is 
similarly weak for cellmates. This weak correlation is likely to due to the fact that 
inmates generally remain in the same facility even as their custody levels change based 
on their behavior, with custody levels rising with misconduct, and falling with continued 
good behavior.  
A potential explanation for why inmates stay in the permanent facilities to which 
they are initially assigned is because transfers seem to require considerable administrative 
overhead. According to PADOC policy, correctional officers wishing to transfer inmates 
to another facility must submit a transfer petition that justifies the move. Justifications 
may include problems adjusting to the facility (“negative adjustment”) as evidence by 
bad behavior, medical issues that require services available only at another facility, and 
other special needs that arise. Additionally, PADOC policy allows incentive-based 
transfers, whereby inmates can be transferred to more desirable facilities (e.g., closer to 
home, lower security level) as a reward for good behavior or what is called “positive 
adjustment.” Conversely, “demotional transfers” can result from negative adjustment 
(Adams, 1992; Toch & Adams, 2002; PADOC, 2011).  
 




Once assigned to a permanent facility, inmates typically shuffle between sections, 
which are akin to units, in that facility. On average, the releasees lived in 7.7 (SD=3.7) 
different sections. This implies that, across the PADOC system, inmates live in three or 
four sections within a facility during their stay. According to a unit manager at SCI-
Dallas, this shuffling to different sections often happens because units and buildings have 
different cultures and some inmates prefer one culture to another. For example, SCI-
Dallas, which was built in the 1960s, went through an expansion in the 1980s. During 
that expansion cellblocks J and K were added to the facility. On those cellblocks, the 
cells are closer together and the walls are thinner, so noise travels more freely throughout 
them. As a result, those blocks tend toward rowdiness. According to the aforementioned 
unit manager, younger inmates prefer the newer blocks, whereas older inmates prefer 
block B, which is smaller and also quieter, or block A, which is smaller still and, due its 
proximity to the main office, even more staid than block B (personal communication, 
2013).  
The observation regarding the culture of the blocks at SCI-Dallas is testable with 
the current data to the extent that misconducts are indicative of rowdiness. During the 
period from January 1, 2000 through December 31, 2007 there were 15,782 misconducts 
recorded at SCI-Dallas. Almost 9,000 of those misconducts took place either in cells or 
on cellblocks. 3,386 of those misconducts took place in cells or the common areas of A, 
B, J, and K blocks. In absolute terms, the number of misconducts was nearly identical on 
blocks A and B (n=1,669) to the number of misconducts on blocks J and K (n=1,717). 
However, blocks A and B hold more beds (n=386) than do blocks J and K (n=317). 
Nevertheless, assuming equal variance, the rate of misconducts per bed on blocks A and 
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B over the seven-year period under examination (4.32) was not significantly different (t=-
0.263) from the rate of misconducts per bed on blocks J and K during that time (5.47). 
The observation regarding the age of the inmates on the different blocks at SCI-Dallas is 
directly testable with the current data. It, too, is unsupported. While the releasees are 
slightly older on blocks A and B than they are on blocks J and K (33.0 vs. 32.3 years of 
age, on average), their cellmates are on blocks J and K are older than they are on blocks 
A and B (38.2 vs. 36.7 years of age on average).17  
This inability to differentiate between sections based on age or misconducts, 
suggests that, while the blocks may have different cultures by a measure other than the 
rate of misconducts, the characteristics of the inmates on those blocks may not be good 
indicators of those cultures. That is, the observable data does not differentiate culture. It 
may simply be that some people, regardless of age or race or any other observable 
characteristic, prefer less rowdy environments. With respect to controlling for the 
potential for different sections to have different cultures that impact reoffending, 
contextual fixed effects at the building and section levels may, therefore, be more 
effective than aggregate individual characteristics. 
 Whether cellblock cultures influence the shuffling of releasees through sections or 
not, the releasees also change cells often. On average, the releasees lived in 14.2 
(SD=10.1) double cells during their first-time prison stays. Given that the modal releasee 
                                                 
17
 A unit manager at SCI-Pittsburgh made a similar observation regarding block cultures. It was suggested 
that the longer-term (browns) inmates in F-block are more invested in the cleanliness of their block and in 
keeping things quiet there, while the shorter-term (blues) inmates in C-block are rowdier. Further, F-block 
has some single cells, whereas C-block has only double cells, which suggests that F-block will be quieter 
because there are fewer inmates. 
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prison stay lasted 22 months, with the first percentile spending only 5.4 months in 
prison18 and the 99th percentile spending 81 months in prison, the releasees changed cells 
about every two months. This means that, although between-facility residential mobility 
is rather low, the rate of within-facility residential mobility is quite high, with inmates 
changing cells about six times per year; and changing blocks about two times per year, on 
average. According to the bed assignment survey, which can be viewed in the appendix 
to this chapter, inmates commonly move within facilities for administratively-driven 
reasons, such as prison programming (e.g., therapeutic communities) and at their own 
request (i.e., inmate agreements). Inmates’ negative or adjustment and other behavior-
driven reasons may also compel correctional officers to move inmates. 
A Day in the Life of a PADOC Inmate 
Below is an outline of the daily schedule at SCI-Dallas as a unit manager 
described it (personal communication, 2013). A copy of the daily schedule for the F-
block at SCI-Pittsburgh appears in the appendix associated with this chapter. As the 
Dallas and Pittsburgh schedules indicate, inmates are locked in their cells with their 
cellmates from 9pm, when the last head count for the day begins, until 6:30am, when the 
first head count of the day “clears” or finishes with all inmates accounted for. In addition, 
inmates are in their cells with their cellmates during head counts, which take place at 
three additional times during the day. Head counts take approximately 30 minutes. 
                                                 
18




Therefore, inmates are routinely locked in their cells with their cellmates for 12 hours 
each day.  
 
*** [Table 3 here] *** 
 
When not confined to their cells, SCI-Dallas and SCI-Pittsburgh inmates are free 
to move throughout their units (i.e., sections) and the portion of the yard allocated to their 
unit. They do not typically interact with inmates from other units. Interestingly, yard time 
is contingent on the timing of the sunset, which means inmates spend more time confined 
specifically to their cellblocks in the wintertime than they do in the summertime. 
Between the end of night yard and lock up at 21:00 hours, inmates can move freely in 
their units.  
Without explicit permission, PADOC inmates cannot leave their units or the 
portion of the prison yard to which they have access. To travel from their section to any 
other area of the prison, inmates are required to have special credentials. Those 
credentials differ by facility. At SCI-Dallas, the credentials are akin to hall passes that 
must be signed and time-stamped by correctional officers on both the sending and 
receiving ends. (See the appendix associated with this chapter for a sample block pass 
from SCI-Dallas.) Should an inmate fail to have his pass time-stamped or signed, he 
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could be subject to disciplinary action.19 At SCI-Pittsburgh, each inmate has an 
identification card that includes his picture and indicates the areas to which he has access.  
By virtue of the fact that they are confined to their units unless they have a 
specific reason to leave them, inmates spend the bulk of their free time with other inmates 
who are assigned to the same unit. Inmates routinely leave their sections for meals and 
exercise, however they do so in the company of the other men in their section and 
generally in isolation from inmates on other units.20 Evidence of this unit separation can 
be seen in the rotation of “blues” and “GP” (general population) inmates housed on F-
Block in SCI-Pittsburgh. (See the appendix associated with this chapter.) At SCI-
Pittsburgh, inmates who wear blue prison issue clothing are separated from inmates who 
wear brown prison issue clothing for reasons described below. This separation is 
maintained through yard, meal, and other times. 
Inmates also generally work in the company of their unit-mates. Most SCI-Dallas 
inmates have jobs on the unit, such as cleaning common areas (personal communication, 
2013). Throughout the PADOC system, inmates who work jobs that are not on the unit 
(e.g., prison industry, kitchen, laundry, or exterior maintenance) are often assigned to the 
same living quarters as their workmates, due to the proximity of the living quarters to the 
work environment. This enables correctional officers to monitor inmates at they travel to 
                                                 
19
 During a prison visit a correctional officer related the story of a recent incident wherein an inmate failed 
to have his pass signed and was missing from his block for several hours. The inmate was currently serving 
a sentence in the RHU for that infraction. 
20
 During this “shift change,” inmates from one section typically exit the cafeteria or gym through one set 
of doors while the inmates from another section enter through another set of doors. The inmates from 




and from work and also to better maintain facility security, as reported in bed assignment 
surveys that were administered to correctional officers in each of the PADOC facilities. 
For example, culinary workers at SCI-Forest are assigned to specific units “to curtail 
contraband from…spreading throughout the institution.” Similarly, at SCI-Dallas 
“outside workers” who take care of the land surrounding the institution live in O-block. 
Further, the work-live overlap is generally so substantial that a single correctional officer 
handles both the cell and work assignments. As one correctional officer reported, “The 
responsibility of inmate placement initially falls on the Inmate Employment Coordinator 
when the inmates first arrive at the institution.” Thereafter, cell assignments proceed 
based on medical restrictions, race, and age.  
Nevertheless, the policies that assign inmates to cells and to work details are 
neither perfectly uniform nor likely to be in complete alignment either within or across 
facilities. Some inmates may live in different units than the majority of their workmates. 
Therefore, work and school assignments may provide inmates with opportunities to 
socialize with inmates not on their block. However, the time inmates spend at work or 
school is still far less than the time inmates spend locked in their cells with their 
cellmates. Per PADOC policy, a standard workday lasts six hours. While not all inmates 
have jobs, those inmates who do not have high school diplomas must attend educational 
programming toward earning their GEDs. Inmates are considered full-time students in the 
PADOC system if they spend four hours in class per day. Thus, if they work full time, 
inmates spend half as much time at work as they do locked in their cells with their 
cellmates; if they go to school they spend at school only one-third of the time they spend 
locked in their cells with their cellmates. 
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Whether the time inmates spend with their cellmates is “quality” time in the sense 
that close personal relationships are fostered during that time and whether the time spent 
with cellmates is of higher quality than the time spent with work or schoolmates is 
impossible to know with the current data. The best that can be said of each of those 
potential relationships is that they, like all relationships, are likely to vary in their quality 
both absolutely and relative to each other. What can be said definitively is that due to the 
highly structured nature of the prison environment, cellmates spend absolutely more time 
alone and in close proximity with each other than they do with any other single inmate.  
How Correctional Officers Assign Inmates to Cells 
Three major conclusions were drawn from the bed assignment survey, which was 
answered in narrative form by correctional officers at twenty-six of the twenty-seven 
PADOC SCIs that were operating in September 2012. First, the process of assigning 
inmates to cells is neither standardized nor uniform across facilities. However, the 
correctional officers in each SCI do seem to employ similar strategies when assigning 
inmates to cells, both at initial placement and for subsequent within-facility moves. 
Second, although many characteristics of the inmates and their potential cellmates may 
play a role in the cell assignment process, race and medical restrictions are the factors 
most critical to that process. Third, in order to really learn how correctional officers 
assign inmates to cells, they would need to be observed as they performed that task. The 
first two conclusions were, therefore, investigated during two prison visits during which 
correctional officers were observed as they made cell assignments.  
 The state correctional institutes at Dallas and Pittsburgh were chosen for 
observation because they are both medium security facilities and because one (Dallas) is 
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on the east side of the state one (Pittsburgh) is on the west side of the state. The bed 
assignment surveys suggested that there might be cultural differences between the eastern 
and the western facilities, which is why one facility on each side of the state was chosen. 
As expected, the process of assigning inmates to cells at SCI-Dallas is both similar to and 
different from that process at SCI-Pittsburgh.  
Bed assignments at SCI-Dallas. At SCI Dallas, a single unit manager 
coordinates the initial placements and within-facility moves that happen daily.  For 
clarity, this person is hitherto called the unit manager coordinator or UMC, even though 
that is not a formal title. The UMC spends 1-2 hours each day coordinating cell 
assignments. Anywhere from 50 to 100 initial placements and within-facility moves take 
place per week.  
The cell assignment process at SCI-Dallas proceeds in four general steps. First, 
the UMC receives a list of inmates being transferred to or moving within the facility. 
Second, the UMC examines the characteristics of the inmates to be celled using 
PADOC’s online tool, which is called docnet. Third, the UMC references a Vacant Bed 
Report to match inmates to open beds in the facility. He does this primarily based on the 
race of both the inmate to be placed and his potential cellmates. Fourth, the UMC 
confirms the cell assignment with the unit managers, who can recommend against the 
assignment based on their more intimate knowledge of the inmates already in the unit, 
particularly the age of the potential cellmate.   
Receive a list of inmates to assign to cells. The list of inmates received by the 
UMC can be a list of inmates being transferred into the facility or a list of inmates being 
moved from one cell to another within the facility. Inmates being transferred into the 
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facility are said to be on the “van” list, because they arrive on a van. SCI-Dallas receives 
between ten and fifty van inmates per week. Inmates arriving to SCI-Dallas are always 
within prison system transfers, typically inmates who have just completed initia l 
classification at SCI-Camp Hill, which supplies the van list. Inmates transfer from SCI-
Camp Hill to SCI-Dallas weekly on Wednesdays. In addition to the SCI-Camp Hill 
transfers, SCI-Dallas, like all PADOC SCIs, may also sporadically receive inmates who 
are being transferred from other, non-intake facilities. Those between-facility transfers 
typically happen for two reasons: the inmate being transferred had a disciplinary problem 
in his previous facility, or an inmate is returning to SCI-Dallas after receiving services 
only available at another facility (e.g., cancer treatments at SCI-Pittsburgh).  
Both of these types of transfers were observed during a prison visit. Although one 
incoming inmate was unknown to the UMC, he was assumed to have disciplinary 
problems based on his custody level, which was four. This was confirmed on docnet, 
where it could be observed that the inmate had multiple recent misconducts. The inmate 
was placed on a block that had not recently received a potentially problematic inmate 
with another inmate of similar race and age. Another incoming inmate was known to the 
UMC, who mentioned the inmate’s frequent transfers into and out of mental health 
treatment. Although not violent and with a low custody level (two), that inmate was 
considered unstable. He was, therefore, placed in a cell at the top of the range where the 
correctional officers sit so that they could better “keep an eye on him.” 
Within-facility transfers nearly always stem from unit managers, who request 
moves via emails to the UMC. While within-facility transfers can only be requested by 
the unit managers, they can be initiated by unit managers who want to, for example, 
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separate particular inmates, or by the inmates themselves who have both formal and 
informal means of making requests, which are described below. The UMC at SCI-Dallas 
reported that inmates, not correctional officers, instigate most internal moves. Those 
requests are typically honored, as long as they are perceived to be in good faith (e.g., not 
for the purpose of predation) because both the inmates and the staff would prefer 
harmonious inmate relationships to acrimonious inmate relationships. 
Examine inmate characteristics. Whether inmates are van arrivals or within-
facility movers, the UMC reviews their characteristics in order to assign them to 
appropriate beds. The van list contains inmates’ custody levels and races, but the UMC 
consults each inmate’s PADOC record (i.e., institutional history) via docnet to get a 
better sense of his needs and characteristics. The most important factors are whether an 
inmate requires special housing, such as a single cell, ground level (bottom tier) cell, or 
bottom bunk; whether an inmate’s custody level or work detail warrants special housing 
(e.g., the RHU for custody level 5 or the O-block dormitory for custody level 2 outside 
workers); whether an inmate is a security threat or formally separated from someone else 
in the facility; the inmate’s race; and his age.  
Match inmates to open beds. To make bed assignments, the unit manager at SCI-
Dallas is equipped with two lists of available beds, examples of which appear in the 
appendix to this chapter.  The two lists of available beds are generated differently. An 
office worker who mines PADOC’s centralized databases generates the Bed Availability 
Report (BAR). The Vacant Bed Report (VBR) is generated nightly by correctional 
officers who report the vacant beds in their units, along with the races of the men 
occupying the non-vacant beds in those cells. The unit manager who makes the bed 
139 
 
assignments prefers to use the latter list to guide his decisions because the most critical 
information (i.e., current inmates’ races and single cell codes) is reported in one place. 
The single cells codes are particularly important because inmates with single cell (Z) 
codes may be housed in two-person cells because no single cells are available. This 
means that the companion bed is not really available, which the VBR, but not the BAR, 
communicates.  
Inmates with no medical, work, or security restrictions are matched strictly on 
race and, secondarily, age, which is confirmed with the unit managers. With respect to 
medical, work, and security restrictions, the medical codes need to be adhered to first. 
Single and bottom bunk inmates are placed in available single cells and bottom bunks, 
both of which are typically at a premium. Bottom bunks, in particular, are in short supply.  
Unless an inmate has a bottom bunk restriction, he is typically placed in a top 
bunk with another inmate of his own race and, if possible, someone reasonably close to 
his age. As the prison population has aged, however, more inmates with bottom bunk 
status are older inmates, so the latter preference is more challenging to meet. This is 
observed in the data. Although the correctional officers who responded to the bed 
assignment survey reported similarity in age as a primary criterion for matching 
cellmates, “similarity” appears to be a broad concept. The average difference in age 
between releasees and their cellmates is nine years, with the mode being seven years. 
There is only a very weak correlation between the age of a releasee and the age of the 
first cellmate to which he is assigned after initial classification (=0.18). By contrast, the 
races of the releasees and their “first assigned cellmates” are highly correlated (=0.73).  
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Separations are restrictions on housing particular inmates together. Separations 
might exist for a number of reasons, including those related to the criminal justice 
system, those related to personal matters, and those related to institutional security. These 
reasons often overlap. For example, some common reasons for inmates to be separated 
include one inmate participating in another inmate’s prosecution, an inmate implicated in 
a crime against another inmate’s family member (e.g., rape), and an inmate who has been 
(or has a known potential to be) victimized by other inmates (e.g., high profile cases, 
particularly those involving sex offenders). In such cases, these inmates would generally 
be separated at the facility or section levels so that they cannot physically encounter each 
other.  Separations are typically administered by SCI-Camp Hill, which distributes 
inmates across the PADOC system. However, the UMC checks for both separations and 
other security risks, such as escape codes and codes indicating gang or security threat 
group (STG) membership or severe mental health problems.  
The UMC typically tries to spread potentially problematic inmates (e.g., higher 
mental health codes, higher custody levels, escape risks, and those with STG verification) 
around the facility. As he makes cell assignments, he proceeds more or less in order by 
unit so that no single unit is overburdened with potentially problematic inmates. That is, 
if the UMC had just moved a person with disciplinary problems to section B, he would 
look to another unit to absorb an incoming inmate with an escape risk code.  
Confirm cell the assignment with the unit manager. After the UMC finds an 
appropriate bed in one of the units, he calls the unit manager to confirm that the 
placement seems reasonable. During observation, concerns about drastic (e.g., greater 
than 10 years) age differences seemed to dictate a deviation from the UMC’s decision, as 
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was the case housing the transferred custody level four inmate described earlier. 
However, in a separate conversation, another prison staff member also indicated that 
some commitment crime types, particularly sexual crimes, might affect placements. In 
particular, she mentioned that a specific sex offender in the TCU was being housed with 
an inmate who was soon to be released date because an inmate close to his release date 
would be less likely to jeopardize his release by victimizing the sex offender.  
Bed assignments at SCI-Pittsburgh. As in the facility at Dallas, there is a single 
unit manager at SCI-Pittsburgh who coordinates bed assignments and who shall also be 
referred to as the UMC or the unit manager coordinator. The UMC at SCI-Pittsburgh 
typically uses more information than her counterpart at SCI-Dallas when celling inmates 
because she faces a more complicated celling environment, with multiple populations, 
multiple modes of entry into the facility, and more diverse movement throughout it.  
With respect to initial placements, SCI-Pittsburgh is similar to SCI-Dallas in that 
between ten and fifty van inmates are received from SCI-Camp Hill weekly on 
Wednesday. However, SCI-Pittsburgh also serves as a western intake facility, meaning 
new inmates arrive daily from county jails, courts, and even from directly from parole 
offices.  
SCI-Pittsburgh receives as many as 100 inmates per week via alternative (i.e., 
non-van) commitment routes. Many county admits are known about in advance and, 
therefore, appear on a list similar to the van list. On that list and in the SCI, county admits 
are separated into parole violators and new commits. Often, alternative admits are not 
known about in advance, so they are not on any list. For example, a parole officer might 
call the UMC to let her know that he will be bringing an inmate to the SCI within the 
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hour, as happened during a prison observation. Information about inmates received in this 
ad-hoc manner is often limited to what correctional officers can observe about the inmate 
or elicit from him, so SCI-Pittsburgh uses a celling checklist to gather pertinent 
information about incoming inmates. A copy of the celling checklist appears in the 
appendix associated with this chapter.  
The initial placement celling situation, which includes van inmates, county 
advance-notice new commits, county advance-notice parole violators, and no-notice 
county admits, is further complicated by the fact that SCI-Pittsburgh houses inmates who 
in the facility specifically to receive specialized medical treatments, both in the oncology 
unit at the SCI and in the medical facilities in the Pittsburgh area, which has a highly 
developed health care sector associated with the universities in the area. Thus, inmates 
can be moving to and from SCI-Pittsburgh to outside medical facilities on a near-daily 
basis. 
SCI-Pittsburgh’s multi-purpose environment has led to the development of three 
different populations, each of which has different needs: a general population of long-
term inmates, county admits awaiting transfer to SCI-Camp Hill or to the facility from 
which they were paroled, and an infirmary population, which includes inmates in 
Pittsburgh for specialized medical treatments and new admits with immediate medical 
issues, such as the need to detoxify.  
The three populations at SCI-Pittsburgh can be identified at a glance by the color 
of their prison-issue clothing. Permanent, general population inmates wear brown, as do 
all inmates at SCI-Dallas. Temporary inmates awaiting transfer to other facilities wear 
blue. Infirmary inmates wear white. The color system helps correctional officers to 
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manage the shifting populations in the facility, particularly the separation between the 
inmates referred to as browns (permanent inmates) and blues (temporary inmates), which 
will be described in more detail below. In particular, the temporary inmates in blue 
should be at SCI-Pittsburgh for a few weeks at most. If an inmate in blue seems to have 
been in the facility for more time than that, a correctional officer will likely notice, check 
on his status, and resolve any issues that may have arisen with his transfer.  
Summary of the intake process. Immediately upon intake, all inmates are 
photographed, receive identification cards, and are assigned inmate and control numbers 
if they do not already have them. Each PADOC inmate has both a control number and an 
inmate number. Each inmate is assigned a unique control number, such that each inmate 
should have only one control number, regardless of how many times he is released from 
and committed to PADOC custody. In contrast, inmates may have multiple inmate 
numbers because they may have been committed multiple times. Only newly-convicted 
inmates receive new inmate numbers. Parole violators, for example, are not assigned new 
inmate numbers; they re-enter the PADOC system under the same inmate number. 
Therefore, the same person admitted to PADOC multiple times but never on a new 
conviction will have only one inmate number, whereas the same person admitted to 
PADOC multiple times after multiple convictions will have multiple inmate numbers.  
After they are identified and assigned numbers, inmates are medically cleared 
(i.e., tested for communicable diseases, particularly tuberculosis) and assigned to cell 
blocks. If not medically cleared (e.g., if drug or alcohol dependencies are detected) 
inmates will stay in the intake unit, infirmary, or restricted housing unit, until they can be 
cleared. Generally speaking, inmates are processed through SCI-Pittsburgh’s intake 
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housing unit (IHU) within 72 hours. At SCI-Pittsburgh, although the UMC must sign off 
on all initial placements and within-facility transfers, the process is decentralized. Unit 
managers use the aforementioned celling checklist to assist with celling inmates in this 
more fluid environment. However, the actual process essentially mirrors that at SCI-
Dallas, except for an initial step: the separation of blues and browns. 
Initial placement in blues or browns. SCI-Pittsburgh filters inmates into housing 
units based on their receipt status (whether they are a parole violator or a new commit) 
and special needs. The main determining factor in inmate placement is commit status. 
Parole violators and new commits are always separated into blues and brown, 
respectively. For security reasons, color separation is always maintained in the facility. 
Parole violators are typically viewed as higher security risks because they are temporary 
admits from “the street” and have, as the UMC said, “street problems,” such as drug and 
alcohol addictions, and higher rates of communicable diseases, like tuberculosis and 
hepatitis (personal communication, 2013; NRC, 2014). New commits, on the other hand, 
have typically been incarcerated during trial, so they are already institutionally 
acculturated. Therefore, upon admit, an immediate division takes place. New commits 
who will be staying at SCI-Pittsburgh, whether they enter via the van or the county, are 
put into browns and parole violators who arrive from the county and who will be 
transferred from SCI-Pittsburgh are put into blues. Additionally, the intake cohorts are 
typically kept together. That is, unless there is a compelling reason to separate them (e.g., 
a fight between inmates in the county jail), inmates received on a particular day will be 
housed with other inmates received on that day.  
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The celling process mirrors SCI-Dallas, with more information. For most 
inmates, the unit managers at SCI-Pittsburgh have the following information: commit 
status, name, and date of birth; anything they can visually observe (e.g., race, stature); 
and any information the transferring entity (i.e., courts, parole officer) might have 
provided. For example, the transferring entity typically informs the SCI if a transfer 
inmate has posed or has unusual potential to pose a security threat. Similarly, a parole 
officer might indicate that a particular admit is a technical violator, meaning he poses 
little threat to institutional security.  
As was previously mentioned, the celling checklist, which appears in this 
chapter’s appendix, is used to gather more information about admits to SCI-Pittsburgh. It 
contains ten questions that must be answered regarding inmate age, county of origin, 
race, stature, mental health, double celling preference, institutional history, criminal 
history, and “any other relevant information.” The any other relevant information 
category is somewhat nebulous. The UMC and other SCI-Pittsburgh correctional officers 
repeatedly mentioned that they “get a feel” for each new inmate as he is processed. More 
concrete information is gathered by directly asking inmates if they have a problem 
“taking a cellie” or if they have a problem taking a cellie “of a particular race or 
religion.”  For instance, according to the UMC, Muslim blacks and Christian whites often 
prefer to avoid each other (personal communication, 2013).21 
If, based on the celling checklist information, an inmate is perceived to be a good 
candidate for double celling (i.e., has no reported conflicts, appears mentally stable, and 
                                                 
21
 Clustering on religion, particularly for Muslims, is observed throughout the PADOC system.  
146 
 
lacks single-cell status), the UMC attempts to match inmates on as many of the celling 
checklist metrics as possible, such that inmates with more extensive criminal histories are 
not with first-timers, older inmates are not with younger inmates, black inmates are not 
with white inmates, and so on. Inmate preferences, however, are secondary to security. 
Note, however, that unlike race and age, most checklist items are ambiguous with respect 
to celling determination. For example, inmates from the same county jail might have a 
conflict with each other or they might be copacetic with each other. 
At the most basic level, intake officers look for any indication that within- facility 
security might be compromised. At SCI-Pittsburgh, the UMC seemed particularly 
concerned with victimization. She repeatedly said that the unit managers like to err on the 
side of caution, especially when it comes to potential for predation. Indications that 
individuals might be predatory include repeatedly asking for specific types of cellmates 
or refusing a single cell.  
How bed assignments are tracked. Facility-wide, a vacant beds report, which is 
similar although not identical to the one generated at SCI-Dallas, is generated nightly at 
SCI-Pittsburgh. Unit managers at SCI-Pittsburgh reference this VBR and their own 
personal knowledge to cell inmates. Further, due to the antiquated nature of the SCI-
Pittsburgh facility, which was built in 1882, analog methods are still employed to track 
bed availability. 
In addition to the computerized system, F block has a physical board in the 
correctional officers’ office on which all bed assignments are tracked. Inmates are housed 
on the bottom four of five levels in the building that is F block. Each inmate is 
represented on the board by yellow (for blues) and white (for browns) cards. The cards fit 
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into empty slots that represent beds. Red and white striped cards indicate broken or 
otherwise unavailable beds. Aside from indicating permanent or temporary status via 
their color, the each card contains the following information: an inmate’s last name, his 
inmate number, his race, and any medical or housing restrictions he may have. There are 
“yard” and “river” sides to F-block, which sits on the east bank of the Ohio River and to 
which the blues and browns are restricted. Blues live on the river side and browns live on 
the yard side. Blues and browns have separate schedules (i.e., yard time, etc.) so that the 
separation between them is constantly maintained. The F-block daily schedule, which 
appears in the appendix associated with this chapter, reflects this separation.  
Similarities and differences in the SCI cell assignment processes. While the 
processes of assigning inmates to cells seem very different in SCI-Pittsburgh and SCI-
Dallas, they are actually generally the same. The main difference stems from the fact that 
SCI-Pittsburgh serves a dual purpose as a general population facility and an intake 
facility for county-level admits, which means that some inmates have been temporarily 
assigned to SCI-Pittsburgh, while others have been permanently assigned there. Aside 
from that difference, the permanent browns at SCI-Pittsburgh are treated just as 
permanent inmates at SCI-Dallas are. They are given permanent cell assignments based 
primarily on their special statuses (if they have any), race and age. Similarly, the blues 
are treated like temporary inmates at an intake facility, such as SCI-Camp Hill. They do 
not have a permanent housing assignment and are awaiting or participating in the intake 
process into the PADOC system.  
The differing statuses of the browns and blues at SCI-Pittsburgh are reflected in 
their constant separation. This conceptual and physical separation can be maintained 
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analytically, such that intake and general populations at SCI-Pittsburgh can be treated as 
separate populations, just like the intake populations at SCI-Camp Hill can be treated 
separately from the general population of inmates in the bulk of the PADOC system. This 
also holds true for the inmates committed in Philadelphia who may be held temporarily at 
SCI-Graterford. Like blues at SCI-Pittsburgh, many inmates only pass through SCI-
Graterford on their way to SCI-Camp Hill (or another permanent facility if they are 
parole violators who can skip initial classification). Other SCI-Graterford inmates are part 
of the permanent population there.  
An additional difference lies in the centralization of the cell assignment process. 
At SCI-Pittsburgh, the process is more decentralized, with unit managers making celling 
decisions more or less independently after inmates are assigned to their units. At SCI-
Dallas the process is more centralized: a single UMC coordinates cell assignments for the 
entire facility. Again, these differences are not as striking as they might seem at first 
glance. At SCI-Pittsburgh, inmates must initially be assigned to a unit or section, as they 
also must be at SCI-Dallas. Further, even at SCI-Dallas, the unit managers in each section 
can ultimately dictate cell assignment changes. According to the bed assignment surveys, 
this is also generally true across other PADOC facilities. For instance, correctional 
officers reported that:  
“Block officers ‘size-up’ inmates upon arrival and have 
discretion to change [a] placement if it appears inappropriate. 
[This change] is reviewed the following morning,”  
 
and also that: 
“[T]he Unit Manager…directs where the inmate will be placed…As 
time progresses the Unit Manager utilizes observations and 
suggestions from the unit security staff [to decide] if changes 
in bed assignments need [to be] made, [and considers] the inmates 




Therefore, the cell assignment process is ultimately decentralized but proceeds 
along these summary lines, as outlined by a correctional officer at SCI-Smithfield:  
“Inmates are moved from reception unit to permanent unit as beds 
become available. Inmates are generally assigned to cells based 
on age and race.  Once assigned to a unit, inmates can sign 90 
day cell agreements with inmates they are compatible with. Cell 
issues that occur on the Unit are resolved by Block Officers and 
the Unit Team. If needed, cell moves can be done immediately.” 
 
The Potential for Inmates to Choose Their Cellmates 
 In the state prison system in Pennsylvania, inmates can opt to choose their 
cellmates by making informal and formal requests to cell with a particular cellmate. 
According to the UMC, inmates are told about the option to request cellmates during 
intake at SCI-Camp Hill. Informal requests consist mainly of ad-hoc verbal requests to 
correctional officers. Formal requests are paper documents must be signed by the inmates 
requesting to be celled together and their unit manager. Examples of the cellmate request 
documents from SCI-Pittsburgh and SCI-Dallas appear in the appendix associated with 
this chapter. While the documents for the two SCIs differ, their content is essentially the 
same; and reflects that the ability for inmates to make cellmate requests is a generalized 
PADOC policy. The documents make it clear that both inmates and their unit manager 
must agree to the move, and that the agreement will persist for 90 days during which the 
inmates cannot request another move and the unit manager agrees not to move them. 
When the agreement ends, the inmates may continue to be housed together, but without 
the agreement binding them or the prison management to that arrangement. The 
agreement may also be renewed. 
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According to the UMC at SCI-Dallas, about five agreements were active on the 
UMC’s unit at the time of the prison visit, which means ten of the approximately 200 
inmates on that unit had entered into agreements in the last 90 days. Unfortunately, 
records of inmate agreements, such as the agreement forms, are purged almost 
immediately after the term of the agreement ends so, in the current data, inmates who 
have lived under agreements for 90 days or more cannot be differentiated from those who 
have lived together for 90 days or more, but without an agreement.  
What drives cellmate requests? From the perspective of the UMC at SCI-
Dallas, formal agreements are generally made between two people who have a past 
history, either outside the PADOC system or within it. With respect to the outside, they 
may have known each other prior to their incarceration (i.e., are related to each other or 
hail from the same neighborhood) or they both may know someone on the outside who 
recommended that they cell together. Within the PADOC system, the two inmates may 
have met during initial classification at SCI-Camp Hill or they may have met each other 
on a job assignment. In fact, 2,202 (21.74%) of the releasees celled for the longest period 
of time with a cellmate they has also celled with at SCI-Camp Hill.  
At SCI-Dallas, inmates are the primary drivers of the internal moves. According 
to the UMC, three main factors motivate these moves: cellmate compatibility, block 
culture, and cell location. Cellmate compatibility essentially refers to whether or not the 
inmates get along. Some factors that play a role in whether cellmates are compatible 
include cleanliness, music and TV preferences, temperament and personality, and the 
amount of time each inmate prefers to spend in the cell. With respect to the latter 
criterion, the UMC reported that some inmates look for cellmates who have work 
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assignments that keep them off the block for most of the day. This affords the inmate 
without such a work assignment more privacy and time alone in the cell. Although the 
current data do not evince it, the UMC also reported that inmates should be compatible 
with their blocks, each of which reportedly has a unique culture and character that the 
unit managers try to maintain.  
In addition to an amenable cellmate and a compatible living environment, inmates 
are also concerned with the locations of cells. Cells at the back of the range (that is, 
farthest from the single entrance to the block) are the most coveted. If there are two tiers, 
cells on the top and at the back of the range are the most prized. These preferences, again, 
reflect a desire for privacy because fewer people walk by upper tier cells and cells at the 
back of the range and, potentially, a desire for less supervision because the correctional 
officers work from the top of the range on the bottom tier, where their offices are 
typically located. These preferences also reflect a desire for comfort: in the winter, 
opening the door to the block sends a blast of cold air into the cells at the top of the 
range. In the summer, that blast is of hot air.  
Due the fact that some cells are preferred, the correctional officers more tightly 
control which inmates can live in those cells. As the officers reported on the bed surveys, 
top tier or back of the range cells are often used to reward inmates’ good behavior. For 
example, one correctional officer wrote:  
“Inmates with an extensive time of positive behavior will be 
moved to a cell in a more desirable location on the unit, usually 
upstairs or at the ends of the tiers as an incentive for 
continued positive behavior.” 
 
Institutional approval of cellmate requests. Both formal and informal requests 
for particular cellmates may be denied, based on both correctional officer preferences and 
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their assessment of the motivation for the move. With respect to personal preferences a 
unit manager at SCI-Pittsburgh, for example, made it clear that while other unit managers 
permit “convenience” moves she does not (personal communication, 2013). In contrast, 
correctional officers at SCI-Dallas reported that inmates housed there are encouraged to 
enter into agreements. When inmates approach unit managers about agreements at SCI-
Dallas, they are typically received amicably because honoring cell requests promotes 
“institutional harmony,” which is in the interest of prison management (personal 
communication, 2013). This argument was echoed by a correctional officer at SCI-Forest, 
who wrote:  
“Inmates submit cell agreements with other inmates that are not 
currently their cell mates.  Moves are made to accommodate these 
cell agreements.  The units strive to have inmates submit cell 
agreements because this stabilizes the population by celling 
inmates together that have things in common, which reduces the 
friction between cell mates.” 
 
Institutional harmony cannot, however, be prized above the personal safety of 
inmates. If, for example, correctional officers perceive predation to be the motivation for 
a particular request, they will block the cellmate request. This was evident in the 
narratives from the bed assignment survey responses. As one correctional officer 
reported:  
“Unit managers should also…look for potential housing concerns 
[such as sexual predation] which may result in victimization. One 
indicator is an inmate who has had a large number of previous 
cell partners [even if he has] no past sexual or violent 
[misconducts].”  
 
This can lead to celling decisions made such that:  
“Inmates who are noted as being physically or mentally weaker may 
require placement with a similarly situated inmate or require a 




This was the case, for example, with the mentally unstable inmate described 
earlier. A unit manager at SCI-Pittsburgh echoed these concerns by relating a story about 
an older black inmate who has a preference for young white men, whom he persists in 
befriending and requesting to cell with, despite his lack of success in getting the unit 
managers to approve those requests (personal communication, 2013).  
 The implicit nature of cellmate choice. As the previous discussion illustrates, 
another way for inmates to “choose” their cellmates or to be assigned to a single cell is 
misbehavior. An inmate can physically attack or mentally abuse his cellmate. Of course, 
negative behavior has its costs: if detected, it will likely result in a misconduct conviction 
that may carry a punishment that includes a stint in the restricted housing unit. In 
addition, time could be added to his sentence. Therefore, these sorts of incidents are 
relatively rare. As a unit manager at SCI-Dallas put it:  
“Ninety-five percent of the guys in here just want to do their 
time with no problems. It’s the other 5% you need to worry 
about.” 
 
Of course, an inmate need not be violent to be unpleasant to cell with; he could be 
favor bad music, be messy, smelly, or just surly. An inmate can, therefore, do things that 
would not necessarily garner misconducts but that, nevertheless, essentially make life so 
unpleasant for his cellmates that very few will accept him as a cellmate. This potentiality 
is evident in the data. While the average releasee had 14 cellmates (SD=9.3) during his 
prison stay, some releasees (n=221) had more than forty cellmates, with one releasee 
churning through ninety-eight cellmates during his prison stay. High numbers of 
cellmates, as the bed assignment survey respondent noted, typically indicate something 
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undesirable about a person, such as a predilection for physical predation or personality 
problems (i.e., an acerbic nature).  
Ultimately, although formal agreements are important, it is important to recognize 
that inmates who are not shuffling from cell to cell have implicitly settled on a cellmate 
relationship that they find, if not ideal, at least tolerable enough to allow to persist. 
Agreements are simply a means of making an implicit relationship explicit. Therefore, 
although those cellmates who were in formal agreements cannot be distinguished from 
those cellmates who were not, shorter and single stretches with cellmates can be 
interpreted as evidence of discontent with a cellmate relationship, whereas longer, 
multiple stretches with cellmates might be indicative of, at the very least, indifference 
between the current cellmate and other potential cellmates.  
In Summary 
 With a population of more than 40,000 inmates, the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections manages one of the largest prison systems in the United States. During the 
time period of the current study (2000-2007), PADOC operated twenty-five male and two 
female facilities, each of which varied in size and most of which operated at above their 
capacities.  
 To assess their educational and therapeutic needs, first-time inmates in the 
PADOC system are evaluated physically, mentally, and emotionally at the intake facility 
located at the state correctional institute at Camp Hill. After spending about three months 
at SCI-Camp Hill, inmates are assigned to a permanent facility where they then serve 
sentences that last, on average, two years. Most inmates stay in their first post-initial 
classification facility, although about twenty-five percent stay in three or four or more 
155 
 
facilities. While most inmates remain in the same post-initial classification facility 
throughout their stays, they move frequently within facilities. The average 2006-2007 
first-time releasee lived in ten different cells on six different units.  
 In the two facilities where correctional officer observations were conducted, SCI-
Pittsburgh and SCI-Camp Hill, the processes used to cell inmates vary due to differences 
in the correctional populations, but still share a similar overarching structure. The 
primary concerns correctional officers try to address when making cellmate pairings 
include race, age, programming needs, and the inmates’ potential for predation or 
victimization. In both facilities and across the PADOC system, inmates are allowed to 
select cellmates, subject to correctional officer approval. From the perspective of the 
correctional officers, inmates look for compatibility in terms of shared interests and 
schedules in selecting cellmates. Correctional officers vary in their tendencies to tolerate 
convenience moves. 
 Inmates spend about twelve hours locked in their cell with their cellmates. While 
much of that time is during sleeping hours, inmates are also likely to spend considerable 
non-cell time with their cellmates. Inmates with similar jobs tend to live in the same 
housing units. Moreover, inmates are confined to their blocks even when not confined to 




CHAPTER 6: Data 
The data that support the current study come from the Pennsylvania Department 
of Corrections (PADOC) and the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP). The PSP provided 
Record of Arrest and Prosecution (RAP) sheet data, which include complete 
Pennsylvania arrest histories, whether those arrests occurred prior to, during, or after 
spells of incarceration. The PSP data supplement data from the PADOC, which contains 
the bulk of the information that supports this study. With respect to movement into, out 
of, and through the state prison system, the PADOC data include information on 
admissions to and releases from prison (including deaths in custody, escapes, and 
executions), transfers between facilities within the PADOC system, and also transfers to 
and from court proceedings and external medical care facilities. Importantly, beginning in 
the fall of 1999, PADOC began to track bed assignments for all inmates in each of the 
state correctional institutions (SCIs). Movements into and out of specific beds, even for a 
few hours, are recorded. 
In addition to movement data, the PADOC data also include demographic, 
criminal history, institutional history, and institutional testing data for current and prior 
PADOC inmates. The demographic data include information about each inmate’s age, 
race, educational attainment, religion, marital status, and military service history. The 
criminal history data include information about the county from which each inmate was 
committed, his commitment crime, sentencing date, and maximum sentence length. For 
cellmates, the number of prior commitments and their timing can be determined. 
Similarly, the number of times a releasee has been reincarcerated after his initial 2006-
2007 release and the timing of those recommitments are available in the data.  
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Institutional testing data refer to the battery of examinations to which each inmate 
is subjected during initial classification. Those tests help assign custody levels and risk 
scores to inmates and to determine what, if any, institutional programming an inmate 
might be eligible to receive. Data from those examinations include information on an 
inmate’s prior mental health and substance abuse, his current reading and IQ levels, a risk 
assessment, and an assessment of the inmate’s mental fitness when admitted to PADOC 
custody.  
Institutional history data include an inmate’s custody and security levels, as well 
as whether he was involved in any prison misconducts, when those misconducts 
occurred, and how serious those infractions were. Misconduct offenses range in 
seriousness from A to E, with E being the least and A being the most serious. Table 4 
lists most unique misconduct offenses and their potential seriousness levels, which appear 
somewhat arbitrary. Offenses classified as most serious, for instance, can include 
everything from homicide to using abusive language. Inmate custody levels range from a 
low of one, typically indicating boot camp or community corrections status, to a high of 
five, which is generally reserved for inmates in the restricted housing unit, whether they 
are there for administrative or disciplinary reasons. Inmate custody levels are meant to 
align with institutional security levels, which also range from a minimum of one to a 
maximum of five. However, in practice inmates at custody levels two, three, and four are 
typically comingled together and dispersed across facilities, each of which has a 
restricted housing unit into which inmates can move and from which they typically return 




*** [Table 4 here] *** 
 
Information about whether an inmate served time in restricted housing (i.e., 
solitary confinement) as a result of misconduct for administrative reasons, is also present 
in the data.  Disciplinary custody typically occurs as a result of a serious (level A or B) 
infraction by the inmate. Administrative custody can happen for multiple reasons. The 
most common reason is for an inmate’s protection, such as when an inmate has been 
involved in a capital or high profile (e.g., Jerry Sandusky22) case, when a juvenile inmate 
is moved through an adult facility, and if an inmate is being threatened.  
In addition to information about the inmates in PADOC SCIs, information about 
the SCIs themselves was also gathered. Each PADOC facility is comprised of multiple 
buildings, which are divided into sections, which correspond to units that are further 
subdivided into cells. Facilities, buildings, sections, and cells vary markedly in size, so 
data on the square footage for cells, buildings, and facilities was collected. The tier or 
floor where each cell is located is also known. The bed assignment data also contain 
detailed information on the beds themselves, such that the “types” of beds occupied by 
inmates during their stays are recorded. For example, if a bed is designated for a 
therapeutic community, that is indicated by the bed type, as are beds designated for the 
general population. Time spent in a particular bed type is, therefore, an indicator of time 
spent in certain kinds of programming.  
                                                 
22
 In 2012, Jerry Sandusky, a one-time assistant football coach under Joe Paterno at The Pennsylvania State 
University, was convicted of scores of crimes related to the sexual abuse of children over many decades. 
Those charges included involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and indecent assault. 
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As the bed type data indicate, PADOC facilities not only have varied physical 
environments, they also have varied programmatic environments. Those programmatic 
environments may include therapeutic communities that address drug, alcohol, and/or 
mental health issues. They may also include programs based in cognitive behavioral 
therapy that attempt to improve offenders’ decision making, and specialized programs for 
sex offenders, violence prevention, and perpetrators of domestic violence.23 Currently, 
PADOC facilities operate an average of ten programs per facility. In addition to 
therapeutic communities and offender programming, most PADOC SCIs (n=15) have 
prison industries, some of which offer opportunities for more advanced job training. 
Those industries include metalworking, woodworking, printmaking, and optics. To 
account for this programmatic variation, data on whether each SCI has a prison industry 
and what kind of therapeutic programming is currently offered in each facility were also 
gathered. (See the SCI Characteristics in Table 2 for information on prison industries and 
prison programming by facility.)  
From the RAP sheet data come information on the prior and (in the case of the 
releasees) post incarceration arrest events in which the releasees and cellmates have been 
involved. The RAP sheets reveal that the releasees and their cellmates were collectively 
arrested more than 500,000 times and charged with more than 1.6M crimes. Arrest 
events, their timing, and the number of unique charges contained in each were preserved 
for each of the inmates. While the RAP sheets contain crime type information, that 
                                                 
23
 A discussion of the intricacies and potential efficacy of therapeutic communities and other prison 
programming with respect to recidivism reduction is beyond the scope of the current study. For more 




information was not required for the purposes of this study. Studies of specialization or 
offending versatility that employ more of the information contained in the RAP sheets is 
planned for future work. 
Data Assembly, Cohort Selection, and Data Organization 
The correctional data were downloaded from PADOC’s Microsoft Access 
databases on May 21, 2012, converted into Stata format, and cleaned and assembled over 
a period of two years. Since 2012, requests for RAP sheets from the Pennsylvania State 
Police have been made periodically through the Office of Planning, Research, and 
Statistics at PADOC. Like the correctional data, the arrest history data allow for a four-
year follow-up.  
All inmates released from PADOC custody for the first time between January 1, 
2006 and December 31, 2007 were identified based on movements into and out of the 
prison system. The 2006-2007 release cohort was chosen to allow for a four-year follow-
up period, which comports with the prior literature that examines a three to five year 
follow-up period (Langan & Levin, 2002; Nagin & Snodgrass, 2013; Durose et al., 2014). 
Following Wheeler (1961) and Nieuwbeerta et al. (2009), the first-time prison inmates in 
that cohort were isolated to eliminate the potential for prior prison commitments to 
condition the prison peer effects. The members of the 2006-2007 first-time release cohort 
are referred to as releasees. Their period of incarceration of a releasee is referred to as a 
prison stay.  
After the first-time releasees were identified, their bed assignments and the bed 
assignments of all other inmates housed in the PADOC system during the seven-year 
study period were used to identify the cellmates with whom they shared double cells 
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during their prison stays. To make the bed assignment data usable, systematic errors in 
the bed assignments were corrected to ensure that, among other things, multiple inmates 
did not occupy single beds simultaneously and that single inmates did not occupy 
multiple beds simultaneously.  Other data anomalies, such as negative time in a bed, were 
similarly corrected prior to matching the releasees to their cellmates.  
The first complete year of bed assignment data became available as of January 1, 
2000, so only those releasees who were admitted on or after that date were included in 
the final sample. Female inmates were also excluded from the current analysis for several 
reasons. Firstly, female inmates are housed in different facilities, so they are not subject 
to the same institutional environments as are male inmates. Similarly, females are housed 
in only one tenth as many facilities, so there is far less variation in the housing 
environments of female inmates, both at the facility and section levels. Finally, both 
preliminary analysis and preliminary reports from correctional officers suggested that 
social interactions with other inmates might affect female inmates differently.24 For 
instance, the correctional officers in both female facilities expressed the general 
sentiment that, “[t]he female population can be challenging to manage due to 
relationships that foster between inmates…problems…surface due to inmates 
consensually developing relations…that sour.” For these reasons, social interactions 
amongst female inmates will be examined in future work. The final sample for the 
current study consists of 10,131 male releasees who were admitted on or after January 1, 
                                                 
24
 Differential susceptibility to peer effects on crime and delinquency by gender is also evident in the extant 
literature (e.g., Giordano et al., 2002; Kreager, 2007).  
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2000 and released from PADOC for the first time between January 1, 2006 and 
December 31, 2007.25 They were matched to 55,656 cellmates, 9,123 of whom are also 
releasees. Therefore, only 1,008 releasees are not also in the cellmate cohort, whereas 
46,533 cellmates are not in the release cohort.  
Each period of contiguous time spent in a double cell with a cellmate is referred 
to as a stretch. On average, 68.8% (SD=26.6, mode=76.0) of a releasee’s stay is 
comprised of double cell assignments. Collectively, the releasees spent more than 
175,000 stretches with cellmates during their stays. As that number indicates, many 
releasees and cellmates spent multiple stretches with each other. A releasee can be paired 
with the same cellmate multiple times for many reasons, for example, if one inmate 
leaves the cell temporarily for the infirmary, restricted housing unit, or special 
programming. Multiple pairings can also happen if a cellmate is released to the 
community and returned to prison after violating parole.  
To organize the data by unique releasee-cellmate pairs, stretches spent with the 
same cellmate were summed. Stretches that did not last at least one day were excluded. 
After summation, 144,347 unique release-cellmate pairs remained. The durations of these 
cellmate associations range in length from 1 to 2,079 days, with a mean of 39.6 days and 
a standard deviation of 67.5 days.  To preserve the temporal ordering of the covariates for 
causal inference, the PADOC demographic, criminal history, and inmate testing data 
                                                 
25
 As selected based only on release date, the original 2006-2007 first-time release sample included 12,494 
inmates. After matching, 53 releasees were excluded from the sample because they did not match to double 
cellmates, which indicates that they were either always housed in single cells or dormitory cells or a 
combination thereof. Excluding inmates admitted before January 1, 2000 reduced the sample to 11,290 
releasees. Finally, excluding females reduced the sample further to 10,131. 
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characterize cellmates and releasees based on the most updated information available at 
the time of the first pairing of the cellmate to the releasee.  
After the unique releasee-cellmate pairs were isolated, the cellmate with whom 
each releasee spent the most time in the least number of stretches was identified. This 
longest duration cellmate association may be entered into explicitly (i.e., via a cell 
request) or the cellmate may be someone with whom the releasee finds it at least 
tolerable, and potentially enjoyable, to live: the acquiescence to the association is 
implicit. On average, releasees take almost about 10.5 months (315 days) to settle into 
this most stable cellmate association. The longest-duration or most time-intensive 
cellmate association then lasts an average of 181.6 (SD=144.8) days. For reference, the 
average time spent with all cellmates, exclusive of longest-duration cellmates, is 28.8 
(SD=41.1) days, with the mode being only fourteen days. Almost one-quarter (24%) of 
the releasees chose celled with another releasee for the longest period of time. Summary 
statistics appear in Table 6. 
Of course, the most stable cellmates are not the only cellmates or inmates with 
whom the releasees live and interact during their stays. Although the most stable cellmate 
association may be the most important cellmate with respect to duration and/or intensity 
of association, other cellmates, such as first and last cellmates, may also be important to a 
releasee’s post-release criminal behavior (Clemmer, 1940). About one-fifth (n=2,200) of 
the releasees appear to have met their longest-duration cellmate during initial 
classification at SCI-Camp Hill, another 199 appear to have met him while waiting at 
Graterford to be transferred to Camp Hill. While some of those most stable cellmates 
may have been encountered after initial classification, it appears that about one-quarter of 
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the releasees met the cellmate with whom they would eventually spend the most cell time 
fairly early in their prison stays. With respect to last cellmates, there is a well-known 
heuristic, the peak-end rule, which predicts that people will remember their most intense 
and their last experiences in a particular situation (Kahneman, Wakker, & Sarin, 1997; 
Kahneman, 2011). Interestingly, the most stable cellmate association is the last cellmate 
association for a quarter of the releasees, whereas the first cellmates association is the 
most stable association for less than 1% of the releasees, suggesting considerable sorting 
that could be a result of either inmate or correctional officer preferences or a combination 
of both (e.g., Crewe, 2007). While cellmate associations beyond the longest-duration 
cellmate are also potentially interesting, the study of them is saved for future work.  
Finally, to help to determine whether social interaction effects operate more 
strongly between pairs of individuals or groups of individuals (Urberg, 1992; Rees & 
Pogarsky, 2011), the average characteristics of all the inmates with whom a releasee 
shared a double cell were calculated. The time each cellmate spent with a releasee was 
used to weight the collective characteristics of the pool. In analyses where both the 
longest-duration cellmate and the cellmate pool characteristics are used, the longest-
duration cellmate is excluded from the cellmate pool characteristics calculation, which 
appears in [8] below.  
Pool characteristics = Sum(Cellmate characteristics *  
Time with cellmate)/Total cellmate time     [8] 
 
In addition to cellmate pool characteristics, the data also allow for assessment of 
whether social interaction effects can be detected more distally (i.e., between groups of 
inmates, as opposed to individual inmates). Section, building, and facility indicators can 
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account for fixed aspects of the environment that are common to all inmates who 
experience them (Manski, 1993; Fletcher, 2009, 2012). Those aspects include things like 
the varying block cultures that were described by the unit managers at SCI-Dallas and 
SCI-Pittsburgh and discussed in Chapter 5. 
Measures 
The correctional data were operationalized in measures that fall into the following 
categories: demographic variables, institutional history variables, institutional testing 
variables, institutional context variables, criminal history variables, and cellmate 
relationship variables. The measures seminal to the current analysis are discussed in the 
following section. All measures are generated based on the data most recently collected 
prior to the first pairing of a releasee to the cellmate being referenced (e.g., longest-
duration cellmates, first cellmates, or last cellmates). All dichotomous measures are 
coded zero (0) for no and one (1) for yes. Measures followed by [*] are used to create a 
derivative of PADOC’s Risk Screening Tool, which is described later in this chapter.   
Demographic variables. Criminal behavior has been shown to be associated or 
theorized to be associated with each of these characteristics. The age-crime curve is a 
ubiquitous criminological construct that depicts the strong mean association of age with 
decreases in criminal behavior after adolescence (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1983). 
Similarly, race, which may be a partial proxy for socioeconomic status, is a consistent 
predictor of criminal behavior, with black offenders typically demonstrating higher rates 
of violence and recidivism than white offenders (Blumstein, 1988; Lafree, Baumer, & 
O’Brien, 2010; Durose et al., 2014). As evidence of stakes in conformity, education, 
marital status, military service, and (to a lesser extent) affiliation with a particular 
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religion have been shown to have protective effects against criminal behavior (Toby, 
1957; Sampson & Laub, 1993, 2003; Warr, 1998; Lochner & Moretti, 2004).  
Age: A continuous measure in years, taken upon admit for releasees and from the 
time of the first pairing with a releasee for cellmates [*]  
 
Black: A dichotomous indicator of whether the inmate is black 
 
Education: A dichotomous indicator of whether the inmate has a high school 
(grade 12) education [*]  
 
 Married: A dichotomous indicator of whether the inmate is married  
 
 Islam: A dichotomous indicator of whether the inmate is a Muslim  
 
 Military service: A dichotomous indicator of whether an inmate is a veteran  
 
Urban: A dichotomous variable that indicates whether the inmate was committed 
to PADOC from an urban county. As designated by the 2000 Census, urban 
Pennsylvania counties are: Allegheny, Beaver, Berks, Bucks, Chester, 
Cumberland, Dauphin, Delaware, Erie, Lackawanna, Lancaster, Lebanon, Lehigh, 
Luzerne, Montgomery, Northampton, Philadelphia, Westmoreland, and York 
 
Institutional history variables. Behavior in prison is typically theorized to 
reflect the potential for continued criminal behavior after release. This is reflected in the 
concept of “good time” whereby inmates who display good behavior or “positive 
adjustment” in prison can shave time off their sentences and, conversely in the 
lengthening of prison stays for inmates who display “negative adjustment” (Adams, 
1992; Toch & Adams, 2002). Custody levels indicate the potential for inmates to 
misbehave in prison. Inmates with lower custody levels are perceived to be at lower risk 
for negative adjustment to the prison context. Inmates with custody levels of four or five 
are perceived to be at higher risk for negative adjustment. Custody levels can rise or fall 
as inmates adjust positively or negatively and as their mental health issues are addressed 
(e.g., Adams, 1992; Toch & Adams, 2002). While custody levels reflect expectations 
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about future behavior, misconducts, disciplinary custody, administrative custody, and 
participation in therapeutic communities reflect actual behavior by the inmate that may 
also influence his post-release behavior. For example, if inmates with substance abuse 
problems can resolve those issues by participating in therapeutic communities, they may 
be at lower risk of recidivating (Wexler, 1995; Inciardi, Martin, & Butzln, 2004; Aos, 
Miller, & Drake, 2007). Although, according to one systematic review of the evidence 
there is not enough evidence to support a claim that prison therapeutic communities 
reduce recidivism (Smith, Gates, & Foxcroft, 2006).  
Custody level: A dichotomous indicator of whether the inmate’s custody level is 
above three 
 
Misconducts: A dichotomous indicator of whether the inmate was found 
responsible for a level A or B misconduct [*]  
 
Administrative custody: A dichotomous indicator of whether the inmate spent 
time in restricted housing for administrative reasons 
 
Therapeutic community: A dichotomous indicator of whether the inmate spent 
time in a bed designated for a therapeutic community 
 
Institutional testing variables. The information collected from inmates during 
initial classification may also impact their reincarceration outcomes. At intake, 
correctional officers record binary indicators of whether inmates report specific behaviors 
in their personal histories. In particular, inmates report education, mental health, 
substance abuse, and employment prior to incarceration to the intake officers. Each of 
these measures is a well-known correlate of criminal behavior, the effectiveness of 
sanctions, and which inmates are in need of institutional programming in PADOC 
(Sherman & Smith, 1992; Farrington, 1995; Bushway & Reuter, 2002; Langan & Levin, 
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2002; Toch & Adams, 2002; MacCoun, Kilmer & Reuter, 2003; MacKenzie, 2006; 
James & Glaze, 2006; Pollack, Reuter, & Sevigny, 2011). 
With respect to the validity of the inmate self-reports, inmates may report specific 
behavioral problems or medical limitations to receive more lenient treatment, better 
facility assignments, or less taxing job placements. Additionally, correctional officers 
may have some incentive to understate the mental health and substance abuse problems 
of the inmates in order to avoid overburdening prison services. There is no way of 
verifying the veracity of their self-reports or the accuracy of correctional officer coding 
of those reports, except to examine how they compare to those of other correctional 
populations and, as discussed in Chapter 8, to examine how they perform in analyses 
(i.e., whether they impact housing decisions and recidivism in sensible ways).  
Comparisons were made between the responses of the PADOC inmates and the 
responses of national inmate samples surveyed by the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) 
and the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). The BJS and ONDCP surveys 
are disconnected from the potential desire to receive services on the part of inmates and 
the potential need to provide services on the part of the correctional system, respectively, 
so this source of bias is eliminated in those surveys. Moreover, the BJS and ONDCP 
samples are temporally consistent with the PADOC sample. Both were taken in 2003, 
about mid-way through the prison stays of members of the 2006-2007 first-time release 
cohort. That PADOC inmates report drug and alcohol abuse, mental health problems, and 




According to a BJS report, 24% of state inmate nationwide reported a recent 
history of mental health problems, while 49% reported symptoms consistent with mental 
disorders, per the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, fourth edition 
(James & Glaze, 2006). These percentages bound those reported by the PADOC releasees 
and cellmates, about one-third of whom reported mental health problems at initial 
classification.  
It is more difficult to assess whether medical limitations are reported with similar 
prevalence because it is unclear which conditions are considered medical limitations in 
the PADOC data. However, the most reasonable interpretation of the data suggests that 
the PADOC medical limitations data comports with what is generally reported by inmates 
upon their admission to prison in the states surveyed by BJS. In the most recently 
available BJS report, Maruschak (2006, 2008) reported that 36% of male state prison 
inmates report a medical limitation. In contrast, 20% of PADOC inmates report medical 
limitations, as recorded by correctional officer. This may reflect slight differences in 
reporting: the BJS statistic includes mental disabilities, whereas the PADOC statistic 
appears to reflect physical limitations, such as those that require bottom bunk or lower 
tier cell assignments. Moreover, according to the same BJS report, about 20% of the 
medical conditions reported are physical, as opposed to mental or learning disabilities, 
which comports with the PADOC figure (Maruschak, 2006, 2008).  
PADOC inmates report slightly more drug abuse than is reported in the most 
recently available national samples, but report similar alcohol abuse (Mumola, 1999; 
Mumola & Karberg, 2006; Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring II (ADAM II), 2008). In 
2004, 69.2% of state prison inmates reported using drugs at least once per week for more 
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than a month and 83.2% reported ever having used drugs (Mumola & Karberg, 2006). In 
1997, 51% of state prisoners reported committing their crimes while under the influence 
of drugs or alcohol. Mumola (1999) concluded that three out of four state prisoners are 
drug or alcohol dependent. In contrast, 85% of the releasees and cellmates in the PADOC 
cohorts report having drug problems and 71% report having problems with alcohol. 
While the PADOC percentages are slightly higher for drugs, they are not unreasonably 
high. The PADOC percentages comport with the higher end of the range of percentages 
of arrestees testing positive for drugs via the Arrestee Drug Abuse Monitoring II (ADAM 
II) program. (Note that ADAM II tests arrestees admitted local jails, not inmates admitted 
to state prisons. Nevertheless, ADAM II does provide information about drug use 
specifically in an offending population, such as the PADOC release cohort.) Across the 
ten ADAM II sites operational in 2003, between 65% and 89% of arrestees tested 
positive for at least one of ten drugs (ADAM II, 2008, p. 13). 
Educational achievement data for national prisoner samples is outdated. In the 
1990s, about 50% of prisoners admitted to and released from state prisons reported either 
graduating from high school or receiving their GED (Beck et al., 1993; Harlow, 2003; 
Durose & Mumola, 2004). PADOC inmates report more educational attainment than the 
average state prisoner reports: about 60% report achievement of a twelfth-grade 
education. Although they report being more highly educated, PADOC inmates report less 
employment than the national jail inmate samples surveyed by BJS. (Employment 
information among inmates was only available for jail inmates, not state prisoners.) Of 
course, jail inmates are not state prison inmates, so this could account for some of the 
difference, as might whether PADOC inmates report only full-time, as opposed to full-
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time and part-time employment, which is unknown. About one-quarter of PADOC 
inmates report some form of employment immediately prior to incarceration, whereas 
60% of jail inmates reported some form of employment (full-time, part-time, or 
occasional) before being arrested (James, 2004).  
Mental health problems: A dichotomous indicator of whether the inmate reported 
past mental health (psychological or suicidal) problems at initial classification  
 
Substance abuse problems: A dichotomous indicator of whether the inmate 
reported past alcohol or substance abuse problems at initial classification [*]  
 
Medical limitations: A dichotomous indicator of whether the inmate reported 
having a medical limitation at initial classification  
 
Prior employment: A dichotomous indicator of whether the inmate reported 
having a job prior to incarceration at initial classification  
 
IQ: A continuous measure of an inmate’s IQ 
Institutional context variables. Although much has been made of the potential 
for overcrowding to incite reoffending, little evidence that overcrowding increases 
recidivism has been generated (Farrington, 1980; Gaes, 1985). Additionally, violence in 
prison seems to have declined, even as prisons have become more crowded in recent 
decades (Diulio, 1987; Useem & Kimball, 1991; Crewe, 2007; NRC, 2014). Privacy, 
however, remains a concern in confined spaces (Adams, 1992; Crewe, 2007). Privacy 
may also help to determine how much time cellmates spend together. For example, cells 
in better location (e.g., higher level tiers) or that afford more space (e.g., square footage) 
are generally perceived to be more attractive, by both inmates and correctional officers. 
Inmates assigned to those cells might be wont to leave them, even given a less than 
desirable cellmate association. Therefore, information regarding these aspects of the cells 
is included in the data.  
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Cell size: A continuous measure of the square footage in a cell 
 
Cell tier: A dichotomous measure of whether a cell is on a lower (0) or an upper 
(1) tier 
 
Criminal history variables. Prior criminal behavior has been shown to be among 
the best predictors of future criminal behavior (Gendreau, Little, & Goggin, 1996; 
Kurlychek, Brame, & Bushway, 2006; Blumstein & Nakamura, 2009). For this reason, 
multiple variables that characterize an inmate’s prior offending are included as predictors 
of both celling assignments and recidivism outcomes. Each of these variables are 
included in or derived from official records.26 For example, the extensiveness of an 
inmate’s prior record and the seriousness of his current offense are reflected in his 
maximum sentence (Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing (PCS), 2012).  
Maximum sentence: A continuous measure of the inmate’s maximum possible 
sentence in months 
 
Stay length: Length of the inmate’s current stay of incarceration in months (i.e., 
time served 
 
Prior arrests: A continuous measure of the number of times the inmate was 
arrested prior to the current stay [*]  
 
Three charges: A dichotomous indicator of whether the inmate’s most recent 
arrest included three or more charges. (This is an LSI-R risk indicator.)   
 
Under 18 at first arrest: A dichotomous indicator of whether the inmate was aged 
18 or younger at the time of his first arrest on record with PADOC [*]  
 
Ever violated community supervision: A dichotomous indicator of whether the 
inmate has a parole violation on record [*]  
 
                                                 
26
 Sixteen releasees and Ninety-six cellmates are missing RAP sheets. For these releasees and cellmates, 
crime types associated with their incarceration offense were used to generate the prior offending dummy 
variables. The dummy variables are zero in the absence of information.  
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Cellmate relationship variables. The seventh proposition in Sutherland’s 
differential association theory states that differential associations may vary in their 
frequency, duration, priority, and intensity. These concepts are not independent, as has 
been noted by empirical researchers in the differential association tradition since Short’s 
initial tests of the theory (Short, 1956, 1958, 1960; Matsueda 1988; Warr, 1993, 2002).  
Burgess and Akers (1966) argued, that “[t]he concept of intensity could be 
operationalized to designate the number of the individual’s positive and negative 
reinforcers” (p. 164, emphasis in original), a conceptualization that Haynie’s (2002) 
operationalization of an “excess of definitions favorable to delinquency” (Sutherland & 
Cressey, 1955, p. 78), reflects. She operationalized Sutherland’s (1947) concept as the 
proportion of delinquent peers in a friendship network. A similar operationalization, [8], 
was used in the current study to characterize the cellmate pool: cellmate characteristics 
were weighted by the proportion of a releasee’s stay spent with the cellmate (i.e., the 
number of days the cellmate spent with the releasee relative to the total amount of time 
the releasee spent in prison).  
In this study, the main modality that moderates the analysis is the duration of the 
association of a releasee with his cellmate. Whether that duration is contiguous or spread 
over multiple stretches may be relevant, as it captures Sutherland’s (1947) notion of 
frequency. For example, the return of releasees to their prior cells or cellmates after an 
administrative separation reveals a clear preference, whether attributable to releasees or 
correctional officers, to maintain that releasee-cellmate association. Moving away from 
and back to a particular cellmate, therefore, captures the frequency of association that 
may be embedded in the duration of association metric.  
174 
 
How much time a releasee spends in prison before encountering a particular 
cellmate might also matter because it reflects Sutherland’s (1947) prediction that 
associations made earlier in life might be more relevant. Clemmer (1940, p. 102) echoed 
this importance in his adaptation of differential association to the prison context. 
However, empirical research in prisons contradicted this prediction. Wheeler (1961) 
found that time to release seemed to matter more because inmates may begin to 
disassociate with their fellow inmates as they anticipate their impending release (Glaser 
& Stratton, 1961; Garabedian, 1963, Wellford, 1967). Therefore, a measure of time to 
release at pairing was included.27  
Stretches. A continuous measure of the number of times a releasee was paired 
with a cellmate 
 
Time to release: A continuous measure of the number of days a releasee had until 
his release at the time of pairing with his cellmate 
 
 Recidivism risk. In the current study, recidivism risk scores serve as measures of 
observed criminality. They are conglomerate measures of the constituent factors thought 
to determine an inmate’s propensity to reoffend (Andrews & Bonta, 2000; Bushway et 
al., 2001). As discussed in Chapter 2, PADOC currently uses both the Level of Services 
Inventory-Revised (LSI-R) and its own Risk Screening Tool (RST) to assess each 
inmate’s recidivism risk. In the current data, however, both risk score variables either do 
not exist (because the RST was not yet implemented) or are too incomplete (due to 
inconsistent LSI-R testing) to use. Although the LSI-R includes too many lifestyle 
                                                 
27
 Note that, due to collinearity, both time to cellmate and time to release variable cannot be included if 
time served is also to be included. Time served is a key and quintessential variable in the measurement of 
both prison effects and prison peer effects (Bayer et al., 2009; Loughran et al., 2009; Nagin et al., 2009; 
Snodgrass et al., 2011). 
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variables to be credibly adapted using the current data, the RST can, with some 
modifications, be reconstructed using the current data. Shortcomings of employing the 
recidivism risk score as a measure of criminality were discussed in Chapter 4 and will be 
explored further in Chapter 10. The primary shortcoming is the absence of attitudinal 
indicators in the score, which does not capture definitions (Sutherland, 1947) well.  
 
*** [Table 5 here] *** 
 
 Reconstructing the RST. The PADOC’s Risk Screening Tool is an in-house risk 
classification assessment tool developed by Bret Bucklen, the Director of Planning, 
Research, and Statistics at PADOC. The RST has been tested in Pennsylvania and found 
to be nearly as reliable as the LSI-R (PADOC, 2012). The RST consists of seven 
indicators and has a range from zero to nine. A copy of the original RST instrument 
appears in the appendix associated with Chapter 2. The adaptation of the available data to 
reconstruct the RST is presented in Table 5 and discussed for each indicator in the RST. 
Reconstructed RST: A continuous measure of the recidivism risk of an inmate that 
is based on an adaptation of PADOC’s Risk Screening Tool with the available 
data 
 
Age 18 or under at first arrest: A dichotomous indicator of whether the inmate 
was under 18 at the time of his first arrest (1 point or 0 points). The original 
indicator for the RST was under 16 at time of first arrests. Although the PSP RAP 
sheet data do include some juvenile arrests, because they are adult arrest histories 
they do not reliably include juvenile arrests, so the threshold was raised. To the 
extent that inmates who were arrested at age 18, but not arrested at age 16, this 
measure will inflate the overall RST metric 
 
RST age: A categorical indicator of whether an inmate is 24 or younger (2 points); 




RST arrests: A categorical indicator of the number of prior arrests, which 
indicates whether an inmate has two or fewer arrests (0 points) between three and 
five arrests (1 point) or six or more arrests (2 points) prior to incarceration. The 
original RST indicator was prior convictions. The PADOC data do not include 
prior convictions, but they do include adult arrest histories. According to Durose 
(2007), individuals are arrested, on average, three times for every conviction, so 
this indicator was operationalized to reflect that average behavior. To the extent 
that convictions were more or less frequent with respect to arrest, this measure 
might under- or over-estimate risk in the RST metric 
 
Misconducts: Indicates whether an inmate was charged with an A or B level 
misconduct (1 point) 
 
Community supervision violations: While the current data to not include data 
from probation and parole, they do contain information on parole violations that 
resulted in recommitment to prison. To the extent that inmates may have violated 
community supervision either prior to an initial PADOC commitment or violated 
community supervision without incurring a recommitment, this measure will 
understate risk in the RST metric (1 point) 
 
Education less than grade 12: Indicates whether an inmate has less than a high 
school education (1 point) 
  
Alcohol or drug problem: Indicates whether an inmate reported having an alcohol 
or drug problem. While the RST scoring instructions specifically instruct the 
correctional officer scoring the tool to make their own assessment about whether 
an inmate has an alcohol or drug problem, this is likely not the case in the general 
initial classification battery. However, this metric is the best indicator available in 
the data to assess whether an inmate might have an alcohol or drug problem. To 
the extent that inmates self-report substance abuse problems when they do not 
have them, this measure will inflate the RST metric (1 point) 
 
Variables Pivotal to the Current Analysis 
Outcome variables. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, outcomes based on arrest 
records are the main outcomes to be explored in the current study. Reincarceration 
outcomes can be explored in future work, although reincarceration without arrest is 
included in the second outcome measure, described below. The potential shortcomings of 
these outcome variables were discussed in Chapter 4 and will be explored further in 
Chapter 10. Those potential shortcomings include the absence of attitudinal measures, the 
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inability to separate individual behavior from the agency of the criminal justice system, 
and the binary operationalization of the outcome.  
Rearrest: A dichotomous indicator of whether a releasee was rearrested for any 
offense within four years after his release 
 
Any recidivism: A dichotomous indicator of whether a releasee was rearrested 
within four years after his release or reincarcerated without being rearrested 
within four years after his release (877 releasees were reincarcerated without 
being rearrested) 
 
Differentiating/moderating variable. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, the 
duration of cellmate association is expected to delineate where prison peer effects can be 
detected. It is also expected to moderate them.  
Duration of association: A continuous measure of the number of days a releasee 
and a cellmate celled together 
 
Social interaction variables. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, the main 
variables of interest in this study are social interaction variables that reflect criminality 
and criminal experience characteristics of the releasee-cellmate association. In particular, 
differential exposure to potentially more criminogenic cellmates is hypothesized to 
foment future criminal behavior. The first three variables listed below reflect level 
characteristics of the inmates’ criminal experience and criminality. The latter two reflect 
the distance between the releasee and his paired cellmate in terms of criminality (i.e., 
recidivism risk) and prior arrests. The first-time releasees by definition have no prior 
incarcerations. As was mentioned above, the shortcomings of these variables with respect 
to construct validity and the implications of those shortcomings for the analysis are 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 10.  
Cellmate prior incarceration: A dichotomous indicator of whether the cellmate 




Inmate prior arrests: A continuous measure of how many times a releasee or 
cellmate had been arrested prior to his current prison stay 
 
Inmate RST: A continuous measure of a releasee or cellmate’s recidivism risk 
 
Relative number of prior arrests: A continuous measure of the difference between 
the cellmate’s number of prior arrests and the releasee’s number of prior arrests. 
Positive numbers indicate that the cellmate is more criminally experienced than 
the releasee. This measure follows the operationalization of McGloin (2009). 
 
Relative RST: A continuous measure of the difference between the cellmate’s 
RST score and the releasee’s RST score. Positive numbers indicate that the 
cellmate is at higher risk of recidivism than the releasee. This measure follows the 
operationalization of McGloin (2009) 
 
Potential instrumental variables. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, exclusion 
restrictions are required to identify the choice model in the local instrumental variables 
framework. These choices will be more thoroughly discussed in Chapter 8.  
Cellmate time to releasee: A continuous measure of how long a cellmate had been 
incarcerated before being paired with a releasee 
 
Cell size: A continuous measure of the square footage of the cell into which a 
releasee was initially placed 
 
Cell tier: A dichotomous measure of whether the cell into which a releasee is 
initially placed is on a lower (0) or an upper (1) tier 
 
The Characteristics of the Cohorts  
The release and cellmate cohorts combined contain 56,664 unique individuals. 
For simplicity, the characteristics of the releasees are reported based on their commitment 
dates, while those of their cellmates are reported with respect to the time of their first 
pairing with any releasee. (See Table 6.)  
On average, the releasees are 42% black, 14% married, and 30 years old, whereas 
their most stable or longest-duration cellmates are 45% black, 15% married, and 32 years 
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old, on average. The commit years in both cohorts range from 1968 to 2007. In terms of 
post-release offending amongst releasees, 58.45% (n=5,922) of the releasees have at least 
one post incarceration arrest on their RAP sheets during the four-year follow-up, while 
67.27% (n=6,815) were either rearrested or reincarcerated without being rearrested at 
least once before the end of the four-year follow-up.  
The releasees and the cellmates differ substantially with respect to their criminal 
histories. By definition, none of the releasees had been incarcerated prior to the current 
prison stay, whereas 29.66% (n=3,005) of the longest-duration cellmates had been 
previously incarcerated at least once. Fifteen percent (n=1,503) of the cellmates are 
known parole violators. The stable cellmates also have more prior arrests (6.7), on 
average, than do the releasees (5.5). The average RST scores associated with the cellmate 
cohort (4.8) are also slightly higher than they are for the releasee cohort (4.5). 
Collectively, the greater criminal experience and heightened criminality of the longest-
duration cellmates relative to their releasees suggests that, on average, those cellmates 
should exert criminogenic prison peer effects on the releasees.  
 
*** [Table 6 here] *** 
 
Limitations of the Data 
As previously discussed, there may be some measurement problems associated 
with the self-report measures stemming from the initial classification battery of questions. 
Inmates may have incentives to under or over report specific conditions and experiences. 
Correctional officers may have incentives to record specific conditions and experiences 
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incorrectly. However, the data overall are very complete, suggesting fastidiousness on the 
part of the correctional officers who record inmates’ information. In fields where scores, 
grades, or categorical information such as race, marital status, and religion are recorded, 
there is essentially no missing data and the data that are recorded appear to be recorded 
with very few errors in that the means and standard deviations are reasonable and there 
are few outliers. For example, the IQ measures have a mean (91) slightly below normal 
(100), as expected. Moreover, only ten inmates have IQs below 50, including four zeroes; 
and only 19 inmates have IQs above 140. The completeness of the recording and the 
consistency of the known metrics with other samples suggest that the other metrics are 
recorded with similar accuracy. Furthermore, the statistics derived from the PADOC data 
related to mental health, substance abuse, and other mental and physical limitations 
comport with those taken from national samples.  
As this is a study of celling decisions and the social interactions that stem from 
them, there may be some concern regarding the paucity of information available in the 
current data regarding correctional officer preferences and the correctional environment 
more generally. For example, information regarding cell locations, beyond their tier, is 
not available. Nor are, for example, surveys of correctional officers that might indicate 
varying preferences regarding initial cellmate placements and tolerances for convenience 
moves.  
It is important to recognize, however, that these data limitations are minimized in 
the local instrument variables (LIV) framework. As described in Chapters 3 and 4, the 
LIV framework adapts to the presence of both unobserved and essential heterogeneity. 
Therefore, these data limitations are less important in the context of the current analysis, 
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which is causal despite them. Moreover, while the unobserved heterogeneity is 
characterized in its entirety (i.e., with respect to all of its component elements) within the 
context of the method, the method represents a step forward in that it is able to 
characterize the contribution of the heterogeneity to variation in the estimates.  
Finally, as has been mentioned in previous chapters, the administrative data from 
PADOC and PSP do not include attitudinal measures. While the LSI-R does include 
some attitudinal measures, the LSI-R scores are too incomplete in the current sample to 
be useful. Moreover, the attitudinal measures cannot be separated from the behavioral 
measures in the data currently available: only the total LSI-R score is included in those 
data. However, as discussed in Chapter 4, the lack of attitudinal measures does not limit 
the applicability of the behavioral measures, which have been shown to be better 
predictors of peer influence in the criminological literature (Wellford, 1973; Warr & 
Stafford, 1991; Pratt et al., 2010).  
A main limitation of the data: exclusivity to Pennsylvania. The incarceration 
and arrest histories pertain exclusively to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The prior 
incarceration of a cellmate is indicative of his greater experience with the prison 
environment and greater experience with crime, more generally. Both are hypothesized to 
breed crime in the prison environment (Sutherland, 1947; Clemmer, 1950; Schrag, 1954; 
Mears et al., 2013). Cellmates who may have been incarcerated in other jurisdictions (i.e., 
other states, county jails) will be indicated as never having been incarcerated, even 
though they have prior experience with incarceration. If effects are criminogenic on 
average, their inclusion will bias those estimates toward zero. Similarly, the rearrest-
based outcomes are measured using RAP sheet data that was sourced exclusively from 
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Pennsylvania. If the releasees were rearrested in other states and prison peer effects are 
determined to be criminogenic on average, the prison peer effect estimates will, again, be 
biased toward zero. More generally, the number of times an inmate had previously been 
arrested also reflects his criminal experience. Inmates who have committed additional 
crimes that were not detected by police will not be captured. Again, if effects are 
criminogenic on average, excluding those offenses will bias estimates toward zero.  
Whether inmates appear to be differentially arrested, particularly in border 
counties, is an empirical question that was not addressed by the current study. However, a 
recent BJS report suggests that the bias due to missing arrests in other states will be 
small. The report indicated that only 10% of released prisoners were rearrested within 
five years in states other than the state in which they were released (Durose et al., 2014, 
p. 7). What percentage of those rearrestees was not also arrested in the state in which they 
were released was not reported. However, that a releasee who is still living in the state to 
which he was released would commit crimes exclusively in another state while not also 
committing them in his home state seems unlikely. In general, approximately 80% of 
Pennsylvania’s inmates are released on parole, which means they must return to the 
jurisdictions from which they were committed (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2014). Among the 
first-time releasees in the 2006-2007 cohort, 85.67% (n=8,679) were released on parole.  
In Summary 
 This chapter introduces a unique dataset to the criminological research 
community. Using administrative data from the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 
and the Pennsylvania State Police, the current data were assembled and constructed. 
Never before has a dataset that reflects complete cellmate assignments for the entirety of 
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prisoners’ stays been constructed. The data include both correctional and arrest history 
data, which enriches the analyses possible from it beyond the capabilities of typical 
criminological data that are limited to correctional or arrestee samples. In addition to 
criminal history information, the data include all of the information (demographic and 
contextual) maintained by PADOC. While the data have some limitations, they represent 
the best currently available information on a cellmate sample from an adult prison 




CHAPTER 7: A Formal Model for Recovering Treatment Effects  under Essential 
Heterogeneity 
 This chapter follows Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005), Heckman, Urzua, and 
Vytlacil (2006), and Basu, Heckman, Navarro, and Urzua (2007) to formally present the 
local instrumental variables method for estimating marginal treatment effect parameters 
and to explain how those parameters relate to other treatment effect parameters and the 
concept of essential heterogeneity. It assumes some basic calculus, econometric, and 
statistical knowledge. Full derivations are not presented in this chapter, as they can be 
referenced in the aforementioned articles.  
A Basic Model Based on Potential Outcomes 
 In a potential outcomes (Fisher, 1935; Roy, 1951; Cox, 1958; Rubin, 1978) 
framework that assesses the role of a single treatment in producing two average 
outcomes, one for the treated individuals and one for the untreated individuals, the two 
potential outcomes can be denoted 𝑌0𝑖  and 𝑌1𝑖  . Those outcomes take the following forms: 
𝑌1 = 𝜇1(𝑋) + 𝑈1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑌0 = 𝜇0(𝑋) + 𝑈0     [9] 
where characteristics 𝑋 are observed by the researcher and the decision maker and 
characteristics 𝑈 are certainly unobserved by the researcher, but may or may not be 
known to the decision maker. The fundamental problem of causal inference is that each 
individual can only assume one treatment value (Rubin, 1978). Randomization is 
intended to solve this fundamental problem (Fisher, 1935), as are statistical techniques 
that allow for causal inference, as described in Chapter 3 (Imbens & Angrist, 1994; 
Heckman & Vytlacil, 1999, 2005). 
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In this study, the outcome is reoffended (or not) and treatment is having spent a 
specific percentage (or more) of total prison stay time with a best cellmate. If 𝐷𝑖 = 0 
denotes the untreated case and 𝐷𝑖 = 1 denotes the treated case, the realization of the 
outcome 𝑌𝑖  for each individual is:  
𝑌𝑖 = 𝐷𝑖𝑌1𝑖 + (1 − 𝐷𝑖)𝑌0𝑖    [10] 
Heckman and Vytlacil (1999) assume that a latent variable model determines the 
decision maker’s treatment condition. Specifically, the latent variable 𝐷∗ is assumed to 
take the form: 
𝐷𝑖
∗ = 𝜇𝐷(𝑍𝑖) − 𝑈𝐷𝑖 , 
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓𝐷𝑖
∗ ≥ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑖 = 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒    [11]  
In this case 𝑍𝑖 represents the observed and 𝑈𝐷𝑖 represents the unobserved random 
variables. 
This is the basic model.  
The basic model is based on the economic notion of utility whereby the 
underlying latent variable 𝐷𝑖
∗ represents the net benefit to the decision maker of choosing 
the treated state. 𝐷𝑖
∗ has an index structure and can take on multiple values, which 
translate to the treated condition above a threshold value and to the untreated condition 
below that threshold value, as will be described in more detail as the chapter proceeds. To 
make this more concrete for now,  𝐷𝑖
∗ might, for example, represent the potential amount 
or type of criminality-enhancing information that could be transferred from a cellmate to 
a releasee in a given amount of time. If the releasee suspects that that he can acquire more 
criminal skills from his cellmate, he may remain with his cellmate for a longer period of 
time, thereby enhancing the criminogenic effect of the association. As described in 
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Chapter 3, this basic model implies a two-step process. The first-step is a decision to be 
treated. That treatment decision leads to a second step in which the consequences of that 
decision are determined.  
Identifying Assumptions 
 The local instrumental variables (LIV) framework of Heckman and Vytlacil 
(1999, 2005) requires that several identifying assumptions be imposed on the basic 
model. They are: 
A1. 𝑌0𝑖  and 𝑌1𝑖  are defined for everyone. That is, there are realizations of outcomes 
stemming from both treatments in the study sample. 
A2. 𝑌0 and 𝑌1 have finite first moments. That is, the expectations of 𝑌0 and 𝑌1 are well 
defined, meaning they have mean values. 
A3. 𝑌0𝑖  and 𝑌1𝑖  are independent across decision makers, meaning the stable unit 
treatment value assumption (SUTVA) applies (Cox, 1958).  
A4. 𝜇𝐷(𝑍) is a nondegenerate random variable conditional on 𝑋 = 𝑥, meaning, 
𝜇𝐷(𝑍) can take on more than one value, which determines treatment by virtue of 
its status as an exclusion restriction. This is one of Imbens and Angrist’s (1994) 
instrumental variable assumptions: The instrument 𝑍 affects treatment 𝐷 only 
through the endogenous regressor 𝑋. 
A5. (𝑈𝐷 ,𝑈0) and (𝑈𝐷 , 𝑈1) are independent of (𝑍, 𝑋). This is the second instrumental 
variables assumption from Imbens and Angrist (1994), which states that the error 




A6. (𝑈𝐷 , 𝑈0) and (𝑈𝐷 ,𝑈1) are continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure on ℜ
2
.28 
This implies that 𝑈𝐷 is distributed uniformly over the range between zero and 
one. 
A7. 1 > 𝑃𝑟 (𝐷 = 1|𝑋) > 0. , meaning the probability of being treated is well defined 
(i.e., there are both treated and untreated individuals in the study sample and the 
probability of treatment does not exceed one or fall below zero for any 
individual).  
A8. 𝑋0 = 𝑋1 almost everywhere. That is, the treated and control groups are 
observationally equivalent (i.e., comparable), such that there is “common support 
of the propensity score” (e.g., Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983, 1984; Apel & Sweeten, 
2010b). The propensity score (i.e., propensity to be treated) defines to whom 
treatment effects apply. Common support of the propensity score means that for 
each propensity to be treated based on observables, there are people who both 
select into treatment and people who do not select into treatment.  
Potential assumption violations: SUTVA. The assumption most likely to be 
violated in the current study is the stable unit treatment value assumption. SUTVA may 
be violated for two reasons. The first is that some releasees share the same longest-
duration (i.e., most time-intensive) cellmate. The other, potentially more serious threat to 
                                                 
28
 A Lebesque measure is the notion of length extended to more complicated sets (e.g., beyond the distance 
between two points). That is, if length is the distance between two points, a and b, or b-a, a Lebesque 
measure extends that notion to multiple dimensions. This assumption is, as Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) 
put it, “a technical assumption made primarily for expositional convenience” (p. 676). It is akin to 
assuming continuity in two dimensions or over a plane, thereby allowing for integration.  
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the validity of the assumption, is that decisions regarding the length of cellmate 
associations do not rest exclusively with the releasee. 
 In the first-time release cohort under study, 17% (n=1,716) of the releasees share 
the same most stable, longest-duration cellmate. Therefore, the first releasee to have been 
treated by spending a particular amount of time with that cellmate could potentially 
influence the second releasee’s treatment. However, as the discussion in the chapter to 
follow will indicate, while a releasee might enter into a cellmate relationship based on 
information about a cellmate, whether that relationship persists is more likely to be based 
on aspects of his particular relationship with his cellmate, rather than the prior 
relationship of his cellmate with another releasee.  
The more serious potential SUTVA violation emerges from the nature of social 
interactions relative to the potential outcomes framework upon which LIV is based: they 
are not one-sided decisions. Social interactions necessarily take place between at least 
two people. In the current study, social interactions occur upon the pairing of a releasee 
with a cellmate. In the PADOC correctional system, how long that pairing endures may 
involve the agency of the releasee, the agency of his cellmate, the agency of both the 
releasee and his cellmate (e.g., via a cellmate request, as described in Chapter 5) or it may 
involve the agency of neither the releasee nor his cellmate: celling decisions may be 
completely attributable to correctional officer preferences.  
To avoid SUTVA violations in the current application of the LIV method, the 
releasee alone is assumed to make the decision to remain with a cellmate. While this does 
not completely accord with the nature of socially-determined celling decisions that may 
potentially be made by the releasee, his cellmate, correctional officers, or some 
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combination thereof, the LIV model allows for this departure from reality because it 
enables the characterization of the collective unobserved heterogeneity attributable to the 
preferences of each of the social actors. In the current application of the LIV method to 
social interaction effects, the preferences of the inmates and the correctional officers are 
unobserved. That is, the agency of the releasee, the agency of his cellmate, the agency of 
the correctional officers and, indeed, the agency of the broader correctional system that 
could be reflected in celling policies (e.g., maintaining minimum racial percentages per 
block, as reported in the bed assignment surveys that appear in the appendix to Chapter 
5), are each unobserved determinants of the duration of cellmate association.  
When treatment effects estimated via LIV are reported, they are reported with 
respect to the collective unobservables, which means that the unobserved determinants of 
the duration of cellmate association attributable to cellmate preferences, correctional 
officer and correctional system preferences, and releasee preferences are each lumped 
into a conglomerate measure of the potential variation in the social interaction effect 
estimates that results from essential heterogeneity. Moreover, the potential essential 
heterogeneity is not limited to only the unobservables related to the agency of the 
aforementioned actors: all unobserved factors are included the collective unobservables 
(e.g., inmate illnesses that result in their transfer, prison closings, etc.). Estimates 
reported with respect to the collective unobservables reflect their collective effect on 
outcomes, which limits the potential for inferences to be made based upon the 
unobserved information because it is impossible to know which of the unobserved factors 
(i.e., those attributable to unobserved releasee characteristics, unobserved cellmate 
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characteristics, unobserved correctional officer characteristics, or other factors, such as 
the unobserved conditions of the cell) might be more or less critical to releasee outcomes. 
Although this operationalization does not a perfectly reflect the processes that 
generate prison peer effects, neither does any empirical analysis based on the popular 
linear-in-means model, which implicitly makes the same assumption regarding a single 
decision maker  (Durlauf & Ioannides, 2010; Sacerdote, 2014). This includes every prior 
empirical peer effect analysis in the criminological literature and most in the economic 
literature.  
The current analysis improves upon prior analyses by taking the first step of 
applying the LIV model to estimate causal social interaction effects. Other methods do 
not eliminate bias due to essential heterogeneity nor do they characterize the contribution 
of the unobservables in any way. The LIV method does. Moreover, when the releasee is 
viewed as the decision maker and all other factors are unobserved: any given releasee’s 
treatment (i.e., his longest-duration cellmate) does not affect the treatment of other 
releasees who are assigned to different time-intensive cellmates. SUTVA can hold.  
The Propensity to Be Treated and the Propensity Not to Be Treated 
Given the preceding assumptions, the propensity score or the probability of 
receiving treatment conditional on the instrument and other observables can be defined 
as: 
 𝑃(𝑧) = Pr(𝐷 = 1|𝑍 = 𝑧) = 𝐹𝑈𝐷 |𝑋(𝜇𝐷(𝑍))   [12]  
where 𝐹 is the distribution of  𝑈𝐷 conditional on 𝑋 and 𝜇𝐷(𝑍) = 𝑃(𝑍). 
 Recall equation [11] and note that it can be restated such that:  
𝐷∗ = 𝑣(𝑍) − 𝑉    [13] 
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where V is a continuous random variable that reflects the unknown determinants of the 
decision to be treated. This restatement of the determinants of treatment illuminates the 
relationships in [14]. The observed characteristics that determine the propensity score are 
a function of the instrument, whereas the unobservables are independent of it. The 
propensity not to be treated is, therefore, a function of the unobservables:  
𝜇𝐷(𝑍) = 𝐹𝑉|𝑋(𝑣(𝑍)) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑈𝐷 = 𝐹𝑉|𝑋(𝑉)   [14] 
Treatment Effects 
In this section, the mean parameters that correspond to treatment effects relevant 
to the current study will be defined:29 the average effect of treatment (ATE) parameter, 
local average effect of treatment (LATE) parameter, and the marginal effect of treatment 
(MTE) parameter, which is equivalent to the local instrumental variable (LIV) 
parameter.30 To begin, note that the treatment effect for an individual decision maker 𝑖 is 
∆𝑖= 𝑌1𝑖 − 𝑌0𝑖. 
 Average treatment effect. This gain from treatment is comprised of two 
components: the average treatment effect (ATE) and unobserved heterogeneity. 
Following Heckman and Vytlacil (1999) and Basu et al. (2007) the average treatment 
effect is equal to:  
𝐴𝑇𝐸(𝑋) = 𝐸(∆|𝑋 = 𝑥) = 𝜇1(𝑋) − 𝜇0(𝑋)   [15] 
                                                 
29
 For other treatment effect definitions and derivations of these parameters see Heckman & Vytlacil (1999, 
2001, 2005).  
30 Heckman and Vytlacil (1999) framed the LIV method in terms of the LIV parameter, whereas Heckman 
and Vytlacil (2005) framed the LIV method in terms of the MTE parameter. The MTE parameter is 
preferable because it more clearly highlights the role that unobserved information plays in treatment 
decisions and their outcomes.  
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Unobserved heterogeneity is represented by 𝑈1 − 𝑈0 from the potential outcomes model. 
The ATE is the effect of treatment, averaged over all individuals in the sample. 
 Local average treatment effect. The local average treatment effect of Imbens 
and Angrist (1994) is defined as the effect of treatment on those who are induced to be 
treated by an arbitrary shift in the instrumental variable from 𝑧 to 𝑧′. In this latent variable 
decision making framework, the instrumental variable is the propensity score 𝑃(𝑧) and 
the LATE is defined as: 
𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸 (𝑥, 𝑃(𝑧),𝑃(𝑧 ′)) =
𝐸(𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥, 𝑃(𝑍) = 𝑃(𝑧)) − 𝐸 (𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥, 𝑃(𝑍) = 𝑃(𝑧 ′))
𝑃(𝑧) − 𝑃(𝑧 ′)
 
where 𝑧 and 𝑧′ are realizations of Z for which 𝑃(𝑧) ≠ 𝑃(𝑧 ′), which reduces to: 
𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐸 (𝑥, 𝑃(𝑧),𝑃(𝑧 ′)) = 𝐸(∆|𝑋 = 𝑥, 𝑃(𝑧 ′) ≤  𝑈𝐷 ≤ 𝑃(𝑧))   [16] 
where 𝑈𝐷 is a probability transformation of 𝑈𝐷 that results in the following uniform 
distribution: 𝑈𝐷 = 𝐹𝑈𝐷 (𝑈𝐷) 
 Local instrumental variables. The local instrumental variable (LIV) parameter is 
the limit of the LATE as 𝑃(𝑧) → 𝑃(𝑧 ′). That is, LATEs apply over intervals, MTEs apply 
at points. As such the LIV parameter takes the form of a derivative, such that the LIV 
equals the derivative of the outcome with respect to the propensity score,  
𝐿𝐼𝑉(𝑥, 𝑃(𝑧)) =
𝜕𝐸(𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥, 𝑃(𝑍) = 𝑃(𝑧))
𝜕𝑃(𝑧)
 
which reduces to:   
𝐿𝐼𝑉(𝑥, 𝑃(𝑧)) = 𝐸(∆|𝑋 = 𝑥, 𝑈𝐷 = 𝑃(𝑧))   [17] 
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The observed aspects of the decision maker’s treatment choice 𝑍 enter the 
calculus only through their index 𝜇𝐷(𝑧), which determines the propensity score. The 𝑍 
then can be used to define the following probabilities, which clarify the relationship 
between the outcomes, the propensity score, and the observed and unobserved 
determinants of treatment. 
Pr(𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥,𝑍 = 𝑧, 𝐷 = 1) = Pr (𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥,𝑈𝐷 ≤ 𝜇𝐷(𝑧))  [17a]  
Pr(𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥,𝑍 = 𝑧, 𝐷 = 0) = Pr (𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥,𝑈𝐷 > 𝜇𝐷(𝑧))  [17b]  
𝑎𝑛𝑑 
Pr(𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥,𝑈𝐷 ≤ 𝜇𝐷(𝑧))) = Pr (𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥, 𝑈𝐷 ≤ 𝑃(𝑧))  [17c]  
Pr(𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥, 𝑈𝐷 > 𝜇𝐷(𝑧)) = Pr (𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥, 𝑈𝐷 > 𝑃(𝑧))  [17d]  
The preceding equations communicate the relationship between utility and the 
unobserved determinants of treatment ([17a-b]) and the relationship between the 
propensity to be treated and the unobserved determinants of treatment ([17c-d]). They are 
similar. When observed characteristics (or utility) are more important than unobserved 
characteristics to a treatment decision, individuals are treated, whereas when unknown 
factors are more important than known factors (or utility), individuals remain untreated.  
Marginal treatment effects. The local instrumental variables concept (Heckman 
& Vytlacil, 1999) was a precursor to the concept of marginal treatment effects, as refined 
in Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) and more fully realized by Heckman et al. (2006). 
Unlike the parameters they had discussed in their 1999 article, Heckman and Vytlacil 
(2005) do not define the marginal treatment effect (MTE) parameter in terms of the 
propensity score. Instead they define the MTE as “the mean effect of treatment on those 
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for whom 𝑋 = 𝑥  and 𝑈𝐷 = 𝑢𝐷” (Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005, p. 678). That is, for those 
whose realizations of observed and unobserved characteristics have specific values, the 
MTE is defined as: 
𝑀𝑇𝐸(𝑥,𝑢𝐷) = 𝐸(∆|𝑋 = 𝑥, 𝑈𝐷 = 𝑢𝐷)    [18] 
 While this change in terminology and orientation is somewhat confusing, the 
MTE parameter is equivalent to the LIV parameter. The equivalency of the relationship 
between the MTE parameter and the LIV parameter is evident in equations [17c-d], 
which show the relationship between the propensity score and the unobserved 
determinants of a decision. It can also be derived as shown in Heckman et al. (2006, p. 
397).  
Relationship between the parameters. Heckman and Vytlacil (1999) show that 
“LIV defines the treatment effect more finely than do LATE, ATE, or TT,” such that 
“[e]ach parameter is an average value of LIV, 𝐸(∆|𝑋 = 𝑥, 𝑈𝐷 = 𝑢), but for values of 𝑈𝐷 
lying in different intervals” (p. 4731). In other words, MTEs are point estimates, whereas 
other treatment effects ordinarily are not.  
Expressing the MTE in terms of 𝑋 and 𝑢𝐷 (instead of 𝑋 and 𝑝, as in the LIV 
parameter) highlights the role of the unobservables in generating the MTE parameters. 
The other treatment parameters can then be expressed in terms of weighted integrals over 
the propensity score (from zero to one) of the MTE with respect to the unobservables 
(Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005, p. 680).  
𝐴𝑇𝐸(𝑋) = ∫ 𝛥𝑀𝑇𝐸(𝑥,𝑢𝐷)𝜕𝑢𝐷
1
0
    [19] 
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All other treatment parameters (except the LATE) are weighted versions of this 
relationship such that the weights are multiplied by the MTE, which implies that if 
𝐸(∆|𝑋 = 𝑥, 𝑈𝐷 = 𝑢𝐷) = 𝐸(∆|𝑋 = 𝑥) and there is no unobserved heterogeneity, all 
treatment effect parameters will be the same. This is the only case in which a single, 
unique effect of treatment for all individuals can be identified (i.e., under response 
homogeneity).  







   [20] 
 The contrast between the integration endpoints of the ATE and the LATE 
illustrates what Heckman and Vytlacil (1999) meant when they said the treatment 
parameters are interval dependent. In the case where the instrument is the propensity 
score, the MTE is integrated over the interval from zero to one to calculate the ATE, 
whereas is it is integrated over the interval 𝑃(𝑧) ≥ 0 to 𝑃(𝑧′) ≤ 1 t to get the LATE. 
While the LATE could apply over the region between zero and one, it typically does not.  
The relationship between MTEs and essential heterogeneity. As has been 
previously stated, essential heterogeneity is heterogeneity that results from some 
combination of selection on levels (unobservables) and selection on gains (outcomes). 
Estimating the marginal treatment effects tests for essential heterogeneity. If the MTEs 
are flat over an arbitrary interval with respect to the propensity score, there is no essential 
heterogeneity. If the MTEs are nonlinear with respect to the propensity score, essential 
heterogeneity is present (Heckman et al., 2006).  
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The importance of the propensity score. Heckman et al. (2006) argue 
convincingly for the importance of the propensity score as an instrument. Operationally, 
the propensity score, 𝑃(𝑍), is an ideal instrument because it always produces positive 
weights for the MTE and the LATE, which is not necessarily the case when other 
instruments are used, as shown in Basu et al. (2007). Conceptually, the propensity score 
helps to highlight the influence of the observed and unobserved determinants of the 
treatment decision. For the observed aspects of the treatment decision, the propensity to 
be treated is can be estimated. As [17c] and [17d] show, the strength of the influence of 
the unobservables can then be ascertained by determining whether or not an individual is 
treated given his propensity to be treated. For well-defined questions, this allows the 
individuals to whom treatment effects apply to be identified based on their observed 
characteristics. This is a unique feature of the LIV method (Heckman et al., 2006; 
Heckman & Urzua, 2010).  
Heckman and Urzua (2010) criticize ordinary instrumental variables methods for 
their failure to identify the portions of the populations to which LATEs apply beyond the 
broad statement that they apply to those who opt into treatment as a result of the 
manipulation of the instrument. In the LIV method, this population and its features can be 
identified via the propensity score, which is a summary measure that reflects the 
probability of selecting into treatment. While different levels of the covariates will 
generate different propensity scores, which makes it difficult to generalize broadly 
regarding the contribution of any single covariate to outcomes after treatment, if an 
individual’s propensity to select into treatment based on observables can be identified and 
an MTE can be identified at that propensity score (i.e., there is common support) the 
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treatment effects that apply to that individual can then be identified, as can the 
contributions made to those effects by each of the observed covariates and the collective 
unobserved information.  
The importance of the validity of the choice model. The latent choice model for 
treatment is the first step relationship that generates the propensity score used as an 
instrument in the prediction of the outcome. The model characterizes the decision 
maker’s treatment decision and, thus, deserves careful consideration: that decision 
making process must be well understood. (Hence, the condition that questions be well-
posed.) Heckman et al. (2006) show that the choice model must be specified correctly to 
identify any treatment effects under conditions where essential heterogeneity is present.  
If the choice model is misspecified, the weights that need to be applied to MTEs to 
determine the various treatment parameters will be incorrect.  
Correct specification of the choice model may seem like an impossible task that 
will circle inevitably back to the original problem of omitted variables bias in selection 
models (Imbens, 2009; Heckman & Urzua, 2010). However, as Basu et al. (2007) 
observed, while all available instruments should be included in the choice model, not all 
potential instruments need to be included. By “correctly specified,” what is meant is that 
the unobservables 𝑈𝐷 are independent of the instruments, 𝑍, and the observed 
characteristics of the decision environment, 𝑋. That is, a potential instrument could be 
omitted, but as long as it is independent of the other instruments and 𝑋′𝑠, the 




Interpreting marginal treatment effects. Per Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 
2005) MTEs can be interpreted in three ways, which are equivalent as long as equation 
[11] holds, that is, as long as the choice model is valid. In the current study, the second 
interpretation is the focus because it highlights the unique ability of the LIV method to 
characterize the contribution of the unobservables to the outcomes. 
1. ∆𝐿𝐼𝑉(𝑥,𝑝) or ∆𝑀𝑇𝐸(𝑥,𝑢) “is the average effect for people who are just 
indifferent between participation or not at the given value of the instrument (i.e., 
for people who are indifferent at 𝑃(𝑧) = 𝑝)” (Heckman & Vytlacil, 1999, p. 
4731), that is, “if they were exogenously assigned a value of 𝑍, say 𝑧, such that 
𝜇𝐷(𝑧) = 𝑢𝑑” (Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005, p. 679). In other words, as if they were 
randomly assigned to treatment and control conditions, as described in Chapter 3. 
2. ∆𝐿𝐼𝑉(𝑥,𝑝) or ∆𝑀𝑇𝐸(𝑥,𝑢) “for values of 𝑝 close to zero is the average effect for 
individuals with unobservable characteristics that make them most inclined to 
participate” (Heckman & Vytlacil, 1999, pp. 4731-2) and “who would participate 
even if the mean scale utility 𝜇𝐷(𝑧) were small” (Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005, p. 
679). Likewise, ∆𝐿𝐼𝑉(𝑥,𝑝) or ∆𝑀𝑇𝐸(𝑥,𝑢)  “for values of 𝑝 close to one is the 
average treatment effect for individuals with unobservable characteristics that 
make them the least inclined to participate” (Heckman & Vytlacil, 1999, p. 4732). 
“If 𝑈𝐷 is large, 𝜇𝐷(𝑧) would have to be large to induce people to participate” 
(Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005, p. 679). In other words, the observed propensity to 




3. “A third interpretation is that MTE conditions on 𝑋 and the residual defined by 
subtracting the expectation of 𝐷∗ from 𝐷∗[, such that] 𝑈𝐷 = 𝐷
∗ − 𝐸(𝐷∗|𝑍, 𝑋)” 
(Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005, p. 679). In a linear regression framework, this is akin 
to writing 𝜀 = 𝑦 − 𝛼 − 𝛽. The unobserved components of treatment are equal to 
the treatment minus the expected value of the treatment given the observed 
components of treatment. 
Adaptation of the LIV Framework to the Study of Prison Peer Effects Moderated 
by Duration 
The main difference between the current LIV implementation and the basic LIV 
framework outlined above is the addition of duration to the choice and outcome models 
such that the choice model [11] becomes [21] and the outcome model [10] becomes [22]. 
 
𝐷𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝜇𝐷(𝑍𝑖𝑡) − 𝑈𝐷𝑖𝑡 , 
 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 1 𝑖𝑓𝐷𝑖𝑡
∗ ≥ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒    [21] 
In the current study, the addition of the temporal dependence is handled in an 
analytically simplistic manner: the LIV model is implemented for three duration 
thresholds, the choice of which is discussed in the following chapter. When considered in 
concert with each other, those three models allow for examination of the presence of 
temporal variation in average and marginal prison peer effect estimates. 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐷𝑖𝑡𝑌1𝑖𝑡 + (1 − 𝐷𝑖𝑡)𝑌0𝑖𝑡    [22] 
In Summary 
This chapter formally outlines the basic local instrumental variables framework, 
as exposited by Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2005). Limitations of the application of the 
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LIV method to the study of social interaction effects were discussed. A minor 
modification was made to allow for temporal variation in the prison peer effect estimates 
to be generated through an empirical application of this framework, which will be 
presented in Chapter 9. The current chapter is followed by Chapter 8, which lays the 
groundwork for the final LIV implementation. In Chapter 8, preliminary analyses are 
presented, the instruments are justified, potential duration thresholds are examined, and 






CHAPTER 8: Preparatory Analyses, Duration Thresholds, and Essential 
Heterogeneity 
In hypothesizing that cellmates matter, such that social interactions with 
criminogenic cellmates will exert criminogenic prison peer effects that can explain some 
portion of the criminogenic effects observed several years after inmates are released from 
prison (Nagin et al., 2009), the current study relies on Sutherland’s (1947) differential 
association theory and developmental cascades (Masten et al., 2005). Potentially 
criminogenic cellmates are cellmates who, based on their past offending behavior and 
other life outcomes (e.g., education, substance abuse), appear to have more criminal 
experience and the criminal attitudes and skills (i.e., criminality) that are consistent with 
more criminal experience. Levels of criminal experience and criminality are indicated by 
the number of prior arrests and the risk assessment scores of the Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections (PADOC) first-time releasees and their cellmates and, for the 
cellmates, by whether they have a prior incarceration. Per balance theory, relative 
distances between the criminal experience and criminality of releasees and their cellmates 
are expected to moderate the relationship between criminogenic cellmates and 
reoffending (McGloin, 2009).  
Overview of the Current Chapter 
The current chapter presents preliminary analyses that lay the groundwork for the 
final local instrumental variables (LIV) model to be presented in Chapter 9. Linear 
probability models (LPM) for the choice and outcome models are discussed. The 
instrumental variables are justified conceptually and empirically, through LPM and 
instrumental variables (IV) specifications. Duration thresholds are explored via IV 
202 
 
methods. Finally, the presence of essential heterogeneity is established via Heckman et 
al.’s (2006) test for it. These analyses demonstrate that prison peer effects on reoffending 
have the potential to emerge through cellmate associations and delineate when in the 
development of those associations those effects might become detectable. Prison peer 
effects are not estimated in this chapter, which presents only preliminary analyses. The 
final analyses that estimate prison peer effects are presented in Chapter 9. 
Linear probability model specifications. As described in Chapters 4 and 7, the 
LIV model is comprised of two equations: a choice model and an outcome model. The 
choice model estimates the propensity for releasees to remain in cellmate associations 
over time. The outcome model estimates the effect of those choices on releasees’ 
reoffending outcomes, rearrest and more general recidivism, which is defined as rearrest 
or reincarceration without rearrest. In the current chapter, those models are outlined and 
justified, beginning with simple linear probability model specifications for both the 
choice and outcome models.  
Linear probability models are the baseline specifications upon which the 
instrumental variables and local instrumental variables specifications are built. While 
they do not address selection or apply to dichotomous outcomes, LPMs are illustrative of 
whether the theoretically expected relationships might emerge: they can establish whether 
there is likely to be an association between reoffending and duration of association. 
Additionally, they can demonstrate how well the data predict the duration of cellmate 
associations. They further allow for a quick verification that prospective exclusion 
restrictions predict the duration of cellmate associations, but do not predict reoffending. 
They may also highlight other potential exclusion restrictions and reveal the presence of 
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significant predictors of reoffending other than the social interaction variables (prior 
arrest, prior incarceration, and risk scores) of primary interest. Finally, in comparison 
with results from instrumental variables and local instrumental variables (LIV) 
specifications, LPMs illustrate the effect that biases due to unobserved and essential 
heterogeneity have on effect estimates.  
Instrumental variables specifications. After the relationships between the 
primary dependent and independent variables and the covariates are explored via the 
LPM specifications, bias due to unobserved heterogeneity, or selection on levels, in the 
relationship between cellmate social interactions and reoffending is addressed through 
instrumental variables models, including two-stage least squares (Imbens & Angrist, 
1994) and Stata’s ivprobit routine. The means through which instrumental variables 
isolate effects, even in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, was discussed 
thoroughly in Chapter 3, so only the 2SLS and ivprobit instrumental variables 
implementations are presented in this chapter. Through the IV implementations, the 
conceptual and statistical validity of the exclusion restrictions is established. After initial 
IV models are estimated, the potential for variation in duration of cellmate associations to 
differentially impact releasees, both alone and in relation to the timing of the pairing 
relative to the releasee’s stay, is assessed. 
The role of duration. The duration of cellmate associations is expected to 
delineate the temporal regions in which prison peer effects might arise, as well as to 
moderate them. A continuous operationalization of duration, such as ivprobit requires and 
that has been applied previously in the criminological literature (e.g., Warr, 1993; Haynie 
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et al., 2005), assumes that each additional day spent with a cellmate will impact a 
releasee similarly.  
While Sutherland (1947) and Clemmer (1940) predicted a positive relationship 
between duration of association and peer influence, prior prison studies and balance 
theory suggest that the relationship between duration and prison peer effects might be 
nonlinear (Wheeler, 1961; Garabedian, 1963; Wellford, 1967; McGloin, 2009). Cellmate 
associations may take some time to develop and to exert prison peer effects because 
cellmate associations are often nascent, not established, social relationships. Moreover, 
even if cellmates have a prior social relationship (e.g., on the cellblock or in a job 
assignment), living in close quarters with that person, which brings its own unique 
challenges (Becker, 1974; Schwartz, 2013), is at the very least a new stage of that 
association. As prison peer associations evolve, prison peer effects may also dwindle due 
to anticipatory socialization effects as inmates approach their release dates (Merton, 
1957; Wheeler, 1961) or they may dwindle as a function of tendencies toward balance in 
associations (McGloin, 2009).  
The presence of essential heterogeneity. To determine whether prison peer 
effects take some time to emerge from newly-established cellmate associations and to 
determine whether they relate nonlinearly to the duration of cellmate association, 
successive thresholds of that duration are explored through LPM and 2SLS analyses. The 
duration of cellmate association is not shown to be significant at any threshold in any 
model of rearrest. However, for some duration thresholds the effect of duration on 
recidivism is significant or and pointing consistently in the criminogenic direction. This 
variation in outcomes at different duration thresholds suggests that the average treatment 
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effect estimated via the ivprobit routine may not appropriately characterize marginal 
prison peer effects with respect to time, even though ivprobit accurately models a 
dichotomous outcome affected by a continuous treatment (Nichols, 2011). 
To see if essential heterogeneity is present, Heckman, et al.’s (2006) test for 
essential heterogeneity is applied at each duration threshold. Those tests reveal the 
presence of essential heterogeneity and dictate the implementation of a method that can 
control for it. To that end, Heckman and Vytlacil’s (1999, 2005) method of local 
instrumental variables (LIV) will be described and implemented in Chapter 9. That LIV 
implementation will provide an answer to the question of whether cellmates matter in the 
production of reoffending. 
The Choice and Outcome Models 
To initially examine whether criminogenic cellmates might affect the reoffending 
outcomes of a first-time PADOC release cohort and whether the duration of cellmate 
association can be predicted using the potential exclusion restrictions described in 
Chapter 6, it is useful to estimate linear probability models for the choice and outcome 
models. LPMs are ordinary least squares regressions applied to dichotomous outcomes. 
Although biased due to the functional form incompatibility, linear probability models are 
easy to implement and to interpret (Long, 1997; Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Chesher, 
2010). They therefore allow for a quick demonstration that a relationship between 
reoffending and the duration of cellmate association exists, is likely to be robust to 
specification, and that the duration of cellmate association can itself be predicted with 




Five linear probability models, one for the choice model (days spent with 
cellmate) and two for each outcome, rearrest and recidivism, are estimated. Variables 
related to releasees, cellmates, criminal experience and criminality (i.e., social interaction 
variables), cellmate pools, other cellmate association and prison context factors, releasee-
cellmate homophily, PADOC facility fixed effects, and the potential instruments are 
added to each of the five model in succession.31 For descriptions of these variables and 
why they are relevant to the study of prison peer effects please see Chapters 2, 4, and 6. 
The LPM specifications, which are estimated with regress in Stata, appear in Figure 3. 
To preserve temporal order, the choice model does not include cellmate pool 
variables because all members of the pool had not yet been encountered prior to the 
releasee-cellmate pairing. The choice model also does not include releasee level or 
relative risk scores. Risk scores are primarily used by the correctional system, so there is 
no reason to assume inmates are aware of their own risk scores or the risk scores of other 
inmates. What inmates are potentially aware of, however, are the observable constituent 
elements of those risk scores, such as other inmates’ approximate ages and whether they 
are attending prison-based GED classes or substance abuse counseling. Moreover, 
through conversation, inmates may quickly become aware of additional constituent risk 
score elements, such as other inmates’ criminal experiences (e.g., approximate number of 
prior arrests, prior misconduct offenses, and prior parole violations) over time (e.g., 
                                                 
31
 In response to the claim by correctional officers that sections have their own cultures, section level fixed 
effects were also estimated. However, because there are so many sections (n=400), some of which have few 
observations, partitioning the sample to this degree did not prove fruitful. Some sections had too few 
releasees. The same held true for building (n=195) level effects. Therefore, given the uneven distribution of 
the releasees across buildings and sections, the cellmate pool characteristics are the measures best suited to 
serve as the most proximal indicators of peer group effects on reoffending.  
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Clemmer, 1940; Sutherland & Cressey, 1955; Shaw, 1966; Earley, 2000; Jones & 
Schmid, 2000; Santos, 2006; Attwood, 2014).  
Two sets of outcome models are estimated as a function of the choice model. 
Outcome model #1 includes only prior incarceration and prior arrest social interaction 
variables along with all of the covariates. Outcome model #2 adds the risk score 
variables, the releasees’ risk scores and the relative release-cellmate risk scores, to the 
model. Each model is estimated once for each reoffending outcome: rearrest and 
recidivism. Each of these models is imperfect, but for different reasons.  
 
*** [Figure 3 here] *** 
 
The first model is complete in that each of the covariates, aside from the 
exclusion restrictions and the risk scores, factor into both the choice and outcome models. 
However, the omission of the risk score means that comparisons cannot be drawn 
between the criminal experience and the criminality measures within the context of the 
same model. While the second model allows for those comparisons, it also introduces 
collinearity because each of the constituent elements of the risk score is included as 
independent covariate in the outcome model.  
The continuous constituent risk score covariates, age and prior arrest, factor into 
the risk score categorically, so they enter the LPM model differently as a function of the 
risk score. The dichotomous constituent risk score covariates, on the other hand, factor 
into the risk score also as dichotomous indicators. While the dichotomous elements of the 
risk score, like their continuous counterparts, enter the outcome model differently as a 
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function of the risk score, they are also more directly correlated with it than are the 
continuous age and prior arrest measures. Nevertheless, eliminating the constituent 
covariates of the risk score proved to be neither theoretically nor methodologically sound, 
as described in the footnote. Each was, therefore, left in the second outcome model. The 
two models are presented in conjunction with each other for completeness and because 
neither is a perfect specification.32   
 Likelihood ratio tests were used to evaluate whether each of the groups of 
variables jointly and significantly improved upon the prior group of variables (e.g., 
whether cellmate characteristics improved upon releasee characteristics; whether pool 
characteristics improved upon releasee and cellmate characteristics; and so forth). The 
results of the likelihood ratio tests and significance tests for each of the sets of models are 
presented in Table 7. Gray boxes indicate significant (p<=0.05) likelihood ratio tests 
(groups of variables) or significance tests (single variables). White boxes indicate 
                                                 
32
 Outcome models that eliminated all variables constituent to the RST score were also estimated. Those 
models clearly did not characterize the hypothesized relationships . When the constituent elements of the 
RST score (e.g., age, age of first arrest, prior arrests, parole violations, high school completion, 
misconducts, and drug use) were removed from the outcome models, variables tha t had never before been 
significant to those models (e.g., the instruments, homophily variables, facility fixed effects, and less 
important characteristics such as military service record) became significant as variation in the remaining, 
previously less critical, variables was inappropriately leveraged to replace the lost variation. This suggests 
that the RST score as a summary measure cannot substitute for its constituent elements.  
It was initially hypothesized that this perturbation was largely driven by the omission of the two 
non-dichotomous risk score elements, age and prior arrest, which are both highly correlated (theoretically 
and methodologically) with the outcomes. To test that hypothesis, models that eliminated one of the two 
were estimated. Eliminating either age or prior arrest causes the same type of perversion with respect to the 
other variables in the model (i.e., they carried inordinate weight). Including both seemed to eliminate it.  
Models that included prior arrest and age, but excluded the dichotomous elements of the risk score 
were then estimated. However, in instrumental variables specifications (e.g., ivreg2 and ivprobit) the 
dichotomous variables, which are treated as instruments if included in the choice equation, but eliminated 
from the outcome equation, proved relevant to the outcome model (i.e., they failed the Sargan -Hansen test). 
Moreover, there is no theoretical reason to assume that the constituent elements of the risk score will not 
have independent effects on the outcome. The decision was, therefore, made to include all constituent 
elements of the risk score in the outcome equation.  
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insignificance. Crosshatched boxes indicate that the variables were not included in the 
model. Only the estimates and p-values for duration of cellmate association are reported. 
Full output from the choice and both sets of outcome models appears in the appendix 
associated with this chapter. The LPMs are, again, simply meant to be instructive insofar 
as the formulation of the choice and outcome models is concerned, so the results from 
these regressions are discussed only in the context of what they mean for later analyses.  
 
*** [Table 7 here] *** 
 
Explained variance. Collectively, these models explain 43.38% of the variance 
in duration, but only about 20% of the variation in rearrest and only about 18% of the 
variation in any available official measure of recidivism. That the outcome models are 
able to explain approximately 18% of the variance in reoffending outcomes is 
encouraging, given that most criminological studies are not able to explain more than 
10% of the variance in criminal behavior (Weisburd & Piquero, 2008). 
Joint significance tests. The results presented in Table 7 indicate that each of the 
included variable groups (i.e., not the cellmate pool) is jointly significant to the choice 
model. Across the specifications, the releasee, cellmate, cellmate pool, other, and social 
interaction characteristics are also jointly significant to the rearrest and any recidivism 
outcomes. The potential exclusion restriction variables are jointly insignificant to both 
outcome models, which suggests that they are good instruments. Additionally, both the 
facility fixed effects, which are jointly significant only to recidivism, and the homophily 
variables, which are jointly significant only to rearrest, might also be good exclusion 
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restrictions in the instrumental variables specifications, even as they indicate differences 
in the etiology of rearrest and recidivism, which will be discussed later in this chapter and 
in Chapter 10. 
Duration of association. Across models, the average effect of time spent with a 
single cellmate is small and crimino-suppressive, but only significant (p1=0.01, p2=0.01) 
for the any recidivism models and the first rearrest model and not significant for the 
second rearrest model (p1=0.05; p2=0.7), which suggests differences in the etiology of 
rearrest versus recidivism. This is entirely plausible, given that social interaction effects 
are known to be highly context and outcome dependent (Hartup, 2005; Brechwald & 
Prinstein, 2011; Horney et al., 2012; Sacerdote, 2014) and that the processes involved in 
generating rearrest and reincarceration are likely to be different (Useem & Piehl, 2007; 
Raphael & Stoll, 2009; Grattet et al., 2009, 2011; NRC, 2014). However, it is troubling 
that prison peer effects would be so sensitive to the choice of outcome, particularly when 
the outcomes are both related to criminal activity and detection of that activity by the 
criminal justice system. Moreover, it suggests that the significant and marginally 
significant effects in the recidivism models are likely to be driven by less than 10% of the 
releasees (n=877), who were reincarcerated, but not arrested. 
Social interaction variables. Statistical models can include either releasee and 
cellmate absolute (i.e., level) measures or a releasee level measure and a releasee-
cellmate relative measure. Due to collinearity, the relative measure and the level cellmate 
measure cannot both be included in the same model. Therefore, the choice was made to 
comport with the prior work of McGloin (2009) to assess whether the relative distance 
between the releasee and his cellmate matters. 
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As opposed to level measures, relative measures allow for a more nuanced 
interpretation regarding the effect of a cellmate on his releasee because they reflect which 
of the inmates is more criminally- inclined, based on observable information. Per balance 
theory, more criminally-involved cellmates and cellmates with more criminality should 
have criminogenic effects on releasees, whereas releasees who are more criminally-
involved or who have more criminality than their cellmates should experience crimino-
suppressive effects as a result of prison peer influence. As outlined in Chapter 6, the 
relative measures in the current study reflect relative risk scores and relative prior arrests. 
Releasee level measures are subtracted from cellmate level measures so that positive 
relative values indicate that the cellmate is more criminal (i.e., has more criminal 
experience or more observed criminality) than the releasee and negative relative values 
indicate that the releasee is more criminal than the cellmate.33   
On average, the relative criminality and criminal experience measures do not 
appear to directly impact releasees’ reoffending outcomes, either rearrest or general 
recidivism, over and above the releasees’ levels of criminal experience and criminality, 
which do have direct effects on both reoffending measures. However, the relative prior 
arrest measure does appear to impact releasees’ outcomes indirectly through the influence 
of the duration of cellmate association. The association of relative cellmate and releasee 
                                                 
33
 It should be noted that although these measures comport with prior criminological research (McGloin, 
2009), difference scores are not the preferred measures to assess congruence. They are a special case of 
polynomial regression, which is the preferred method (Edwards, 2001). However, the purpose of the 
current study is not to assess congruence. In fact, as was discussed in Chapter 4, the cellmates’ outcomes 
are not fully known, so the current study cannot assess congruence. A more relevant shortcoming of these 
relative measures is that they assume that relative distances have the same impact, no matter where they 
occur. That is, they assume homogeneity across the continuum. This assumption is unlikely to be valid. For 
example, a relative distance of two prior arrests at one arrest versus three arrests might be quite different 
than a difference of two prior arrests at eight and ten arrests (e.g., Blumstein et al., 1986).  
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prior arrest with the duration of cellmate association is suggestive that inmates may 
choose to associate with each other for longer or shorter periods based on their criminal 
experiences.  
Potential instrumental variables. Three potential instrumental variables are 
examined: first post-initial classification (IC) cell square footage, first post-IC cell tier, 
and cellmate’s time served before pairing. Cell tier significantly predicts rearrest and is 
marginally significant for any recidivism in one of the models, so it cannot serve as an 
instrument. Neither of the remaining potential instruments is a significant predictor in any 
outcome model, but each is a significant predictor in the choice model, which suggests 
that both have the potential to be good exclusion restrictions. Statistical tests, which are 
presented later in this chapter, demonstrate can demonstrate the empirical validity of the 
instruments. However, instrumental variables must be justified conceptually as well as 
statistically (Imbens & Angrist, 1994; Bushway & Apel, 2010).  
Can the instruments be justified conceptually? Although results from the linear 
probability models estimated above show that the instrumental variables (square footage 
of the first assigned cell and cellmate’s time served prior to pairing) appear to be 
exogenous to the outcome model, they must be justified conceptually. After initial 
classification, inmates are sent to their first permanent facility within the PADOC system. 
Once assigned to a facility, placement in a cell is random after a few observable 
characteristics are taken into consideration. Per Chapter 5, those factors are, most 
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notably, race and medical limitations.34 Characteristics of the first post-IC cell 
environment and the timing of the move relative to the cellmate are, therefore, potentially 
exogenous instruments. The main assumption (Imbens & Angrist, 1994) that those 
exclusion restrictions must meet is that a cellmate’s time in prison can only affect the 
releasee through his pairing with that cellmate. Likewise, the physical environment of a 
particular cell should only affect a releasee if he is placed in that cell.  
While it might be argued that inmates are often rewarded with moves to preferred 
cells, which could be larger cells, or preferred cellmates, who might be capable of more 
stable, time-intensive associations, this argument does not reasonably apply to inmates 
who are experiencing their first placement in a facility. While they may have been 
assigned high or low custody levels based primarily on their criminal histories, at the 
time of their initial post-IC placement inmates have not yet had the opportunity to 
demonstrate positive adjustment (i.e., that they will do “good time’), which might be 
rewarded (Adams, 1992; O’Hear, 2012). Nor are they likely to have demonstrated the 
potential for negative adjustment (i.e., troublemaking), which might increase their 
potential to be assigned to a smaller cell or to a more acerbic cellmate. Moreover, by their 
own admission, correctional officers know very little about incoming inmates (personal 
communication, 2013), as is illustrated by the celling checklist employed at SCI-
Pittsburgh, which appears in the appendix to Chapter 5.  
                                                 
34
 Correctional officers also list similar age as a factor, but this is not evident in the data. See Chapter 3 for 
a description of the process that correctional officers use to assign inmates to cells.  
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In addition to the paucity of information they have about incoming inmates, the 
decisions correctional officers make regarding initial cell assignments are generally 
constrained by factors other than the characteristics of the inmates and their cells. Table 2 
shows that nearly all PADOC SCIs operated above capacity between January 1, 2000 and 
December 31, 2007, a situation that served to constrain correctional officer’s discretion in 
making cell assignments. More compelling is the information provided by the bed 
assignment surveys. In response to the bed assignment survey, no correctional officers 
reported that initial placements are based on cell size characteristics or a cellmate’s time 
served, despite the fact that they reported nearly fifty other unique criteria for celling 
inmates, as shown in the appendix to Chapter 5. 
On the use of multiple instruments. Basu et al. (2007) write, “If there are 
multiple instruments which have been proven to be significant determinants of the choice 
of treatment, then all of them should be simultaneously included in the estimation of the 
choice model” (p. 1155). This is because different instruments estimate different 
treatment effect parameters. Treatment effect estimates are sensitive to the choice of 
instrument (Imbens & Angrist, 1994; Bushway & Apel, 2010; Heckman et al., 2006; 
Basu et al., 2007). This sensitivity remains even when the propensity score is used to 
predict the outcome, as Basu et al. (2007) illustrate in their analysis of breast cancer 
treatment outcomes in which they compared the estimates from two exclusion 
restrictions. The effect estimates stemming from both were correct, but incomplete, 
meaning they each applied only to a portion of the sample. When combined, they 
provided a more accurate illustration of the determinants of treatment and outcomes.  
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The current study seeks to estimate treatment effects that are not sensitive to the 
choice of instrument (e.g., Heckman & Urzua, 2010), so multiple exclusion restrictions 
are used to specify the choice model. Moreover, the instruments chosen, particularly the 
facility fixed effects (described below), cover the full range of observations, meaning the 
estimates generated through employment of those instruments can generalize to the entire 
sample, as opposed to only to specific individuals in the sample (e.g., Bushway & Apel, 
2010). 
 Facility fixed effects. Facility fixed effects are collectively insignificant to the 
production of rearrest, but appear to jointly affect any recidivism. However, only SCI-
Mercer is a significant predictor on its own. The lack of a significant relationship 
between reoffending and every other facility, particularly given the facilities’ differing 
security levels, may be surprising given the prior literature related to the prison context 
which found that assignment to higher security level facilities increased recidivism (Gaes 
& Camp, 2009). However, the lack of concordance between the current study and 
previous studies may also be purely contextual, as peer effects have been shown to vary 
considerably depending on the domain in which they are measured (Brechwald & 
Prinstein, 2011; Hartup, 2005; Sacerdote, 2014).  
PADOC is currently studying how facility assignments are made in order to 
improve inmate placement, which suggests that the disparity between the current findings 
and the extant literature may reflect organizational differences between the state 
correctional systems in Pennsylvania and California, the system Gaes and Camp (2009) 
studied. In the PADOC system, inmates of varying custody levels are dispersed 
throughout the system, whereas the classification and placement system used in 
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California is more formulaic and, therefore, potentially better suited to evince facility-
level differences in inmates’ post-release reoffending outcomes that result from it (Berk 
& de Leeuw, 1999; Tahamont, 2013). Alternatively, it may just be that the facilities 
matter differently than has previously been imagined. Specifically, it appears that facility 
assignments impact rearrest through the amount of time releasees spend with their 
cellmates. 
“`The reason [cellmates] are allowed to cell together is because I believe in 
putting people into cells who are compatible,’ [Matthews, the warden at 
Leavenworth] said” (Earley, 2000, p. 256). 
 
Facility level effects might directly predict the duration of cellmate relationships 
because different institutions may have different administrative preferences and process 
related to the celling of inmates. At SCI-Dallas and SCI-Pittsburgh, for example, some 
correctional officers expressed a preference for disallowing convenience moves, whereas 
others, like Matthews, believed that convenience moves helped to maintain institutional 
harmony (personal communication, 2013). Similarly, some facility superintendents might 
look favorably on convenience moves and cellmate requests, whereas another may not. 
As seems to have been the case in Leavenworth, the personal preference of the 
superintendent may then become an institutional preference, particularly if the 
superintendent uses his authority to enforce that preference via administrative rules (e.g., 
Diulio, 1987; Wilson, 1989).  
Homophily variables. Individuals tend to associate with other individuals similar 
to themselves. This tendency toward what sociologists call homophily is one of the most 
robust findings in the criminological, sociological, psychological, and economic 
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literatures (Glueck & Glueck, 1950; Gans, 1961; Cohen, 1977; Kandel, 1978; Buss, 
1985; Mortensen, 1988; Warr, 2002; Weerman & Smeenk, 2005; Currarini, Jackson, & 
Pin, 2009; Young, 2011; Schwartz, 2013). As shown in Table 6, cellmate associations 
conform to this general tendency.  
Although cellmate relationships, like all human relationships, exhibit homophily 
across multiple demographic and criminal history characteristics, not all of the homophily 
variables appear to impact reoffending. Only prior employment, urbanity, mental health 
problems, and religion appear to affect reoffending. Moreover, only for the rearrest 
outcomes are the homophily variables collectively significant to the releasees’ 
propensities to reoffend. In contrast, like facility assignment, sameness between inmate 
pairs does appear to consistently play an indirect role in both rearrest and recidivism 
outcomes by helping to determine how long cellmate associations persist. These 
relationships make sense in the context of the extant literature, which has found that 
relationships between more similar couples last longer (Schwartz, 2013). Thus, there is 
reason to expect similarity between cellmates to predict relationship duration, even if it 
does not affect rearrest (e.g., Mortensen, 1988). However, the preliminary linear 
probability models also suggests that the homophily variables might not serve well as 
valid instruments because several of them significantly affect both reoffending outcomes, 
holding all other variables constant, even though they do so jointly only for rearrest. 
Insignificant outcome predictors. Aside from the joint significance of classes of 
variables, the standard errors for the coefficients on individual variables estimated via the 
linear probability models suggest that some of them do not belong in the outcome models 
because they indicate a failure to reject the null hypothesis that those variables affect 
218 
 
duration, rearrest, or recidivism. While those models could be refined to eliminate those 
variables, doing that would eliminate many variables that criminological theory expects 
to affect these outcomes, per the discussions in Chapters 2, 3, and 6. They are, therefore, 
left in the models. Only those groups of variables that appear to be good potential 
instruments (e.g., facility fixed effects and instrumental variables) due to their failure to 
jointly affect the reoffending outcomes are eliminated from the outcome models. They 
are still included in the choice model.  
A More Appropriate Model to Estimate Causal Effects: Instrumental Variables  
 According to Long (1997), linear probability models are inappropriate for 
dichotomous outcomes for several reasons, the most important of which is that they 
violate the functional form (i.e., normality) assumption of ordinary least squares. Further, 
in contrast to the examples presented by Angrist and Pischke (2009) to validate the 
practice of estimating LPMs, Dong and Lewbel (2012) showed that in some 
circumstances linear probability models failed to predict even the correct sign of the 
average treatment effects estimated. Therefore, the relationship between rearrest and time 
spent with cellmates should be demonstrated to be robust to proper specification using an 
appropriate model, such as the probit model.  
Although more appropriate to dichotomous outcomes, the probit model, like the 
LPM, assumes that no omitted variables bias the estimates of the effect of social 
interactions with cellmates on rearrest. That is, probit and OLS implausibly assume an 
exogenous relationship between the explanatory variables and the error term in the 
production of rearrest and recidivism. As explained in detail in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, the 
duration of the cellmate association is likely to be endogenous because many unmeasured 
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characteristics of the releasees, their cellmates, and their institutional environments might 
influence both how long releasees remain in cellmate relationships and whether they 
reoffend.  
Two-stage least squares (2SLS) is one approach to estimating treatment effects 
free of unobserved heterogeneity. It is also the most common method used for estimating 
instrumental variables models (Imbens & Angrist, 1994; Nichols, 2007, 2011; Angrist & 
Pischke, 2009). As the name implies, it involves two steps. In the first step, the exclusion 
restrictions are used to predict variation in the endogenous explanatory variable via 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. The second step is also an OLS regression in 
which the outcome is regressed on the predicted endogenous variable in order to arrive at 
the instrumented estimate of the average effect of the endogenous variable on the 
outcome. As just discussed, OLS is inappropriate for dichotomous outcomes, so 2SLS is 
an inappropriate model in the current framework. Its virtue lies in its ability to test the 
validity of the instruments. Stata’s ivreg2 routine implements 2SLS and reports the 
results from three tests of the exclusion restrictions.  
Stata’s ivprobit routine estimates effects for models with dichotomous outcomes 
and continuous treatments, which are thought to be subject to unobserved heterogeneity. 
Unlike ivreg2, the ivprobit routine is appropriate for estimating an average treatment 
effect (ATE) when outcomes are dichotomous and the endogenous regressor is 
continuous (Nichols, 2007, 2011). ivprobit is, therefore, an appropriate estimation 
strategy under the current conditions, wherein the outcome variables, rearrest and 
recidivism, are dichotomous and endogenous regressor, the number of days spent with a 
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cellmate, is continuous. However, unlike the ivreg2 routine, the ivprobit routine reports 
scant tests for the validity of the instruments (Baum, Schaffer, & Stillman, 2007).  
Using Stata’s ivreg2 routine, models were estimated including the instrumental 
variables (cell square footage and cellmate’s time to releasee), the homophily variables, 
and the facility fixed effects. Those models did not pass the validity tests (results not 
shown). The ivreg2 and ivprobit models were then re-estimated without the homophily 
variables. The results from the tests of the exclusion restrictions from ivreg2 are 
presented in Table 8. The results from ivprobit are presented in Table 9. For ivreg2, only 
the results of the tests of the exclusion restrictions are discussed, whereas the ivprobit 
results are discussed only in the context of the duration and social interaction variables.  
 
*** [Table 8 here] *** 
 
Do the instruments pass the validity tests? ivreg2 reports the results of several 
tests of the validity and strength of the instruments: an underidentification test, a weak 
identification test, and the Sargan-Hansen test for the joint validity of the instruments 
(Baum, et al., 2007).35 The choice model for both the rearrest and recidivism outcomes is 
the same, so each of the tests applies to both models. To summarize, the results from each 
of the three tests of the exclusion restrictions, presented in Table 8, indicates that, 
collectively, the instruments are both valid (e.g., related to the outcome only through the 
                                                 
35
 When errors are heteroskedastic, the tests of the validity and strength of the instruments may be invalid 
because instruments can present as valid, even when they are not. Analogous tests to the ones described in 
the main text are performed automatically if the robust option is specified to handle heterskedasticity. The 
robust option was specified in each of the ivreg2 models. 
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endogenous regressor) and strong predictors of the endogenous regressor, duration of 
cellmate association.  
The underidentification test. The underidentification test reports a test of the rank 
of the matrix of coefficients and instruments. The null hypothesis is that the matrix is not 
full rank (i.e., the rows and columns are not linearly independent), meaning that the 
model is not identified. A rejection of the null hypothesis means that the model is 
identified. The significant chi-square statistics associated with the identification tests 
indicate that, for all four specifications, the model is identified.  
The weak identification test. Bound, Jaeger, and Baker (1995) showed that 
identification is not possible when the instruments are only weakly correlated with the 
endogenous regressor. The intuition behind their result is that if only a tiny amount of 
exogenous variation is leveraged, the chance of detecting differences in outcomes as a 
result of that miniscule amount variation erodes quickly, particularly in smaller samples. 
The test for weak instruments employed by ivreg2 is a version of the Cragg-Donald test, 
which identifies the least partial correlation between the endogenous regressor and the 
instruments (i.e., the minimum eigenvalue is identified). To assess whether the 
instruments are weak relative to the amount of bias to be tolerated, the Cragg-Donald 
statistic should be compared to the critical values derived by Stock and Yogo (2005). For 
each specification, the Cragg-Donald statistic is larger than the Stock-Yogo critical value 
at 5% bias, which suggests that the instruments are not weak. Were the Stock-Yogo 




The Sargan-Hansen test. The Sargan-Hansen test assesses the joint null 
hypothesis that the instruments are valid instruments, in the sense that they are related to 
the outcome only through the endogenous regressor(s). Rejection of the null indicates 
that the instruments may not be valid instrument because they appear to belong in the 
second-stage outcome equation as well as in the first-stage choice equation.  In the 
current analyses, the insignificant chi-squared statistics indicate a failure to reject the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are valid.  
 
*** [Table 9 here] *** 
 
Interpreting the ivprobit results. Although ivreg2 reports tests of the instruments 
that are valid under homogeneity, per the discussion above, the ivreg2 estimates are 
biased due to the functional form incompatibility, whereas the results from the ivprobit 
analysis are not. Results from the ivprobit analysis appear in Table 9. 
Duration. For rearrest the duration of cellmate association is not significant in 
either the first or the second outcome models (p1=0.365; p2=0.559), nor in the second any 
recidivism model. Duration was significant in the first model for any recidivism 
(p1=0.028; p2=0.060). These results suggest that considerable unobserved heterogeneity 
had biased the previous LPM estimates. The significance of the estimated effects was 
reduced dramatically in IV estimates, as compared to the LPM estimates. More 
importantly, even though they are imprecisely estimated, the direction of the effects 
appears to have shifted from crimino-suppressive in the LPM models to criminogenic in 
the IV models. 
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Social interaction variables. The relative prior arrest and relative risk score 
measures are not significant predictors of rearrest or recidivism in either outcome model, 
but the level measures for both releasee prior arrests and releasee risk scores are 
significant for both rearrest and any recidivism in each of the models.36 Neither is 
cellmate prior incarceration. Only the release prior arrests and risk scores are significant 
predictors. Each significantly predicts both reoffending outcomes.  
Relationship timing. Finally, the timing of the pairing of the releasees and their 
longest-duration cellmates appears inconsequential with respect to the releasees’ rearrest 
outcomes. Prior criminological research suggested that inmates might become less 
prisonized as their release dates approach and they begin to orient themselves to less 
criminal reference groups outside prison (Merton, 1957; Wheeler, 1961; Glaser & 
Stratton, 1961). This suggests that cellmates encountered closer to releasees’ release 
dates might engender weaker prison peer effects, as the findings from prior studies of 
prisonization had indicated (Wheeler, 1961; Garabedian, 1963; Wellford, 1967). In 
contrast to that prior research, the coefficients on the releasee time to release measure 
were imprecisely estimated in each of the rearrest models currently under consideration, 
which fails to indicate that the timing of the releasee-cellmate pairings mattered. In the 
recidivism models, however, the releasee’s time to release at pairing with his longest-
                                                 
36
 To investigate the possibility that the level cellmate prior arrest and risk scores measures would 
significantly predict releasee outcomes, each of the models (the choice and four outcome models) was re-
specified such that the level measures replaced the relative measures. The cellmate level measures were 
also insignificant predictors of release reoffending. To investigate further, interaction terms (e.g., releasee 
prior arrests x cellmate prior arrests; releasee risk score x cellmate risk score) were also added to these 
models. Again, neither the cellmate level nor the interaction terms emerged as significant predictors of 
releasee reoffending. Only the releasees’ prior criminal experience predicted their reoffending . 
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duration cellmate did emerge as a significant (p<=0.05) predictor in both models. This 
result continues to indicate differences in the etiology of rearrest and reincarceration with 
respect to cellmate social interactions.  
Exploring Duration of Cellmate Association Thresholds 
Although the ivprobit routine assumes more plausible functional forms for the 
current treatment and outcome variables, the treatment effect it identifies might be 
misleading for at least two reasons. First, like each of the previous models, ivprobit 
assumes that each day of cellmate association impacts the releasee similarly, even though 
the only prior research on the relationships between socialization through associations in 
prison, time in prison, and time to release from prison suggests that this might not be the 
case (Wheeler, 1961; Garabedian, 1963; Wellford, 1967). Second, while ivprobit, like 
2SLS, can handle unobserved heterogeneity it does not account for heterogeneity in 
treatment effects that might be associated with essential heterogeneity, in particular, 
selection on gains (Heckman et al., 2006).  
Average prison peer effects estimated with ivprobit could be misleading if each 
day that a releasee spends with his cellmate does not impact the releasee in the same way 
(Merton, 1957; Wheeler, 1961; McGloin, 2009). Average prison peer effects may also be 
misleading if inmates remain in different durations of cellmate association for different 
reasons (e.g., own choice, correctional officer choices, and cellmate’s choice). These 
different processes, the details of which are unobserved in the data, might yield different 
effects across the spectrum of releasees. Therefore, the ATE recovered via the ivprobit 
estimation strategy could be misleading in that it might over or understate the effect of 
number of days a particular releasee spends with a cellmate on rearrest (Heckman & 
225 
 
Vytlacil, 2005).  To examine this possibility, duration of cellmate association thresholds 
were created.  
The prison peer effects generated at each duration of cellmate association 
threshold are examined to see if they differ from those generated at the other thresholds. 
Duration of cellmate association thresholds are defined dichotomously, in terms of 
whether a releasee spends at least a particular number of days with his cellmate (e.g., at 
least thirty days, at least ninety days, etc.). The counterfactual is not spending at least that 
particular number of days with a cellmate (e.g., less than 30 days, less than 89 days, etc.).  
 In the current study, some cellmates spent only fifteen days with their longest-
duration cellmate, whereas others spent more than 2,000 days in their most stable 
cellmate associations. The duration of cellmate association can, in principle, be 
dichotomized at each day across this wide range. Per the discussion in Chapter 4, thirty-
day increments appear to be reasonable stretches of time in which to detect prison peer 
effects and changes in them over time (Wheeler, 1961; Garabedian, 1963; Wellford, 
1967). The coefficients and p-values associated with these incremental duration threshold 
variables, estimated with 2SLS specifications for rearrest and any reoffending in both 
outcome models, are presented in Table 10. The shaded boxes indicate significance of the 
effect of duration on releasee reoffending.  
 
*** [Table 10 here] *** 
 
Per Table 10, few releasees spend less than less than two or more than twelve 
months of their stay with one cellmate. The sample size below the two-month and above 
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the one-year thresholds is, therefore, likely to be inadequate to support analysis. That 
there are no relationships that are approach significance between duration of cellmate 
association and reoffending below the two-month threshold or above the one-year 
threshold supports this assessment. 
There are no significant relationships between rearrest and the duration of 
cellmate association at any duration threshold. There are some thresholds for which the 
effect of duration on recidivism appears significant. These effects emerge primarily in the 
first outcome model that excludes RST scores.  
In the first outcome model that excludes RST scores, effects are significant (or 
very nearly significant) for any recidivism from the 60-day threshold through the 240-day 
threshold, with the most significant effects (p<=0.02) occurring at the 120-day, 150-day, 
and 180-day thresholds. At each of the thresholds for which effects are significant, the 
direction of the effect is criminogenic. Moreover, the criminogenic effects generally 
appear to be increasing with the duration of cellmate association, as predicted by 
Clemmer (1940) and Sutherland (1947). As the releasees spend increasing amounts of 
time with their cellmates, their propensity to recidivate appears to increase.  
In conjunction with the ivprobit results, this analysis suggests that there is no 
relationship between the duration of cellmate association and rearrest outcomes, but that 
there may be a relationship between the duration of cellmate association and recidivism 
outcomes. Additionally, there are some indications that bias may need to be overcome. 
The 2SLS estimates are certainly biased because the outcomes are dichotomous and also, 
potentially, due to the presence of essential heterogeneity in the relationship between 
duration of cellmate association and reoffending.  
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A Test for Essential Heterogeneity  
Essential heterogeneity refers to response heterogeneity that proceeds from both 
selection on levels, or unobserved covariates, and selection on gains, or unobserved 
information about treatment outcomes (Heckman et al., 2006). Criminological assertions 
that inmates will enter into prison peer relationships in order to, for example, enhance 
their crime committing prowess (Bentham, 1830; Clemmer, 1950; Nagin, 2013), 
implicitly assume the presence of essential heterogeneity because they assume that 
inmates enter into prison peer relationships based on the potential gains to be had from 
them. To make this clearer, if observationally similar releasees’ responses to their 
cellmates were homogeneous, they would respond to observationally similar cellmates in 
observationally similar environments in the same way. Under essential heterogeneity, 
observationally similar releasees’ responses appear heterogeneous because researchers 
lack critical information about the determinants of the decision to remain with a cellmate, 
including whether the releasee expects to influence his own reoffending through that 
decision.   
Detecting essential heterogeneity. Following Heckman et al. (2006) and Basu et 
al. (2007), it is possible to implement a straightforward process to test whether essential 
heterogeneity is present in the relationship between criminogenic cellmate associations 
and future criminal behavior. First, the choice model, which characterizes the decision to 
associate with a cellmate for a specific duration of time, is estimated. From that model, 
the probability that releasees select into particular durations of cellmate association is 
predicted. This probability is referred to as the propensity score. Different specifications 
of the outcome model, which relate rearrest and recidivism to the propensity to select into 
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a particular duration of cellmate association threshold, are then explored.  Specifically, 
the propensity score is interacted with the other covariates and/or higher order 
polynomial terms of the propensity score are introduced into the outcome models 
sequentially, as shown in [23]. If those terms are significant or if they are jointly 
significant, a nonlinear relationship between rearrest and the propensity to enter into a 
criminogenic cellmate association is indicated.  
Reoffending = A + B(propensity score) + C(propensity score polynomial terms) + 
D(releasee characteristics) + E(cellmate characteristics) + 
F(pool characteristics) + G(other variables) + 
H(propensity score interacted with D, E, F, G variables) + U  [23] 
 
Nonlinearities in the relationship between rearrest and the propensity to cell with 
a cellmate for a specific amount of time imply the presence of essential heterogeneity. To 
be clear, evidence of essential heterogeneity can manifest in multiple ways. If the higher-
order polynomial terms are significant predictors of rearrest, essential heterogeneity is 
present. Similarly, if likelihood ratio tests show that the higher order polynomial terms 
improve the fit of the model, essential heterogeneity is present. Likewise, if likelihood 
ratio tests show that the interaction terms are jointly significant, essential heterogeneity is 
present. Each of these alternatives is a sufficient condition to establish the presence of 
essential heterogeneity. The steps used to detect essential heterogeneity in the current 
sample are detailed in 4. 
 




The presence of essential heterogeneity indicates that instrumental variables 
techniques that attempt to recover average or local average treatment effects, such as 
2SLS or Stata’s ivprobit routine, cannot recover accurate treatment effects because 
treatment responses are not uniform for all members of the study sample. To recover 
meaningful information, the local instrumental variables technique can be employed to 
recover marginal treatment effects (MTE) at multiple decision points along the 
propensity score continuum. 
 
*** [Table 11 here] *** 
 
The presence of essential heterogeneity. Results from the tests for essential 
heterogeneity at each duration threshold from 60 days through 360 days are presented in 
Table 11. The presence of essential heterogeneity is consistently suggested for each 
model, except the second recidivism specification that includes risk scores, for which 
essential heterogeneity is indicated at some thresholds but not for others. The most 
consistent finding across the three models where essential heterogeneity is evidenced is 
that both the interaction and the propensity score squared terms are significant. 
Importantly, this is true for the first outcome model of recidivism where the duration 
effects appear significant. Neither the cubed nor the quartic propensity scores are 
significant above the squared propensity score. The local instrumental variables method 
can, therefore, be implemented without the highest order polynomial terms to estimate 
causal effects in the presence of essential heterogeneity.  
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There appears to be only scant evidence of essential heterogeneity in the second 
outcome model of recidivism. This finding is positive for an initial study of essential 
heterogeneity in prison peer effects. The results from the local instrumental variables 
implementation for this model should confirm the estimates generated from the simple IV 
specification: there should be no evidence of significant treatment effects on release 
reoffending for the second recidivism outcome. Due to the presence of essential 
heterogeneity in the other three models, a remote possibility remains that some releasees 
will experience significant treatment effects, even though the overall effect is null.  
Summary of Preliminary Findings  
 In the current chapter, the preliminary work leading up to the full implementation 
of the local instrumental variables method to estimate prison peer effects was presented. 
A choice model and two outcome models were specified, estimated, and interpreted 
through multiple specifications, including linear probability models and instrumental 
variables specifications. Through the linear probability models, each of the two outcome 
models was explored for both rearrest and recidivism reoffending outcomes.  The results 
(Table 7) suggested that the facility fixed effect variables, in addition to two of the 
originally proposed exclusion restrictions, were collectively related to the choice, but not 
to the outcome models. The instrumental variables were justified conceptually and 
statistical tests empirically supported their conceptual validity. 
Stata’s ivprobit routine was used to estimate the average effect of duration of 
cellmate association on releasee reoffending, as measured by the prevalence of rearrest 
and the prevalence of recidivism, which includes rearrest and reincarceration without 
rearrest. Only the first outcome model supported the hypothesis that the duration of 
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cellmate association, on average, affects either reoffending outcome. (In three of four 
models, the coefficient on duration of association was insignificant.) Moreover, the social 
interaction variables, relative prior arrest and relative risk scores, were not significant 
predictors of either reoffending outcome. Cellmate prior incarceration predicted rearrest 
only in the first outcome model.  
Per Chapters 2 and 4, duration thresholds were explored to see when during the 
course of a releasee’s association with his cellmate prison peer effects might emerge and 
whether they might thereafter decay. At some duration thresholds, particularly in the first 
outcome model of recidivism, the effect of duration on recidivism was significant 
(p<=0.05) or very close to significant (p<0.06). Within the thresholds where treatment 
effects due to duration appeared significant, those treatment effects increased with the 
duration of association, until they simply became clearly insignificant.  
Even though duration did not appear to independently and significantly impact 
rearrest, the variation within the duration thresholds suggested that essential 
heterogeneity might bias the results for both rearrest and recidivism. To detect the 
presence of essential heterogeneity, Heckman et al.’s (2006) simple test was employed at 
each duration threshold in each of the outcome models (Basu et al., 2007). For three of 
the four outcome specifications, the tests revealed the consistent presence of essential 
heterogeneity: the propensity score interaction terms were jointly significant, the 
propensity score squared terms were significant, and the inclusion of both improved the 
fit of the model.  
Collectively, the analyses undertaken at each duration threshold suggested that if 
prison peer effects emerge, they are most likely to be discernible after 60 days and before 
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240 days with a cellmate, with the 150-day threshold looking most promising with 
respect to the strength and marginal significance of the detected effects. Theoretically, the 
six-month threshold is of particular interest, as the timing of average prisonization effects 
with the average onset and persistence of cellmate relationships coincides near that 
threshold, as was discussed in Chapters 2 through 5 (Wheeler, 1961; Garabedian, 1963).  
The 150-day and 180-day thresholds, in addition to one other, the 120-day 
threshold, are the focus of the LIV analysis to be undertaken in Chapter 9. In that chapter, 
the choice of the 120-day threshold is defended in the context of an explanation of the 
common support of the propensity score, which precedes the final LIV analysis, through 




CHAPTER 9: Local Instrumental Variables and Prison Peer Effects  
In Chapter 8, the analytical model that underpins the local instrumental variables 
(LIV) implementation was developed. The choice model predicts the probability that 
releasee-cellmate associations meet duration thresholds. In a treatment effects (i.e., 
potential outcomes) framework (Roy, 1951; Rubin, 1978), treated releasees are those who 
are in cellmate associations that meet a particular duration threshold (i.e., the association 
lasts for a particular amount of time). Untreated releasees are those who are in cellmate 
associations that do not meet a particular duration threshold.  
Two outcome models were specified. The first includes two criminal experience 
measures, prior incarceration and prior arrest; the second adds a criminality measure in 
the form of a risk score. These models estimate prison peer effects for two reoffending 
outcomes: rearrest, a traditional measure, and recidivism, which includes rearrest and 
reincarceration without arrest. Treatment effects are estimated with respect to duration 
and prison peer effects are estimated with respect to the criminality and criminal 
experience measures. To be clear, treatment effects are the effects on reoffending 
generated by duration and prison peer effects (i.e., social interaction effects) are the 
effects on the treatment effects generated by variation in the social interaction variables. 
In the current analytical framework, treatment effects must be estimated before prison 
peer effects can be estimated. 
Introduction to Prison Peer Effect Estimation 
Within duration thresholds, prison peer effects can be estimated through a similar 
process to the process that estimates treatment effects or they can be estimated by 
estimating treatment effects across the range of the values that the social interaction 
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variables can assume. Treatment effects with respect to duration are identified using the 
local instrumental variables method (Heckman & Vytlacil, 1999, 2005). As the 
specification of choice and outcome models foretells, identifying treatment effects in the 
LIV framework is a multi-step process, beginning with estimation of the choice model. 
The choice model and the support of the propensity score. The choice model 
predicts the probability that a releasee-cellmate association lasts a particular length of 
time. The probability, which is referred to as a propensity score, is a summary measure 
that reflects the propensity that a releasee will be treated based on the observed 
information contained in the administrative data provided by Pennsylvania State Police 
(PSP) and the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (PADOC). Like all probabilities, 
propensity scores range from zero to one. 
Propensity scores apply to individual releasees, but the distribution of propensity 
scores in the release cohort can also be characterized. An important property of the 
distribution of the propensity scores in the release cohort is whether it has common 
support. If a particular propensity score (e.g., a 50% probability of remaining with a 
cellmate for at least 150 days) has common support, it means that both treated (e.g., 
stayed with their cellmates for at least 150 days) and untreated (e.g., left their cellmates 
before 150 days) releasees have that propensity to remain with their cellmate. Common 
support indicates that the releasees who stayed with their cellmates can be compared with 
those who did not, given their propensity scores. Full support of the propensity score 
means that across the zero to one range of the propensity score distribution there are both 
treated and untreated releasees at each propensity score. In other words, full support 
indicates that, based on the observable information summarized in the propensity score, 
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the treated and untreated groups are balanced, or observationally equivalent. As in 
experimental studies, which create balance on unobserved as well as observed 
characteristics, when treated and untreated groups are balanced, causal comparisons can 
more plausibly be made between them (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983, 1984; Heckman & 
Vytlacil, 1999, 2005; Apel & Sweeten, 2010b; Brave & Walstrum, 2014).37  
For treatment effects to be estimated, the propensity score distribution must have 
common support. Marginal treatment effects (MTE) can be estimated wherever the 
propensity score has common support because there are treated and untreated releasees to 
compare at those points. Average treatment effects (ATE) can be estimated only when the 
propensity score has full support. If the propensity score does not have full support, 
estimation of ATEs must rely on (at minimum) the generally untenable assumption that 
partial sample characteristics generalize or extrapolate to the entire sample.  
The current study asks whether prison peer effects can, on average, help to 
account for the average null prison effects observed in criminological literature (Nagin et 
al., 2009). As such, average treatment effects and how they are, on average, affected by 
prison peer interactions are the intended foci of the current analysis and its 
interpretations. It would, therefore, be advantageous for the support of the propensity 
score to be full at the duration thresholds considered.   
                                                 
37
 Naturally, there will not be treated and untreated releasees at each and every propensity score across the 
zero to one range of probability. Comparisons between treated and untreated releasees are made within 
narrow bins. In studies that rely on propensity score matching for identification, the support of the 
propensity score (i.e., whether treated and untreated groups are balanced) within narrow ranges can be 
assessed quantitatively using, for example, t-tests or by estimating standard bias (i.e., Cohen’s d) within 
those bins (Apel & Sweeten, 2010b). The current study does not employ semi-parametric methods and, 
thus, does not rely on the support of the propensity score for identification (Heckman et al., 2006; Brave & 
Walstrum, 2014). Instead, parametric assumptions (i.e., normality) are made. However, the support of the 
propensity score indicates to which releasees the effect estimates apply. 
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The outcome model, marginal, and average treatment effects. The outcome 
model is a function of the propensity score predicted through the choice model. In 
addition to revealing the presence of essential heterogeneity, Heckman et al.’s (2006) 
test, which was performed in Chapter 8, indicated that the outcome models are a function 
of the propensity score, the propensity score squared, and the interaction of the 
propensity score with the covariates in the model. From estimates of those models, 
marginal treatment effects due to duration and marginal prison peer effects due to the 
criminal experience and criminality of cellmates are derived.   
Marginal treatment effects are calculated by taking the derivative of the outcome 
with respect to the propensity score and, due to the presence of the interaction terms, the 
mean values of the covariates. This derivative is the local instrumental variable for which 
the LIV method is named (Heckman & Vytlacil, 1999, 2005; Heckman et al., 2006). In 
principle, the MTEs can be calculated for any values the covariates can assume, so 
variation in treatment effects can be estimated for particular segments of the sample, as 
designated by their observed characteristics. As the current analysis investigates how 
social interactions affect average treatment effects stemming from spending time with 
cellmates, it makes the most sense to allow the covariates to assume their average values. 
After the MTEs are estimated at the covariate means, average treatment effects with 
respect to the values of the covariates are calculated by integrating the MTEs over a 
propensity score distribution that has full support. In the context of the current study, 
these average treatment effects apply to particular durations of cellmate association at the 
mean covariate values. They are not the prison peer effects of primary interest. 
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Prison peer effect estimation. The process used to examine marginal treatment 
effects with respect to duration can be extended to derive marginal prison peer effects 
(MPPE) and average prison peer effects (APPE) with respect to the social interactions 
that occur during incarceration. Marginal and average prison peer effects are theorized to 
operate not through duration of cellmate association, but through the effect of cellmate 
criminal experience and cellmate criminality on releasee reoffending. Duration delineates 
temporal regions of cellmate association wherein prison peer effects might be detected 
and is also expected to moderate them, but the criminality and criminal experience of 
prison peers (i.e., cellmates) are expected to drive prison peer effects, as described in 
Chapters 2 and 4 (Sutherland, 1947; Matsueda, 1988; Warr, 2002; McGloin, 2009). The 
marginal and average prison peer effects operate within duration thresholds and through 
the social interaction variables: prior incarceration, prior arrest, and recidivism risk. 
To estimate marginal prison peer effects, the derivative of the ATE can be taken 
with respect to each of the social interaction variables. Alternatively, average treatment 
effects can be estimated at different values of the social interaction variables. The latter 
approach, which relies on a new Stata routine: margte (Brave & Walstrum, 2014),38 is the 
one taken in the current analysis. Changes in average treatment effects as a result of 
variation in the social interaction variables are the prison peer effects of primary interest 
to the current study. To clarify, the prison peer effects being estimated appear in the 
following equation [24]: 
                                                 
38
 Select analyses were also completed via the author’s own self-generated processes. The results are 
comparable. Presenting the results from the Stata routine provides the reader with an introduction to the 




∆𝐸[𝑌1𝑖 − 𝑌0𝑖 |𝑋𝑖𝑗]
∆𝑆𝑖𝑗
 
  [24] 
where 𝑌1𝑖 are outcomes when the duration threshold is met, 𝑌0𝑖  are outcomes when the 
duration threshold is not met, the 𝑋𝑖𝑗 are the covariates, and ∆𝑆𝑖𝑗 are the changes in the 
social interaction variables. The social interaction variables, 𝑆𝑖𝑗, are a subset of the 𝑋𝑖𝑗. 
Thus, the average prison peer effect being estimated is conditional on the observed 
characteristics, which are reflected in the propensity score. Indifference, that is the 
MPPEs, are also conditional on observed characteristics, such that the indifference is with 
respect to the propensity not to meet a particular duration threshold given the observable 
characteristics, not between actually meeting that threshold or not.39 
The rest of the chapter. This chapter proceeds in the following manner. The 
support of the propensity score at several duration thresholds is discussed. The choice of 
the 120-day, 150-day, and 180-day thresholds is defended. The process of estimating 
marginal and average treatment effects with respect to duration is described. Prison peer 
effects, both marginal and average, are then explored within the chosen duration 
thresholds. This chapter concludes with a brief summary of the findings. 
Assessing Common Support of the Propensity Score 
The local instrumental variables method is appropriate for estimating causal 
treatment effects under essential heterogeneity. Treatment effects are estimated with 
                                                 
39
 To clarify further, indifference does not reflect indifference between, for example, spending 149 and 150 
days with a time-intensive cellmate. Indifference is conditional on the observed probability of spending 
150+ days with a cellmate or not. Therefore, individuals who exhibit the propensity to stay with best 
cellmate for 150+ days may have spent 151 or 2,000 days with their time-intensive cellmates.  
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respect to the releasees’ propensity to be treated (i.e., their propensity scores). Propensity 
scores are generated through estimation of the choice model, which must include 
exclusion restrictions, as was described in Chapters 3, 4, and 8 (Heckman & Vytlacil, 
1999, 2005; Brave & Walstrum, 2014).  
In the current study, each releasee’s propensity score is a summary measure of the 
contribution made by observed information (i.e., the data) to his probability of 
maintaining his cellmate relationship for a particular duration of time. Whether a releasee 
met or failed to meet a duration threshold primarily due to his own volition, his 
cellmate’s volition, or the volition of the correctional officers is immaterial as long as the 
exclusion restrictions that support identification of the propensity score are robust, 
meaning they apply to more than a small subset of releasees. If the propensity score 
model lacks crucial information, particularly with respect to the exclusion restrictions, the 
propensity score estimates will be inefficient. The implication of that inefficiency is that 
common support can be indicated where there is none, which means that the identified 
treatment effects will be invalid for all or some of the sample under consideration 
(Heckman et al., 2006; Basu et al., 2007; Brave & Walstrum, 2014). Careful attention 
must, therefore, be paid to the choice of exclusion restrictions and to where along its 
range the propensity score distribution has common support. Chapter 8 gave due attention 
to the exclusion restrictions. The current section gives similar attention to the support of 
the propensity score at multiple duration thresholds.  
 




The duration of cellmate associations, in combination with the timing of cellmate 
associations, is theorized to delineate when social interaction effects can be detected. In 
Chapter 8, the effect of duration of association on reoffending at the duration thresholds 
between 60 days and 240 days was shown to be significant, suggesting that it may take 
longer than a month for cellmate relationships to develop the capacity to exert social 
influence. That those effects increased with the duration of cellmate association before 
becoming insignificant after eight months further suggested that cellmate influence, while 
increasing over time, may eventually reach a saturation point. The timing of the pairings 
with respect to the releasees’ release dates did not appear to impact reoffending in any of 
the models, even though prior research indicated that it should.  
 
*** [Figure 6 here] *** 
 
In terms of the potential to detect significant treatment effects and prison peer 
effects within duration thresholds, the significant effects point to the seven duration 
thresholds between the 60-day and 240-day thresholds. The common support of the 
propensity score will, therefore, be examined for those thresholds. Figures 5 through 11 
depict the common support of the propensity score for the 60-day through the 240-day 
duration of cellmate association thresholds. Conglomerate graphs of the remaining 
thresholds are presented in the appendix associated with this chapter. In each of the 
graphs, the hollow bins represent releasees who do not meet the threshold while the 




*** [Figure 7 here] *** 
 
The common support of the propensity score identifies the propensity score 
ranges within duration of cellmate association thresholds at which marginal treatment 
effects and the treatment effects derived from them can be identified. Common support is 
a characteristic of the distribution of propensity scores in the release cohort by whether or 
not a particular duration of cellmate association threshold is met (i.e., whether the 
releasees are treated or not). Within duration of cellmate association thresholds, 
propensity scores that have common support see realizations of releasees who both met 
threshold and those who did not. Where the propensity score has common support, the 
releasees who met the threshold are comparable to those who did not, given their 
observed characteristics. For example, if based on their observed characteristics two 
releasees each have a 40% chance of remaining with their cellmates for at least 180 days, 
but one stays with his cellmate (treated) while one does not (untreated), the propensity 
score for the 180-day threshold is said to have common support at 40%. The propensity 
score has full common support if, at each propensity score in the distribution from zero to 
one, there are releasees who received different treatments (e.g., met or did not meet the 
threshold).  
 
*** [Figure 8 here] *** 
 
The common support of the propensity score characterizes what is known about 
the sample. It also characterizes what is unknown. The propensity score is a prediction 
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about treatment decisions based on what is known. But unobserved information also 
affects both treatment decisions and outcomes in observational studies. If unobserved 
factors played no role in treatment decisions, there would be no common support for the 
propensity score because all treatment decisions would be fully determined by the 
observed information summarized in those scores. Similarly, if there are no observed 
treatment decisions at particular propensity scores, there is a void of observable 
information about the determinants of the decisions at those scores. This typically 
happens at either very high or very low propensities to accept treatment. Without 
additional assumptions, estimated treatment effects cannot be generalized to individuals 
who might have those propensities, but do not appear in the available data (Heckman & 
Vytlacil, 1999, 2005; Heckman et al., 2006).  
 
*** [Figure 9 here] *** 
  
Figures 5 through 11 show that across the duration of association treatment 
thresholds for which marginal effects of duration on reoffending were found the support 
of the propensity score is either full or nearly full. While common support is narrow or 
not quite complete at the tails, particularly at the lower end of the propensity score 
distribution for the 60-day threshold and at the upper end of the 240-day distribution, the 
propensity score distributions at the 90-day, 120-day, 150-day, 180-day, and 210-day 
appear to have full support. As a result, marginal treatment effects, average treatment 
effects, and their corresponding prison peer effects can be estimated at each of those 




*** [Figure 10 here] *** 
 
 Duration thresholds to be studied. Marginal and average treatment and prison 
peer effects are examined at three duration thresholds. Per the discussion in Chapter 8, 
the 150-day threshold was chosen because it is the threshold at which ATEs appeared 
strongest and most significant. Per the discussion in Chapter 2, the 180-day threshold was 
chosen because it comports with the thresholds explored in prior criminological research 
related to the timing of prisonization (Wheeler, 1961; Garabedian, 1963; Wellford, 1967). 
The third threshold balances the other two in timing (thirty days between each threshold) 
and, more importantly, in support over the propensity score.  
At the 180-day threshold there are more releasees who do not meet the threshold 
than there are releasees who do. That is also the case at the 210-day and 240-day 
thresholds. In contrast, at the 120-day threshold there are more releasees who meet the 
threshold than there are releasees who do not. The choice of the 120-day threshold in 
addition to the 150-day and 180-day thresholds will, therefore, allow for comparisons 
among a threshold that favors the treated (120-day threshold), a threshold that supports a 
more even distribution of treated and untreated releasees (150-day threshold), and a 
threshold balanced in favor of the untreated (180-day). Each of the three chosen 
thresholds appears to have full support, meaning comparisons can be drawn across them 
with respect to each of the effects of interest in the current study: marginal and average 




*** [Figure 11 here] *** 
 
Estimating Marginal and Average Treatment Effects: An Explanation 
Estimating marginal and average treatment effects with respect to duration is not 
the primary aim of the current study. However, the treatment effects with respect to 
duration are the primary effects identified via the LIV framework. Discussing 
identification of treatment effects, therefore, introduces the context in which the inquiry 
into prison peer effects will proceed: the baseline average treatment effect estimates are 
the estimates to which the average prison peer effect estimates are compared. 
𝑀𝑇𝐸(𝑥,𝑢𝐷) = 𝐸(∆|𝑋 = 𝑥, 𝑈𝐷 = 𝑢𝐷) 
To estimate marginal treatment effects, the derivative of the outcome (i.e., rearrest 
or recidivism) is taken with respect to the propensity score, as shown in [18], which is 
reproduced above. The resultant equation is then evaluated at small intervals where the 
propensity score has common support, for example 0.01 intervals along the zero to one 
continuum of the propensity score distribution. Interaction terms appear in the outcome 
model, which means that MTEs are calculated with respect to arbitrary values of the 
covariates. As this is mainly a study of whether average prison peer effects contribute to 
null or criminogenic average prison effects, the mean values of the covariates are applied. 




When common support of the propensity score is full, an average treatment effect 
can be calculated by integrating the MTEs over the zero to one range of the propensity 
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score, as shown in [19], which is reproduced above.40 ATEs are calculated for each of the 
three duration thresholds under study because they each enjoy common support. While 
average treatment effects lack meaning when marginal treatment effects vary 
substantially, such as in the presence of essential heterogeneity, as summary measures 
they allow for a quick assessment of whether criminogenic prison peer effects, on 
average, outweigh crimino-suppressive prison peer effects, as predicted by the extant 
criminological literature summarized in Nagin et al. (2009). 
The margte routine. Stata’s margte routine is a local instrumental variables 
implementation created by Brave and Walstrum (2014). The margte routine has the 
capability to estimate average treatment effects in a local instrumental variables 
framework, via both parametric and semi-parametric methods. The routine produces 
standard regression output and a graphical depiction of the average and marginal 
treatment effects it estimates. The graphical outputs concisely represent the results of 
complex processes. As such, they are the primary outputs of interest and the primary 
outputs presented in the tables and figures associated with this chapter.41  
                                                 
40
 To convert marginal treatment effects to other treatment effect parameters (e.g., local average treatment 
effects, policy relevant treatment effects, treatment on the treated, etc.) weights can be derived from the 
data (Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005, pp. 680-681). That derivation process is not undertaken in the current 
study, as it is not necessary for the study of marginal and average treatment effects. 
41
 Per the local instrumental variables method, margte calculates marginal prison peer effects by taking the 
derivative of the reoffending outcomes with respect to the propensity score. The outcome model is a linear 
probability model. Although the reoffending outcomes are dichotomous, the convention in the literature is 
to estimate the marginal treatment effects  for dichotomous outcomes using LPMs because LPMs are easier 
to implement and easier to interpret (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). In defense of this practice, Angrist and 
Pischke (2009, p. 107) write, “[W]hile a nonlinear model may fit the CEF [conditional expectation 
function] for LDV [limited dependent variables] more closely than a linear model, when it comes to 
marginal effects, this probably matters little.” This is because the decision points at (or minute intervals 
over) which the MTEs are calculated are very small, so potential nonlinearities are unlikely manifest in 
such a small region. While exceptions wherein the estimates from LPMs may not substitute for estimates 




Depiction of average and marginal treatment effects. Marginal and average 
treatment effects are depicted graphically with respect to “U_D,” which is the propensity 
not to be treated. Per Chapter 7, the propensity not to be treated is the cumulative 
distribution of the unobservables (i.e., all the unobserved information grouped together), 
which is constrained to be uniform. The propensity not to be treated is a summary 
measure that indicates the contribution that the collective unobserved information makes 
to the decision to remain with a cellmate for at least, for example, 120 days, or not. The 
propensity not to be treated is inversely related to the propensity score (i.e., the 
propensity to be treated), such that if a releasee is treated (if 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 1), the value ascribed 
to the unobservables is greater than one minus the propensity score (Basu et al., 2007, p. 
1139; Brave & Walstrum, 2014, p. 195). In each of the margte graphs, the solid line 
represents the MTEs, the dashed line, the ATE. 
While it may seem convoluted to conceptualize treatment effects in this way, 
doing so enables the retrieval of otherwise unavailable information, as is illustrated by the 
graphs. The graphs depict the sum of the contributions made by unobserved factors to the 
treatment effect estimates. To put it another way, the graphs present information about 
how unknown factors (i.e., information that is not in the data) affect the estimates. The 
contribution of the known or observed factors is, of course, reflected in the regression 
estimates, which are presented for select analyses in the appendix to this chapter.  
                                                                                                                                                 
directions and magnitudes of the coefficients between the LPM and probit specifications, which are not 
presented, but are available upon request, suggest that the current analysis is not an example of a real-world 
exception to Angrist and Pischke’s (2009) generalization. 
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With respect to thinking about the contribution of the unobservables it is 
important, as was discussed in Chapter 7, to remember that U_D, the collective 
unobserved information, is not decomposable: the collective contribution of all of the 
unobservables, as a conglomerate, is reflected in U_D. It, therefore, includes all of the 
information unavailable to the researcher, but relevant to the releasees’ decisions to 
remain with cellmates. Moreover, it includes elements of the agency of the correctional 
officers and cellmates who play roles in the persistence of prison peer relationships.  
 Guide to interpretation of the ATEs and MTEs. Figure 12 is a guide to 
interpreting the marginal treatment effect graphs produced by margte. The probability of 
not being treated increases along the X-axis. The treatment effect of remaining with a 
cellmate for several months, versus leaving him, on reoffending increases along the Y-
axis. At low probability of not remaining with a cellmate for several months (i.e., meeting 
the threshold), releasees experience criminogenic effects. At high probability of not 
remaining with a cellmate for several months (i.e., not meeting the threshold), releasees 
experience crimino-suppressive effects. The average treatment effect (ATE) reported in 
the legend is the average of all of the marginal treatment effects estimated. More precise 
average treatment effect estimates are reported in Table 12.  
 




Figure 13 depicts what the marginal treatment effect curves might look like when 
average treatment effects are criminogenic, null, and crimino-suppressive.42 Again, the 
probability of not being treated increases along the X-axis, while the MTE estimates 
increase along the Y-axis. Assuming full support of the propensity score, MTEs can be 
estimated across the range of the propensity to not be treated. Whether ATEs are crimino-
suppressive, null, or criminogenic depends on whether the bulk of the MTEs are crimino-
suppressive, null, or criminogenic, as vertical shifts in the identical MTE curves illustrate. 
The first (highest) curve represents criminogenic average treatment effects, the second 
(middle) null average treatment effects, and the third (lowest) crimino-suppressive 
average treatment effects. 
 
*** [Figure 13 here] *** 
 
Average and marginal treatment effect estimates and interpretations . Figures 
14 through 19 present the marginal and average treatment effect estimates from the first 
outcome model that excludes the risk score, as estimated with margte. Figures 20 through 
25 present the marginal and average treatment effect estimates from the second outcome 
model that includes the risk score, as estimated with margte. Figures 14 through 16 and 
Figures 17 through 19 depict the average and marginal treatment effects of duration on 
rearrest at each of the thresholds under study. Figures 20 through 22 and Figures 23 
                                                 
42
 Note that the MTE curve does not have to assume this shape. It can, in fact, assume any shape. This 
shape, which is the shape of the MTE and MPPE curves in the current study, is adopted merely for 
consistency of exposition. 
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through 25 depict the average and marginal treatment effects of duration on recidivism at 
each threshold under study.  
 
*** [Figures 14 through 19 here] *** 
 
Each figure in Figures 14 through 25 consists of two graphs. The wavier graph on 
the left is estimated with maximum likelihood, under the assumption of normality, which 
is the default in the margte implementation. The regression output associated with each 
of these maximum likelihood estimates is presented in the appendix associated with this 
chapter.43 The figure on the right is generated through the same specification, but forces a 
functional form that has a squared propensity score term, as indicated by the test for 
essential heterogeneity in Chapter 8. For each estimate, standard errors surrounding the 
marginal treatment effect estimates are generated via fifty bootstrapped replications of 
the estimation process.  
 
*** [Figures 20 through 25 here] *** 
 
In each figure, both the maximum likelihood (ML) and propensity score squared 
(PS2) specifications reflect a similar downward sloping marginal treatment effect curve 
                                                 
43
 Although the regression output from margte is presented in the appendix to this chapter, it is worth 
noting a few things about that output here. First, estimates for the treated and untreated groups are 
presented separately for the maximum likelihood regressions. This is by design in the margte routine, 
which is based on Stata’s etregress routine. Second, the significant Mills ratios from those regressions 
indicate the presence of selection on unobservables and, thus, support the tests for essential h eterogeneity 
from Chapter 6.   
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that is positive when the propensity to remain with a cellmate is high and negative when 
the propensity to be remain with a cellmate is low. Note that the addition of the squared 
propensity score term to each model changes the shape of the MTE curves, forcing them 
to follow straight lines, as opposed to waves. In addition, the imposition of the higher-
order propensity score term, which is insignificant in the models, sometimes attenuates 
the ATEs, as shown in the figures and the regression output in the appendix to this 
chapter. For these reasons, only the maximum likelihood specifications will be presented 
when prison peer effects are examined. However, it should be noted that the standard 
error bands in the propensity score squared graphs are narrowest near the middle of the 
distribution of the propensity score (i.e., at a 50% probability not to be treated), which is 
where the subsample sizes are largest and where the estimated effect of duration on 
reoffending is nearest zero.  
Across thresholds and specifications, the average treatment effect of duration on 
both reoffending outcomes is near zero and not significant. In each case, the marginal 
treatment effect curve crosses zero at about a 50% probability of being treated. Moreover, 
the MTEs are also generally insignificant, as is reflected by the shaded standard error 
bands surrounding each MTE curve. However, there does appear to be variation in the 
ATEs with respect to the unobserved and observed characteristics of the releasees and 
their environments. That is, the non-horizontal MTE curves, which include some 
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significant point estimates, indicate the presence of essential heterogeneity.44 Unobserved 
factors are affecting the estimates. 
Even though the estimated marginal treatment effects are generally not 
significantly different than zero, considering what the downward-sloping shape of the 
MTE curve means is instructive in the context of this initial study of social interaction 
effects under essential heterogeneity. In these instances, when the contribution of the 
unobserved information is such that the probability of not staying with a cellmate for 
several months is high, effects are crimino-suppressive. When the unobserved factors 
indicate that the probability of not staying with a cellmate for several months is low, 
effects are criminogenic, as illustrated in Figure 12.  
Characterizing the unobserved factors that are driving these effects is an exercise 
in hypotheticals. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the unobserved factors that determine 
the length of time releasees spend with their cellmates are likely multitudinous and 
involve the agency of many people, including the releasees, their cellmates, other 
inmates, and correctional officers. Moreover, these many indeterminate unobserved 
factors, which may operate in concert or conflict with each other, cannot be logically 
separated from each other because they cannot be individually measured. However, their 
collective contribution to the observed response heterogeneity with respect to time spent 
with cellmates can be characterized.  
                                                 
44
 Selection on unobservables is also indicated by the significant Mills ratios reported in the regression 
output in the appendix to this chapter. 
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The ability to characterize the collective contribution of the unobservables (as 
well as the individual contributions of the observables) is a unique advantage of the LIV 
method. When unobserved factors encourage releasees to leave their cellmates before 
spending several months with them, those releasees’ probability of reoffending is lesser; 
when unobserved factors encourage releasees to stay with their cellmates for several 
months or more, their probability of reoffending is greater. The collective unobserved 
factors that encourage longer cellmate relationships also encourage reoffending, whereas 
the collective unobserved factors that discourage longer cellmate relationships discourage 
reoffending. Whether these treatment effects are subject to prison peer effects is the 
subject of the following section.  
Marginal and Average Prison Peer Effects Estimates 
There are two approaches to estimation of prison peer effects. The first is similar 
to the estimation of treatment effects: to estimate marginal prison peer effects with 
respect to each of the social interaction variables in the model, the derivative of the 
average treatment effect at each threshold can be taken with respect to the social 
interaction variables. In the second, ATEs can be estimated with respect to the values that 
the social interaction variables can adopt. The latter approach is adopted in the current 
study, which relies on Stata’s margte routine (Brave & Walstrum, 2014). The routine 
allows for specification of the values at which to compute the ATEs and MTEs. Variation 
in average treatment effects at varying values of the social interaction variables is 
equivalent to a prison peer effect. 
How to determine whether cellmates exert prison peer effects. Average and 
marginal prison peer effects are the variation in the average and margina l treatment 
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effects generated by the shifts in the social interaction variables. For each of the outcome 
models, baseline average treatment effect (ATE) estimates and average prison peer effect 
(APPE) estimates with respect to variation in the social interaction variables for both 
reoffending outcomes are presented in Table 12. The first section of Table 12 reports 
ATEs. The second, third, and fourth sections of the table report average prison peer effect 
estimates for each of the social interaction variables: cellmate prior incarceration, relative 
prior arrests, and relative risk scores. The APPEs are ATEs estimated at particular values 
of the social interaction variables within particular duration thresholds, as shown in the 
above equation [24]. Comparing the APPE estimates within particular duration thresholds 
ensures that time does not confound expectations about or interpretation of those 
estimates. 
 
*** [Table 12 here] *** 
 
Prior incarceration. Longest-duration cellmates who have a prior incarceration 
should increase releasees’ probability of reoffending, relative to longest-duration 
cellmates without a prior incarceration, as predicted by differential association theory, 
which expects those with more criminal experience to exert more criminogenic effects 
(Sutherland, 1947). This means that, when looking at the results of the analyses that are 
presented in Table 12, the APPEs associated with cellmates who do not have a prior 
incarceration on record in Pennsylvania should be lower than the ATEs and the APPEs 




Relative prior arrest. A positive relative prior arrest value indicates that a releasee 
has less criminal experience, as indicated by fewer arrests, than his longest-duration 
cellmate. A negative relative prior arrest value indicates that a releasee has more criminal 
experience, as indicated by more arrests, than his longest-duration cellmate. Per balance 
theory, APPEs on reoffending should be negative for releasees with negative relative 
prior arrest values and positive for releasees with positive relative prior arrest values 
(McGloin, 2009). Moreover, as relative prior arrest values increase, the effect on 
reoffending should, per differential association theory, also increase (Sutherland, 1947). 
Put another way, when positive, larger relative arrest differentials should yield larger 
increases in reoffending. When negative, larger relative arrest differentials should yield 
larger decreases in reoffending. There should be a positive relationship between the 
relative arrest measure and the APPE estimates reported in Table 12, whether reoffending 
is measured by rearrest or general recidivism.  
Relative risk. The relative risk score measures operate similarly to the relative 
prior arrest measures. Negative relative risk scores indicate that the releasee has more 
criminality, whereas positive relative risk scores indicate that the longest-duration 
cellmate has more criminality. Negative relative risk scores should yield crimino-
suppressive effects, whereas positive relative risk scores should yield criminogenic 
effects. The larger the differential in relative risk, the larger the effect should be, as the 
releasee and his cellmate attempt to achieve balance in their association (McGloin, 2009). 
From the negative end to the positive end of the continuum of relative risk scores, the 
average prison peer effects reported in Table 12 should be increasing, with large crimino-
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suppressive effects at the negative end giving way to large criminogenic effects at the 
positive end.  
Prison peer effects as a function of prior incarceration. Figures 26 through 37 
depict the average treatment effects on releasees’ rearrest and recidivism at each 
treatment threshold for each outcome model, as moderated by the prior incarceration of 
their cellmates. In each figure, the graph on the left depicts marginal and average prison 
peer effects when the cellmates are first-time prison inmates (prior incarceration = 0), 
while the graph on the right depicts the marginal and average prison peer effects when 
the cellmates have a prior incarceration on record with PADOC (prior incarceration = 1).  
 
*** [Figures 26 through 37 here] *** 
 
Each of the graphs reveals no discernible differences in the reoffending outcomes 
of releasees who have more criminally experienced cellmates versus those who have less 
criminally experienced cellmates, as measured by the prior incarceration status of the 
cellmates. This is confirmed by the more nuanced average prison peer effect estimates 
reported in Table 12. While the insignificant prison peer effects of cellmate prior 
incarceration on releasee reoffending point consistently in the criminogenic direction and 
while the APPEs on recidivism are sporadically significant at lower duration thresholds, 
the only firm conclusion that can be drawn is that this analysis finds no support for the 
hypothesis that more criminally experienced cellmates, in terms of their incarceration 





*** [Table 13 here] *** 
 
Prison peer effects as a function of relative prior arrest. Figures 38 through 73 
depict marginal and average prison peer effects, as attenuated by the relative difference in 
prior arrest of the releasees and their cellmates. In the data, relative prior arrest 
differentials range from –45 to +71. Marginal prison peer effects are presented for 
relative prior arrests between a -6 differential and a +6 differential, with positive numbers 
indicating greater cellmate criminal experience (i.e., more prior arrests) and negative 
numbers indicating lesser cellmate experience (i.e., fewer prior arrests) relative to the 
releasee. The range from -6 to +6 includes 75.87% (n=7,687) of the releasees, as shown 
in Table 13. Making comparisons within this range ensures that those comparisons are 
being made between several hundred releasees or more, as opposed to only several dozen 
releasees or fewer.  
 
*** [Figures 38 through 73 here] *** 
 
For brevity graphs of the MPPEs and APPEs are presented only for absolute 
differentials of two, four, and six. In each figure the graph on the left presents prison peer 
effects at the negative value of relative prior arrest (e.g., -6) while the graph on the right 
presents prison peer effects at the positive value (e.g., +6). Per Sutherland (1947) and 
McGloin (2009), wider differentials should evidence larger social interaction effects.  
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Contrary to the literature that expects social interaction effects, the graphs indicate 
that average treatment effects do not differ by relative prior arrest, thus indicating no 
evidence of discernible prison peer effects. This is true across the -8 to +10 continuum of 
relative prior arrest, as indicated in Table 12, which reports APPEs over the range of 
relative prior arrest values.45 
 
*** [Table 14 here] *** 
 
Prisons peer effects as a function of relative risk. Figures 74 through 97 depict 
marginal and average prison peer effects, as moderated by the relative risk scores of the 
releasees and their cellmates. Graphs are presented only for the second outcome model 
because the scores from PADOC’s Risk Screening Tool (RST) were only included in the 
second outcome model, as described in Chapter 8. In the data, the relative risk scores 
                                                 
45
 In general, the results from the prior arrest models are puzzling, even though they are not significant. 
Because these puzzles stem from insignificant effect estimates, they are discussed in a footnote, not the 
main text.  
According to criminological theory, within duration thresholds (i.e., holding time constant) 
releasees with negative differentials should see their reoffending decrease, whereas releasees with positive 
differentials should see their reoffending increase. This is not observed for rearrest or for reincarceration. In 
each outcome model, at each duration threshold, the average treatment effect of duration on releasee 
recidivism is reduced as the prior arrest differential between the releasees and their cellmates increases.  
This result contradicts differential association theory, which at the very least would expect 
increasingly wide positive differentials to exert increasingly criminogenic effects. Balance theory is also 
not supported from the perspective of the release: negative differentials should yield negative effects, 
positive differentials positive effects  for the releasees, even though the cellmates’ outcomes cannot be 
observed. This pattern is not seen at in either model, at any threshold, for either outcome.  
To further complicate matters, for all but the first outcome model at the 150-day threshold, the 
ATE of duration on releasee rearrest is increased as the prior arrest differential between the releasees and 
their cellmates increases. While these effects on rearrest are expected in that increasingly wide positive 
differentials are predicted to exert increasingly criminogenic effects of rearrest, they also suggest that social 
interactions act in opposite ways on releasees who are reincarcerated without being arrested than on 
releasees who are simply rearrested, which is puzzling.   
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range from -7 to +7. The figures present marginal and average prison peer effects for 
rearrest and recidivism at each threshold for four absolute values of the relative RST 
score: four, three, two, and one. These values cover 98.03% (n=9,931) of the individuals, 
as indicated by Table 14. As was the case for relative prior arrest, the figures related to 
relative risk scores depict the negative differential score on the left (e.g., -4) and the 
positive differential score on the right (e.g., +4). 
 
*** [Figures 74 through 97 here] *** 
 
The figures indicate that there is no discernible difference in average prison peer 
effects by differences in relative risk between the releasees and their cellmates. Again, 
this finding provides no support for the criminological literature that expects social 
interactions to impact offending outcomes.  
Overall outcomes. Table 12 presents average prison peer effect estimates over 
wider ranges of the social interaction variables. The null prison peer effect findings with 
respect to each of the criminal experience and criminality measures are confirmed by 
those estimates. Across the ranges of the criminality and criminal experience measures, 
there is very little evidence that cellmate criminality or criminal experience moderates the 
average treatment effects estimated for each duration threshold. There is no consistent 
evidence of average prison peer effects that indicates support for the hypothesis that 
prisons are learning environments in which criminals develop their criminality, or 
propensity to commit crime, as suggested by Clemmer (1940, 1950).  
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What the Current Study Finds 
The current study finds no evidence of average prison peer effects on the rearrest 
or recidivism outcomes of the first-time PADOC release cohort. This null finding is not 
affected by the specification of the outcome model. Nor is it affected by the choice of 
social interaction variables, which are indicators of inmates’ criminality and criminal 
experience. The null APPE estimates are consistent across the three duration of cellmate 
association thresholds.  
While arguments that prisons, on average, are schools of crime, find no support in 
the current study, the notion that prison peers can be beneficial to some first-time prison 
releasees (i.e., reduce their reoffending), while harming others (i.e., increasing their 
reoffending) does find support. Substantial and consistent essential heterogeneity was 
found in the in the relationship between reoffending and cellmate social interactions. This 
heterogeneity remained despite the presence of numerous theoretically relevant controls.  
 The presence of essential heterogeneity was established by the tests presented in 
the previous chapter and the significant Mills ratios reported in the margte output, 
examples of which appear in the appendix to the current chapter. In addition, essential 
heterogeneity is evident in the graphical output. At each threshold, the shape of the MTE 
curve is downward sloping. Were no essential heterogeneity present, the MTE curves 
would be flat (i.e., horizontal). The marginal prison peer effect curves mirror the MTE 
curves. The estimated MPPEs in each of the graphs (Figures 26 through 97) range from 
about –0.2 to +0.2. Each MPPE curve follows a symmetrical downward-sloping pattern, 
crossing zero at about a 50% probability of meeting the duration threshold in question. 
Moreover, the propensity score squared MTE graphs in Figures 14 through 25 indicate 
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that the standard errors are narrowest near this mid-point. It is, therefore, not surprising 
that the average prison peer effect (and average treatment effect) parameter estimates are 
precisely estimated in this region. Where the marginal prison peer effects are 
criminogenic or crimino-suppressive (i.e., at the tails), they are generally larger, but also 
more imprecisely estimated. Moreover, when the MPPEs at the tails are significant, they 
typically balance each other, thus reinforcing the central tendency toward null APPEs.  
 The marginal prison peer effect estimates are significant only in rare instances and 
only over a very small range of the propensity to not be treated, at most a 20% probability 
of not remaining with a cellmate for a particular number of days. Only at very high and 
very low probabilities of meeting the duration threshold are MPPEs sometimes 
significant. At high probabilities of remaining with a cellmate for a particular number of 
days (or low probability of not remaining with a cellmate for a particular number of 
days), if the MPPEs are significant, they are always criminogenic. At low probabilities of 
remaining with a cellmate for a particular number of days (or high probability of not 
remaining with a cellmate for a particular number of days) if the MPPEs are significant, 
they are always crimino-suppressive.  
Crimino-suppressive effects countervail criminogenic effects. Put another way: 
when factors that are not included in the data encourage releasees to stay with their 
cellmates, the releasees experience criminogenic effects that are rather large (e.g., a 20% 
increase in the probability of being rearrested), whereas when factors not included in the 
data encourage releasees to leave their cellmates, the releasees experience crimino-
suppressive effects that are similarly large (e.g., a 20% decrease in the probability of 
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being rearrested). However, in general, those effects are not significantly different from 
zero.  
 Keeping in mind that characterizing the unobservables is an hypothetical exercise, 
the criminological framework outlines in Chapter 2 can provide a plausible explanation 
of these observations. For example, unobserved criminal attitudes and behaviors on the 
part of the releasees and their cellmates can explain the observed outcomes.  
Releasees high in criminality might have a strong desire to stay with highly 
skilled criminal cellmates (e.g., Shaw, 1966) because those releasees believe they can 
learn techniques relevant to particular criminal behavior from those cellmates, as 
suggested by Bentham (1830), Clemmer (1950), and Nagin et al. (2009). The criminality 
and desires of the releasees are unobserved, as are the particular skills that those releasees 
may hope to learn from their cellmates. Nevertheless, the contribution those 
unobservables make to the detected effects is both observable and criminogenic.  
Conversely, releasees who are low in criminality might find the excessive 
criminal attitudes of their cellmates distasteful. This could and, according to the PADOC 
correctional officers, often does happen in the case of inmates assigned to cellmates who 
are sex offenders (personal communication, 2013). Releasees assigned to cellmates 
whose criminality they find unacceptable my want to desist from their cellmate 
associations. They may also want to desist from crime in order to avoid a prison 
environment where they might be compelled to interact with distasteful individuals. In 
this example, the criminal attitudes and behaviors releasee and his longest-duration 
cellmate are equally unobservable. What is observable, however, is their collective 




 The current study finds very little support for the hypothesis that social 
interactions between cellmates can account for the average criminogenic effects of prison 
on reoffending outcomes. The longest-duration cellmate associations maintained by the 
members of a release cohort from the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections were 
examined to see if the prior criminal experience and criminality of the cellmates would 
influence the reoffending outcomes of the releasees who spent varying amounts of time 
with their longest-duration cellmates. On average, no consistent significant associations 
were found between duration of cellmate association and the releasees’ reoffending 
outcomes, which included rearrest and recidivism, defined as rearrest and reincarceration 
without rearrest. Estimating average prison peer effects across the range of the cellmate 
criminality and criminal experience measures also revealed no significant variation in 
those effects. In other words, no evidence of average prison peer effects was found. 
However, considerable evidence of marginal prison peer effects was found: substantial 
essential heterogeneity remained despite the inclusion of numerous statistical controls.  
While the contribution that the unobserved determinants of decisions cannot be 
decomposed into its constituent elements, that the prison peer effect estimates evinced 
heterogeneity despite dozens of control variables suggests the need for improvement on 
two fronts. First, more data, particularly regarding criminal attitudes and definitions, can 
be collected from incoming inmates. Second, the local instrumental variables method can 




CHAPTER 10: Discussion 
The consensus in the criminological literature is that the average effect of 
incarceration on reoffending is null or criminogenic, rather than crimino-suppressive. 
Nagin et al. (2009) interpret this prison effect as a failure of specific deterrence because, 
in their view of the extant literature, prison should deter those who experience it from 
future offending. In other words, the effect of prison should be crimino-suppressive, not 
criminogenic. The current study has sought to establish whether average prison peer 
effects can be held accountable for some portion of the failure of incarceration to reduce 
reoffending. The evidence presented in the preceding chapters suggests that they cannot.  
That is not, however, the end of the story.  
Although average prison peer effects are null, they are not homogenous. 
Considerable response heterogeneity, which is attributable to essential heterogeneity 
(Heckman et al., 2006), remained evident in the marginal prison peer effect estimates, 
despite the inclusion of numerous theoretically relevant controls in both the choice and 
outcome models. That considerable response heterogeneity remained despite the 
inclusion of controls thought be relevant to the production of reoffending suggests the 
potential for considerable bias in previous estimates of social interaction effects, which 
included fewer such controls and/or used methods unable to handle essential 
heterogeneity, such as multiple regression and instrumental variables techniques.  
Naturally, the preceding conclusion is not without its caveats. The inability to 
construct true attitudinal measures of criminality, as required by criminological theory, 
and the application of a single-decision maker method to a multiple decision-maker 
problem are major, but not the only, shortcomings of the current study and, indeed, many 
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criminological studies. Moreover, each of these shortcomings may have impacted the 
results. Fortunately, both shortcomings have the potential to be addressed in future work. 
A Succinct Summary of the Current Study 
According to criminological theory, peer or social influence arises during social 
interaction. Through ordinary learning mechanisms, what Sutherland (1947) called 
definitions (i.e., attitudes, motivations, and rationalizations, per Matsueda (1988)) and 
behaviors, both antisocial and prosocial, are discussed, modeled, encouraged, and 
discouraged (Skinner, 1952; Sutherland & Cressey, 1955; Bandura, 1962; Burgess & 
Akers, 1966; Matsueda, 1988; Akers, 2009; Kahneman, 2011). Evidence of social 
influence (i.e., a peer effect) emerges as increased or decreased criminal behavior and 
criminal definitions. Whether peer effects excite or abate criminal behavior and attitudes 
depends on the relative criminal experience and criminality of the interacting individuals 
(Sutherland, 1947, McGloin, 2009).  
Socialization to the prison environment through social interaction, which has been 
termed prisonization, is the process of criminal peer influence applied to the context of 
incarceration (Clemmer, 1940, 1950). Prisonization, which occurs primarily in interaction 
with other inmates, has been shown to vary with the duration of time inmates have served 
as well as with the duration of time they have left to serve, such that prisonization 
increases through mid-sentence then decreases as inmates approach their release dates 
(Wheeler, 1961; Garabedian, 1963; Wellford, 1967). Moreover, although prisonization 
effects may decelerate after peaking during the course of a prison stay, they do appear to 
remain elevated over pre-prison levels and to persist for some time after inmates are 
released from prison. While not all inmates exhibit the same pattern of prisonization 
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(Garabedian, 1963), on average, first-time prison inmates appear less prisonized at 
baseline than do returning inmates (Wheeler, 1961).  
Developmental cascade theory may account for the persistence of prisonization 
due to prison peer effects (Masten et al., 2005; Dishion et al., 2010). An hypothetical 
cascading prison peer effect process might involve cellmate interactions that lead to 
deviancy or criminality talk, through which criminality increases such that it engenders 
future criminal behavior, because increased criminality due to prison peer interactions 
influences all subsequent interactions that the inmate has post-prison (Sutherland, 1947; 
Lorenz, 1972; Dodge & Dishion, 2005; Sherman & Harris, 2013).  
To examine potential prison peer effects, the current study focused on first-time 
releasees, longest-duration cellmates, and several social interaction variables that reflect 
the criminal experience and criminality of the releasees and their cellmates. A cohort 
(n=10,131) of first-time releasees was chosen because first-time inmates are theorized to 
be likeliest to experience the strongest prison peer effects (Wheeler, 1961; Nieuwbeerta 
et al., 2009). The cellmates who celled with each first-time releasee for the most days 
were identified because they were expected, based on their time-intense associations with 
the releasees, to exert the strongest prison peer effects relative to other cellmates who 
engaged in less time-intense associations with the members of the first-time release 
cohort (Sutherland, 1947; Agnew, 1991; Warr, 1993).  
Social interaction variables that delineate cellmates and releasees based on their 
criminal experience and criminality were then identified. Cellmates with prior 
incarceration records were expected to exert more criminogenic prison peer effects 
relative to first-timers because they have more extensive criminal experience, as indicated 
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by their incarceration histories. Similar reasoning led to the expectation that cellmates 
with lengthier arrest records would be likelier to exert criminogenic effects than those 
with shorter arrest records. Cellmates with higher risk scores, which reflect criminality, 
were likewise expected to exert more criminogenic prison peer effects relative to those 
with lower risk scores. Level cellmate measures were considered relative to level releasee 
measures to more fully account for variation in peer influence (McGloin, 2009). The 
relative distance between the criminal experience and criminality of a releasee and his 
longest-duration cellmate was expected to matter. More criminal releasees were expected 
to experience crimino-suppressive prison peer effects as a result of interacting with 
relatively more prosocial cellmates. Releasees paired with relatively more antisocial 
cellmates were expected to experience criminogenic prison peer effects.  
The current study attempted to isolate statistically significant average prison peer 
effects on reoffending using the local instrument variables (LIV) method (Heckman & 
Vytlacil, 1999, 2005). The LIV method is a choice-theoretic method that isolates the 
effect of binary decisions through a two-stage process. In the first stage, the probability of 
making a dichotomous decision is predicted. In the second, that probability (i.e., 
propensity score) is used to predict the outcomes of interest.  
The dichotomous first-stage model predicts the probability that two inmates cell 
together for a particular duration of time. Duration was chosen to characterize cellmate 
associations because prior criminological research had shown that prison socialization 
processes depend on it nonlinearly, such that prisonization accelerates, peaks, and then 
declines through prison stays (Wheeler, 1961; Garabedian, 1963; Wellford, 1967). The 
second-stage predicted two outcomes of prison peer interactions: the prevalence of 
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rearrest and the prevalence of more general recidivism, defined as rearrest or 
reincarceration without arrest. Within the limitations of the data (i.e., self-report data 
were not available), these outcomes capture reoffending such that it reflects the least 
intense intervention by the criminal justice system (Maltz, 1984; Thornberry & Krohn, 
2000).  
To causally identify prison peer effects using any method that relies on 
instrumental variables, including LIV, at least one exclusion restriction that directly 
predicts the celling longevity decision, but only indirectly predicts reoffending must 
exist, both conceptually and in the available data (Imbens & Angrist, 1994; Heckman & 
Vytlacil, 1999, 2005; Bushway & Apel, 2010). Multiple exclusion restrictions were 
theoretically and empirically justified, such that they were demonstrated to be plausible, 
strong and sample-wide predictors capable of isolating average prison peer effects on 
reoffending outcomes (Basu et al., 2007).  
Through the LIV framework, the longest-duration (i.e., most stable or most time-
intense) cellmate associations maintained by the members of a first-time release cohort 
from the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (PADOC) were examined to see if the 
prevalence of releasee reoffending, as reflected in rearrest and a more general recidivism 
measure, was affected by the prior criminal experience and criminality of those cellmates. 
It was not. Multiple decision thresholds at 30-day increments of the duration of cellmate 
association were investigated to see if average prison peer effects varied as the duration 
cellmate association was raised from 120 to 150 to 180 days. They did not. The null 
findings pertaining to average prison peer effects held across duration thresholds, for 
multiple model specifications, and both reoffending outcomes. That average peer effects 
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were found to be consistently null with respect to each of the social interaction variables 
and at each of the duration thresholds obviates the need to discuss the questions 
enumerated in Chapter 4. Average prison peer effects of longest-duration cellmates on 
releasees are null at multiple duration thresholds, for multiple behavioral outcomes and 
social interaction variables, and regardless of model specification.  
Importantly, although the APPEs were estimated to be null, marginal prison peer 
effects were shown both to vary and to be significant for some releasees. That is, 
essential heterogeneity (Heckman et al., 2006) was shown to be present in the 
relationship between releasee reoffending and prison peer interactions. The biases due to 
unobserved heterogeneity are evident in comparisons between the effect estimates from 
linear probability models (LPM), instrumental variables (IV) specifications, and the local 
instrumental variables models. Initially significant and crimino-suppressive average 
prison peer effect estimates from LPMs became insignificant in three of the four models 
and appeared to point in the criminogenic direction under the IV specifications, including 
the ivprobit specification, which employs the correct functional form with respect to the 
nature of the instrumental and outcome variables. 
The presence of essential heterogeneity was confirmed at each of the thresholds 
between 30 and 360 days in both outcome models using Heckman et al.’s (2006) test. It 
was also evident in the final LIV estimates at the 120-day, 150-day, and 180-day 
thresholds, which reported significant Mills ratios and evinced downward-sloping 
marginal prison peer effect (MPPE) curves. Although the APPEs were near-universally 
insignificant for both reoffending outcomes across the duration thresholds and outcome 
models, the LIV models also established that MPPEs were often significant, particularly 
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at extreme values of the propensity not to maintain a cellmate association for several 
months, that is, when the probability that a releasee would remain with or leave his was 
very certain. Moreover, some MPPEs operated in the criminogenic direction, while others 
operated in the crimino-suppressive direction. 
The presence of essential heterogeneity and variation in the estimated marginal 
prison peer effects indicates that average prison peer effects do not accurately 
characterize the effect of cellmates on releasees in most circumstances. Some releasees 
are unaffected by their prison peers, but other releasees are more likely to be arrested or 
reincarcerated without an arrest after spending time with their cellmates, while still others 
are less likely to be arrested or reincarcerated without an arrest after spending time with 
their cellmates.  
The releasees who experience criminogenic effects are those who, for unobserved 
reasons, stay in their longest-duration associations for at least several months. The 
releasees who experience crimino-suppressive effects are those who, for unobserved 
reasons, leave those associations before several months have elapsed. This was true in 
both model specifications for both rearrest and more general recidivism outcomes and at 
each of the three duration thresholds (120-day, 150-day, and 180-day) examined.  
While speculative, a primary unobserved factor driving these outcomes could be 
unmeasured criminality. Releasees with more criminal propensity may want to cultivate 
more intense criminal associations that enable them to reoffend (e.g., Bentham, 1830; 
Clemmer, 1940; Lerman, 2009), while releasees with lesser criminal propensity may 
want to dissociate themselves from such associations in order to curb their reoffending 
(e.g., Wheeler, 1961; Giordano et al., 2002; Crewe, 2007).   
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That prison peer effects were estimated to be null, on average, was an unexpected 
finding given both prior theory and prior research. The first-time PADOC releasees were 
paired with time-intensive cellmates who, on average, had more extensive arrest histories, 
more prior spells of incarceration, and higher risk scores. In this scenario, criminological 
theory predicts that prison peers will, on average, exert criminogenic effects (Clemmer, 
1940; Sutherland, 1947; McGloin, 2009) and that those effects have the potential to 
cascade over time and through domains (Masten et al., 2005; Dishion et al., 2014). 
Research has also indicated that this is likely to be the case (e.g., Wheeler, 1961; Bayer et 
al., 2009). Methodological, operational, and theoretical limitations may each have 
contributed to the null APPE findings. The main foci of this final chapter are to explore 
why those APPE findings may appear null and to argue that future prison peer effect 
studies should focus on marginal, rather than average, effects.  
Methodological Limitations 
Methodologically, prison peer effects were explored within the context of their 
capacity to moderate the average treatment effects demarcated by the duration of cellmate 
association. After essential heterogeneity (Heckman et al., 2006) was detected in the 
relationship between time spent with cellmates and reoffending, a local instrumental 
variables framework (Heckman & Vytlacil, 1999, 2005) was developed to estimate 
prison peer effects. The LIV framework is the most appropriate framework to adopt when 
essential heterogeneity is present and causal effect identification is desired (Heckman et 
al., 2006; Brave & Walstrum, 2014).  
In most criminological explanations of offending, the presence of essential 
heterogeneity is implicit: unobserved criminality is a factor both in decisions that affect 
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criminal behavior and in the criminal behavior itself. This is true of Clemmer’s (1940) 
differential association-based (Sutherland, 1947; Wellford, 1967) theory of prisonization, 
wherein inmates must decide how deeply to assimilate into the prison environment. How 
complete their prisonization becomes then impacts their post-prison offending patterns.  
According to Clemmer (1950), the process of prisonization affects and is affected 
by inmates’ criminality, which also influences their future (i.e., post-prison) criminal 
behavior. Essential heterogeneity is, therefore, implicit in his hypothesis that prisons are 
learning environments. Essential heterogeneity is also expected in the current prison peer 
effect framework, which relies primarily on the work of Sutherland (1947), Clemmer 
(1940, 1950), Wheeler (1961), Masten et al. (2005), and McGloin (2009). Inmates are 
expected to remain in cellmate relationships due to unobservable factors (e.g., their 
criminality; the criminality of their cellmates; the disposition of the correctional officers), 
which are expected to impact reoffending independently as well as through the duration 
of cellmate association. Prison peer effects are expected to persist over time as causally 
shifted criminality influences subsequent interactions and behaviors in the post-prison 
environment (Masten et al., 2005; Dishion et al., 2010; Dishion, 2014). 
Although the LIV framework allows for causal identification of treatment effects 
under essential heterogeneity, it has at least three weaknesses when applied to 
identification of prison peer effects. First, in the context of prison peers, the treatment 
decision is less well-defined than it is in other contexts. In educational contexts, for 
example, the decisions to graduate high school or to finish college are well-structured 
binary choices (e.g., Heckman et al., 2006; Heckman & Urzua, 2010). Celling decisions 
are naturally binary in that inmates are either placed together in a cell or not. However, in 
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an analytical framework in which cellmate pairs are already determined, how to 
characterize the nature of those pairings to preserve the binary nature of the pairing 
decision is not obvious. 
 In the current operationalization, the decision was made to characterize cellmate 
associations based on their duration. That decision may have been consequential to the 
null outcomes. Other cellmate association characterizations, which may be both more 
relevant to the study of prison peer effects and less likely to evince null effects, are also 
possible, as outlined in the operational weaknesses section below.  
The second weakness of the LIV method as it was applied is that it requires a 
large sample if interaction effects for continuous variables are to be explored. Ultimately, 
the sample size may not have been large enough to support identification of causal effects 
at the extremes of the propensity score distributions, which is where significant effects 
appear to be emerging and also where the tails have the fewest observations.  
Finally, in applying the LIV method to the problem of identification of social 
interaction effects, the agency of the releasee was adopted as the primary driver of the 
treatment, which was defined as the persistence of the prison peer relationship. While 
adopting this perspective avoids the SUTVA problem, it fails to accurately characterize 
the social relationship as involving the agency of the releasee’s cellmate and the agency 
of the correctional officers, as well as the agency of the releasee. 
Cellmate association characterizations. In the current prison peer LIV 
framework, the criminality of the releasees and their cellmates are theorized to predict 
both the duration of cellmate association and releasee reoffending. The choice to treat 
duration as the determining factor in the production of prison peer effects on reoffending 
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was appropriate in the prison context for at least three reasons. First, duration is 
inextricably linked to prison effects because prisoners are sentenced to spend particular 
amounts of time in prison. Second, when prisoners are assigned to cellmates their 
association may need time to develop to the point where prison peer effects become 
detectable. Finally, prior research had shown duration to be a factor in the degree to 
which inmates become prisonized (Wheeler, 1961; Garabedian, 1963; Wellford, 1967).  
Monthly duration thresholds between one month and two years of cellmate 
association were explored to see when during the course of a cellmate association prison 
peer effects might be detectable. Three thresholds were explored: the 180-day threshold 
comported with prior criminological work on the timing of prisonization relative to 
prison stays and the timing of a pairing with a longest-duration cellmate, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. The 150-day threshold seemed most promising in terms of the potential to 
detect prison peer effects because that is where the effects appeared most significant, as 
shown in Chapter 6. The 120-day threshold balanced the other two in terms of the 
distribution of releasees over the propensity score, as shown in Chapter 9. Average prison 
peer effects were insignificant at all three thresholds.  
Although duration is a reasonable potential delineator of the development of 
prison peer relationships, it may not be the lens through which prison peer effects should 
be investigated. In particular, duration is generally theorized to moderate prison peer 
effects, not to generate them independently (Sutherland, 1947; Glaser & Stratton, 1961). 
Other aspects of human relationships that do not involve time may, therefore, better serve 
to delineate treatment choices in the LIV framework.  
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Obvious candidates to substitute for duration as delineating characteristics of 
releasee-cellmate associations are the homophily variables, which reflect similarity 
between releasees and cellmates on particular characteristics. Homophily is evident in all 
human relationships (Becker, 1974; Cohen, 1977; Kandel, 1978; Buss, 1985; Mare, 1991; 
McPherson et al., 2001; Weerman & Smeenk, 2005), but how it affects the outcomes of 
those relationships is unclear (e.g., Glueck & Glueck, 1950; Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; 
Hartup, 2005; Mouw, 2006). In the current framework, the homophily variables were 
strongly predictive of the duration of cellmate association, but did not collectively appear 
to significantly influence recidivism outcomes, although they did influence rearrest 
outcomes. However, the homophily variables created for this study generally reflected 
demographic similarities, rather than similarities based on criminality or criminal 
experience.  
Through the arrest history data provided by the Pennsylvania State Police, it may 
be possible to construct measures of criminal proclivities and skills, as evidenced by the 
types of prior crimes that prisoners committed. Similarity or difference with respect to 
criminal experience measures might provide a better means through which to predict the 
formation of cellmate associations and the reoffending outcomes theorized to proceed 
from them. They may also serve as a better test of the “schools of crime” hypothesis, 
which expects inmates to develop greater criminality that foments reoffending (Bentham, 
1830). For example, it may be possible to determine whether inmates specialized in 
particular crime types before prison and whether those specializations changed after 
prison, as a result of social interactions (e.g., Bayer et al., 2009).  
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Sample size. An additional limitation of the LIV method as applied was the 
sample size. While a first-time release cohort consisting of 10,131 releasees seemed like 
an adequately large sample, it was not. That the sample size emerged as a limitation was 
a direct consequence of the implementation of the method, which requires balanced 
comparison groups (Heckman & Vytlacil, 1999, 2005; Apel & Sweeten, 2010b).  
The choice model in the current LIV framework predicts the probability that 
releasees stay with their cellmates for particular lengths of time. That propensity score is 
then used to predict prison peer effects on reoffending outcomes. The support of the 
propensity score distribution in the sample, in part, determines to whom the predicted 
prison peer effects can be generalized. When the support of the propensity score is full, 
treatment effects have the potential to be generalized to the entire sample.  
Full support of the propensity score means that across the zero to one range of the 
distribution of propensity scores, there are individuals who share similar propensity 
scores but were treated differently: some remained with their cellmates for several 
months (i.e., were treated) while others did not (i.e., were untreated). In other words: the 
treatment and control groups must balance on the propensity to be treated, not the 
treatment (i.e., specific duration) itself. Where the treatment and control groups balance, 
marginal prison peer effects (MPPE) can be estimated. If the propensity score has full 
support an average prison peer effect (APPE) can be calculated by integrating the 
estimated MPPEs over the range of the propensity score.  
Determining releasees’ propensity scores as a function of treatment (i.e., meeting 
a duration threshold or not) both divides the cohort into treatment groups and distributes 
it along the range of potential propensity scores. While this process creates appropriate 
276 
 
comparison groups as a function of the propensity score within the treatment and control 
groups (i.e., people with the same propensity to be treated who were both treated and not 
treated), it can also create very small propensity-score dependent comparison groups, 
particularly at the extremes of the propensity score. In the current analysis, these 
divisions were then exacerbated because marginal prison peer effects were estimated at 
different levels of the social interaction variables, thus further subdividing the sample.  
To make this more concrete, imagine that the 10,000 releasees are distributed 
uniformly in equal-size treated and untreated groups across the range of the propensity 
score. The addition of the prior incarceration social interaction indicator creates four, 
again equally-sized groups: treated-prior incarceration, untreated-prior incarceration, 
treated-no prior incarceration, and untreated-no prior incarceration. Were the marginal 
prison peer effects estimated in 100 bins along such a distribution, the approximately 
2,500 releasees in each of the four categories would be dispersed in groups of twenty-five 
on either side across the propensity score continuum, thus creating very small comparison 
groups.  
With respect to the relative risk and relative prior arrest measures, the comparison 
groups through which the marginal prison peer effects are estimated have the potential to 
become even smaller. This can be seen by examining crosstabs of the social interaction 
variables at deciles of the propensity score, which are presented for select deciles at the 
150-day threshold in the appendix associated with this chapter. It is clear from these 
crosstabs that the wide standard error bands around the estimates (e.g., Figures 14 
through 25), particularly at extreme values of the propensity score, are driven by small 
sample size. To improve the current analysis, it may be possible to select a larger sample 
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of first-time PADOC releasees that covers more release years. Alternatively, the sample 
could be expanded to include those releasees with prior incarcerations. Still another 
possibility is to reframe the analysis such that these interactions are not a part of it. The 
latter might be accomplished by creating differentiating characteristics of the releasee-
cellmate associations based on the social interaction variables.  
In addition to suggesting a means through which this study can be improved, this 
discussion of the support of the propensity score and its implications suggests an 
empirical explanation for the heavily context-dependent effects estimated in the social 
interaction literature (Hartup, 2005; Mouw, 2006; Gangl, 2010; Horney et al., 2012; 
Sacerdote, 2014) and for the null effects estimated via robust IV designs (Angrist, 2013). 
Samples in which there is not balance with respect to the propensity score may generate 
biased effect estimates because apples are being compared to oranges, as described in 
Chapter 3. This is likelier in smaller samples, as the cross-tabulations in appendix 
illustrates, because there are far fewer individuals to balance. The implication, then, is 
that samples could be highly skewed toward one end of the propensity score distribution 
(e.g., the end in which criminogenic effects are generated or the end in which crimino-
suppressive effects are generated) and/or large portions of the sample might lack 
appropriate comparisons. In either case, average treatment effects estimated without 
appropriate weighting will be biased due to these imbalances (Heckman & Vytlacil, 
2005). Similarly, instrumental variables implementations, such as those recommended by 
Fletcher (2009, 2012), often fail to generalize to the entire sample (i.e., they are 
localized), even though that is the goal. That is, LATEs are estimated, when ATEs are 
desired (Heckman et al., 2006; Bushway & Apel, 2010).  
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Single decision makers. The current application of the LIV method is further 
limited because the LIV framework is a potential outcomes framework based on the Roy 
(1951) model, which means the LIV framework is a single decision-maker framework, 
not a multiple decision-maker framework. Although, as was discussed in Chapter 7, 
potential stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) violations can be avoided by 
adopting the perspective of a single decision maker, applying the model in this way is 
unlikely to accurately model the decisions that result in particular cellmate association 
durations because multiple decision makers can influence those decisions. While all 
regression-based models (i.e., all analyses based on the linear-in-means model) of peer 
influence make the same assumption (Wellford, 1973; Manski, 1993; Brock & Durlauf, 
2001, 2007; Mouw, 2006; Gangl, 2010; Graham, 2011; Sacerdote, 2014), making that 
assumption does have implications for the interpretations that can be made from this LIV 
analysis.  
The main implication of the decision to adopt the perspective that the releasee 
(i.e., the unit of analysis) is the decision maker is that the collective unobservables that 
contribute to essential heterogeneity in the relationship between cellmate associations and 
reoffending outcomes reflect some combination of unobserved determinants of releasee 
decisions (e.g., criminal attitudes and beliefs), unobserved aspects of cellmate and 
correctional officer decisions (e.g., dispositions, correctional programming needs), and 
any other unobserved factors (e.g., characteristics of other potential cellmates; unit 
cultures, etc.) that might influence reoffending outcomes. While their collective 
contribution can be characterized, the collective unobserved determinants of decisions 
cannot be separated from each other.  
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Were the LIV model extended to accommodate multiple decision makers, it might 
be possible to separate the unobservables into unobservables attributable to each decision 
maker. Doing this would highlight areas where future research could concentrate (e.g., on 
the releasee and his cellmate, on the correctional system, or on some other area of 
inquiry) to better understand individual reoffending outcomes. This extension to the LIV 
model is planned for future work.  
Operational Limitations 
Operationally, the choices made regarding the specific releasees, cellmate 
relationships, social interaction variables, and reoffending outcomes to evaluate may have 
limited the potential for prison peer effects to be captured and generalized. First-time 
releasees were chosen because they were expected to experience the most extreme prison 
peer effects. Longest-duration cellmates were chosen because they were expected to exert 
the most extreme prison peer effects. The prevalence of rearrest and recidivism (i.e., 
rearrest or reincarceration without rearrest) were chosen because they are the most 
directly related to the act of reoffending, with the least amount of intervention by the 
criminal justice system. Each of these choices limits either the internal or external 
validity of the findings.  
First-time releasees. In 2006 and 2007, 17,582 unique prisoners were released 
from PADOC custody. Of those, 12,494 were first-timers.46 71.06% of the prisoners 
released from PADOC custody in 2006 and 2007 were, therefore, first-time releasees. 
Still, the findings reported by the current study are generalizable only to first-time prison 
                                                 
46
 Of those, 10,131 were admitted to PADOC custody on or after January 1, 2000. 
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inmates, who make up only a little more than two-thirds of the population of inmates 
released from PADOC in 2006 and 2007. Thus the failure to find average criminogenic 
effects in this sub-population still allows for the possibility that peer effects could be, on 
average, criminogenic if the whole population were covered. Expanding the sample of 
PADOC first-time releasees to include all of the members of the release cohort (i.e., 
adding in the re-offenders) would allow for comparisons between the impact of prison 
peers on the reoffending outcomes of first-time and returning prisoners.  
Longest-duration cellmates. The cellmates with whom releasees shared a cell 
for the most days were theorized to exert greater prison peer effects than other cellmates. 
Per Sutherland (1947), relationships that last longer should yield larger social interaction 
effects (Agnew, 1991; Warr, 1993; Haynie et al., 2005). This choice had consequences 
for the cellmate association duration thresholds that could feasibly be investigated. For 
example, most releasees spent more than one month with their cellmates, so meaningful 
comparisons could not be drawn between those releasees who spent at least a month with 
their cellmates and those who did not. It may be possible, though contrary to theory, that 
shorter-duration associations produce more meaningful effects. In the prison context, for 
example, cases of “negative adjustment” that require immediate moves due to one inmate 
victimizing another might be expected to generate large, cascading, criminogenic effects 
(Adams, 1992; personal communication, 2013).  
Other choices related to which cellmate associations were examined may also 
have been consequential. Although the timing of the onset of the longest-duration 
cellmate association relative to the releasees’ prison stays did not seem to significantly 
affect reoffending outcomes, cellmates other than the longest-duration cellmates might be 
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more relevant to releasee reoffending. In particular, Clemmer (1940) ascribed importance 
to first cellmates because inmates “seem to rely greatly on [their] first impressions of 
people” and the “first contacts” that they make in prison (p. 100).  
Last cellmates might also be especially relevant. The peak-end rule suggests that 
the most intense and the most recent experiences are the most salient (Kahneman et al. 
1997; Kahneman, 2011). This implies that last cellmates might exert greater peer 
influence than other cellmates, although whether those effects should be criminogenic or 
crimino-suppressive is unclear. Glaser and Stratton (1961) hypothesized that inmates tend 
toward different associations during different periods (early, middle, and late) of their 
prison stays, such that inmates seek more prosocial influences as they approach their 
release dates. Crewe (2007) reported pre-release behavioral improvements in line with 
this expectation, which was also confirmed by PADOC staff members who reported 
housing sex offenders, who are at higher risk for victimization, with inmates who are near 
their release date (personal communication, 2013). These pre-release behavioral 
anomalies on the part of both inmates and correctional officers may create particularly 
artificial cellmate relationships that either fail to generate appreciable social interaction 
effects, fail to generate social interaction effects that persist beyond incarceration 
(Giordano, 2003), or generate crimino-suppressive rather than criminogenic effects.  
 The problem with the hypothesis that other cellmates might exert greater 
influence over releasee outcomes than do the longest-duration cellmates is that the 
PADOC data do not reflect that potential. The collective contribution of the cellmate 
pool, exclusive of longest-duration cellmates, was generally inconsequential to 
reoffending after the influence of the longest-duration cellmates was controlled. 
282 
 
Moreover, as shown in Table 7, most characteristics of the longest-duration cellmates did 
not affect releasee reoffending independently. These results may cast some doubt on prior 
prison peer evidence based on facility- level effects aggregated from individual offending 
histories (e.g., Bayer et al., 2009). However, it is important to note, once again, that the 
current study did not include measures of the types of criminal behavior in which the 
releasees and their cellmates engaged prior to incarceration, whereas those criminal 
behaviors were the focus of the Bayer et al. (2009) inquiry. That difference could account 
for the disparate results.   
Social interaction and outcome measures. The measures used to indicate 
criminal experience and criminality were the number of prior arrests, whether a cellmate 
had a prior incarceration, and a risk score based on PADOC’s Risk Screening Tool. With 
respect to the social interaction variables, the risk score measure proved problematic 
methodologically. In addition, each of the social interaction variables is subject to similar 
conceptual problems.  
The risk score was constructed from other measures in the PADOC data that 
remained significant to the determination of reoffending outcomes even when the risk 
score was included in the analysis. This suggests that the risk score does not predict 
outcomes as well as its constituent elements do. Moreover, its inclusion as a summary 
measure may unnecessarily introduce some collinearity into the model, although not so 
much that the models could not be estimated.  
Each of the social interaction measures, which are intended to reflect criminal 
experience and/or criminality, is flawed in the context of criminological learning theories, 
particularly differential association theory, the constructs of which both prisonization and 
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balance theories reference. The constructs that underlie differential association theory are 
more nuanced than the social interaction measures utilized in the current study.  
Differential association theory expects definitions to motivate criminal behavior, 
but each of the social interaction measures is a behavioral measure. For example, the risk 
score measure is derived from of an actuarial assessment used widely by correctional 
administrators in Pennsylvania. While the risk score is, therefore, a measure of 
criminality employed by PADOC, it, not a true attitudinal measure of underlying 
criminality, as favored by differential association theory (Sutherland, 1947). Moreover, 
the non-demographic elements that comprise the risk score are behavioral, rather than 
attitudinal indicators of an individual’s propensity to commit future crimes. Similarly, 
prior incarceration and prior arrest are behavioral indicators thought to reflect attitudinal 
differences. However, they may not serve that purpose, particularly given their reliance 
on the agency of the criminal justice system for measurement, as will be discussed in 
more detail below.  
Differential association theory also expects different definitions to motivate 
different crimes. Unlike Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), Sutherland (1947) did not 
subscribe to the notion of a general theory of crime. In contrast, the recidivism risk, prior 
incarceration, and prior arrest measures reflect general seriousness or frequency in 
offending, but do not capture the subtler differences in various types of criminal behavior 
(e.g., expressive or instrumental, violent or non-violent). Moreover, while they do capture 
differential criminal behavior in terms of volume (Warr & Stafford, 1991) and while they 
had previously been shown to be related to prisonization processes (Wheeler, 1961; 
Wellford, 1973), the prior incarceration and prior arrest measures, in particular, do not 
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capture the hypothesized differences definitions or attitudes that incite those behaviors 
(Sutherland & Cressey, 1955; Matsueda, 1988).  
Similarly, the dichotomous outcome measures are blunt measures of reoffending, 
both conceptually and operationally. As described in Chapter 4, the rearrest and 
recidivism measures are official measures that reflect some intervention of the criminal 
justice system in addition to reoffending. Moreover, because they are binary measures 
they only capture whether a releasee’s apparent attempt to reoffend was detected and 
sanctioned by the criminal justice system: nothing more nuanced than that is recoverable. 
The rearrest and recidivism measures, therefore, are not just measures of individual 
reoffending behavior, they also measure whether that reoffending was sanctioned by the 
criminal justice system. 
The individual and institutional elements of the reoffending measures cannot be 
separated (Maltz, 1984). The implications of the inability to decompose the reoffending 
measures into individual behavior and the agency of the criminal justice system are 
discussed more thoroughly in the context of the differences between the rearrest and 
recidivism outcomes, below. They can be summarized as such: the reoffending measures 
may poorly reflect actual offending behavior, which may limit their utility as indicators 
of prison peer influence. 
The reoffending measures are also dichotomous. While dichotomous offending 
measures, particularly for outcomes, are the most frequently used measures in the 
criminological literature, Sweeten (2012) argued that they are the “simplest and weakest” 
(p. 542) measures of offending because they ignore “all seriousness and frequency of 
offending” (p. 552). Dichotomous measures weight less serious offenses the same as 
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more serious offenses. Outcomes based on them are, therefore, potentially driven by 
more frequent, minor crimes. For these reasons, Sweeten (2012) further recommended 
that dichotomous measures “should only be used if they are shown to be robust to known 
methodological shortcomings” (p. 554).  
Unlike the aforementioned conceptual concerns that do apply to the social 
interaction measures, Sweeten’s (2012) concerns related to the dichotomous 
operationalization of the outcome variables do not appear to apply to the reoffending 
measures used in the current study. With respect to frequency, most of the PADOC 
releasees who were rearrested (n=5,938), were only arrested once (n=2,637) and only 
about 10% were arrested more than three times. There is, therefore, very little variation in 
reoffending frequency to exploit for the purposes of effect identification. With respect to 
the seriousness of the criminal activity of those releasees who were arrested, only 718 
releasees were not arrested for a drug, property, or violent crime. These primary offense 
types are not trivial offenses in this dataset, as can be seen in the appendix to this chapter. 
Moreover, official measures like arrest are likely to underreport criminal activity (Maltz, 
1984; Thornberry & Krohn, 2000). It is, therefore, reasonable to capture these potentially 
less serious events to more accurately measure the prevalence of reoffending in the 
release cohort.  
With respect to the reincarceration without rearrest cases, which seem to be 
driving the significant findings, there is also little variation in frequency to exploit. The 
vast majority of releasees are either not recommitted (n=5,440) or only recommitted once 
(n=3,244). With respect to the reincarcerating event itself, differentiations were not made 
with respect to the type of reincarceration (e.g., whether the reincarceration resulted from 
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a new court commitment or a parole violation). That is, the seriousness of the 
reincarcerating offense was not captured. It is also unclear whether it could be captured, 
as strong assumptions would need to be made regarding the nature of parole violations, in 
part because the type of violating offense is not recorded in the PADOC data. Inmates 
who are recommitted without being rearrested appear in the data under the original 
offense(s) for which they were committed. Moreover, as Grattet et al. (2009, 2011) found 
in California, some parolees who have committed serious offenses are recommitted as 
parole violators without being tried for these new crimes, a practice known as back-end 
sentencing.   
In sum, like the social interaction measures, the outcome measures lack subtlety, 
particularly given the rich criminological context in which criminal behaviors and 
attitudes are expected to be transferred from inmate to inmate via ordinary learning 
processes, such as dialogue, modeling, punishment and reinforcement (Clemmer, 1940; 
Sutherland, 1947; Burgess & Akers, 1966; Matsueda, 1988; Akers, 2009). As noted in 
Chapter 4, Matsueda’s (1988) critique of the differential association literature applies to 
the current study: attitudes and definitions are not observed. Only behaviors are. 
Furthermore, those behaviors are broad reoffending measures, not nuanced measures of 
criminal proclivities that might be reflected in offense descriptions and crime types (e.g., 
Bayer et al., 2009). Finally, the reoffending measures confound the behavior of 
individuals and the behavior of the criminal justice system. These shortcomings with 
respect to the construct validity of the social interaction variables and the outcome 
variables imply that, while the current study has been motivated by criminological theory, 
it is not an adequate test of it.  
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Dichotomous outcomes in the LIV framework. In addition to their failure to fully 
capture criminological constructs in a differential association framework, the 
dichotomous outcome measures are problematic in the context of the LIV method, which 
expects a dichotomous exclusion restriction, but continuous outcome measures. Applying 
continuous models to dichotomous outcomes is common in the treatment effect literature 
(Brock & Durlauf, 2001, 2007; Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Dong & Lewbel, 2012; 
Chesher, 2010; Chesher & Rosen, 2013). Moreover, Angrist and Pischke (2009) argue 
that the dichotomous nature of the outcome variable is inconsequential when estimating 
marginal effects, as is done in the LIV method, because the area over which the 
estimation occurs is so minute.47 However, Dong and Lewbel (2012) show that there are 
cases where the choice of a binary, rather than a continuous, outcome does impact results.  
The current study does not appear to be a case similar to the one simulated by 
Dong and Lewbel (2012). The generally null results from the ivprobit model, which does 
employ the correct functional form assumptions with respect to the outcome and 
instrumental variables, mirrored the null average prison peer effects estimated via local 
instrumental variables.48 Nevertheless, an extension of the LIV framework to 
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 In his explication of the IV method for application to criminological randomized controlled trials, Angrist 
(2006, p. 35) goes further, “Whenever you have a complete set of dummy variables on the right hand side 
of a regression equation (a scenario known as a saturated model), linear probability models estimate the 
underlying conditional mean function perfectly…You cannot improve upon perfection” (emphasis in 
original). This was true in the current analysis: the facility fixed effects are a complete set of dummy 
variables.  
48
 In the context of the null LIV estimates at each duration threshold examined, the single significant 
coefficient on duration in the ivprobit specifications is curious. It may be that the ivprobit results, which do 
not account for essential heterogeneity, were biased. It may also be that the choice of duration thresholds, 




dichotomous outcomes or the choice of continuous outcome measures would improve the 
internal validity of the estimation process.  
Divergence between rearrest and recidivism outcomes. Despite the lack of 
subtlety in the outcome measures, the analysis based upon them did reveal an interesting 
puzzle. Although the LIV-estimated prison peer effects were insignificant for both 
rearrest and recidivism, aspects of the preliminary analyses suggested that peer influence 
impacts each reoffending measure differently. In the baseline linear probability models, 
recidivism was more significantly affected by prison peer influence than was rearrest. 
Moreover, in the more appropriate specifications (IV and LIV), the average peer prison 
peer effect estimates were likelier to be significant or close to significant for recidivism 
outcomes, whereas estimates for the rearrest outcomes never approached significance. 
The factors that predict rearrest and recidivism also appear to differ. In the LPM 
models, the homophily variables were collectively significant to rearrest, but not to 
recidivism, while the facility fixed effects appeared collectively significant to recidivism, 
but not rearrest. Similar differences emerged for individual predictors such as the 
releasee’s time to release, prior employment, and maximum sentence, as well as for the 
cell characteristics (e.g., tier). These differences between the average prison peer effects 
estimated for each outcome suggest, first, that recidivism is more subject to prison peer 
effects than is rearrest and, second, that the processes that generate these outcomes differ.  
Only the inclusion of those who were reincarcerated without being rearrested in 
the recidivism measure differentiated the two outcomes measures. And, only 877 
releasees were reincarcerated without being arrested. These individuals, who comprise 
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only 8.66% of the release cohort, therefore, appear to be driving the difference between 
the rearrest and recidivism estimates.  
That social interaction effects are known to be highly context and outcome 
dependent may explain the observed differences between the rearrest and recidivism 
models (Hartup, 2005; Brechwald & Prinstein, 2011; Horney et al., 2012; Sacerdote, 
2014). For example, Sacerdote (2014) noted that peer effects in education are modest, 
whereas they can be substantial for non-academic outcomes, such as drinking and 
delinquency (e.g., Glaeser, Sacerdote, & Scheinkman, 1996; Duncan et al., 2005). 
Additionally, within the exclusive study of criminal and delinquent behaviors, outcomes 
have been shown to depend heavily on context (Horney et al., 2012), with situational 
elements thought to play a significant role in the production of criminal behavior 
(Osgood et al., 1996). However, finding that peer effects vary with the contexts in which 
behaviors arise and propagate or that they vary depending on the types of behaviors 
examined is far different than finding that two related measures of similar behaviors 
appear to yield dramatically different effects. 
Prevalence of rearrest and recidivism are typically conceptualized as contextually 
similar: they are two measures of underlying reoffending behavior (Maltz, 1984). As 
such, they should be positively correlated. However, in the current study, they were not. 
In fact, although the results were insignificant, with respect to relative prior arrests, 
rearrest evinced the expected increase in average prison peer effects as a result of 
interacting with more criminally experienced cellmates, while average prison peer effects 
on recidivism unexpectedly appeared to decrease with respect to increasing positive 
differentials in relative prior arrest. Neither relationship suggested the presence of the 
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balancing effects (positive effects associated with positive risk scores, negative effects 
associated with negative risk scores) expected by McGloin’s (2009) theory.   
The etiology of rearrest versus the etiology of reincarceration. Explaining the 
divergence in the average prison peer effects associated with the rearrest and recidivism 
outcomes would strain current criminological conceptualizations of peer influence. While 
Sutherland (1947) did not expect different crimes to have similar etiologies, it is doubtful 
that he would argue that one measure of general criminal involvement should differ from 
another, such that they do not at least point in the same direction. It may, therefore, be the 
case that, for some releasees, learning processes are overwhelmed by other mechanisms.  
Criminological explanations that do not rely on learning theories might better 
explain the seemingly disparate, although insignificantly so, outcomes for rearrest and 
recidivism. The differences in the rearrest and recidivism outcomes might, for instance, 
reflect the changing nature of the probability of being reincarcerated for a new crime 
(Grattet et al., 2009, 2011).  
In his careful consideration of potential recidivism measures, Maltz (1984) 
concluded that rearrest is the measure most likely to reflect true reoffending behavior 
primarily because it involves the least successive steps of the criminal justice system. 
Concurrently, the role of the criminal justice system in the production of reoffending was 
subject to empirical exploration (e.g., Farrington, 1977; Petersilia & Turner, 1990). In an 
instructive study, Petersilia and Turner (1990) found, contrary to their expectation that 
intermediate sanctions might reduce reoffending (Petersilia & Turner, 1989), that more 
intensive supervision of probationers yields more reoffending. They attributed this 
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counterintuitive finding to an increase in the probability of detection of ongoing criminal 
behavior due to the intensive supervision.  
Similarly, the releasees in the current sample who were reincarcerated without 
being rearrested may have been subject to stricter supervision regimes than the releasees 
who were rearrested. Approximately 85% of the 2006-2007 first-time PADOC releasees 
were released on parole, which accords with the national numbers (Maruschak & 
Bonczar, 2013). As has been the case nationally, a substantial number of the PADOC 
releasees appear to be returned to prison, both after committing new crimes and for 
technical violations.  
The trend toward recommitting technical parole violators creates a revolving door 
from the prison to the community and back again that does not necessarily require an 
arrest (Useem & Piehl, 2007; Raphael & Stoll, 2009; Grattet et al., 2009, 2011). Paroled 
drug offenders can be recommitted, without having been arrested, for failing mandatory 
drug tests administered by their parole officers and for absconding (Hawken & Kleiman, 
2009; Bonczar, 2008). Parolees can also be recommitted for non-criminal behaviors such 
as failing to maintain employment. A potentially greater concern is the commonality of 
“back end sentencing” (Grattet et al., 2009, p. 10) of criminal offenses, which appears to 
have supplanted new prosecutions in California and, potentially, in Pennsylvania. Grattet 
et al. (2009, 2011) found that California parolees who had committed new crimes were 
often remanded immediately to correctional custody rather than compelled to face a new 
prosecution, a practice which both obfuscates these offenders’ true criminal records and 
escalates the process of reincarceration.   
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In short, the how and why of reincarceration may appear to differ markedly from 
the how and why of rearrest, not because reoffending differs, but because the detection of 
that reoffending differs. These potential differences between the processes that generate 
each reoffending measure are currently poorly understood, but there are indications that 
those differences exist, both in the prior literature and in the current study.  
Importantly, the differences in the etiologies of rearrest and recidivism might 
signal that official measures of reoffending are too noisy (i.e., so polluted by the agency 
of criminal justice system actors) to serve as accurate measures of individual behavior. 
Moreover, if official measures do not accurately reflect individual behavior, they also 
cannot serve as indicators of peer influence. Whether and how the processes that result in 
rearrest and reincarceration differ and whether and how they might have obfuscated the 
prison peer effect estimates in the current study are, therefore, important questions for 
future research.  
Theoretical Limitations 
 According to the descriptive statistics presented in Chapter 6, cellmates in the 
current study were, on average, more criminally experienced, as measured by their prior 
incarceration and prior arrest histories, and exhibited more average criminality, as 
measured by their RST scores, than the first-time releasees. Average criminogenic prison 
peer effects were expected, but null average prison peer effects were detected. While this 
outcome contradicts the expectations of differential association (Sutherland, 1947), 
balance (McGloin, 2009), and prisonization (Clemmer, 1940, 1950) theories, strong 
conclusions with respect to those theories cannot be made due to the inability to construct 
attitudinal criminality measures from the administrative data. However, that behavioral 
293 
 
measures, which have been used to evaluate peer effects (Warr & Stafford, 1991; Pratt et 
al., 2010), evinced such little variation in average prison peer effects suggests that other 
processes may better explain the failure of incarceration to reduce reoffending.  
Other mechanisms. That prisons can be learning environments (Bentham, 1830; 
Clemmer, 1950) is only one means through which the assumed specific deterrent effects 
of imprisonment might be subverted. As was discussed in Chapter 2, harsh prison 
environments may lead to defiant post-prison responses that excite reoffending (Sherman, 
1993; Gendreau, Goggin, & Cullen, 2000; Toch, 2001; Mears, 2014; Winerip & 
Schwirtz, 2014). Alternatively, the apparent failure of incarceration to reduce reoffending 
may owe less to what happens to people in prison and more to what happens to people 
after they are released from prison (Travis, 2005; Blumstein & Nakamura, 2009; NRC, 
2014.). Labeling processes and the resultant social and institutional stigmatization of 
those who have been incarcerated may better account for the enduring deleterious effects 
of incarceration (Lemert, 1951; Pager, 2003; Pettit & Western, 2004).  Similarly, 
institutionalized political and societal post-prison disenfranchisement may stymie 
reintegration processes (Travis, 2005; Lattimore & Visher, 2009; NRC, 2014). Finally, 
increased surveillance by the criminal justice system may account for a significant 
portion of the prevalence of rearrest and, in particular, reincarceration (Petersilia & 
Turner, 1989, 1990; Grattet et al., 2009, 2011). 
Is there specific deterrence to subvert? The preceding section argued that, if the 
failure of incarceration to reduce reoffending reflects a failure of specific deterrence, as 
suggested by Nagin et al. (2009), mechanisms other than social influence during 
incarceration may better account for that failure. There is, of course, another possibility: 
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specific deterrence may not have failed; the presumption that there are specific deterrent 
effects to subvert may be false.  
Nagin et al. (2009) attempted to establish that deterrence as a result of 
incarceration is a real phenomenon. However, the studies that they cited as paying 
particular attention to the counterfactual that incarceration has a null specific deterrent 
effect (Helland & Tabarrok, 2007; Drago et al., 2009) are potentially paying particular 
attention to the wrong counterfactual (Heckman & Urzua, 2010).  
Two of the strong studies reviewed by Nagin et al. (2009) pay careful attention to 
the potential deterrent effects of incarceration. They demonstrate that the threat of 
twenty-five years in prison is a strong deterrent (Helland & Tabarrok, 2007) and that the 
threat of having to serve a residual sentence after early release from prison is also a 
substantive deterrent to future criminal behavior (Drago et al., 2009). However, the threat 
of punishment is different than the experience of it, just as being committed to prison for 
a particular amount of time is not the same as being released early from prison due to an 
exogenous policy shift (e.g., Levitt, 1996). As Heckman and Urzua (2010) noted in their 
criticism of the treatment effects literature more generally, IV strategies often fail to 
address the exact policy question of interest. That seems to be the case with respect to the 
studies reviewed by Nagin et al. (2009). Those studies fail to address the key question of 
interest: Does the experience of incarceration affect reoffending?  In so doing, they, 
therefore, also fail to definitively demonstrate that specific deterrent effects contribute to 
null prison effects.  
If incarceration has a null, instead of a presumed and rather large specific 
deterrent effect on reoffending (e.g., Nagin & Snodgrass, 2013), the null prison peer 
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effect findings from the current study make sense. In the proverbial law of averages, 
positive effects and negative effects balance. In samples, however, positive and negative 
effects may emerge by chance, a tendency that may account for the previously reported 
modest prison peer effects (Bayer et al., 2009) as well as the equally modest peer effects 
reported in the extant literature (Angrist, 2013; Sacerdote, 2014).  
Questions Asked and Answered: A Story of Average Effects Becomes a Story of 
Marginal Effects 
 The main insight to come from this study is that productive lines of inquiry into 
prison peer influence are unlikely to proceed from asking and answering questions related 
to average effects. Put simply, average prison peer effects neither adequately nor 
accurately characterized prison peer effects for many first-time releasees from PADOC. 
That statement is not meant to imply that there are no prison peer effects. Instead, what is 
clear is that there is considerable variation in prison peer effects, such that a single, 
average measure fails to characterize those effects for many prison peers. 
Considerable response heterogeneity was evident in the marginal prison peer 
effect estimates. Response heterogeneity is endemic to the social sciences (Heckman, 
2000) criminology (Loughran & Mulvey, 2010), and to the study of social interactions, in 
particular (Durlauf & Ioannides, 2010; Graham, 2011; Sacerdote, 2014). In the context of 
the current study, response homogeneity would mean that the effect estimates would 
show that observationally similar releasees respond to observationally similar cellmates 
in observationally similar environments in observationally similar ways. That did not 
happen. While most of the members of the PADOC first-time release cohort experienced 
no discernible prison peer effects, some releasees appeared to experience criminogenic 
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prison peer effects, and others appeared to experience crimino-suppressive prison peer 
effects.  
Definitive conclusions pertaining to the marginal prison peer effects themselves 
are imprudent to draw given the thinner subsamples at the tails of the propensity score 
distribution where the significant MPPEs emerged. Nevertheless, the LIV analysis 
provided strong evidence that cellmate associations may benefit some inmates, even as 
they harm others: not one of the dozens of marginal prison peer effect curves is 
horizontal. Moreover, the finding that MPPEs are relevant at the tails of the propensity 
score distribution echoes Wellford’s (1973) conclusion that behavioral shifts due to 
attitudinal change are evident only at “orientational extremes” (p. 115).   
Marginal prison peer effects isolated via the LIV method are reported as a 
function of the propensity not to remain in lengthy cellmate associations. In the LIV 
framework, marginal prison peer effects and, more generally, marginal treatment effects, 
are framed in this way to highlight the role played by the unobserved determinants of 
treatment (i.e., duration of association with criminogenic cellmates) in generating the 
observed response heterogeneity of the releasees. The ability to characterize the 
collective effect of all the unknown factors that determine outcomes is a unique strength 
of the LIV method. Other methods do not offer the ability to characterize the 
unobservables separately or collectively.  
The current analysis evinced considerable response heterogeneity in the 
relationship between cellmate social interactions and reoffending. When releasees stay in 
long-term cellmate associations for unobserved reasons, they experience criminogenic 
effects. When, for unobserved reasons, releasees do not stay in long-term cellmate 
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associations, they experience crimino-suppressive effects. Marginal prison peer effects 
vary even though average prison peer effects do not. 
 The response heterogeneity in the marginal prison peer effect estimates is 
attributable to essential heterogeneity. Importantly, the presence of essential 
heterogeneity, which is implicitly theorized to bias criminological studies of social 
influence, was detected despite the inclusion of more “statistical controls for selection” 
than “those in any previous research on peer effects” (Haynie & Osgood, 2005, p. 1119). 
Yet, the presence of essential heterogeneity means that critical information about the 
determinants of the cellmate association longevity decision and the outcomes theorized to 
result from it remained unobserved.   
 The essential heterogeneity detected in the current study can potentially, but not 
definitively, be attributed to many factors.  The unobserved determinants of the length of 
the cellmate association are likely to include unobserved elements of the releasee’s 
decision, unobserved components related to the agency of cellmates and correctional 
officers, and unobserved elements of the prison context. To better understand the 
relationship between cellmate associations and reoffending outcomes, these unobserved 
factors need to become better understood. Given their absence from the current study, 
attitudinal measures may be good candidates for future exploration, particularly where 
they are extreme (Wellford, 1973). 
Future Directions 
 The null average prison peer effect findings reported by the current study were 
surprising. If evidence from future studies continues to confirm that average prison peer 
effects are null, it will contradict hundreds of years of criminological theory and 
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evidence, which overwhelmingly predicts that social interactions that take place in prison 
will have criminogenic effects on prisoners, primarily because less experienced criminal 
encounter more experienced criminals in prison (Bentham, 1830; Clemmer, 1940; Bayer 
et al., 2009; Nagin et al., 2009). If it does not, this study will stand as an anomaly. 
 Overcoming limitations. The preceding discussion illuminated several potential 
limitations of the current analysis. The first future steps to be taken therefore involve 
overcoming them. First, a larger sample of first-time releasees can be identified. A larger 
sample would likely allow for more accurate effect identification, particularly at the 
extreme regions of the propensity to not enter into lengthy cellmate relationships, which 
is where marginal prison peer effects appear most likely to have non-null effects. If a 
larger sample cannot be taken, a more complete application of the local instrumental 
variables framework can be used to estimate the effect of treatment on the treated, as 
described below. 
Second, more nuanced social interaction and outcome measures that better reflect 
the attitudinal constructs central to criminological theory can be created by better 
exploiting the arrest history information provided by the Pennsylvania State Police and 
the institutional testing data from PADOC. Through more nuanced criminality and 
criminal experience measures, it may be possible to isolate changes in offending behavior 
that are subtler than prevalence, which is a weak measure (Sweeten, 2012). For example, 
shifts in the versatility and specialization of offending may be detectable (Farrington, 
Snyder, & Finnegan, 1988; Bayer et al., 2009; Sullivan & McGloin, 2014). Moreover, as 
described in the section on the potential for theory testing below, better measures of the 
inmates’ criminality may be available from PADOC.  
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Third, cellmate relationships other than the longest-duration cellmate can also be 
explored. First and last cellmates might have particular importance in the evolution of 
inmates’ prisonization processes (Clemmer, 1940; Jones & Schmid, 2000; Kahneman et 
al., 2011). Peer groups may also prove relevant, although they did not seem to be in the 
current analysis (Rees & Pogarsky, 2011). Fourth, effects on other releasees can also be 
explored. While the first-time releasees are theorized to be more susceptible to social 
influence in the prison environment than more seasoned inmates (Wheeler, 1961; 
Nieuwbeerta et al., 2009), whether they actually are or not remains an untested empirical 
matter. Extending the first-time release cohort to include non-first-timers would allow for 
an empirical investigation of this decades-old assumption, while also allowing for more 
general prison peer effect estimates.  
Finally, the LIV framework can be formally extended to better reflect the reality 
of social interactions: it can be extended to include characterization of multiple decision 
makers (and the unobserved heterogeneity attributable to each) and to account for binary 
outcomes. Work by Graham (2011), Brock and Durlauf (2001, 2007), and Chesher & 
Rosen (2013) exemplifies the ways in which these extensions might be possible. For a 
review, see also Durlauf and Ioannides (2010). 
Extending the analysis. The current study introduced the concept of essential 
heterogeneity and the method of local instrumental variables to criminology. It did not, 
however, offer a full exposition of every element of the LIV method. Through 
identification of the marginal treatment effect parameters all other treatment effects can 
be identified, not just average treatment effects (Heckman & Vytlacil, 1999, 2000, 2001; 
2005; Basu et al., 2007). For example, local average treatment effects, policy-relevant 
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treatment effects, and the effect of treatment on the treated can be identified. 
Furthermore, those effects can be identified even when the support of the propensity 
score is not full by deriving sample-dependent weights to the convert the MTEs to other 
treatment effect parameters, as shown in Heckman and Vytlacil (2005, p. 680-681).  
The effect of treatment on the treated (TOT), in particular, may be important to 
understanding variation in prison peer effects, beyond their null averages. Operationally, 
in highly segregated prison environments, pairing releasees and cellmates with particular 
characteristics might be rare (e.g., Harvard Law Review, 2004; Trulson, Marquart, 
Hemmens, & Carroll, 2008). Such pairings might also be particularly consequential in 
determining average outcomes if they generate large criminogenic or crimino-suppressive 
effects. To examine the effects of these pairings, TOT parameter estimates might be 
helpful. As illustrated in Basu et al. (2007), TOT estimates are useful when support of the 
propensity score is not full, as it might not be for rarer pairings. Furthermore, TOT 
estimates might also be useful if a larger sample of PADOC releasees cannot be taken or 
if taking that larger sample again fails to produces adequately-sized comparison groups at 
the extremes of the propensity score distribution.  
Extending the application of the analysis. Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) point 
to three “central tasks” of their research. Those tasks, “evaluating the impacts of public 
policies, forecasting their effects in new environments, and predicting the effects of 
policies never tried” (p. 669), illustrate the potential of the LIV method, particularly for 
prison peer research.  
Incarceration is, for better or for worse, a common public policy that will impact 
the lives of the millions who experience it and the lives of millions more who are 
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connected to those who experience it (NRC, 2014). Within prisons, decisions that create 
cellmate associations determine which inmates will be prison peers and for how long. 
While formalized policies do not appear to govern those decisions in the PADOC system, 
those informal decisions have consequences, just as if they were codified. The primary 
goal of the current study has been to determine the effects of those celling decisions. On 
average, those effects appear null. At the margin of the probability of remaining with a 
cellmate, however, some inmates are affected positively by their cellmates in that they 
are less likely to reoffend after associating with them and some are affected negatively by 
their cellmates in that they are more likely to reoffend after associating with them.  
A central task for future prison peer research will be to gather more knowledge 
regarding inmate and institutional celling preferences and to apply that knowledge to 
predict the effects of potential housing policy shifts, just as researchers are now 
attempting to prospectively predict the effects of potential sentencing policy shifts (e.g., 
Reitz, 2009). However, as this is the first study to apply the LIV method to the study of 
social interaction effects in any context, it is prudent to echo Sacerdote’s (2014) caution 
regarding peer allocations, while also illuminating a unique potential of the LIV method 
as it pertains to the possibility of (eventually) formulating and testing policies intended to 
alter prison peer effects on reoffending.  
Sacerdote (2014, p. 1) cautioned against the temptation to recommend policies to 
reallocate peers to manipulate peer effects. “[D]espite potential temptation,” he wrote, 
“we have not reached the point at which we can reliably use knowledge of peer effects to 
implement policies that improve outcomes for students and other human subjects” (e.g., 
Carrell, Sacerdote, & West, 2013). That temptation is, however, the potential to which 
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policymakers aspire and a research goal to which Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) implicitly 
referred.  
The local instrumental variables framework offers a means through which the 
potential to reduce, or at least not exacerbate, reoffending through cellmate assignments 
may become possible. To work toward that goal, more information about the individuals 
to whom particular policies apply and the particular effects to which they are subject can 
be extracted from applications of the LIV method than can be extracted from the 
application of other estimation strategies, such as ordinary least squares regression or 
instrumental variables techniques.  
In addition to enhancing the potential for econometric analyses to generate the 
knowledge necessary to make prison peer allocation decisions, the LIV framework offers 
a means through which such allocations can be prospectively tested (Heckman & 
Vytlacil, 2005). In contrast to ordinary IV techniques, such as 2SLS, which difference out 
levels in order to identify gains, the individuals to whom particular marginal treatment 
effects apply can be identified in an LIV implementation. If definitive trends emerge 
within the observable information to suggest that some prisoners are routinely harmed by 
particular cellmate pairings, whereas other prisoners are not, it may be possible to avoid 
those harmful pairings.  
The potential for theory testing. Were the current study a true test of 
criminological learning theories, it would offer them little support. Although, as is 
implicit in criminological learning theories, essential heterogeneity was shown to be 
present in the relationship between social interactions with cellmates and reoffending, the 
estimated average prison peer effects did not accord with the expectations of the 
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criminological learning theories (i.e., differential association, balance, and prisonization) 
used to motivate this study.  By each of the three measures of criminality and criminal 
experience, the cellmates of the first-time releasees were, on average, more criminogenic 
than the releasees. Still, evidence of average criminogenic prison peer effects did not 
emerge from any of the estimated models, at any of the examined duration thresholds.  
While the current study relied on criminological learning theories for motivation, 
it was not a true test of those theories. The behavior-driven outcome, criminality, and 
criminal experience measures do not align well with the definitions described by 
Sutherland (1947) and relied upon by Clemmer (1940) and McGloin (2009), per 
Matsueda (1988). Moreover, official measures of reoffending reflect both individual 
behavior and the behavior of the criminal justice system to unknown degrees. 
Future work can explore the means through which criminological theory might 
better be tested using data that may be available from PADOC. The PADOC data are still 
being explored and developed for research purposes, which means they can be developed 
for particular research purposes, such as theory testing.  For example, a true test of 
McGloin’s (2009) balance theory would require outcome data for both releasees and 
cellmates. To that end, prison misconduct data can be assembled such that prior and post 
cellmate association reoffending measures for both the releasees and their cellmates are 
present in the data. Alternatively, a sample comprised of only releasees with released 
cellmates could potentially be selected.  
To better test differential association theory, attitudinal measures derived from 
answers to the individual LSI-R questions might be available from LSI-R tests, which 
have been more uniformly administered in recent years. The LSI-R is now used by both 
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PADOC at intake and by the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, so pre and post 
cellmate association criminality measures might be available for both releasees and their 
cellmates. Such measures would enable a more credible test of differential association 
theory (Matsueda, 1988).  
Finally, whether developmental cascades lead to the persistence of prison peer 
effects over time has the potential to be explored via the PADOC data. Data on prison 
programming may be able to shed light on whether inmates are more likely to reoffend 
after interacting in intimate therapeutic groups. In therapeutic groups, iatrogenic effects 
may emerge as inmates discuss criminal behavior and, potentially, diminish the harm it is 
perceived to do to others. Increases in reoffending may emerge as inmates rationalize 
their behaviors through deviancy talk (Matza, 1964; Masten et al., 2005; Dodge et al., 
2006; Dishion et al., 2010; Dishion, 2014).  
Conclusion 
The current study has sought to establish whether average prison peer effects can 
be held accountable for some portion of the failure of incarceration to reduce reoffending. 
The null average prison peer effects identified by the current study cannot account for 
prison effects that appear, on average, criminogenic. 
Within the null average prison peer effects estimated lies tremendous variation in 
marginal prison peer effects. Some MPPEs appear to exert significant criminogenic 
effects on reoffending. Others appear to exert crimino-suppressive effects.  
That substantial variation in the estimated marginal prison peer effects remained 
despite the inclusion of numerous controls suggests the potential for bias in previous peer 
effect estimates, in prison and other contexts, which relied on less robust methodology 
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and/or employed fewer controls. Variation in the marginal prison peer effect estimates 
also points to an explanation for the modest and context-dependent social interaction 
effects estimated through robustly designed studies: unbalanced samples can yield biased 
and conflicting estimates. 
This study was the first to examine prison peer effects in an adult prison 
population in the United States. Institutional, demographic, and criminal history 
information were collected from the administrative databases of the Pennsylvania 
Department of Corrections and the Pennsylvania State Police to create a unique dataset in 
which the members of a first-time release cohort were matched to each of the cellmates 
with whom they shared a double cell.  
This study introduced the concept of essential heterogeneity to criminology and is 
the first criminological study to apply the local instrumental variables method to explain 
offending behavior or social interaction effects. Essential heterogeneity is implicit in and 
endemic to criminological theories, particular those of social influence. Criminological 
theories of social influence expect unobserved factors such as criminality to affect the 
outcomes of decisions that affect criminal behavior both independently and through those 
decisions. 
The local instrumental variables analysis illustrated the role that essential 
heterogeneity plays in the determination of the impact of prison peers on reoffending. 
That illustration suggests that, given the current state of knowledge regarding prison peer 
effects and social interaction effects, more generally, it is more useful to study prison 
peer effects in marginal, rather than average, terms. Too many factors that determine how 
releasees respond to their cellmates are unknown. Moreover, the collective distribution of 
306 
 
those unobservables appears balanced in the propensity to not be treated. Future work on 
prison peer effects should focus on the development of subtle measures that more 
accurately capture criminological concepts and on determining who is harmed and who is 





Chapter 4 Tables 
Table 1. Cross-tabulations of the prevalence of arrest (rearry4), the prevalence of 
incarceration (has_postI), and the prevalence of any recidivism (reincy4) 
 
. tab rearry4 has_postI 
 
     (sum) |       has_postI 
   rearry4 |         0          1 |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
         0 |     3,775      1,139 |     4,914  
         1 |     1,665      3,552 |     5,217  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |     5,440      4,691 |    10,131  
 
 
. tab reincy4 has_postI 
 
           |       has_postI 
   reincy4 |         0          1 |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
         0 |     3,775          0 |     3,775  
         1 |     1,665      4,691 |     6,356  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |     5,440      4,691 |    10,131  
 
 
. tab reincy4 rearry4 
 
           |     (sum) rearry4 
   reincy4 |         0          1 |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
         0 |     3,775          0 |     3,775  
         1 |     1,139      5,217 |     6,356  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |     4,914      5,217 |    10,131  
 
Chapter 5 Tables 
The tables associated with  Chapter 5 appear starting on the following page.
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Table 2. Characteristics of Pennsylvania’s state correctional institutes that house males, 2000-2007. 
Characteristics of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Male Facilities, 2000-2007 
  General Characteristics  Population %  Capacity Industry and Select Programs 
SCI Open Close 
Square 













Albion 1993   354K 4 1,958 2,295 160.5 120.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Camp Hill 1941  721K 4 3,160 3,380 153.5 108.0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Chester 1998  91K 3 978 1,163 149.1 101.1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Coal Twp 1993  276K 3 1,657 1,864 171.9 116.5 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Cresson 1987 2013 --- 4 1,254 1,571 141.2 112.2 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Dallas 1960  142K 3 1,807 2,090 146.7 119.4 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Fayette 2003  294K 4 --- 2,036 --- 106.4 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Forest 2004  316K 4 --- 2,072 --- 104.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Frackville 1987  130K 4 1,000 1,106 139.5 122.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Graterford 1929  444K 4 3,197 2,898 130.7 103.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Greene 1993  388K 4 1,726 1,917 129.6 105.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Greensburg 1969 2013 --- 3 830 979 148.2 122.4 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Houtzdale 1996  320K 3 1,807 2,293 148.1 120.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Huntingdon 1889  2.9M 4 1,982 2,184 140.4 128.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Laurel High 1996  468K 2 381 1,015 79.5 108.1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Mahanoy 1993  379K 3 1,961 2,290 160.7 113.9 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Mercer 1978  260K 2 1,024 1,310 176.9 117.3 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Pine Grove 2001  181K 3 --- 703 --- 106.7 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Pittsburgh 1882  538K 3 1,772 799 116.0 53.3 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Quehanna 1992  136K 1 225 455 97.8 98.5 0 1 0 1 0 0 
Retreat 1986  180K 3 842 889 183.8 110.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Rockview 1915  326K 3 2,109 2,109 198.6 124.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Smithfield 1988  127K 4 1,208 1,225 185.3 122.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Somerset 1993  360K 4 1,754 2,314 182.0 121.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Waymart 1989  149K 2 1,191 1,278 101.0 95.4 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Waynesburg 1985 2003 --- 2 455 --- 94.2 --- 1 --- --- --- --- --- 
TOT/AVE         34,278 42,235 145.0 110.6 15 23 20 22 22 23 
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Table 3. Outline of the Daily Schedule at SCI Dallas 
Outline of the daily schedule at SCI Dallas 
 
0600: Wake-up 
0630: Count clears 
0830: Breakfast ends 
1030: Yard time ends 
1100: Count clears 
1230: Lunch ends 
1300: Count clears 
1530: Yard time ends 
1630: Count clears 
1800: Bed moves take place 
1830: Night yard time starts 
Daylight ends: Night yard ends 
2030: Shower time 
2100: Lock up 
2130: Count clears 






Chapter 6 Tables 
Table 4. Misconduct classifications for most unique charges. 
PADOC Misconduct Classifications 
Misconduct Literal High Low 
ARSON A A 
ASSAULT A A 
BODY PUNCHING, HORSE PLAY C E 
BREAK RESTRICTION OR QUARANTINE A C 
BURGLARY A A 
DESTROY, ALTER, OR DAMAGE PROPERTY B C 
ESCAPE A A 
EXHORT BY THREAT OR BLACKMAIL A B 
FAIL TO REPORT AN ARREST A B 
FAILTO REPORT OFFENSE/CONTRABAND B E 
FAIL TO STAND COUNT B D 
FIGHTING A B 
GAMBLING OR GAMBLING OPERATION A C 
INDECENT EXPOSURE A C 
KIDNAPPING/UNLAWFUL RESTRAINT A A 
LOAN OR BORROW PROPERTY B D 
LIE TO AN EMPLOYEE B D 
MURDER A A 
POSSESS CONTRABAND OR MONEY B B 
POSSESS OR CIRCULATE  A PETITION A C 
POSSESS OR USE DANGEROUS SUBSTANCE A B 
PRESENCE IN AN UNAUTHORIZED AREA B D 
RAPE/INVOLUNTARY INTERCOURSE A A 
REFUSE TO WORK OR ATTEND SCHOOL B C 
REFUSE TO OBEY AN ORDER B B 
RIOT A A 
ROBBERY A A 
SEX ACTS WITH OTHERS OR SODOMY A B 
SEXUAL HARASSMENT A A 
SMOKING WHERE PROHIBITED C E 
TAKE  FOOD FROM DINING C E 
TATOOING/SELF-MUTILATION A C 
THEFT OF SERVICES (I.E., CABLE OR OTHER) B B 
THREATEN AN EMPLOYEE OR FAMILY A A 
THREATEN ANOTHER INMATE A B 
UNAUTHORIZED USE/MAIL OR TELEPHONE B C 
USE ABUSIVE OR OBSCENE LANGUAGE A C 






Table 5. Adaptation of the RST using the current data. 
Q RST Question (Section B) Adaptation Max R(n) C(n) R(% ) C(% ) 
1 Age at first arrest 18 or under at first arrest 1 3,521 3,481 34.75 34.36 
2 Current age Current age 2     
 0: 43 or older 0: 43 or older  2,485 4,224 24.53 41.69 
 1: 25-43 1: 25-43  5,203 5,723 51.36 56.49 
 2:24 or younger 2:24 or younger  3,731 3,020 36.83 29.81 
3 Prior convictions Prior arrests 2     
 0: 0 prior convictions 0: 0-2 prior arrests  2,641 2,484 26.07 24.52 
 1: 1 prior conviction 1: five or fewer arrests  3,388 3,068 33.44 30.28 
 2: 2+ prior convictions 2: six or more arrests  4,102 4,579 40.49 45.20 
4 Misconducts Convicted of AB misconduct 1 2,485 4,224 24.53 41.69 
5 Violated community supervision Has parole violation  1 0 0   
6 Education less than grade 12 Education less than grade 12 1 4,069 4,038 40.16 39.86 
7 Alcohol or drug problem Reported alcohol/drug problem 1 9,436 9,254 93.14 91.34 





Table 6. Inmate characteristics for 10,131 releasees and 55,656 cellmates  
 Releasees All Cellies Stable 
Cellies 
Demographic Variables    
Age, years 30.3 (9.8) 33.1 (10.3) 31.57 (9.9) 
Black 41.88 48.84 45.07 
White 44.02 37.63 41.22 
Latino 13.47 12.89 13.02 
Other (Asian, Am. Indian, Other) 0.63 0.12 0.69 
Married 13.59 14.11 15.49 
Muslim 14.23 18.69 16.88 
Catholic 19.71 17.97 19.17 
Protestant 30.87 31.27 31.73 
Jewish 0.47 0.58 0.51 
No religion 20.91 17.13 17.25 
Other 13.81 14.36 14.46 
Served in US military 5.91 6.98 6.76 
Committed from an urban county 75.59 78.96 78.96 
Institutional History Variables    
Earliest custody Level > 3 23.2 28.64 23.83 
Ever in administrative custody 1.84 18.2 23.36 
Ever in therapeutic community 8.04 3.89 6.27 
Institutional Testing Variables    
IQ 91.2 (13.9) 90.4 (14.8) 91.2 (14.6) 
Has medical limitations 19.15 23.41 21.69 
Reported employment before prison 24.78 38.3 34.91 
Reported mental health problems 33.52 33.93 32.8 
Sentence and timing    
Maximum sentence, months  63.1 (38.8) 112.6 (143.5) 114.5(144.6) 
Time served, months 28.24 (18.8) --- --- 
Three charges, recent arrest    
Risk score measures    
18 or under at first arrest 34.75 34.36 --- 
RST age 1.25 (0.65) 1.16 (0.64) --- 
RST arrests 1.14 (0.80) 1.21 (0.81) --- 
Ever convicted of AB misconduct 24.53 41.69 --- 
Violated supervision or escaped 0.00 14.84 --- 
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Less than high school education 40.16 39.86 --- 
Reported alcohol or drug problem 93.14 91.41 --- 
Risk score total  4.52 (1.53) 4.79 (1.58) --- 
Treatments and moderators    
Prior arrests 5.5 (4.3) 6.7 (5.8) 6.4 (5.6) 
Has a prior incarceration --- 30.22 29.66 
Relative arrests  0.86 (6.87) --- --- 
Relative risk 0.27 (1.95) --- --- 
Days in longest cellmate association 181.6(144.8) --- --- 
Outcomes    
Rearrested within 4 years  51.50 --- --- 
Any CJS involvement within 4 years  62.74 --- --- 
Other variables    
Stretches 1.57 (1.06) --- --- 
Releasee time to release 532.2 
(430.40) 
--- --- 
Releasee is also a cellmate 90.05 --- --- 
Cellmate is also releasee --- 16.39 23.98 
Cellmates (n) 14.2 (9.3) --- --- 
21 releasees have only one cellmate; Pool data is equal to single cellmate data for them 
16 releasees and 655 cellmates and 96 best cellmates have no RAP sheet: Their prior 
offending comes from PADOC records  
Other missing data is minimal: No releasees are missing covariates 151 cellmates are 





Chapter 8 Tables 
Table 7. Choice and outcome models for rearrest and recidivism outcomes. Linear 
probability models estimated. 
 
      Prior Arrest Prior Arrest/RST 











  Adj. R-squared 43.38 19.35 17.40 19.88 17.99 
LRT Releasee           
  Cellmate            
  Pool            
  Social Interaction           
  Other           
  Same           
  Facility Fixed           
  Instruments           
Duration Time Together   
-0.000080 -0.000103 -0.000074 -0.000095 
(0.052) (0.011) (0.074) (0.011) 
Instruments Cell Sq Footage           
  C Time to Releasee           
Social C Prior Prison           
Interaction R Prior Arrest           
  Relative Prior Arrest           
  R RST           
  Relative RST           
Releasee Age           
  Black           
  Married           
  Islam           
  Urban           
  Max sentence           
  Custody Level           
  Misconducts           
  TC           
  Solitary AC           
  Three Charges           
  Under 18 First           
  Medical           
  HS Grad           
  Job           
  Drugs/Alcohol           
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  Mental Health           
 
US Vet           
  IQ           
Cellmate Age           
  Black           
  Married           
  Islam           
  Urban           
  Max sentence           
  Custody Level           
  Misconducts           
  TC           
  Solitary AC           
  Three Charges           
  Under 18 First           
  Medical           
  HS Grad           
  Job           
  Drugs/Alcohol           
  Mental Health           
  US Vet           
  IQ           
  Violate Supervision           
Pool Age           
  Black           
  Married           
  Islam           
  Urban           
  Max sentence           
  Prior Arrests           
  Custody Level           
  Misconducts           
  TC           
  Solitary AC           
  Three Charges           
  Under 18 First           
  Medical           
  HS Grad           
  Job           
  Drugs/Alcohol           
  Mental Health           
  US Vet           




Prior Prison           
  Violate supervision           
  RST               
Other Stretches           
  R Time to Release           
  Stay Length           
  Tier           
Same Age           
  Race           
  Married           
  Islam           
  Urban           
  Custody Level           
  Misconducts           
  TC           
  Solitary AC           
  Three Charges           
  Under 18 First           
  Medical           
  HS Grad           
  Job           
  Drug/Alcohol           
  Mental Health           
  US Vet           
  IQ           
Facility CAM           
base=ALB CHS           
  COA           
  CRE           
  DAL           
  FRA           
  FRS           
  FYT           
  GRA           
  GRE           
  GRN           
  HOU           
  HUN           
  LAU           
  MAH           
  MER           
  PIT           
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  PNG           
  RET           
  ROC           
  SMI           
  SMR           
  WAM           
  WAY           
  Key           
  Not significant     
  
  
  Significant    
   
  
  Not in model           
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Table 8. Exclusion restriction tests output from ivreg2 for both outcome models and both 
reoffending outcomes. 
 
Outcome model #1. Four-year rearrest outcomes. ivreg2 instrument tests. 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):            979.723 
                                                   Chi-sq(27) P-val =   0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):         51.906 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:  5% maximal IV relative bias    21.42 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):        33.331 
                                                   Chi-sq(26) P-val =   0.1527 
 
Outcome model #1. Four-year recidivism outcomes. ivreg2 instrument tests. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):            979.723 
                                                   Chi-sq(27) P-val =   0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):         51.906 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:  5% maximal IV relative bias    21.42 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):        36.262 
                                                   Chi-sq(26) P-val =   0.0870 
 
Outcome model #2. Four-year rearrest outcomes. ivreg2 instrument tests. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):            988.453 
                                                   Chi-sq(27) P-val =   0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):         52.649 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:  5% maximal IV relative bias    21.42 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):        34.892 
                                                   Chi-sq(26) P-val =   0.1140 
 
Outcome model #2. Four-year recidivism outcomes. ivreg2 instrument tests. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic):            988.453 
                                                   Chi-sq(27) P-val =   0.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Weak identification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic):         52.649 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values:  5% maximal IV relative bias    21.42 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments):        37.240 





Table 9. Output from ivprobit for both outcomes models and both outcomes.  
Social interaction variables and duration are highlighted in gray.  
 Duration: total_tt 
 Prior incarceration: c_hasPriorI 
 Prior number of arrests: r_pri_narr 
 Relative number of prior arrests: rel_pri_narr 
 
Outcome model #1. Four-year rearrest outcomes. ivprobit. 
Probit model with endogenous regressors           Number of obs   =      10131 
                                                  Wald chi2(86)   =    1897.57 
Log likelihood = -67713.844                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           total_tt |    .000326   .0003601     0.91   0.365    -.0003797    .0010318 
              r_age |  -.0314991   .0019744   -15.95   0.000     -.035369   -.0276293 
            r_black |   .1956599   .0498115     3.93   0.000     .0980311    .2932886 
          r_married |  -.1297893   .0527524    -2.46   0.014    -.2331822   -.0263964 
            r_islam |   .2470626   .0478336     5.17   0.000     .1533106    .3408147 
            r_urban |   .0449779   .0369148     1.22   0.223    -.0273738    .1173297 
          r_maxsent |  -.0044171   .0005004    -8.83   0.000    -.0053978   -.0034364 
         r_cust_gt3 |   .1197958   .0375857     3.19   0.001     .0461292    .1934624 
            r_misAB |   .0862103   .0397384     2.17   0.030     .0083245     .164096 
            r_hadtc |   .0169048   .0822565     0.21   0.837    -.1443149    .1781246 
      r_ever_ac_sol |   .0130126   .0516192     0.25   0.801    -.0881591    .1141843 
          r_3charge |   .0533947   .0288397     1.85   0.064      -.00313    .1099195 
         r_p_medlim |  -.0288071   .0424191    -0.68   0.497    -.1119469    .0543327 
         r_p_hsgrad |  -.0771452    .030033    -2.57   0.010    -.1360089   -.0182816 
        r_p_had_job |   .1755038   .0327174     5.36   0.000     .1113788    .2396288 
   r_p_prob_drugalc |   .1994232   .0814511     2.45   0.014      .039782    .3590644 
        r_p_prob_mh |   .0787933   .0318471     2.47   0.013     .0163741    .1412125 
          r_p_usvet |  -.1003563   .1059947    -0.95   0.344    -.3081021    .1073894 
             r_p_iq |   5.11e-06   .0010836     0.00   0.996    -.0021187    .0021289 
     r_18under_1arr |   .1587143   .0343812     4.62   0.000     .0913285    .2261002 
              c_age |  -.0025418   .0019648    -1.29   0.196    -.0063928    .0013092 
            c_black |  -.0530746   .0401308    -1.32   0.186    -.1317295    .0255803 
          c_married |  -.0281907   .0526119    -0.54   0.592     -.131308    .0749267 
            c_islam |  -.0309163   .0462243    -0.67   0.504    -.1215144    .0596818 
            c_urban |  -.0302396    .036849    -0.82   0.412    -.1024622    .0419831 
          c_maxsent |   -.000288   .0001072    -2.69   0.007    -.0004981   -.0000778 
         c_cust_gt3 |  -.0223695   .0360898    -0.62   0.535    -.0931041    .0483651 
            c_misAB |   .0205923   .0354201     0.58   0.561    -.0488297    .0900144 
            c_hadtc |   -.002487   .0674149    -0.04   0.971    -.1346178    .1296437 
      c_ever_ac_sol |   .0763478   .0489175     1.56   0.119    -.0195287    .1722243 
          c_3charge |  -.0185221   .0291529    -0.64   0.525    -.0756608    .0386166 
         c_p_medlim |  -.0634833   .0423249    -1.50   0.134    -.1464387     .019472 
         c_p_hsgrad |  -.0586328   .0301146    -1.95   0.052    -.1176563    .0003906 
        c_p_had_job |  -.0034543    .033636    -0.10   0.918    -.0693796     .062471 
   c_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0589982   .0817804    -0.72   0.471    -.2192849    .1012885 
        c_p_prob_mh |  -.0094601   .0311921    -0.30   0.762    -.0705956    .0516754 
          c_p_usvet |  -.1069302   .1056971    -1.01   0.312    -.3140928    .1002324 
             c_p_iq |  -.0013038   .0010163    -1.28   0.199    -.0032957     .000688 
     c_18under_1arr |   .0445638   .0335912     1.33   0.185    -.0212738    .1104013 
              c_apv |   .0054835   .0495135     0.11   0.912    -.0915613    .1025282 
             cp_age |  -.0056994   .0037145    -1.53   0.125    -.0129796    .0015808 
           cp_black |  -.0368222   .0714925    -0.52   0.607    -.1769449    .1033004 
         cp_married |   .0378725    .083037     0.46   0.648     -.124877     .200622 
           cp_islam |   .0923088   .0873748     1.06   0.291    -.0789428    .2635603 
           cp_urban |  -.0310252   .0693786    -0.45   0.655    -.1670047    .1049543 
         cp_maxsent |   .0003632   .0002222     1.63   0.102    -.0000723    .0007987 
        cp_pri_narr |   .0025465   .0057995     0.44   0.661    -.0088203    .0139133 
        cp_cust_gt3 |   .0667208   .0668081     1.00   0.318    -.0642207    .1976623 
           cp_misAB |  -.0819538   .0699554    -1.17   0.241    -.2190638    .0551561 
           cp_hadtc |  -.0091465   .1361161    -0.07   0.946    -.2759291    .2576362 
       cp_hasPriorI |  -.0979706   .0868805    -1.13   0.259    -.2682533     .072312 
     cp_ever_ac_sol |   .1044507    .078892     1.32   0.186    -.0501748    .2590763 
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         cp_3charge |   .0256027   .0591407     0.43   0.665    -.0903109    .1415164 
        cp_p_medlim |  -.1015944   .0700434    -1.45   0.147    -.2388769     .035688 
        cp_p_hsgrad |   .0186906   .0608153     0.31   0.759    -.1005052    .1378865 
       cp_p_had_job |   -.179112   .0602089    -2.97   0.003    -.2971192   -.0611048 
  cp_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0851818   .1023877    -0.83   0.405    -.2858581    .1154945 
       cp_p_prob_mh |   .0314383   .0601988     0.52   0.602    -.0865492    .1494259 
         cp_p_usvet |   .0867178    .119859     0.72   0.469    -.1482017    .3216372 
            cp_p_iq |  -.0013519   .0019816    -0.68   0.495    -.0052357     .002532 
    cp_18under_1arr |   .0517106    .067101     0.77   0.441    -.0798049     .183226 
             cp_apv |   .1189585   .1025543     1.16   0.246    -.0820442    .3199611 
        c_hasPriorI |   .0586822   .0412718     1.42   0.155     -.022209    .1395735 
         r_pri_narr |   .0813271   .0046384    17.53   0.000     .0722361    .0904181 
       rel_pri_narr |   .0030515   .0028408     1.07   0.283    -.0025163    .0086192 
          stretches |  -.0156401   .0177839    -0.88   0.379    -.0504958    .0192157 
         r_time2rel |  -.0000152   .0000602    -0.25   0.800    -.0001333    .0001028 
         r_staytime |  -.0000388   .0000731    -0.53   0.595    -.0001821    .0001045 
           same_age |  -.0071182   .0308371    -0.23   0.817    -.0675579    .0533215 
          same_race |   .0289203    .034093     0.85   0.396    -.0379007    .0957413 
       same_married |   -.009236   .0519484    -0.18   0.859    -.1110529     .092581 
         same_islam |   -.067044   .0445977    -1.50   0.133    -.1544538    .0203658 
         same_urban |    .095726   .0354229     2.70   0.007     .0262985    .1651536 
      same_cust_gt3 |  -.0301476   .0348707    -0.86   0.387     -.098493    .0381978 
         same_misAB |   .0304254   .0329205     0.92   0.355    -.0340976    .0949484 
         same_hadtc |   .0140369     .06726     0.21   0.835    -.1177902    .1458641 
   same_ever_ac_sol |   .0426113   .0474099     0.90   0.369    -.0503105    .1355331 
       same_3charge |  -.0306123   .0282145    -1.08   0.278    -.0859117    .0246871 
      same_p_medlim |   .0006757   .0415361     0.02   0.987    -.0807336    .0820851 
      same_p_hsgrad |  -.0031001   .0280471    -0.11   0.912    -.0580713    .0518711 
     same_p_had_job |  -.0875164   .0326408    -2.68   0.007    -.1514911   -.0235417 
same_p_prob_drugalc |   .0480897   .0808734     0.59   0.552    -.1104194    .2065987 
     same_p_prob_mh |  -.0740446   .0299974    -2.47   0.014    -.1328384   -.0152508 
       same_p_usvet |  -.0974246   .1040849    -0.94   0.349    -.3014273    .1065782 
          same_p_iq |  -.0096986   .0273357    -0.35   0.723    -.0632755    .0438784 
  same_18under_1arr |   .0120066   .0299944     0.40   0.689    -.0467814    .0707945 
              _cons |   1.189355   .3540878     3.36   0.001     .4953557    1.883355 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            /athrho |  -.0658155   .0415398    -1.58   0.113    -.1472319    .0156009 
           /lnsigma |   4.683968   .0070253   666.73   0.000     4.670198    4.697737 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                rho |  -.0657206   .0413603                     -.1461772    .0155997 
              sigma |   108.1985   .7601226                      106.7189    109.6986 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Instrumented:  total_tt 
Instruments:   r_age r_black r_married r_islam r_urban r_maxsent r_cust_gt3 r_misAB 
               r_hadtc r_ever_ac_sol r_3charge r_p_medlim r_p_hsgrad r_p_had_job 
               r_p_prob_drugalc r_p_prob_mh r_p_usvet r_p_iq r_18under_1arr c_age 
               c_black c_married c_islam c_urban c_maxsent c_cust_gt3 c_misAB 
               c_hadtc c_ever_ac_sol c_3charge c_p_medlim c_p_hsgrad c_p_had_job 
               c_p_prob_drugalc c_p_prob_mh c_p_usvet c_p_iq c_18under_1arr c_apv 
               cp_age cp_black cp_married cp_islam cp_urban cp_maxsent cp_pri_narr 
               cp_cust_gt3 cp_misAB cp_hadtc cp_hasPriorI cp_ever_ac_sol cp_3charge 
               cp_p_medlim cp_p_hsgrad cp_p_had_job cp_p_prob_drugalc cp_p_prob_mh 
               cp_p_usvet cp_p_iq cp_18under_1arr cp_apv c_hasPriorI r_pri_narr 
               rel_pri_narr stretches r_time2rel r_staytime same_age same_race 
               same_married same_islam same_urban same_cust_gt3 same_misAB 
               same_hadtc same_ever_ac_sol same_3charge same_p_medlim same_p_hsgrad 
               same_p_had_job same_p_prob_drugalc same_p_prob_mh same_p_usvet 
               same_p_iq same_18under_1arr cellsqft_tt_fa tier_tt_fa c_time2r_tt 
               52.fac_tt 54.fac_tt 55.fac_tt 56.fac_tt 57.fac_tt 58.fac_tt 
               59.fac_tt 60.fac_tt 61.fac_tt 62.fac_tt 63.fac_tt 64.fac_tt 
               65.fac_tt 66.fac_tt 68.fac_tt 69.fac_tt 72.fac_tt 73.fac_tt 
               75.fac_tt 76.fac_tt 77.fac_tt 78.fac_tt 81.fac_tt 82.fac_tt 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 




Outcome model #1. Four-year recidivism outcomes. ivprobit. 
Probit model with endogenous regressors           Number of obs   =      10131 
                                                  Wald chi2(86)   =    1713.47 
Log likelihood = -67521.998                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           total_tt |   .0007904   .0003597     2.20   0.028     .0000854    .0014954 
              r_age |  -.0307855   .0019181   -16.05   0.000    -.0345449   -.0270261 
            r_black |   .1481954   .0505447     2.93   0.003     .0491295    .2472612 
          r_married |  -.1230124    .051352    -2.40   0.017    -.2236605   -.0223643 
            r_islam |   .2477032   .0504312     4.91   0.000     .1488598    .3465466 
            r_urban |  -.0806279   .0370702    -2.18   0.030    -.1532842   -.0079716 
          r_maxsent |  -.0003848   .0004975    -0.77   0.439    -.0013599    .0005903 
         r_cust_gt3 |   .1515098   .0393349     3.85   0.000     .0744148    .2286048 
            r_misAB |   .0682244   .0405089     1.68   0.092    -.0111716    .1476204 
            r_hadtc |    .126828    .082896     1.53   0.126    -.0356452    .2893012 
      r_ever_ac_sol |   .0197665   .0528441     0.37   0.708    -.0838061    .1233391 
          r_3charge |   .0405349   .0291386     1.39   0.164    -.0165757    .0976454 
         r_p_medlim |  -.0039324   .0421045    -0.09   0.926    -.0864558    .0785909 
         r_p_hsgrad |  -.1028035   .0306295    -3.36   0.001    -.1628362   -.0427709 
        r_p_had_job |  -.0325458   .0330055    -0.99   0.324    -.0972354    .0321437 
   r_p_prob_drugalc |   .2772089   .0796937     3.48   0.001     .1210121    .4334058 
        r_p_prob_mh |   .2111625   .0321872     6.56   0.000     .1480768    .2742482 
          r_p_usvet |  -.0304442   .0963446    -0.32   0.752    -.2192761    .1583877 
             r_p_iq |  -.0000263     .00109    -0.02   0.981    -.0021627    .0021101 
     r_18under_1arr |   .1006012   .0356408     2.82   0.005     .0307465    .1704558 
              c_age |  -.0041765     .00194    -2.15   0.031    -.0079788   -.0003742 
            c_black |  -.0015725   .0407502    -0.04   0.969    -.0814414    .0782964 
          c_married |  -.0497494   .0511742    -0.97   0.331    -.1500491    .0505502 
            c_islam |  -.1051863   .0488227    -2.15   0.031     -.200877   -.0094957 
            c_urban |  -.0268648   .0369666    -0.73   0.467     -.099318    .0455884 
          c_maxsent |  -.0002027   .0001048    -1.93   0.053    -.0004081    2.68e-06 
         c_cust_gt3 |  -.0376494   .0377066    -1.00   0.318     -.111553    .0362543 
            c_misAB |   .0175736   .0362731     0.48   0.628    -.0535203    .0886676 
            c_hadtc |  -.0832445   .0680748    -1.22   0.221    -.2166686    .0501797 
      c_ever_ac_sol |   .0974313   .0503334     1.94   0.053    -.0012204     .196083 
          c_3charge |   .0061504   .0294293     0.21   0.834      -.05153    .0638308 
         c_p_medlim |  -.0240044   .0419571    -0.57   0.567    -.1062388      .05823 
         c_p_hsgrad |   -.040184   .0306692    -1.31   0.190    -.1002945    .0199266 
        c_p_had_job |   .0041293   .0338995     0.12   0.903    -.0623124     .070571 
   c_p_prob_drugalc |   .0730353   .0799516     0.91   0.361     -.083667    .2297375 
        c_p_prob_mh |  -.0050011    .031567    -0.16   0.874    -.0668713    .0568691 
          c_p_usvet |   .0064768   .0959106     0.07   0.946    -.1815044    .1944581 
             c_p_iq |  -.0017267   .0010227    -1.69   0.091    -.0037312    .0002778 
     c_18under_1arr |   .0402296   .0347472     1.16   0.247    -.0278736    .1083328 
              c_apv |   .0303633   .0504478     0.60   0.547    -.0685127    .1292392 
             cp_age |  -.0060089   .0036814    -1.63   0.103    -.0132243    .0012065 
           cp_black |  -.0344554   .0718799    -0.48   0.632    -.1753375    .1064267 
         cp_married |  -.0720046    .082415    -0.87   0.382     -.233535    .0895259 
           cp_islam |   .0246787   .0892951     0.28   0.782    -.1503365    .1996939 
           cp_urban |  -.0793427   .0692825    -1.15   0.252    -.2151339    .0564486 
         cp_maxsent |   .0002511    .000224     1.12   0.262    -.0001879      .00069 
        cp_pri_narr |   .0051886   .0058178     0.89   0.372    -.0062142    .0165913 
        cp_cust_gt3 |    .167084   .0685289     2.44   0.015     .0327699    .3013981 
           cp_misAB |  -.0649268   .0705689    -0.92   0.358    -.2032393    .0733857 
           cp_hadtc |  -.1196683   .1351782    -0.89   0.376    -.3846127    .1452761 
       cp_hasPriorI |  -.0887449    .087152    -1.02   0.309    -.2595596    .0820698 
     cp_ever_ac_sol |   .0714611    .079551     0.90   0.369    -.0844561    .2273783 
         cp_3charge |   .1289025   .0591531     2.18   0.029     .0129645    .2448405 
        cp_p_medlim |  -.0687115   .0699417    -0.98   0.326    -.2057948    .0683718 
        cp_p_hsgrad |   .0362248   .0611959     0.59   0.554     -.083717    .1561667 
       cp_p_had_job |  -.0809748   .0603181    -1.34   0.179    -.1991961    .0372464 
  cp_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0490926   .1020454    -0.48   0.630     -.249098    .1509128 
       cp_p_prob_mh |  -.0264218   .0602706    -0.44   0.661      -.14455    .0917064 
         cp_p_usvet |    .069122   .1178022     0.59   0.557     -.161766    .3000101 
            cp_p_iq |  -.0027808   .0019676    -1.41   0.158    -.0066373    .0010758 
    cp_18under_1arr |   .0526302    .067773     0.78   0.437    -.0802024    .1854628 
             cp_apv |   .0949527   .1031826     0.92   0.357    -.1072815    .2971869 
        c_hasPriorI |   .0516813   .0418229     1.24   0.217    -.0302902    .1336528 
         r_pri_narr |   .0790517   .0047594    16.61   0.000     .0697234      .08838 
       rel_pri_narr |     .00364   .0028659     1.27   0.204    -.0019771    .0092572 
          stretches |  -.0367245   .0178992    -2.05   0.040    -.0718062   -.0016427 
         r_time2rel |  -.0001015   .0000599    -1.69   0.090    -.0002189    .0000159 
         r_staytime |  -.0002268   .0000725    -3.13   0.002     -.000369   -.0000846 
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           same_age |  -.0110282   .0306603    -0.36   0.719    -.0711212    .0490647 
          same_race |  -.0072257   .0343969    -0.21   0.834    -.0746423    .0601909 
       same_married |  -.0430607   .0505037    -0.85   0.394    -.1420462    .0559248 
         same_islam |  -.1315512   .0470876    -2.79   0.005    -.2238413   -.0392612 
         same_urban |   .0374028   .0355838     1.05   0.293    -.0323402    .1071458 
      same_cust_gt3 |  -.0204359   .0364852    -0.56   0.575    -.0919455    .0510738 
         same_misAB |   .0200218   .0337412     0.59   0.553    -.0461097    .0861534 
         same_hadtc |   .0006718   .0679417     0.01   0.992    -.1324916    .1338351 
   same_ever_ac_sol |      .0473   .0488227     0.97   0.333    -.0483907    .1429908 
       same_3charge |  -.0229627   .0284975    -0.81   0.420    -.0788167    .0328913 
      same_p_medlim |   .0091662   .0411102     0.22   0.824    -.0714083    .0897406 
      same_p_hsgrad |   .0161039   .0285711     0.56   0.573    -.0398944    .0721022 
     same_p_had_job |    -.07022   .0328944    -2.13   0.033    -.1346918   -.0057482 
same_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0451696   .0791021    -0.57   0.568    -.2002069    .1098677 
     same_p_prob_mh |  -.0463193   .0303938    -1.52   0.128    -.1058901    .0132516 
       same_p_usvet |    .001206   .0942478     0.01   0.990    -.1835164    .1859283 
          same_p_iq |  -.0082592   .0276356    -0.30   0.765    -.0624239    .0459055 
  same_18under_1arr |   .0119507   .0312279     0.38   0.702    -.0492548    .0731562 
              _cons |   1.548824   .3509844     4.41   0.000     .8609076    2.236741 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            /athrho |  -.1223623   .0418448    -2.92   0.003    -.2043767    -.040348 
           /lnsigma |   4.683977   .0070254   666.72   0.000     4.670208    4.697747 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                rho |  -.1217553   .0412245                     -.2015778   -.0403261 
              sigma |   108.1995   .7601445                      106.7199    109.6997 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Instrumented:  total_tt 
Instruments:   r_age r_black r_married r_islam r_urban r_maxsent r_cust_gt3 r_misAB 
               r_hadtc r_ever_ac_sol r_3charge r_p_medlim r_p_hsgrad r_p_had_job 
               r_p_prob_drugalc r_p_prob_mh r_p_usvet r_p_iq r_18under_1arr c_age 
               c_black c_married c_islam c_urban c_maxsent c_cust_gt3 c_misAB 
               c_hadtc c_ever_ac_sol c_3charge c_p_medlim c_p_hsgrad c_p_had_job 
               c_p_prob_drugalc c_p_prob_mh c_p_usvet c_p_iq c_18under_1arr c_apv 
               cp_age cp_black cp_married cp_islam cp_urban cp_maxsent cp_pri_narr 
               cp_cust_gt3 cp_misAB cp_hadtc cp_hasPriorI cp_ever_ac_sol cp_3charge 
               cp_p_medlim cp_p_hsgrad cp_p_had_job cp_p_prob_drugalc cp_p_prob_mh 
               cp_p_usvet cp_p_iq cp_18under_1arr cp_apv c_hasPriorI r_pri_narr 
               rel_pri_narr stretches r_time2rel r_staytime same_age same_race 
               same_married same_islam same_urban same_cust_gt3 same_misAB 
               same_hadtc same_ever_ac_sol same_3charge same_p_medlim same_p_hsgrad 
               same_p_had_job same_p_prob_drugalc same_p_prob_mh same_p_usvet 
               same_p_iq same_18under_1arr cellsqft_tt_fa tier_tt_fa c_time2r_tt 
               52.fac_tt 54.fac_tt 55.fac_tt 56.fac_tt 57.fac_tt 58.fac_tt 
               59.fac_tt 60.fac_tt 61.fac_tt 62.fac_tt 63.fac_tt 64.fac_tt 
               65.fac_tt 66.fac_tt 68.fac_tt 69.fac_tt 72.fac_tt 73.fac_tt 
               75.fac_tt 76.fac_tt 77.fac_tt 78.fac_tt 81.fac_tt 82.fac_tt 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 




Outcome model #2. Four-year rearrest outcomes. ivprobit. 
Probit model with endogenous regressors           Number of obs   =      10131 
                                                  Wald chi2(89)   =    1943.10 
Log likelihood = -67676.281                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           total_tt |   .0002101   .0003597     0.58   0.559    -.0004948     .000915 
              r_age |  -.0224667   .0023421    -9.59   0.000    -.0270572   -.0178763 
            r_black |   .1958316   .0499621     3.92   0.000     .0979078    .2937555 
          r_married |  -.1207451    .052888    -2.28   0.022    -.2244036   -.0170865 
            r_islam |    .236757   .0480082     4.93   0.000     .1426626    .3308513 
            r_urban |   .0379813   .0370212     1.03   0.305     -.034579    .1105415 
          r_maxsent |  -.0043909   .0005022    -8.74   0.000    -.0053752   -.0034065 
         r_cust_gt3 |   .1145042   .0376605     3.04   0.002     .0406911    .1883174 
            r_misAB |  -.0865226   .0464947    -1.86   0.063    -.1776505    .0046053 
            r_hadtc |   .0106119   .0824081     0.13   0.898     -.150905    .1721288 
      r_ever_ac_sol |   .0135476   .0517245     0.26   0.793    -.0878305    .1149256 
          r_3charge |   .0550036   .0289056     1.90   0.057    -.0016504    .1116575 
         r_p_medlim |  -.0301387   .0424716    -0.71   0.478    -.1133815    .0531041 
         r_p_hsgrad |  -.2485598   .0385053    -6.46   0.000    -.3240288   -.1730909 
        r_p_had_job |   .1788296   .0327968     5.45   0.000      .114549    .2431102 
   r_p_prob_drugalc |   .0054087   .0861243     0.06   0.950    -.1633918    .1742092 
        r_p_prob_mh |   .0795282   .0319224     2.49   0.013     .0169615    .1420949 
          r_p_usvet |   -.110376   .1059639    -1.04   0.298    -.3180613    .0973094 
             r_p_iq |   .0002512   .0010865     0.23   0.817    -.0018782    .0023806 
     r_18under_1arr |   -.062268   .0462804    -1.35   0.178    -.1529759    .0284399 
              c_age |   -.003362   .0022619    -1.49   0.137    -.0077954    .0010713 
            c_black |  -.0517519   .0402177    -1.29   0.198    -.1305772    .0270734 
          c_married |  -.0228063   .0527315    -0.43   0.665    -.1261581    .0805455 
            c_islam |  -.0313321   .0463766    -0.68   0.499    -.1222286    .0595644 
            c_urban |  -.0237972   .0369554    -0.64   0.520    -.0962284    .0486341 
          c_maxsent |  -.0002856   .0001077    -2.65   0.008    -.0004966   -.0000746 
         c_cust_gt3 |  -.0280404    .036186    -0.77   0.438    -.0989637    .0428829 
            c_misAB |   .0385013   .0418011     0.92   0.357    -.0434274      .12043 
            c_hadtc |  -.0031951   .0675616    -0.05   0.962    -.1356134    .1292232 
      c_ever_ac_sol |   .0732789   .0490305     1.49   0.135     -.022819    .1693768 
          c_3charge |  -.0164919   .0292191    -0.56   0.572    -.0737604    .0407765 
         c_p_medlim |  -.0641817   .0423729    -1.51   0.130     -.147231    .0188676 
         c_p_hsgrad |   -.046836   .0373437    -1.25   0.210    -.1200283    .0263563 
        c_p_had_job |  -.0047048    .033706    -0.14   0.889    -.0707673    .0613577 
   c_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0450841   .0857519    -0.53   0.599    -.2131548    .1229866 
        c_p_prob_mh |  -.0070257   .0312519    -0.22   0.822    -.0682783    .0542269 
          c_p_usvet |  -.1134725   .1056693    -1.07   0.283    -.3205806    .0936356 
             c_p_iq |  -.0012408   .0010173    -1.22   0.223    -.0032346    .0007531 
     c_18under_1arr |   .0615879   .0435617     1.41   0.157    -.0237915    .1469672 
              c_apv |   .0230802   .0538131     0.43   0.668    -.0823916    .1285521 
             cp_age |  -.0052663   .0044037    -1.20   0.232    -.0138974    .0033648 
           cp_black |  -.0312571   .0717342    -0.44   0.663    -.1718536    .1093394 
         cp_married |   .0434525   .0832193     0.52   0.602    -.1196543    .2065593 
           cp_islam |    .091819   .0876615     1.05   0.295    -.0799943    .2636324 
           cp_urban |  -.0314833   .0695483    -0.45   0.651    -.1677954    .1048288 
         cp_maxsent |   .0003801   .0002228     1.71   0.088    -.0000566    .0008168 
        cp_pri_narr |   .0010508   .0071199     0.15   0.883     -.012904    .0150056 
        cp_cust_gt3 |   .0549868   .0671606     0.82   0.413    -.0766455    .1866191 
           cp_misAB |  -.0905393   .0842917    -1.07   0.283    -.2557479    .0746694 
           cp_hadtc |  -.0054347   .1363872    -0.04   0.968    -.2727487    .2618793 
       cp_hasPriorI |  -.0999923   .0871632    -1.15   0.251    -.2708289    .0708444 
     cp_ever_ac_sol |   .1111663   .0790757     1.41   0.160    -.0438192    .2661517 
         cp_3charge |   .0267865   .0592678     0.45   0.651    -.0893763    .1429493 
            cp_rsth |   .0126162   .0454527     0.28   0.781    -.0764695    .1017019 
        cp_p_medlim |  -.1001068   .0701952    -1.43   0.154    -.2376868    .0374732 
        cp_p_hsgrad |    .005417   .0768474     0.07   0.944    -.1452011    .1560351 
       cp_p_had_job |  -.1803526   .0603729    -2.99   0.003    -.2986814   -.0620238 
  cp_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0829424   .1154754    -0.72   0.473    -.3092701    .1433853 
       cp_p_prob_mh |   .0301433   .0603438     0.50   0.617    -.0881283    .1484149 
         cp_p_usvet |    .082681   .1201926     0.69   0.492    -.1528922    .3182542 
            cp_p_iq |  -.0013999   .0019887    -0.70   0.481    -.0052977    .0024979 
    cp_18under_1arr |   .0311114   .0892622     0.35   0.727    -.1438393    .2060621 
             cp_apv |   .0996639   .1112661     0.90   0.370    -.1184136    .3177414 
        c_hasPriorI |   .0623706   .0413843     1.51   0.132     -.018741    .1434823 
         r_pri_narr |   .0583749   .0060418     9.66   0.000     .0465331    .0702166 
       rel_pri_narr |   .0039674   .0034451     1.15   0.249    -.0027848    .0107197 
             r_rsth |   .1537731   .0320869     4.79   0.000      .090884    .2166622 
           rel_rsth |   -.016252   .0216617    -0.75   0.453    -.0587081    .0262041 
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          stretches |  -.0119957   .0177793    -0.67   0.500    -.0468425    .0228511 
         r_time2rel |  -.0000157   .0000605    -0.26   0.795    -.0001342    .0001028 
         r_staytime |  -.0000248   .0000733    -0.34   0.735    -.0001684    .0001188 
           same_age |  -.0033959   .0308963    -0.11   0.912    -.0639516    .0571598 
          same_race |   .0267913   .0342075     0.78   0.434    -.0402541    .0938367 
       same_married |  -.0053451   .0520683    -0.10   0.918    -.1073971     .096707 
         same_islam |  -.0705263   .0447466    -1.58   0.115    -.1582281    .0171755 
         same_urban |   .1000209   .0355085     2.82   0.005     .0304256    .1696162 
      same_cust_gt3 |  -.0292674   .0349242    -0.84   0.402    -.0977176    .0391829 
         same_misAB |   .0320487   .0330042     0.97   0.332    -.0326384    .0967358 
         same_hadtc |   .0162255    .067355     0.24   0.810     -.115788    .1482389 
   same_ever_ac_sol |   .0415952   .0475132     0.88   0.381    -.0515289    .1347193 
       same_3charge |  -.0295342   .0282854    -1.04   0.296    -.0849726    .0259043 
      same_p_medlim |   .0011465   .0415788     0.03   0.978    -.0803464    .0826394 
      same_p_hsgrad |   .0004327    .028123     0.02   0.988    -.0546873    .0555528 
     same_p_had_job |  -.0866099   .0327151    -2.65   0.008    -.1507303   -.0224895 
same_p_prob_drugalc |   .0575429    .081311     0.71   0.479    -.1018238    .2169096 
     same_p_prob_mh |  -.0724955   .0300557    -2.41   0.016    -.1314035   -.0135875 
       same_p_usvet |  -.1029441   .1040483    -0.99   0.322    -.3068751    .1009869 
          same_p_iq |  -.0104422   .0274005    -0.38   0.703    -.0641463    .0432619 
  same_18under_1arr |   .0103129   .0300525     0.34   0.731    -.0485889    .0692148 
              _cons |   .6598748   .3943986     1.67   0.094    -.1131322    1.432882 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            /athrho |  -.0518627   .0414161    -1.25   0.210    -.1330368    .0293115 
           /lnsigma |   4.682745   .0070252   666.56   0.000     4.668975    4.696514 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                rho |  -.0518162    .041305                     -.1322575    .0293031 
              sigma |   108.0663   .7591913                      106.5885    109.5645 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Instrumented:  total_tt 
Instruments:   r_age r_black r_married r_islam r_urban r_maxsent r_cust_gt3 r_misAB 
               r_hadtc r_ever_ac_sol r_3charge r_p_medlim r_p_hsgrad r_p_had_job 
               r_p_prob_drugalc r_p_prob_mh r_p_usvet r_p_iq r_18under_1arr c_age 
               c_black c_married c_islam c_urban c_maxsent c_cust_gt3 c_misAB 
               c_hadtc c_ever_ac_sol c_3charge c_p_medlim c_p_hsgrad c_p_had_job 
               c_p_prob_drugalc c_p_prob_mh c_p_usvet c_p_iq c_18under_1arr c_apv 
               cp_age cp_black cp_married cp_islam cp_urban cp_maxsent cp_pri_narr 
               cp_cust_gt3 cp_misAB cp_hadtc cp_hasPriorI cp_ever_ac_sol cp_3charge 
               cp_rsth cp_p_medlim cp_p_hsgrad cp_p_had_job cp_p_prob_drugalc 
               cp_p_prob_mh cp_p_usvet cp_p_iq cp_18under_1arr cp_apv c_hasPriorI 
               r_pri_narr rel_pri_narr r_rsth rel_rsth stretches r_time2rel 
               r_staytime same_age same_race same_married same_islam same_urban 
               same_cust_gt3 same_misAB same_hadtc same_ever_ac_sol same_3charge 
               same_p_medlim same_p_hsgrad same_p_had_job same_p_prob_drugalc 
               same_p_prob_mh same_p_usvet same_p_iq same_18under_1arr 
               cellsqft_tt_fa tier_tt_fa c_time2r_tt 52.fac_tt 54.fac_tt 55.fac_tt 
               56.fac_tt 57.fac_tt 58.fac_tt 59.fac_tt 60.fac_tt 61.fac_tt 
               62.fac_tt 63.fac_tt 64.fac_tt 65.fac_tt 66.fac_tt 68.fac_tt 
               69.fac_tt 72.fac_tt 73.fac_tt 75.fac_tt 76.fac_tt 77.fac_tt 
               78.fac_tt 81.fac_tt 82.fac_tt 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 




Outcome model #2. Four-year recidivism outcomes. ivprobit. 
Probit model with endogenous regressors           Number of obs   =      10131 
                                                  Wald chi2(89)   =    1760.62 
Log likelihood =  -67484.39                       Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                    |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           total_tt |   .0006775   .0003598     1.88   0.060    -.0000277    .0013827 
              r_age |  -.0214696   .0022983    -9.34   0.000    -.0259741   -.0169651 
            r_black |   .1485371   .0507091     2.93   0.003      .049149    .2479252 
          r_married |  -.1137221   .0514905    -2.21   0.027    -.2146416   -.0128027 
            r_islam |   .2374519   .0506286     4.69   0.000     .1382217    .3366821 
            r_urban |  -.0879995   .0371938    -2.37   0.018     -.160898    -.015101 
          r_maxsent |  -.0003185   .0004995    -0.64   0.524    -.0012976    .0006606 
         r_cust_gt3 |   .1460683    .039432     3.70   0.000      .068783    .2233536 
            r_misAB |  -.1106916   .0474311    -2.33   0.020    -.2036549   -.0177283 
            r_hadtc |   .1235419   .0831561     1.49   0.137     -.039441    .2865248 
      r_ever_ac_sol |   .0200456   .0530035     0.38   0.705    -.0838392    .1239305 
          r_3charge |   .0427524   .0292256     1.46   0.144    -.0145288    .1000336 
         r_p_medlim |  -.0055949   .0421775    -0.13   0.894    -.0882613    .0770715 
         r_p_hsgrad |  -.2805575   .0392423    -7.15   0.000    -.3574711    -.203644 
        r_p_had_job |   -.030282   .0330811    -0.92   0.360    -.0951196    .0345557 
   r_p_prob_drugalc |    .077178   .0845548     0.91   0.361    -.0885464    .2429024 
        r_p_prob_mh |   .2130341   .0322815     6.60   0.000     .1497636    .2763046 
          r_p_usvet |  -.0415102   .0963486    -0.43   0.667    -.2303499    .1473295 
             r_p_iq |   .0002192   .0010934     0.20   0.841    -.0019239    .0023623 
     r_18under_1arr |  -.1290409   .0476203    -2.71   0.007    -.2223749   -.0357069 
              c_age |  -.0036564   .0022449    -1.63   0.103    -.0080564    .0007435 
            c_black |  -.0005727   .0408568    -0.01   0.989    -.0806506    .0795052 
          c_married |  -.0434759   .0512945    -0.85   0.397    -.1440113    .0570595 
            c_islam |  -.1074673   .0490076    -2.19   0.028    -.2035204   -.0114143 
            c_urban |  -.0223118   .0370871    -0.60   0.547    -.0950012    .0503777 
          c_maxsent |  -.0001978   .0001054    -1.88   0.061    -.0004044    8.79e-06 
         c_cust_gt3 |  -.0453361    .037821    -1.20   0.231    -.1194638    .0287917 
            c_misAB |    .008939   .0426985     0.21   0.834    -.0747485    .0926265 
            c_hadtc |   -.087133   .0682882    -1.28   0.202    -.2209755    .0467095 
      c_ever_ac_sol |   .0938221    .050497     1.86   0.063    -.0051503    .1927945 
          c_3charge |   .0083962   .0295095     0.28   0.776    -.0494414    .0662338 
         c_p_medlim |  -.0241629   .0420207    -0.58   0.565     -.106522    .0581962 
         c_p_hsgrad |  -.0544717   .0378602    -1.44   0.150    -.1286763    .0197329 
        c_p_had_job |   .0023101   .0339776     0.07   0.946    -.0642847    .0689049 
   c_p_prob_drugalc |   .0565269   .0840546     0.67   0.501    -.1082171    .2212709 
        c_p_prob_mh |  -.0036727   .0316318    -0.12   0.908    -.0656698    .0583244 
          c_p_usvet |   .0008461   .0958947     0.01   0.993    -.1871041    .1887963 
             c_p_iq |  -.0016703   .0010234    -1.63   0.103    -.0036762    .0003355 
     c_18under_1arr |   .0228641   .0446809     0.51   0.609    -.0647089     .110437 
              c_apv |   .0241093   .0547744     0.44   0.660    -.0832466    .1314653 
             cp_age |  -.0057687   .0043747    -1.32   0.187     -.014343    .0028056 
           cp_black |  -.0297001   .0721422    -0.41   0.681    -.1710961    .1116959 
         cp_married |  -.0682745   .0826572    -0.83   0.409    -.2302797    .0937306 
           cp_islam |   .0241312   .0896178     0.27   0.788    -.1515165    .1997788 
           cp_urban |   -.080423   .0694748    -1.16   0.247    -.2165911    .0557452 
         cp_maxsent |   .0002681   .0002249     1.19   0.233    -.0001727    .0007089 
        cp_pri_narr |   .0039319   .0071395     0.55   0.582    -.0100613     .017925 
        cp_cust_gt3 |   .1588338   .0689146     2.30   0.021     .0237637     .293904 
           cp_misAB |  -.0709264   .0846461    -0.84   0.402    -.2368297    .0949768 
           cp_hadtc |     -.1206   .1355667    -0.89   0.374    -.3863058    .1451059 
       cp_hasPriorI |  -.0904964    .087426    -1.04   0.301    -.2618483    .0808554 
     cp_ever_ac_sol |    .078129   .0797869     0.98   0.327    -.0782505    .2345085 
         cp_3charge |   .1314222   .0592978     2.22   0.027     .0152007    .2476437 
            cp_rsth |   .0104192   .0455111     0.23   0.819     -.078781    .0996193 
        cp_p_medlim |  -.0694849   .0700994    -0.99   0.322    -.2068772    .0679074 
        cp_p_hsgrad |   .0252524   .0769993     0.33   0.743    -.1256633    .1761682 
       cp_p_had_job |  -.0809561   .0604909    -1.34   0.181    -.1995161    .0376038 
  cp_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0447594   .1153124    -0.39   0.698    -.2707675    .1812487 
       cp_p_prob_mh |  -.0281065   .0604292    -0.47   0.642    -.1465455    .0903325 
         cp_p_usvet |   .0666785   .1180993     0.56   0.572     -.164792    .2981489 
            cp_p_iq |  -.0028491   .0019743    -1.44   0.149    -.0067187    .0010205 
    cp_18under_1arr |    .033833   .0899568     0.38   0.707     -.142479     .210145 
             cp_apv |   .0763648   .1118543     0.68   0.495    -.1428655    .2955951 
        c_hasPriorI |    .053749   .0419593     1.28   0.200    -.0284896    .1359876 
         r_pri_narr |   .0516552   .0062326     8.29   0.000     .0394394    .0638709 
       rel_pri_narr |   .0021524   .0034753     0.62   0.536    -.0046591    .0089639 
             r_rsth |    .186479   .0325005     5.74   0.000     .1227792    .2501787 
           rel_rsth |   .0102181   .0218632     0.47   0.640     -.032633    .0530691 
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          stretches |  -.0329785   .0178986    -1.84   0.065    -.0680591    .0021021 
         r_time2rel |  -.0001005   .0000602    -1.67   0.095    -.0002184    .0000174 
         r_staytime |  -.0002156   .0000728    -2.96   0.003    -.0003583   -.0000729 
           same_age |  -.0063396   .0307396    -0.21   0.837    -.0665881    .0539089 
          same_race |  -.0100318   .0345241    -0.29   0.771    -.0776979    .0576342 
       same_married |  -.0390961   .0506215    -0.77   0.440    -.1383125    .0601203 
         same_islam |   -.136687    .047275    -2.89   0.004    -.2293443   -.0440298 
         same_urban |    .042558   .0356833     1.19   0.233      -.02738    .1124959 
      same_cust_gt3 |  -.0193833   .0365628    -0.53   0.596    -.0910451    .0522785 
         same_misAB |   .0221568   .0338383     0.65   0.513    -.0441651    .0884786 
         same_hadtc |   .0025078    .068108     0.04   0.971    -.1309814    .1359971 
   same_ever_ac_sol |   .0463677   .0489745     0.95   0.344    -.0496205     .142356 
       same_3charge |  -.0219662   .0285843    -0.77   0.442    -.0779903    .0340579 
      same_p_medlim |   .0089411   .0411668     0.22   0.828    -.0717443    .0896265 
      same_p_hsgrad |   .0203137    .028661     0.71   0.478    -.0358609    .0764882 
     same_p_had_job |  -.0685502   .0329723    -2.08   0.038    -.1331746   -.0039258 
same_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0374265   .0794677    -0.47   0.638    -.1931804    .1183274 
     same_p_prob_mh |  -.0447692   .0304635    -1.47   0.142    -.1044765    .0149382 
       same_p_usvet |  -.0037108   .0942353    -0.04   0.969    -.1884085     .180987 
          same_p_iq |  -.0089685   .0277095    -0.32   0.746    -.0632783    .0453412 
  same_18under_1arr |   .0103509   .0313094     0.33   0.741    -.0510144    .0717162 
              _cons |   .9408018   .3921024     2.40   0.016     .1722951    1.709308 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
            /athrho |  -.1079817   .0417273    -2.59   0.010    -.1897657   -.0261977 
           /lnsigma |   4.682753   .0070254   666.55   0.000     4.668983    4.696522 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
                rho |  -.1075639   .0412445                     -.1875201   -.0261917 
              sigma |   108.0672   .7592105                      106.5893    109.5655 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Instrumented:  total_tt 
Instruments:   r_age r_black r_married r_islam r_urban r_maxsent r_cust_gt3 r_misAB 
               r_hadtc r_ever_ac_sol r_3charge r_p_medlim r_p_hsgrad r_p_had_job 
               r_p_prob_drugalc r_p_prob_mh r_p_usvet r_p_iq r_18under_1arr c_age 
               c_black c_married c_islam c_urban c_maxsent c_cust_gt3 c_misAB 
               c_hadtc c_ever_ac_sol c_3charge c_p_medlim c_p_hsgrad c_p_had_job 
               c_p_prob_drugalc c_p_prob_mh c_p_usvet c_p_iq c_18under_1arr c_apv 
               cp_age cp_black cp_married cp_islam cp_urban cp_maxsent cp_pri_narr 
               cp_cust_gt3 cp_misAB cp_hadtc cp_hasPriorI cp_ever_ac_sol cp_3charge 
               cp_rsth cp_p_medlim cp_p_hsgrad cp_p_had_job cp_p_prob_drugalc 
               cp_p_prob_mh cp_p_usvet cp_p_iq cp_18under_1arr cp_apv c_hasPriorI 
               r_pri_narr rel_pri_narr r_rsth rel_rsth stretches r_time2rel 
               r_staytime same_age same_race same_married same_islam same_urban 
               same_cust_gt3 same_misAB same_hadtc same_ever_ac_sol same_3charge 
               same_p_medlim same_p_hsgrad same_p_had_job same_p_prob_drugalc 
               same_p_prob_mh same_p_usvet same_p_iq same_18under_1arr 
               cellsqft_tt_fa tier_tt_fa c_time2r_tt 52.fac_tt 54.fac_tt 55.fac_tt 
               56.fac_tt 57.fac_tt 58.fac_tt 59.fac_tt 60.fac_tt 61.fac_tt 
               62.fac_tt 63.fac_tt 64.fac_tt 65.fac_tt 66.fac_tt 68.fac_tt 
               69.fac_tt 72.fac_tt 73.fac_tt 75.fac_tt 76.fac_tt 77.fac_tt 
               78.fac_tt 81.fac_tt 82.fac_tt 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 





Table 10. Two-stage least squares threshold models for rearrest and any reoffending, p-
values and coefficients reported. 
 
      Outcome Model #1 Outcome Model #2 
   
Rearrest Recidivism Rearrest Recidivism 
Days n=1 n=0 Coef p Coef p Coef p Coef p 
30 9,914 217 0.0530 0.740 0.2119 0.180 0.0134 0.933 0.1683 0.285 
60 8,636 1,495 0.0152 0.605 0.0606 0.038 0.0060 0.837 0.0504 0.082 
90 7,219 2,912 0.0122 0.596 0.0505 0.027 0.0045 0.843 0.0420 0.065 
120 5,966 4,165 0.0170 0.502 0.0597 0.017 0.0084 0.738 0.0502 0.044 
150 4,920 5,211 0.0265 0.390 0.0733 0.016 0.0154 0.617 0.0610 0.045 
180 3,981 6,150 0.0311 0.401 0.0825 0.024 0.0173 0.638 0.0674 0.064 
210 3,131 7,000 0.0382 0.391 0.0951 0.031 0.0220 0.619 0.0776 0.077 
240 2,489 7,642 0.0416 0.426 0.0977 0.059 0.0219 0.672 0.0765 0.136 
270 1,951 8,180 0.0514 0.430 0.1120 0.083 0.0272 0.673 0.0865 0.176 
300 1,531 8,600 0.0294 0.676 0.0886 0.203 0.0061 0.930 0.0645 0.349 
330 1,226 8,905 0.0601 0.494 0.1413 0.105 0.0320 0.714 0.1127 0.191 
360 961 9,170 0.1068 0.304 0.1666 0.105 0.0745 0.470 0.1343 0.187 
390 776 9,355 0.1121 0.314 0.1608 0.147 0.0798 0.470 0.1295 0.239 
420 647 9,484 0.1259 0.340 0.1865 0.156 0.0888 0.499 0.1499 0.251 
450 513 9,618 0.1797 0.252 0.2402 0.125 0.1372 0.379 0.1976 0.203 
480 419 9,712 0.1921 0.267 0.2068 0.230 0.1544 0.370 0.1704 0.320 
510 350 9,781 0.1981 0.302 0.2198 0.251 0.1596 0.404 0.1826 0.339 
540 282 9,849 0.1573 0.460 0.1732 0.415 0.1156 0.586 0.1339 0.526 
570 239 9,892 0.1346 0.587 0.2188 0.378 0.0723 0.769 0.1604 0.515 
600 192 9,939 0.1378 0.604 0.2220 0.401 0.0797 0.763 0.1660 0.527 
630 156 9,975 0.2737 0.380 0.3237 0.298 0.1864 0.546 0.2401 0.435 
660 134 9,997 0.1106 0.746 0.2114 0.535 0.0081 0.981 0.1119 0.741 
690 108 10,023 0.1232 0.766 0.3533 0.395 0.0018 0.996 0.2345 0.569 
720 91 10,040 0.1915 0.700 0.4796 0.336 0.0398 0.936 0.3295 0.504 





Table 11. Tests for essential heterogeneity. 
Outcome models being compared: 
 ps: Only level two (outcome model) variables 
 ps2: Level two variables plus propensity score (PS) interactions 
 ps3: Level two variables, PS interactions, PS squared 
 ps4: Level two variables, PS interactions, PS squared, PS cubed 
 
Models with significant p-values are highlighted in gray. 
Outcome model #1. Rearrest outcomes.  
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  30 d 
ps v. ps2  .7247282244852543 68 60.64817219923316 
ps2 v. ps3  .0499777483746286 1 3.842205207712141 
ps v. ps3  .6313676651018567 69 64.4903774069453 
ps3 v. ps4  .9923544494457799 1 .000091822835202 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  60 d 
ps v. ps2  .0073634753183159 68 99.7097151120015 
ps2 v. ps3  .3931413325206187 1 .7292039761960041 
ps v. ps3  .0080377199486241 69 100.4389190881975 
ps3 v. ps4  .6859455895396183 1 .1635096718910063 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  90 d 
ps v. ps2  .0013852449613909 68 108.2323149654294 
ps2 v. ps3  .0029898700399877 1 8.813639834430433 
ps v. ps3  .0002727927718945 69 117.0459547998598 
ps3 v. ps4  .0111951184249119 1 6.434079087955979 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  120 d 
ps v. ps2  .0005637886762719 68 112.4674146232628 
ps2 v. ps3  .0000549173675309 1 16.27032299052371 
ps v. ps3  .000017318763026 69 128.7377376137865 
ps3 v. ps4  .5909420006103214 1 .2888755597377894 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  150 d 
ps v. ps2  .0006588732162918 68 111.7474244308814 
ps2 v. ps3  .0032758988666004 1 8.647058053958972 
ps v. ps3  .000127450202238 69 120.3944824848404 
ps3 v. ps4  .658593402635154 1 .1952367363446683 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  180 d 
ps v. ps2  .0010027647965851 68 109.7782065284009 
ps2 v. ps3  .0164497400693443 1 5.754151308572546 
ps v. ps3  .000381710483412 69 115.5323578369735 
ps3 v. ps4  .4089768981509421 1 .6817729058075201 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  210 d 
ps v. ps2  .0010027647965851 68 109.7782065284009 
ps2 v. ps3  .0164497400693443 1 5.754151308572546 
ps v. ps3  .000381710483412 69 115.5323578369735 
ps3 v. ps4  .4089768981509421 1 .6817729058075201 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  240 d 
ps v. ps2  .0009817747882854 68 109.8784498735986 
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ps2 v. ps3  .074514452596624 1 3.180663807945166 
ps v. ps3  .0006535717874361 69 113.0591136815437 
ps3 v. ps4  .9776559553886963 1 .000784435083915 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  270 d 
ps v. ps2  .0020582285655765 68 106.2977298204842 
ps2 v. ps3  .0421361317813183 1 4.129727642468424 
ps v. ps3  .0011402139991166 69 110.4274574629526 
ps3 v. ps4  .6762357653562577 1 .174394136049159 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  300 d 
ps v. ps2  .0037812881411134 68 103.2294707271194 
ps2 v. ps3  .030068516207043 1 4.705370725621833 
ps v. ps3  .0019018051781111 69 107.9348414527412 
ps3 v. ps4  .552591336691555 1 .3526953012042213 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  330 d 
ps v. ps2  .019015534269619 68 94.33731829819408 
ps2 v. ps3  .0145172375154234 1 5.974130487406001 
ps v. ps3  .0082262329877018 69 100.3114487856001 
ps3 v. ps4  .4558586060993994 1 .5560439381806646 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  360 d 
ps v. ps2  .0618980619731459 68 86.79137573507796 
ps2 v. ps3  .0094924184242932 1 6.727751502605315 
ps v. ps3  .026403066185915 69 93.51912723768328 
ps3 v. ps4  .6516483699474327 1 .2038282588309812 
 
Outcome model #1. Recidivism outcomes.  
comparison  p-value   df LRT stat 30 d 
ps v. ps2  .873249778908923 68 54.948136122498 
ps2 v. ps3  .3403988475039348 1 .9089286189955601 
ps v. ps3  .8731082714078705 69 55.85706474149356 
ps3 v. ps4  .8800989154938205 1 .0227538591325356 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  60 d 
ps v. ps2  .0042380217580368 68 102.6397773053086 
ps2 v. ps3  .4421897310730704 1 .5905934394650103 
ps v. ps3  .0047830029301139 69 103.2303707447736 
ps3 v. ps4  .8425698418065506 1 .0394449108916888 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  90 d 
ps v. ps2  .0090000175559026 68 98.6122667245545 
ps2 v. ps3  .4629744933921253 1 .5386939669842832 
ps v. ps3  .0101375639197148 69 99.15096069153878 
ps3 v. ps4  .0014537396829266 1 10.13634704436299 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  120 d 
ps v. ps2  .0272863007808729 68 92.15004652874813 
ps2 v. ps3  .0226635556242213 1 5.194110131444177 
ps v. ps3  .013925719502702 69 97.34415666019231 
ps3 v. ps4  .0632944063518958 1 3.448886260490326 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  150 d 
ps v. ps2  .0602889745599804 68 86.97411031532465 
ps2 v. ps3  .0314928507241893 1 4.625893704027476 
ps v. ps3  .0357745308287799 69 91.60000401935213 
ps3 v. ps4  .6427426866258331 1 .2151730475306977 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  180 d 
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ps v. ps2  .1354657331231485 68 80.91965786341825 
ps2 v. ps3  .0250598064080583 1 5.019748651244299 
ps v. ps3  .081635746343152 69 85.93940651466255 
ps3 v. ps4  .7739995130634999 1 .0824535892897984 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  210 d 
ps v. ps2  .1297818191391264 68 81.26722036427054 
ps2 v. ps3  .0629077388855319 1 3.45901605832114 
ps v. ps3  .0960351918042417 69 84.72623642259168 
ps3 v. ps4  .4385770100211271 1 .6000026630172215 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  240 d 
ps v. ps2  .1421285737239905 68 80.52591435311479 
ps2 v. ps3  .0745329585963803 1 3.18025804177887 
ps v. ps3  .1096436866856804 69 83.70617239489366 
ps3 v. ps4  .5817827143854477 1 .3033614709038375 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  270 d 
ps v. ps2  .2898873885316106 68 73.96072213480147 
ps2 v. ps3  .0790922606398188 1 3.083456771857527 
ps v. ps3  .2369681597423108 69 77.044178906659 
ps3 v. ps4  .8861876851861604 1 .0204861342299409 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  300 d 
ps v. ps2  .3331684078828728 68 72.45870330276557 
ps2 v. ps3  .0596073477690238 1 3.548276105340847 
ps v. ps3  .2631298926871957 69 76.00697940810642 
ps3 v. ps4  .938996285235467 1 .0058570644978317 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  330 d 
ps v. ps2  .4470672744157994 68 68.88933766136142 
ps2 v. ps3  .0278649145431451 1 4.836405749103506 
ps v. ps3  .3263834811911357 69 73.72574341046493 
ps3 v. ps4  .930405327423431 1 .0076273817649053 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  360 d 
ps v. ps2  .5005400092216298 68 67.3188138507212 
ps2 v. ps3  .0267528536129231 1 4.906690465750216 
ps v. ps3  .3718415124665846 69 72.22550431647142 
ps3 v. ps4  .6792145624325571 1 .171011334467039  
 
Outcome model #2. Rearrest outcomes.  
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  30 d 
ps v. ps2  .6341961413914275 71 66.34769741171203 
ps2 v. ps3  .0815192017697536 1 3.03434982633371 
ps v. ps3  .5655683421891279 72 69.38204723804574 
ps3 v. ps4  .2532002018934728 1 1.305559536945111 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  60 d 
ps v. ps2  .0893206139522504 71 87.5006594965962 
ps2 v. ps3  .1001738769685425 1 2.702773015877028 
ps v. ps3  .0721878105821004 72 90.20343251247323 
ps3 v. ps4  .7551828575855737 1 .0972271714781527 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  90 d 
ps v. ps2  .0534369068513583 71 91.21297340822093 
ps2 v. ps3  .0535505333066178 1 3.726655025280706 
ps v. ps3  .03641830674487 72 94.93962843350164 




comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  120 d 
ps v. ps2  .0491432931403505 71 91.78834659174754 
ps2 v. ps3  .0198824683986739 1 5.422184542110699 
ps v. ps3  .0255743968614229 72 97.21053113385824 
ps3 v. ps4  .9372064517385101 1 .0062065182901279 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  150 d 
ps v. ps2  .0732146326867188 71 88.97802224166844 
ps2 v. ps3  .1229124286869727 1 2.379810846699911 
ps v. ps3  .0615155683508351 72 91.35783308836835 
ps3 v. ps4  .6457660352033199 1 .2112799520491535 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  180 d 
ps v. ps2  .1105637642280466 71 85.84859181700995 
ps2 v. ps3  .1851093399157665 1 1.75611895532893 
ps v. ps3  .1017862594877711 72 87.60471077233888 
ps3 v. ps4  .6290067870425506 1 .2334100337611744 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  210 d 
ps v. ps2  .1024131476917372 71 86.45013752505838 
ps2 v. ps3  .4812953558052726 1 .4959267628128146 
ps v. ps3  .1106370813648233 72 86.9460642878712 
ps3 v. ps4  .4774478037660458 1 .5046872268521838 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  240 d 
ps v. ps2  .0960756937601363 71 86.94443472976491 
ps2 v. ps3  .7602993675706724 1 .0930784977390431 
ps v. ps3  .1093735700124302 72 87.03751322750395 
ps3 v. ps4  .7048415040414431 1 .1434842203561857 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  270 d 
ps v. ps2  .1352410066199308 71 84.21489403990927 
ps2 v. ps3  .7984324275764469 1 .0652170852517884 
ps v. ps3  .1526374558429111 72 84.28011112516106 
ps3 v. ps4  .8999888963453597 1 .0157942995156191 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  300 d 
ps v. ps2  .1916489121197597 71 81.17904401440865 
ps2 v. ps3  .9937744359475715 1 .0000608816062595 
ps v. ps3  .214861126766433 72 81.17910489601491 
ps3 v. ps4  .9038381668335926 1 .0145960818081221 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  330 d 
ps v. ps2  .3129938911117198 71 76.26973814975281 
ps2 v. ps3  .7405255652610261 1 .109665250789476 
ps v. ps3  .3397595409181237 72 76.37940340054229 
ps3 v. ps4  .8135972306896071 1 .055595950303541 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  360 d 
ps v. ps2  .4368822212616864 71 72.2341825983458 
ps2 v. ps3  .9444614309870697 1 .0048530142539676 
ps v. ps3  .4699185758609322 72 72.23903561259976 
ps3 v. ps4  .9574495663065186 1 .0028466880685301  
Outcome model #2. Recidivism outcomes.  
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  30 d 
ps v. ps2  .9383639673014026 71 53.61664359154565 
ps2 v. ps3  .2113240722714267 1 1.562332169634828 
ps v. ps3  .9294865304607938 72 55.17897576118048 




comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  60 d 
ps v. ps2  .0135961481925384 71 99.85653662332879 
ps2 v. ps3  .6900365388779264 1 .1590458108912571 
ps v. ps3  .0161716042867643 72 100.0155824342201 
ps3 v. ps4  .9796001091757441 1 .0006538380821439 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  90 d 
ps v. ps2  .0253810313291002 71 96.09438250442872 
ps2 v. ps3  .1787127394467108 1 1.808296303965108 
ps v. ps3  .0228898968008918 72 97.90267880839383 
ps3 v. ps4  .1059743293946452 1 2.613250708009218 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  120 d 
ps v. ps2  .0832611604391269 71 88.02903730364415 
ps2 v. ps3  .0122917503649541 1 6.26829301741418 
ps v. ps3  .0401297113674184 72 94.29733032105833 
ps3 v. ps4  .9531595589648606 1 .0034503344977566 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  150 d 
ps v. ps2  .1442093726505706 71 83.67717751403325 
ps2 v. ps3  .0457154212273295 1 3.992049664502701 
ps v. ps3  .1009500997023657 72 87.66922717853595 
ps3 v. ps4  .2657841157242836 1 1.23837678851487 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  180 d 
ps v. ps2  .21812330997519 71 79.96916245022476 
ps2 v. ps3  .0659077843380533 1 3.382106099776138 
ps v. ps3  .1697257377301008 72 83.3512685500009 
ps3 v. ps4  .1093379633468886 1 2.5637642878919 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  210 d 
ps v. ps2  .227019072804088 71 79.58459792518079 
ps2 v. ps3  .3649739973851827 1 .8207054232225346 
ps v. ps3  .2327027387975313 72 80.40530334840332 
ps3 v. ps4  .0555342643654488 1 3.665971334727146 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  240 d 
ps v. ps2  .2455274537619131 71 78.81436226184087 
ps2 v. ps3  .5428850777964709 1 .3702187077888084 
ps v. ps3  .2627043066859431 72 79.18458096962968 
ps3 v. ps4  .2932589055396707 1 1.104599555128516 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  270 d 
ps v. ps2  .3577005375334557 71 74.74448801701328 
ps2 v. ps3  .5523048631005164 1 .3532042487386207 
ps v. ps3  .3783088269705727 72 75.0976922657519 
ps3 v. ps4  .8450301893305968 1 .0382059398707497 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  300 d 
ps v. ps2  .5063017937732053 71 70.14741464570216 
ps2 v. ps3  .3491713293789225 1 .8764664164755231 
ps v. ps3  .510394750525224 72 71.02388106217768 
ps3 v. ps4  .7738932991452228 1 .0825332775348215 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  330 d 
ps v. ps2  .6864988505440716 71 64.73168466039169 
ps2 v. ps3  .1355369691026672 1 2.22791122682429 
ps v. ps3  .6459219118603183 72 66.95959588721598 
ps3 v. ps4  .7311514004047714 1 .1180570535489096 
 
comparison  p-value  df LRT stat  360 d 
ps v. ps2  .7538620204332558 71 62.50749908783291 
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ps2 v. ps3  .1486673570945478 1 2.085871496279651 
ps v. ps3  .7202785785068799 72 64.59337058411256 




Chapter 9 Tables 
Table 12. Average treatment effect and average prison peer effect estimates from the local instrumental variables analysis 
implemented with margte. 
 
  120-Day Threshold 150-Day Threshold 180-Day Threshold 
  Average treatment effects  
 
Model #1 Model #2 Model #1 Model #2 Model #1 Model #2 
  rearrest recidivism rearrest recidivism rearrest recidivism rearrest recidivism rearrest recidivism rearrest recidivism 
 
0.0100 0.0511 0.0025 0.0431 -0.0150 0.0362 -0.0249 0.0250 -0.0252 -0.0140 -0.0341 0.0164 
 
(0.749) (0.092) (0.936) (0.152) (0.556) (0.172) (0.335) (0.362) (0.411) (0.765) (0.259) (0.584) 
  Average treatment effects as moderated by prior incarceration 
 
Model #1 Model #2 Model #1 Model #2 Model #1 Model #2 
 value rearrest recidivism rearrest recidivism rearrest recidivism rearrest recidivism rearrest recidivism rearrest recidivism 
0 -0.0095 0.0391 -0.0172 0.0309 -0.0300 0.0291 -0.0398 0.0180 -0.0437 0.0165 -0.0524 0.0056 
 
(0.771) (0.136) (0.603) (0.368) (0.349) (0.328) (0.266) (0.439) (0.269) (0.586) (0.170) (0.867) 
1 0.0563 0.0795 0.0093 0.0721 0.0204 0.0531 0.0104 0.0417 0.0188 0.0535 0.0493 0.0420 
 
(0.132) (0.017) (0.806) (0.022) (0.613) (0.033) (0.770) (0.275) (0.637) (0.171) (0.148) (0.256) 
  Average treatment effects as moderated by relative prior arrest 
  Model #1 Model #2 Model #1 Model #2 Model #1 Model #2 
 value rearrest recidivism rearrest recidivism rearrest recidivism rearrest recidivism rearrest recidivism rearrest recidivism 
-8 0.0007 0.0580 0.0021 0.0609 -0.0133 0.0442 -0.0254 0.0350 0.0338 0.0284 -0.0370 0.0211 
 
(0.984) (0.101) (0.954) (0.041) (0.642) (0.226) (0.432) (0.237) (0.320) (0.426) (0.333) (0.606) 
-6 0.0028 0.0565 0.0022 0.0569 -0.0137 0.0424 -0.0253 0.0327 -0.0319 0.0282 -0.0364 0.0200 
 
(0.926) (0.060) (0.935) (0.119) (0.658) (0.175) (0.441) (0.319) (0.385) (0.449) (0.315) (0.553) 




(0.849) (0.044) (0.930) (0.062) (0.670) (0.226) (0.450) (0.268) (0.449) (0.417) (0.224) (0.581) 
-2 0.0070 0.0533 0.0024 0.0489 -0.0145 0.0388 -0.0251 0.0282 -0.0280 0.0278 -0.0351 0.0179 
 
(0.801) (0.094) (0.933) (0.067) (0.631) (0.206) (0.408) (0.270) (0.408) (0.379) (0.172) (0.639) 
0 0.0091 0.0518 0.0025 0.0448 -0.0149 0.0370 -0.0249 0.0260 -0.0260 0.0276 -0.0344 0.0169 
 
0.7360 0.0580 0.9350 0.0770 0.5160 0.1980 0.4380 0.3220 0.5460 0.4100 0.3760 0.5580 
2 0.0112 0.0502 0.0026 0.0408 -0.0152 0.0352 -0.0248 0.0237 -0.0240 0.0273 -0.0337 0.0158 
 
(0.646) (0.055) (0.936) (0.191) (0.614) (0.190) (0.405) (0.431) (0.371) (0.402) (0.211) (0.653) 
4 0.0133 0.0486 0.0027 0.0368 -0.0156 0.0334 -0.0247 0.0215 -0.0221 0.0271 -0.0331 0.0148 
 
(0.638) (0.052) (0.932) (0.232) (0.640) (0.226) (0.465) (0.453) (0.415) (0.477) (0.379) (0.673) 
6 0.0155 0.0471 0.0028 0.0328 -0.0160 0.0315 -0.0246 0.0192 -0.0201 0.0269 -0.0324 0.0137 
 
(0.652) (0.138) (0.933) (0.298) (0.599) (0.334) (0.357) (0.539) (0.472) (0.450) (0.380) (0.692) 
8 0.0176 0.0455 0.0029 0.0288 -0.0164 0.0297 -0.0245 0.0170 -0.0181 0.0267 -0.0317 0.0127 
 
(0.620) (0.097) (0.937) (0.407) (0.645) (0.390) (0.537) (0.570) (0.665) (0.507) (0.392) (0.734) 
10 0.0197 0.0439 0.0030 0.0247 -0.0168 0.0279 -0.0244 0.0147 -0.0162 0.0265 -0.0311 0.0116 
 
(0.558) (0.193) (0.928) (0.470) (0.657) (0.362) (0.517) (0.661) (0.640) (0.517) (0.414) (0.791) 
  Average treatment effects as moderated by relative risk scores  
  Model #1 Model #2 Model #1 Model #2 Model #1 Model #2 
 value rearrest recidivism rearrest recidivism rearrest recidivism rearrest recidivism rearrest recidivism rearrest recidivism 
-4   
 
-0.0372 -0.0020   
 






(0.572) (0.976)   
 
(0.887) (0.704)   
 
(0.355) (0.964) 
-3   
 
-0.0279 0.0086   
 






(0.639) (0.881)   
 
(0.816) (0.618)   
 
(0.239) (0.904) 
-2   
 
-0.0186 0.0191   
 






(0.658) (0.680)   
 
(0.693) (0.565)   
 
(0.224) (0.861) 
-1   
 
-0.0093 0.0297   
 






(0.739) (0.359)   
 





0   
 
(0.000) (0.040)   
 






(0.999) (0.185)   
 
(0.251) (0.411)   
 
(0.266) (0.651) 
1   
 
0.0093 0.0508   
 






(0.811) (0.094)   
 
(0.293) (0.325)   
 
(0.368) (0.607) 
2   
 
0.0186 0.0613   
 






(0.621) (0.079)   
 
(0.446) (0.494)   
 
(0.519) (0.565) 
3   
 
0.0278 0.0719   
 






(0.570) (0.055)   
 
(0.446) (0.658)   
 
(0.774) (0.669) 
4   
 
0.0371 0.0824   
 
-0.0390 0.0249   
 
-0.0079 0.0276 
      (0.559) (0.188)     (0.558) (0.661)     (0.886) (0.674) 
Bolded effects are significant at p<0.05. p-vales in (). Dark gray = Increasing ATEs/Higher ATE. Light gray = Decreasing ATEs/Lower ATE
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Table 13. Cross tabulation, relative prior arrest. 
rel_pri_nar | 
          r |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
        -45 |          1        0.01        0.01 
        -41 |          1        0.01        0.02 
        -39 |          1        0.01        0.03 
        -38 |          1        0.01        0.04 
        -37 |          1        0.01        0.05 
        -33 |          1        0.01        0.06 
        -29 |          3        0.03        0.09 
        -27 |          2        0.02        0.11 
        -26 |          2        0.02        0.13 
        -25 |          3        0.03        0.16 
        -24 |          7        0.07        0.23 
        -23 |          2        0.02        0.25 
        -22 |          5        0.05        0.30 
        -21 |         11        0.11        0.40 
        -20 |         10        0.10        0.50 
        -19 |         10        0.10        0.60 
        -18 |         13        0.13        0.73 
        -17 |         16        0.16        0.89 
        -16 |         26        0.26        1.15 
        -15 |         27        0.27        1.41 
        -14 |         31        0.31        1.72 
        -13 |         48        0.47        2.19 
        -12 |         56        0.55        2.74 
        -11 |         58        0.57        3.32 
        -10 |         92        0.91        4.22 
         -9 |        130        1.28        5.51 
         -8 |        169        1.67        7.18 
         -7 |        211        2.08        9.26 
         -6 |        293        2.89       12.15 
         -5 |        369        3.64       15.79 
         -4 |        467        4.61       20.40 
         -3 |        613        6.05       26.45 
         -2 |        719        7.10       33.55 
         -1 |        801        7.91       41.46 
          0 |      1,006        9.93       51.39 
          1 |        853        8.42       59.81 
          2 |        742        7.32       67.13 
          3 |        596        5.88       73.01 
          4 |        520        5.13       78.15 
          5 |        384        3.79       81.94 
          6 |        324        3.20       85.13 
          7 |        255        2.52       87.65 
          8 |        231        2.28       89.93 
          9 |        186        1.84       91.77 
         10 |        140        1.38       93.15 
         11 |        114        1.13       94.27 
         12 |         98        0.97       95.24 
         13 |         76        0.75       95.99 
         14 |         64        0.63       96.62 
         15 |         48        0.47       97.10 
         16 |         46        0.45       97.55 
         17 |         39        0.38       97.94 
         18 |         29        0.29       98.22 
         19 |         27        0.27       98.49 
         20 |         27        0.27       98.76 
         21 |         17        0.17       98.92 
         22 |         19        0.19       99.11 
         23 |         12        0.12       99.23 
         24 |         10        0.10       99.33 
         25 |          6        0.06       99.39 
         26 |         10        0.10       99.49 
         27 |         11        0.11       99.60 
         28 |          2        0.02       99.62 
         29 |          1        0.01       99.62 
         30 |          2        0.02       99.64 
         31 |          2        0.02       99.66 
         32 |          5        0.05       99.71 
         33 |          2        0.02       99.73 
         34 |          3        0.03       99.76 
         35 |          2        0.02       99.78 
         36 |          3        0.03       99.81 
         37 |          3        0.03       99.84 
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         38 |          1        0.01       99.85 
         39 |          1        0.01       99.86 
         40 |          3        0.03       99.89 
         41 |          2        0.02       99.91 
         42 |          2        0.02       99.93 
         43 |          2        0.02       99.95 
         46 |          3        0.03       99.98 
         63 |          1        0.01       99.99 
         71 |          1        0.01      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 




Table 14. Cross tabulation, relative risk score.  
   rel_rsth |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
         -7 |          2        0.02        0.02 
         -6 |         10        0.10        0.12 
         -5 |         51        0.50        0.62 
         -4 |        191        1.89        2.51 
         -3 |        532        5.25        7.76 
         -2 |      1,053       10.39       18.15 
         -1 |      1,596       15.75       33.91 
          0 |      2,105       20.78       54.68 
          1 |      1,961       19.36       74.04 
          2 |      1,315       12.98       87.02 
          3 |        832        8.21       95.23 
          4 |        346        3.42       98.65 
          5 |        120        1.18       99.83 
          6 |         16        0.16       99.99 
          7 |          1        0.01      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 







Chapter 5 Figures 
Figure 1. Map of PADOC facilities and their associated prison industries. 
 
 
Source: Pennsylvania Department of Corrections  2010. Reprinted with permission.  
 






Chapter 8 Figures 
Figure 3. Initial choice and outcome model specifications. 
 
Choice model: 
Days with cellmate = A + C(releasee characteristics) + D(cellmate 
characteristics) + E(prior incarceration and releasee level and relative prior 
arrest) + G(other variables) + H(cellmate similarity variables) + I(facility fixed 
effects) + J(potential instruments) + U 
 
Outcome model #1 (Prior arrest social interactions): 
Reoffending = A + B(days with cellmate) + C(releasee characteristics) + 
D(cellmate characteristics) + E(Prior incarceration and releasee level and 
relative prior arrest) + F(pool characteristics) + G(other variables) + 
H(cellmate similarity variables) + I(facility fixed effects) + J(potential 
instruments) + U 
 
Outcome model #2 (All social interactions): 
Reoffending = A + B(days with cellmate) + C(releasee characteristics) + 
D(cellmate characteristics) + E(all social interaction variables) + F(pool 
characteristics) + G(other variables) + H(cellmate similarity variables) + 
I(facility fixed effects) + J(potential instruments) + U 
 
Figure 4. Steps used to detect essential heterogeneity in the relationship between having a 
criminogenic cellmate and rearrest. 
 
Steps to Test for Essential Heterogeneity 
 
1. Using probit regression, estimate the full first-stage choice 
model where the outcome is the duration of cellmate 
association; 
 
2. Predict the probability of celling with a cellmate for a 
particular amount of time. This is the propensity score; 
 
3. Estimate the second-stage outcome model, with terms for the 
propensity score, the level 2 regressors, interactions between 
the level 2 regressors and the propensity score, the 
propensity score squared, and the propensity score cubed added 
sequentially; 
 
4. Calculate the joint significance of each of the added terms 
using likelihood ratio tests. If the terms are significant, 
nonlinearities are present and essential heterogeneity is 






Chapter 9 Figures 
Common support of the propensity score graphs. 
Figure 5. Common support of the propensity score at the 60-day threshold. 
 






Figure 7. Common support of the propensity score at the 120-day threshold. 
 




Figure 9. Common support of the propensity score at the 180-day threshold. 
 
 










Figure 12. Guide to interpretation of treatment effect graphs. 
 






Average and marginal treatment effect graphs for outcome model #1. 
Figure 14. Average and marginal treatment effects on rearrest at the 120-day threshold 




Figure 15. Average and marginal treatment effects on rearrest at the 150-day threshold 
from outcome model #1. 
 
 
Figure 16. Average and marginal treatment effects on rearrest at the 180-day threshold 




Figure 17. Average and marginal treatment effects on recidivism at the 120-day threshold 
from outcome model #1. 
 
 
Figure 18. Average and marginal treatment effects on recidivism at the 150-day threshold 





Figure 19. Average and marginal treatment effects on recidivism at the 180-day threshold 





Average and marginal treatment effect graphs for outcome model #2. 
Figure 20. Average and marginal treatment effects on rearrest at the 120-day threshold 
from outcome model #2. 
 
Figure 21. Average and marginal treatment effects on rearrest at the 150-day threshold 




Figure 22. Average and marginal treatment effects on rearrest at the 180-day threshold 
from outcome model #2. 
 
 
Figure 23. Average and marginal treatment effects on recidivism at the 120-day threshold 






Figure 24. Average and marginal treatment effects on recidivism at the 150-day threshold 
from outcome model #2. 
 
 
Figure 25. Average and marginal treatment effects on recidivism at the 180-day threshold 




Average and marginal treatment effect graphs for outcome model for prior 
incarceration in outcome model #1. 
 
Figure 26. Average and marginal prison peer effects of cellmate prior incarceration on 




Figure 27. Average and marginal prison peer effects of cellmate prior incarceration on 
releasees’ rearrest at the 150-day threshold, outcome model #1. 
 
Figure 28. Average and marginal prison peer effects of cellmate prior incarceration on 





Figure 29. Average and marginal prison peer effects of cellmate prior incarceration on 
releasees’ recidivism at the 120-day threshold, outcome model #1. 
 
Figure 30. Average and marginal prison peer effects of cellmate prior incarceration on 





Figure 31. Average and marginal prison peer effects of cellmate prior incarceration on 





Average and marginal treatment effect graphs for outcome model for prior 
incarceration in outcome model #2. 
 
Figure 32. Average and marginal prison peer effects of cellmate prior incarceration on 




Figure 33. Average and marginal prison peer effects of cellmate prior incarceration on 
releasees’ rearrest at the 150-day threshold, outcome model #2. 
 
Figure 34. Average and marginal prison peer effects of cellmate prior incarceration on 





Figure 35. Average and marginal prison peer effects of cellmate prior incarceration on 
releasees’ recidivism at the 120-day threshold, outcome model #2. 
 
 
Figure 36. Average and marginal prison peer effects of cellmate prior incarceration on 






Figure 37. Average and marginal prison peer effects of cellmate prior incarceration on 





Average and marginal prison peer effect graphs for prior arrest in outcome 
model #1. 
 
Figure 38. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 120-day threshold, outcome model #1, relative arrest = -6 and relative 




Figure 39. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 120-day threshold, outcome model #1, relative arrest = -4 and relative 
arrest = +4. 
 
Figure 40. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 120-day threshold, outcome model #1, relative arrest = -2 and relative 




Figure 41. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 150-day threshold, outcome model #1, relative arrest = -6 and relative 
arrest = +6. 
 
Figure 42. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 150-day threshold, outcome model #1, relative arrest = -4 and relative 




Figure 43. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 150-day threshold, outcome model #1, relative arrest = -2 and relative 
arrest = +2. 
 
Figure 44. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 180-day threshold, outcome model #1, relative arrest = -6 and relative 




Figure 45. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 180-day threshold, outcome model #1, relative arrest = -4 and relative 
arrest = +4. 
 
Figure 46. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 180-day threshold, outcome model #1, relative arrest = -2 and relative 




Figure 47. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 120-day threshold, outcome model #1, relative arrest = -6 and relative 
arrest = +6. 
 
Figure 48. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 120-day threshold, outcome model #1, relative arrest = -4 and relative 




Figure 49. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 120-day threshold, outcome model #1, relative arrest = -2 and relative 
arrest = +2. 
 
Figure 50. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 150-day threshold, outcome model #1, relative arrest = -6 and relative 




Figure 51. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 150-day threshold, outcome model #1, relative arrest = -4 and relative 
arrest = +4. 
 
Figure 52. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 150-day threshold, outcome model #1, relative arrest = -2 and relative 




Figure 53. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 180-day threshold, outcome model #1, relative arrest = -6 and relative 
arrest = +6. 
 
Figure 54. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 180-day threshold, outcome model #1, relative arrest = -4 and relative 




Figure 55. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 180-day threshold, outcome model #1, relative arrest = -2 and relative 





Average and marginal prison peer effect graphs for prior arrest in outcome 
model #2. 
 
Figure 56. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 120-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative arrest = -6 and relative 




Figure 57. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 120-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative arrest = -4 and relative 
arrest = +4. 
 
Figure 58. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 120-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative arrest = -2 and relative 




Figure 59. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 150-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative arrest = -6 and relative 
arrest = +6. 
 
Figure 60. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 150-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative arrest = -4 and relative 




Figure 61. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 150-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative arrest = -2 and relative 
arrest = +2. 
 
Figure 62. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 180-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative arrest = -6 and relative 




Figure 63. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 180-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative arrest = -4 and relative 
arrest = +4. 
 
Figure 64. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 180-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative arrest = -2 and relative 




Figure 65. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 120-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative arrest = -6 and relative 
arrest = +6. 
 
Figure 66. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 120-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative arrest = -4 and relative 




Figure 67. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 120-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative arrest = -2 and relative 
arrest = +2. 
 
Figure 68. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 150-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative arrest = -6 and relative 




Figure 69. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 150-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative arrest = -4 and relative 
arrest = +4. 
 
Figure 70. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 150-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative arrest = -2 and relative 




Figure 71. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 180-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative arrest = -6 and relative 
arrest = +6. 
 
Figure 72. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 180-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative arrest = -4 and relative 




Figure 73. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative prior arrest on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 180-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative arrest = -2 and relative 





Average and marginal prison peer effect graphs for risk scores in outcome 
model #2. 
 
Figure 74. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 





Figure 75. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 120-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative RST = -3 and relative RST 
= +3. 
 
Figure 76. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 





Figure 77. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 120-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative RST = -1 and relative RST 
= +1. 
 
Figure 78. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 





Figure 79. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 150-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative RST = -3 and relative RST 
= +3. 
 
Figure 80. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 





Figure 81. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 150-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative RST = -1 and relative RST 
= +1. 
 
Figure 82. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 





Figure 83. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 180-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative RST = -3 and relative RST 
= +3. 
 
Figure 84. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 





Figure 85. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 
rearrest at the 180-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative RST = -1 and relative RST 
= +1. 
 
Figure 86. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 120-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative RST = -4 and relative 




Figure 87. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 120-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative RST = -3 and relative 
RST = +3. 
 
Figure 88. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 120-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative RST = -2 and relative 




Figure 89. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 120-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative RST = -1 and relative 
RST = +1. 
 
Figure 90. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 150-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative RST = -4 and relative 




Figure 91. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 150-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative RST = -3 and relative 
RST = +3. 
 
Figure 92. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 





Figure 93. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 150-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative RST = -1 and relative 
RST = +1. 
 
Figure 94. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 180-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative RST = -4 and relative 




Figure 95. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 180-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative RST = -3 and relative 
RST = +3. 
 
Figure 96. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 180-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative RST = -2 and relative 




Figure 97. Average and marginal prison peer effects of relative risk score on releasees’ 
recidivism at the 180-day threshold, outcome model #2, relative RST = -1 and relative 
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RST Scoring Sheet for the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. 
 
A Inmate Name:   
Correctional Planning is 
Required? 
 
          
 Inmate Number:   YES  NO   




       
          
 Staff Member:        








        
 
Circle appropriate response for each item 
below: 
       
B 1) Offender's age at first arrest?  C Override Considerations   
  age 16 or older 0  (if one or more of the following are 
checked "Yes" override to full 
assessment battery) 
 
  age 15 or younger 1   
          
 2) Current age of offender?   
1) History of Domestic 
Violence? 
 
  44 & older 0       
  25 - 43 1  YES  NO   
  24 & younger 2       
          
 3) Prior convictions as an adult?   2) Two or more DUIs?   
  0 0       
  1 1  YES  NO   
  2 or more 2       
          
 
4) Sanctioned for behavior in institutional 
setting? 
 3) Current sex offense?   
  no 0       
  yes 1  YES  NO   
          
 
5) Violation of a period of community 
supervision? 
      
  no 0       
  yes 1  4) Violence indicated?  
397 
 
      
 6) Failed to attain 12th grade education?    
  no 0   
  yes 1  YES  NO   
          
 
7) Alcohol or Other Drug problem during 
lifetime? 
      
  no 0       
  yes 1       
          
          
  Final Score        
          
  
Please Circle Risk 
Level 
Low                                  
(0 - 
4) 
Medium                                   
(5 - 6) 
High                          
(7 - 9) 
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Bed assignment survey and its results. 
Thank you for taking the time to answer a few questions regarding the process by which 
inmates are placed in beds.  
 
We are interested in better understanding how decisions to place inmates into cells are 
made. We are particularly interested in any factors, such as (but not limited to) custody 
level (PACT), risk level (RST/LSIR), inmate demographics (age, race, etc.), inmate 
personal preferences, separation issues, commitment crime types, and bed availability, 
that might affect inmate bed placements. We are interested in how important each of 
those factors is in the decision making process. We are also interested in the bed 
placement decision making process itself.  
 
Please answer each of the questions as completely as possible. More information is better 
than less. Additionally, if you can, please attach copies of any official checklists, 
guidelines, or procedures that are used to place inmates. 
 
Q1. Please describe how inmates are assigned to beds at different levels of your 
institution (e.g., building, section, cell). Please provide as much information as 
you think necessary to fully describe the placement process, keeping in mind that 
we are especially interested in the factors that determine inmate placements and 
how those factors are weighted (i.e., how important each of the factors is). For 
this question, we are interested in the process that applies to the general 
population, that is, most of your inmates. For example, the procedure may attempt 
to double-cell inmates if their commitment crime types are similar, their custody 
levels are the same, and there is no separation issue between them.  Or, the 
procedure may assign inmates of the same custody level to one building, but 
within the building, inmates are assigned to cells based on bed space availability. 
 
If you have official guidelines, checklists, or procedures that dictate how inmates 
are assigned to cells in your facility, please attach the documentation that 
describes the procedures. 
 
Q2.Is the process used to place inmates the same throughout your facility or does it 
differ by building or section within your facility? If some buildings or sections in 
your facility place inmates using a different process, could you please describe the 
different processes, indicating to which building or section they apply? (Here, we 




Q3.Why are inmates generally moved from cell to cell during their stays in your 
institution? Could you please list some reasons for inmate moves (e.g., changes in 
custody level) and indicate how common they are? 
 
Q4.Who is responsible for overseeing the inmate placement process? If we may 




Results: Factors in PADOC initial placements 





Results: Factors in PADOC within-facility moves 






Chapter 8 Appendix 
Choice linear probability model regression output. 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   10131 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 90, 10040) =   87.22 
       Model |  93157099.3    90  1035078.88           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |   119144929 10040  11867.0248           R-squared     =  0.4388 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4338 
       Total |   212302028 10130  20957.7521           Root MSE      =  108.94 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
           total_tt |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     cellsqft_tt_fa |  -.2296038   .1073454    -2.14   0.032    -.4400223   -.0191854 
         tier_tt_fa |   4.606217   2.241488     2.05   0.040      .212452    8.999981 
        c_time2r_tt |   .1885017   .0278109     6.78   0.000     .1339868    .2430166 
              r_age |   -.068642   .1501978    -0.46   0.648    -.3630597    .2257757 
            r_black |   1.969174   3.228649     0.61   0.542    -4.359626    8.297973 
          r_married |  -4.814642   4.148375    -1.16   0.246    -12.94629    3.317004 
            r_islam |  -2.789621   3.669108    -0.76   0.447    -9.981808    4.402566 
            r_urban |   .9832676   2.978727     0.33   0.741    -4.855634    6.822169 
          r_maxsent |   .1888018   .0398963     4.73   0.000     .1105971    .2670065 
         r_cust_gt3 |  -1.261988   3.004857    -0.42   0.675    -7.152109    4.628133 
            r_misAB |  -4.528932   3.195086    -1.42   0.156    -10.79194    1.734076 
            r_hadtc |  -5.697554   5.971884    -0.95   0.340    -17.40364    6.008535 
      r_ever_ac_sol |  -23.97363     4.0909    -5.86   0.000    -31.99261   -15.95465 
          r_3charge |   .4412901   2.332159     0.19   0.850    -4.130209    5.012789 
         r_p_medlim |  -5.322322   3.384867    -1.57   0.116    -11.95734    1.312695 
         r_p_hsgrad |   2.098427   2.428911     0.86   0.388    -2.662725     6.85958 
        r_p_had_job |  -2.197671   2.620452    -0.84   0.402    -7.334282     2.93894 
   r_p_prob_drugalc |  -22.19149   6.182035    -3.59   0.000    -34.30952   -10.07346 
        r_p_prob_mh |  -10.91355   2.543387    -4.29   0.000     -15.8991   -5.928001 
          r_p_usvet |   1.459334   7.860959     0.19   0.853    -13.94972    16.86839 
             r_p_iq |   .1915739   .0865646     2.21   0.027     .0218899    .3612578 
     r_18under_1arr |  -1.591754   2.799412    -0.57   0.570    -7.079162    3.895654 
              c_age |   .4690279    .157199     2.98   0.003     .1608863    .7771694 
            c_black |    4.43525   3.229106     1.37   0.170    -1.894445    10.76495 
          c_married |   5.751475   4.139993     1.39   0.165    -2.363741    13.86669 
            c_islam |  -2.560275   3.606853    -0.71   0.478     -9.63043     4.50988 
            c_urban |  -1.077964   3.001302    -0.36   0.719    -6.961117     4.80519 
          c_maxsent |   .0411899   .0080563     5.11   0.000     .0253979     .056982 
         c_cust_gt3 |  -5.274924   2.922427    -1.80   0.071    -11.00347    .4536187 
            c_misAB |  -3.987415   2.962136    -1.35   0.178    -9.793796    1.818965 
            c_hadtc |  -3.250013   5.708691    -0.57   0.569    -14.44019    7.940164 
      c_ever_ac_sol |  -7.366068   3.979795    -1.85   0.064    -15.16726     .435127 
          c_3charge |   6.049312   2.350284     2.57   0.010     1.442285    10.65634 
         c_p_medlim |  -3.128476   3.363723    -0.93   0.352    -9.722047    3.465095 
         c_p_hsgrad |   4.988381   2.434307     2.05   0.040     .2166523    9.760109 
        c_p_had_job |  -7.791509   2.689564    -2.90   0.004    -13.06359   -2.519426 
   c_p_prob_drugalc |  -21.70291   6.177288    -3.51   0.000    -33.81163   -9.594188 
        c_p_prob_mh |   -7.92913   2.512115    -3.16   0.002    -12.85338   -3.004881 
          c_p_usvet |  -12.02145   7.791695    -1.54   0.123    -27.29473    3.251838 
             c_p_iq |   .1410386   .0818828     1.72   0.085    -.0194681    .3015453 
     c_18under_1arr |  -4.004883   2.710787    -1.48   0.140    -9.318568    1.308803 
              c_apv |   4.502809   4.012633     1.12   0.262    -3.362755    12.36837 
        c_hasPriorI |  -2.595447    3.34256    -0.78   0.437    -9.147534     3.95664 
         r_pri_narr |   -.683823   .2792653    -2.45   0.014    -1.231239   -.1364072 
         c_pri_narr |    -1.2182   .2260091    -5.39   0.000    -1.661223   -.7751767 
          stretches |   31.69085   1.098175    28.86   0.000     29.53821     33.8435 
         r_time2rel |   .0026538   .0049259     0.54   0.590    -.0070019    .0123095 
         r_staytime |   .1025271   .0047178    21.73   0.000     .0932793    .1117749 
           same_age |   5.386562   2.481724     2.17   0.030     .5218852    10.25124 
          same_race |   3.480549   2.759324     1.26   0.207    -1.928278    8.889377 
       same_married |   8.378273   4.073426     2.06   0.040     .3935422      16.363 
         same_islam |    8.22742   3.462665     2.38   0.018     1.439904    15.01494 
         same_urban |   2.675539   2.877031     0.93   0.352    -2.964018    8.315096 
      same_cust_gt3 |  -1.231374   2.830429    -0.44   0.664    -6.779582    4.316833 
         same_misAB |  -7.998774   2.627122    -3.04   0.002    -13.14846   -2.849089 
         same_hadtc |   5.887665   5.523085     1.07   0.286    -4.938687    16.71402 
   same_ever_ac_sol |  -4.969524   3.815687    -1.30   0.193    -12.44904    2.509987 
       same_3charge |   4.675059    2.27772     2.05   0.040     .2102715    9.139847 
      same_p_medlim |   .8338698   3.299603     0.25   0.800    -5.634012    7.301752 
      same_p_hsgrad |  -.3283876   2.264969    -0.14   0.885    -4.768181    4.111406 
415 
 
     same_p_had_job |   .4882493   2.616932     0.19   0.852    -4.641461    5.617959 
same_p_prob_drugalc |   16.34843   6.120131     2.67   0.008     4.351747    28.34511 
     same_p_prob_mh |  -.6295035   2.422175    -0.26   0.795    -5.377451    4.118444 
       same_p_usvet |   -6.04654    7.66426    -0.79   0.430    -21.07002    8.976944 
          same_p_iq |   4.186251   2.206604     1.90   0.058    -.1391345    8.511636 
  same_18under_1arr |  -2.428243   2.419096    -1.00   0.316    -7.170155     2.31367 
                    | 
             fac_tt | 
               CAM  |   -70.0726   6.161757   -11.37   0.000    -82.15088   -57.99432 
               CHS  |   20.44542    8.46314     2.42   0.016     3.855973    37.03487 
               COA  |   16.82359   7.181058     2.34   0.019     2.747281     30.8999 
               CRE  |  -34.79314   9.784659    -3.56   0.000    -53.97303   -15.61325 
               DAL  |   -5.48759   8.490231    -0.65   0.518    -22.13014    11.15496 
               FRA  |  -2.652818   9.562124    -0.28   0.781     -21.3965    16.09086 
               FRS  |   11.47568   6.666701     1.72   0.085    -1.592387    24.54375 
               FYT  |   14.55192   7.663412     1.90   0.058    -.4698992    29.57374 
               GRA  |  -47.10056   9.451037    -4.98   0.000    -65.62649   -28.57464 
               GRE  |  -4.697444   9.184936    -0.51   0.609    -22.70176    13.30687 
               GRN  |   8.134494   9.652968     0.84   0.399    -10.78726    27.05624 
               HOU  |   16.12592   6.842561     2.36   0.018     2.713128    29.53871 
               HUN  |   -55.3387   8.868636    -6.24   0.000      -72.723    -37.9544 
               LAU  |  -19.74355   10.14997    -1.95   0.052    -39.63953     .152416 
               MAH  |   65.24186   6.962907     9.37   0.000     51.59317    78.89056 
               MER  |  -8.320465   9.684256    -0.86   0.390    -27.30355    10.66262 
               PIT  |  -15.86536   22.40117    -0.71   0.479    -59.77614    28.04542 
               PNG  |  -36.70152   8.523598    -4.31   0.000    -53.40948   -19.99356 
               RET  |   58.77057   9.011181     6.52   0.000     41.10685    76.43429 
               ROC  |  -3.817339   7.841624    -0.49   0.626    -19.18849    11.55381 
               SMI  |   26.43316   8.577451     3.08   0.002     9.619635    43.24668 
               SMR  |   9.905253   7.094725     1.40   0.163    -4.001829    23.81234 
               WAM  |  -107.3855   15.66149    -6.86   0.000    -138.0851   -76.68582 
               WAY  |  -270.2839   79.04534    -3.42   0.001    -425.2286   -115.3392 
                    | 
              _cons |    40.8325   23.02107     1.77   0.076    -4.293411    85.95841 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Outcome linear probability model regression output, rearrest. 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   10131 
-------------+------------------------------           F(115, 10015) =   23.11 
       Model |  515.448353   115  4.48215959           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1942.16037 10015   .19392515           R-squared     =  0.2097 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2007 
       Total |  2457.60873 10130  .242606982           Root MSE      =  .44037 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          has_postA |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           total_tt |  -.0000623   .0000405    -1.54   0.124    -.0001416    .0000171 
              r_age |  -.0064403   .0007348    -8.76   0.000    -.0078807   -.0049999 
            r_black |   .0550587   .0163377     3.37   0.001     .0230335     .087084 
          r_married |  -.0295916   .0168043    -1.76   0.078    -.0625314    .0033482 
            r_islam |    .056033   .0152414     3.68   0.000     .0261569    .0859092 
            r_urban |   .0201293   .0121873     1.65   0.099    -.0037602    .0440188 
          r_maxsent |  -.0012654    .000162    -7.81   0.000     -.001583   -.0009478 
         r_cust_gt3 |    .023889   .0123911     1.93   0.054       -.0004     .048178 
            r_misAB |   -.035922   .0151099    -2.38   0.017    -.0655405   -.0063036 
            r_hadtc |   .0226796   .0279584     0.81   0.417    -.0321246    .0774837 
      r_ever_ac_sol |   .0064064   .0166315     0.39   0.700    -.0261948    .0390075 
          r_3charge |   .0219318   .0094451     2.32   0.020     .0034175    .0404462 
         r_p_medlim |  -.0010638   .0136994    -0.08   0.938    -.0279174    .0257898 
         r_p_hsgrad |  -.0912186   .0124244    -7.34   0.000     -.115573   -.0668642 
        r_p_had_job |   .0654379   .0106321     6.15   0.000     .0445968     .086279 
   r_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0234287   .0265954    -0.88   0.378    -.0755611    .0287037 
        r_p_prob_mh |    .029336   .0104188     2.82   0.005     .0089131    .0497589 
          r_p_usvet |  -.0371625   .0318306    -1.17   0.243    -.0995569    .0252319 
             r_p_iq |   .0002044   .0003524     0.58   0.562    -.0004864    .0008952 
     r_18under_1arr |  -.0401893   .0152803    -2.63   0.009    -.0701417    -.010237 
              c_age |  -.0012172   .0007358    -1.65   0.098    -.0026595    .0002251 
            c_black |  -.0050795   .0131425    -0.39   0.699    -.0308415    .0206825 
          c_married |  -.0129221   .0167532    -0.77   0.441    -.0457617    .0199175 
            c_islam |  -.0027379   .0146388    -0.19   0.852    -.0314329    .0259571 
            c_urban |  -.0142175   .0121715    -1.17   0.243    -.0380761    .0096412 
          c_maxsent |  -.0000851   .0000326    -2.61   0.009    -.0001491   -.0000212 
416 
 
         c_cust_gt3 |  -.0058929   .0118802    -0.50   0.620    -.0291805    .0173946 
            c_misAB |   .0091621   .0139465     0.66   0.511    -.0181758    .0364999 
            c_hadtc |  -.0052533    .023121    -0.23   0.820    -.0505751    .0400684 
      c_ever_ac_sol |   .0162921   .0160975     1.01   0.312    -.0152623    .0478464 
          c_3charge |  -.0037543   .0095227    -0.39   0.693    -.0224208    .0149121 
         c_p_medlim |   .0112173    .013615     0.82   0.410    -.0154708    .0379055 
         c_p_hsgrad |   .0008409   .0121348     0.07   0.945    -.0229456    .0246275 
        c_p_had_job |    .000766    .010888     0.07   0.944    -.0205767    .0221087 
   c_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0012116   .0264074    -0.05   0.963    -.0529755    .0505522 
        c_p_prob_mh |  -.0128205   .0102194    -1.25   0.210    -.0328524    .0072115 
          c_p_usvet |  -.0257177   .0315537    -0.82   0.415    -.0875694    .0361339 
             c_p_iq |  -.0002477   .0003317    -0.75   0.455    -.0008978    .0004024 
     c_18under_1arr |   .0150573    .014233     1.06   0.290    -.0128422    .0429568 
              c_apv |    .014073   .0175498     0.80   0.423    -.0203282    .0484742 
        c_hasPriorI |   .0275772   .0135412     2.04   0.042     .0010337    .0541207 
         r_pri_narr |   .0161879   .0018537     8.73   0.000     .0125544    .0198215 
       rel_pri_narr |   .0010042   .0011134     0.90   0.367    -.0011782    .0031867 
             r_rsth |    .062272   .0103331     6.03   0.000     .0420172    .0825269 
           rel_rsth |  -.0075396   .0070226    -1.07   0.283    -.0213053     .006226 
             cp_age |  -.0026098   .0012099    -2.16   0.031    -.0049815   -.0002381 
           cp_black |  -.0164917   .0233791    -0.71   0.481    -.0623194     .029336 
         cp_married |   .0166362   .0271151     0.61   0.540    -.0365148    .0697873 
           cp_islam |   .0714407   .0284181     2.51   0.012     .0157354    .1271459 
           cp_urban |  -.0304204    .022738    -1.34   0.181    -.0749913    .0141506 
         cp_maxsent |   .0000554   .0000715     0.77   0.439    -.0000848    .0001955 
        cp_pri_narr |   .0015092   .0019016     0.79   0.427    -.0022183    .0052367 
        cp_cust_gt3 |   .0048847   .0218956     0.22   0.823    -.0380351    .0478045 
           cp_misAB |  -.0202766   .0228881    -0.89   0.376    -.0651419    .0245888 
           cp_hadtc |  -.0219315   .0452141    -0.49   0.628    -.1105602    .0666972 
       cp_hasPriorI |  -.0011605   .0285023    -0.04   0.968    -.0570308    .0547097 
     cp_ever_ac_sol |   .0402279   .0261583     1.54   0.124    -.0110477    .0915035 
         cp_3charge |   .0009657   .0193676     0.05   0.960    -.0369987    .0389302 
        cp_p_medlim |  -.0208502   .0229005    -0.91   0.363    -.0657397    .0240393 
        cp_p_hsgrad |  -.0147035   .0199572    -0.74   0.461    -.0538236    .0244166 
       cp_p_had_job |  -.0236399    .019706    -1.20   0.230    -.0622676    .0149877 
  cp_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0129707   .0331379    -0.39   0.695    -.0779277    .0519863 
       cp_p_prob_mh |   .0146262   .0197643     0.74   0.459    -.0241159    .0533682 
         cp_p_usvet |   .0216433   .0386637     0.56   0.576    -.0541453    .0974319 
            cp_p_iq |  -.0002333   .0006473    -0.36   0.719    -.0015023    .0010356 
    cp_18under_1arr |   .0119668   .0221986     0.54   0.590     -.031547    .0554806 
             cp_apv |    .012646   .0337172     0.38   0.708    -.0534464    .0787385 
          stretches |  -.0008389   .0046322    -0.18   0.856    -.0099189    .0082412 
         r_time2rel |   .0000172     .00002     0.86   0.389    -.0000219    .0000563 
         r_staytime |  -.0000253   .0000199    -1.28   0.202    -.0000643    .0000136 
           same_age |   .0091309   .0100482     0.91   0.364    -.0105657    .0288274 
          same_race |   .0073634   .0111928     0.66   0.511    -.0145767    .0293034 
       same_married |  -.0111294   .0164814    -0.68   0.500    -.0434362    .0211775 
         same_islam |  -.0179163   .0140341    -1.28   0.202    -.0454259    .0095932 
         same_urban |    .024971   .0116503     2.14   0.032     .0021341    .0478079 
      same_cust_gt3 |  -.0161327   .0114526    -1.41   0.159    -.0385822    .0063168 
         same_misAB |  -.0057243   .0106412    -0.54   0.591    -.0265832    .0151346 
         same_hadtc |  -.0017078   .0223486    -0.08   0.939    -.0455156       .0421 
   same_ever_ac_sol |    .014272   .0154397     0.92   0.355    -.0159929    .0445368 
       same_3charge |  -.0089006   .0092224    -0.97   0.335    -.0269783     .009177 
      same_p_medlim |   .0114058   .0133572     0.85   0.393     -.014777    .0375886 
      same_p_hsgrad |   .0034624   .0091713     0.38   0.706    -.0145152      .02144 
     same_p_had_job |  -.0268303   .0105926    -2.53   0.011    -.0475939   -.0060667 
same_p_prob_drugalc |   .0190868   .0248059     0.77   0.442    -.0295378    .0677114 
     same_p_prob_mh |  -.0212484   .0098231    -2.16   0.031    -.0405036   -.0019933 
       same_p_usvet |  -.0186844   .0310384    -0.60   0.547    -.0795259    .0421571 
          same_p_iq |  -.0022969   .0089323    -0.26   0.797     -.019806    .0152122 
  same_18under_1arr |  -.0077464   .0097967    -0.79   0.429    -.0269499    .0114571 
                    | 
             fac_tt | 
               CAM  |  -.0237467   .0252718    -0.94   0.347    -.0732846    .0257912 
               CHS  |  -.0514059   .0346309    -1.48   0.138    -.1192893    .0164776 
               COA  |   .0167849   .0291568     0.58   0.565    -.0403684    .0739381 
               CRE  |  -.0667305   .0396828    -1.68   0.093    -.1445168    .0110557 
               DAL  |  -.0254697   .0344677    -0.74   0.460    -.0930334     .042094 
               FRA  |   .0328056   .0387304     0.85   0.397    -.0431139     .108725 
               FRS  |  -.0171347    .027294    -0.63   0.530    -.0706365    .0363671 
               FYT  |  -.0428617    .031089    -1.38   0.168    -.1038024     .018079 
               GRA  |   .0112992   .0383541     0.29   0.768    -.0638826     .086481 
               GRE  |  -.0577764   .0372267    -1.55   0.121    -.1307482    .0151954 
               GRN  |   .0047908    .039134     0.12   0.903    -.0719196    .0815013 
               HOU  |  -.0017824   .0279182    -0.06   0.949    -.0565076    .0529428 
               HUN  |   -.008776   .0361701    -0.24   0.808    -.0796767    .0621246 
               LAU  |  -.0824396   .0414062    -1.99   0.047     -.163604   -.0012752 
417 
 
               MAH  |  -.0140643   .0283781    -0.50   0.620     -.069691    .0415624 
               MER  |  -.0779699   .0393495    -1.98   0.048    -.1551027    -.000837 
               PIT  |   .0318586   .0907221     0.35   0.725     -.145975    .2096922 
               PNG  |   .0299152   .0353111     0.85   0.397    -.0393017     .099132 
               RET  |  -.0293294   .0367466    -0.80   0.425    -.1013601    .0427014 
               ROC  |  -.0049769   .0318059    -0.16   0.876    -.0673228    .0573691 
               SMI  |  -.0174546   .0348607    -0.50   0.617    -.0857886    .0508794 
               SMR  |  -.0039032   .0287819    -0.14   0.892    -.0603216    .0525151 
               WAM  |  -.0140692   .0636632    -0.22   0.825     -.138862    .1107235 
               WAY  |  -.2569528   .3198512    -0.80   0.422    -.8839255    .3700199 
                    | 
     cellsqft_tt_fa |   .0004282   .0004352     0.98   0.325     -.000425    .0012813 
         tier_tt_fa |    .022098   .0090832     2.43   0.015     .0042931    .0399028 
        c_time2r_tt |   5.53e-06   .0001128     0.05   0.961    -.0002156    .0002267 




Outcome linear probability model regression output, recidivism. 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   10131 
-------------+------------------------------           F (115, 10015) =   20.35 
       Model | 422.587187   115  3.67467119           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  1808.04552 10015  .180533752           R-squared     =  0.1894 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1801 
       Total |  2230.63271 10130  .220200663           Root MSE      =  .42489 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
          has_postO |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
--------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
           total_tt |  -.0000732   .0000391    -1.87   0.061    -.0001497    3.39e-06 
              r_age |  -.0066645    .000709    -9.40   0.000    -.0080542   -.0052747 
            r_black |   .0414232   .0157635     2.63   0.009     .0105235    .0723229 
          r_married |  -.0310617   .0162137    -1.92   0.055    -.0628438    .0007205 
            r_islam |   .0542126   .0147057     3.69   0.000     .0253864    .0830388 
            r_urban |  -.0207556    .011759    -1.77   0.078    -.0438056    .0022943 
          r_maxsent |  -.0001386   .0001563    -0.89   0.375    -.0004451    .0001678 
         r_cust_gt3 |   .0277545   .0119556     2.32   0.020     .0043192    .0511899 
            r_misAB |  -.0399004   .0145789    -2.74   0.006     -.068478   -.0113229 
            r_hadtc |   .0553674   .0269758     2.05   0.040     .0024893    .1082454 
      r_ever_ac_sol |  -.0017104    .016047    -0.11   0.915    -.0331657     .029745 
          r_3charge |   .0189759   .0091132     2.08   0.037     .0011122    .0368395 
         r_p_medlim |  -.0094701   .0132179    -0.72   0.474    -.0353799    .0164398 
         r_p_hsgrad |  -.0966142   .0119878    -8.06   0.000    -.1201127   -.0731157 
        r_p_had_job |   .0156633   .0102585     1.53   0.127    -.0044453     .035772 
   r_p_prob_drugalc |     .00915   .0256607     0.36   0.721    -.0411502    .0594502 
        r_p_prob_mh |   .0663752   .0100526     6.60   0.000     .0466701    .0860804 
          r_p_usvet |  -.0283731   .0307119    -0.92   0.356    -.0885747    .0318284 
             r_p_iq |   .0002679     .00034     0.79   0.431    -.0003986    .0009345 
     r_18under_1arr |  -.0700941   .0147432    -4.75   0.000    -.0989938   -.0411944 
              c_age |  -.0006734   .0007099    -0.95   0.343     -.002065    .0007182 
            c_black |   .0017227   .0126807     0.14   0.892    -.0231339    .0265793 
          c_married |  -.0168191   .0161644    -1.04   0.298    -.0485046    .0148663 
            c_islam |  -.0150342   .0141243    -1.06   0.287    -.0427207    .0126523 
            c_urban |  -.0083386   .0117438    -0.71   0.478    -.0313587    .0146815 
          c_maxsent |  -.0000653   .0000315    -2.08   0.038    -.0001271   -3.63e-06 
         c_cust_gt3 |  -.0059399   .0114626    -0.52   0.604     -.028409    .0165292 
            c_misAB |  -.0014651   .0134563    -0.11   0.913    -.0278422    .0249119 
            c_hadtc |  -.0309053   .0223084    -1.39   0.166    -.0746342    .0128236 
      c_ever_ac_sol |   .0225597   .0155318     1.45   0.146    -.0078857     .053005 
          c_3charge |   .0087318    .009188     0.95   0.342    -.0092786    .0267422 
         c_p_medlim |   .0011151   .0131365     0.08   0.932    -.0246351    .0268653 
         c_p_hsgrad |  -.0032502   .0117083    -0.28   0.781    -.0262008    .0197004 
        c_p_had_job |  -.0019509   .0105054    -0.19   0.853    -.0225436    .0186417 
   c_p_prob_drugalc |   .0305514   .0254793     1.20   0.231    -.0193933     .080496 
        c_p_prob_mh |  -.0053935   .0098602    -0.55   0.584    -.0247215    .0139345 
          c_p_usvet |   -.004543   .0304448    -0.15   0.881    -.0642209    .0551348 
             c_p_iq |  -.0002573     .00032    -0.80   0.421    -.0008846    .0003699 
     c_18under_1arr |  -.0013629   .0137328    -0.10   0.921    -.0282818    .0255561 
              c_apv |   .0043824    .016933     0.26   0.796    -.0288098    .0375745 
        c_hasPriorI |   .0182161   .0130653     1.39   0.163    -.0073945    .0438267 
         r_pri_narr |   .0135418   .0017885     7.57   0.000     .0100359    .0170476 
       rel_pri_narr |   .0003925   .0010743     0.37   0.715    -.0017133    .0024982 
418 
 
             r_rsth |   .0705883   .0099699     7.08   0.000     .0510452    .0901313 
           rel_rsth |   .0026806   .0067758     0.40   0.692    -.0106013    .0159624 
             cp_age |  -.0032708   .0011674    -2.80   0.005    -.0055591   -.0009824 
           cp_black |   -.010217   .0225574    -0.45   0.651    -.0544341    .0340001 
         cp_married |  -.0081208   .0261621    -0.31   0.756    -.0594039    .0431622 
           cp_islam |   .0316812   .0274194     1.16   0.248    -.0220663    .0854288 
           cp_urban |  -.0361582   .0219388    -1.65   0.099    -.0791627    .0068464 
         cp_maxsent |    .000035    .000069     0.51   0.612    -.0001002    .0001702 
        cp_pri_narr |   .0024182   .0018348     1.32   0.188    -.0011783    .0060147 
        cp_cust_gt3 |   .0329769   .0211261     1.56   0.119    -.0084345    .0743883 
           cp_misAB |  -.0171343   .0220837    -0.78   0.438    -.0604228    .0261543 
           cp_hadtc |  -.0460849    .043625    -1.06   0.291    -.1315987     .039429 
       cp_hasPriorI |  -.0061101   .0275006    -0.22   0.824    -.0600168    .0477966 
     cp_ever_ac_sol |   .0363397    .025239     1.44   0.150    -.0131339    .0858132 
         cp_3charge |   .0274607    .018687     1.47   0.142    -.0091695     .064091 
        cp_p_medlim |  -.0186965   .0220956    -0.85   0.397    -.0620084    .0246153 
        cp_p_hsgrad |   .0026871   .0192558     0.14   0.889    -.0350582    .0404323 
       cp_p_had_job |   -.008663   .0190134    -0.46   0.649     -.045933    .0286071 
  cp_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0206829   .0319733    -0.65   0.518     -.083357    .0419912 
       cp_p_prob_mh |  -.0071339   .0190697    -0.37   0.708    -.0445143    .0302466 
         cp_p_usvet |   .0009137   .0373049     0.02   0.980    -.0722113    .0740387 
            cp_p_iq |  -.0002577   .0006246    -0.41   0.680     -.001482    .0009667 
    cp_18under_1arr |   .0020334   .0214185     0.09   0.924     -.039951    .0440179 
             cp_apv |   .0205737   .0325322     0.63   0.527    -.0431959    .0843433 
          stretches |   -.002439   .0044694    -0.55   0.585    -.0111999     .006322 
         r_time2rel |  -8.95e-06   .0000193    -0.46   0.642    -.0000467    .0000288 
         r_staytime |  -.0000562   .0000192    -2.93   0.003    -.0000938   -.0000187 
           same_age |   .0090698   .0096951     0.94   0.350    -.0099345    .0280741 
          same_race |   .0023483   .0107994     0.22   0.828    -.0188206    .0235173 
       same_married |  -.0161332   .0159022    -1.01   0.310    -.0473047    .0150382 
         same_islam |  -.0252557   .0135408    -1.87   0.062    -.0517985     .001287 
         same_urban |   .0111927   .0112408     1.00   0.319    -.0108416     .033227 
      same_cust_gt3 |   -.009587   .0110501    -0.87   0.386    -.0312475    .0120735 
         same_misAB |  -.0013469   .0102672    -0.13   0.896    -.0214727     .018779 
         same_hadtc |  -.0010609   .0215632    -0.05   0.961    -.0433291    .0412072 
   same_ever_ac_sol |   .0117833   .0148971     0.79   0.429     -.017418    .0409845 
       same_3charge |  -.0089329   .0088982    -1.00   0.315    -.0263752    .0085095 
      same_p_medlim |   .0022591   .0128878     0.18   0.861    -.0230036    .0275217 
      same_p_hsgrad |   .0024223    .008849     0.27   0.784    -.0149234     .019768 
     same_p_had_job |  -.0166061   .0102203    -1.62   0.104    -.0366399    .0034277 
same_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0183962   .0239341    -0.77   0.442    -.0653119    .0285194 
     same_p_prob_mh |  -.0068646   .0094778    -0.72   0.469    -.0254431    .0117138 
       same_p_usvet |   -.006563   .0299476    -0.22   0.827    -.0652663    .0521403 
          same_p_iq |  -.0033711   .0086184    -0.39   0.696    -.0202648    .0135226 
  same_18under_1arr |  -.0107603   .0094524    -1.14   0.255    -.0292889    .0077683 
                    | 
             fac_tt | 
               CAM  |  -.0275638   .0243837    -1.13   0.258    -.0753607    .0202331 
               CHS  |  -.0326285   .0334138    -0.98   0.329    -.0981262    .0328692 
               COA  |   .0328063   .0281321     1.17   0.244    -.0223383     .087951 
               CRE  |  -.0398595   .0382881    -1.04   0.298     -.114912    .0351929 
               DAL  |  -.0218343   .0332564    -0.66   0.511    -.0870235    .0433549 
               FRA  |   .0176892   .0373693     0.47   0.636    -.0555621    .0909405 
               FRS  |  -.0143358   .0263348    -0.54   0.586    -.0659573    .0372857 
               FYT  |  -.0210902   .0299964    -0.70   0.482    -.0798892    .0377088 
               GRA  |   .0352764   .0370062     0.95   0.340    -.0372632    .1078159 
               GRE  |  -.0211753   .0359184    -0.59   0.556    -.0915825    .0492319 
               GRN  |  -.0148984   .0377586    -0.39   0.693    -.0889129     .059116 
               HOU  |   .0130009    .026937     0.48   0.629     -.039801    .0658028 
               HUN  |  -.0320425   .0348989    -0.92   0.359    -.1004514    .0363664 
               LAU  |  -.0680979   .0399509    -1.70   0.088    -.1464097     .010214 
               MAH  |   .0026963   .0273807     0.10   0.922    -.0509754     .056368 
               MER  |  -.0966849   .0379665    -2.55   0.011     -.171107   -.0222629 
               PIT  |   .0182235   .0875337     0.21   0.835    -.1533602    .1898071 
               PNG  |   .0262855   .0340701     0.77   0.440    -.0404987    .0930697 
               RET  |  -.0273191   .0354552    -0.77   0.441    -.0968184    .0421801 
               ROC  |   .0086331   .0306881     0.28   0.778    -.0515218    .0687879 
               SMI  |  -.0216258   .0336355    -0.64   0.520    -.0875582    .0443065 
               SMR  |  -.0000614   .0277704    -0.00   0.998    -.0544969    .0543742 
               WAM  |  -.0469794   .0614258    -0.76   0.444    -.1673864    .0734275 
               WAY  |  -.3205088   .3086101    -1.04   0.299    -.9254467     .284429 
                    | 
     cellsqft_tt_fa |    -.00004   .0004199    -0.10   0.924    -.0008631    .0007832 
         tier_tt_fa |   .0135601   .0087639     1.55   0.122     -.003619    .0307392 
        c_time2r_tt |   .0001418   .0001089     1.30   0.193    -.0000716    .0003552 




Chapter 9 Appendix 
Conglomerate common support graphs. 





Figure 9A.2: Common support of the propensity score 290-420 days. 
 
 




Figure 9A.4: Common support of the propensity score 630-720 days. 
 
Example margte regression output. 
Outcome Model #1: An example of margte Output for Rearrest. 
Bootstrap replications (50) 
----+--- 1 ---+--- 2 ---+--- 3 ---+--- 4 ---+--- 5  
..................................................    50 
 
Parametric Normal MTE Model                     Number of obs      =     10131 
Treatment Model: Probit                         Replications       =        50 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
        has_postA |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Treated           | 
      c_hasPriorI |   .0376993   .0166013     2.27   0.023     .0051614    .0702373 
       r_pri_narr |   .0252541   .0017715    14.26   0.000      .021782    .0287262 
     rel_pri_narr |   .0008807    .001112     0.79   0.428    -.0012987    .0030601 
            r_age |  -.0105089   .0008774   -11.98   0.000    -.0122285   -.0087893 
          r_black |   .0372059   .0257656     1.44   0.149    -.0132936    .0877055 
        r_married |   -.015292   .0155271    -0.98   0.325    -.0457246    .0151406 
          r_islam |   .0641532   .0187518     3.42   0.001     .0274004     .100906 
          r_urban |   .0302334   .0172057     1.76   0.079    -.0034892    .0639559 
        r_maxsent |  -.0012622   .0002251    -5.61   0.000    -.0017034   -.0008211 
       r_cust_gt3 |   .0467684    .011824     3.96   0.000     .0235937    .0699431 
          r_misAB |   .0377194   .0179554     2.10   0.036     .0025274    .0729114 
          r_hadtc |     .03504   .0298066     1.18   0.240    -.0233798    .0934598 
    r_ever_ac_sol |  -.0015834   .0142823    -0.11   0.912    -.0295762    .0264095 
        r_3charge |   .0244847   .0131129     1.87   0.062     -.001216    .0501854 
       r_p_medlim |  -.0118402   .0132341    -0.89   0.371    -.0377785    .0140982 
       r_p_hsgrad |  -.0159265   .0139011    -1.15   0.252    -.0431722    .0113192 
      r_p_had_job |   .0690902   .0110573     6.25   0.000     .0474182    .0907622 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |   .0664788   .0225092     2.95   0.003     .0223616    .1105961 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0213977    .016461     1.30   0.194    -.0108652    .0536606 
        r_p_usvet |  -.0150707   .0260152    -0.58   0.562    -.0660596    .0359181 
           r_p_iq |   .0001534   .0004993     0.31   0.759    -.0008251     .001132 
   r_18under_1arr |   .0485798   .0159959     3.04   0.002     .0172284    .0799312 
            c_age |  -.0013368   .0008487    -1.58   0.115    -.0030002    .0003267 
          c_black |   .0053463   .0195206     0.27   0.784    -.0329134     .043606 
        c_married |  -.0174038    .014485    -1.20   0.230    -.0457938    .0109862 
          c_islam |    .008677   .0178858     0.49   0.628    -.0263785    .0437324 
          c_urban |   .0002247   .0152553     0.01   0.988    -.0296751    .0301246 
422 
 
        c_maxsent |   -.000099    .000038    -2.61   0.009    -.0001734   -.0000246 
       c_cust_gt3 |  -.0164796   .0136991    -1.20   0.229    -.0433293    .0103701 
          c_misAB |    .006247   .0141724     0.44   0.659    -.0215304    .0340245 
          c_hadtc |  -.0398626   .0257054    -1.55   0.121    -.0902443     .010519 
    c_ever_ac_sol |   .0082009   .0153014     0.54   0.592    -.0217894    .0381912 
        c_3charge |  -.0066856   .0133327    -0.50   0.616    -.0328172     .019446 
       c_p_medlim |   .0090317   .0149585     0.60   0.546    -.0202865    .0383498 
       c_p_hsgrad |  -.0087261   .0122068    -0.71   0.475     -.032651    .0151989 
      c_p_had_job |    .018007   .0115181     1.56   0.118    -.0045681    .0405821 
 c_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0202401   .0190678    -1.06   0.288    -.0576123    .0171321 
      c_p_prob_mh |  -.0188549   .0127836    -1.47   0.140    -.0439104    .0062005 
        c_p_usvet |  -.0082218   .0295975    -0.28   0.781    -.0662318    .0497882 
           c_p_iq |  -.0002305   .0003262    -0.71   0.480    -.0008698    .0004088 
   c_18under_1arr |   .0173749   .0141874     1.22   0.221    -.0104319    .0451818 
            c_apv |   .0044979   .0192781     0.23   0.816    -.0332865    .0422822 
           cp_age |   -.000991   .0017145    -0.58   0.563    -.0043514    .0023693 
         cp_black |   .0260827   .0313506     0.83   0.405    -.0353633    .0875286 
       cp_married |  -.0412754   .0405359    -1.02   0.309    -.1207243    .0381735 
         cp_islam |   .0430166   .0321403     1.34   0.181    -.0199774    .1060105 
         cp_urban |  -.0427809   .0340436    -1.26   0.209    -.1095051    .0239434 
       cp_maxsent |   .0001363   .0000773     1.76   0.078    -.0000153    .0002879 
      cp_pri_narr |  -.0011048   .0028406    -0.39   0.697    -.0066722    .0044627 
      cp_cust_gt3 |   .0027879   .0257307     0.11   0.914    -.0476433    .0532192 
         cp_misAB |  -.0381412   .0308258    -1.24   0.216    -.0985587    .0222762 
         cp_hadtc |  -.0243644   .0574372    -0.42   0.671    -.1369392    .0882104 
     cp_hasPriorI |  -.0527115   .0447689    -1.18   0.239    -.1404568    .0350338 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |    .060071   .0318251     1.89   0.059     -.002305     .122447 
       cp_3charge |    .022552   .0246762     0.91   0.361    -.0258124    .0709165 
      cp_p_medlim |  -.0126715   .0354052    -0.36   0.720    -.0820644    .0567215 
      cp_p_hsgrad |  -.0249367   .0280389    -0.89   0.374    -.0798919    .0300185 
     cp_p_had_job |  -.0164746   .0267311    -0.62   0.538    -.0688665    .0359174 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0352901   .0479013    -0.74   0.461    -.1291749    .0585948 
     cp_p_prob_mh |   .0419362   .0264442     1.59   0.113    -.0098936    .0937659 
       cp_p_usvet |  -.0339344    .050891    -0.67   0.505    -.1336788    .0658101 
          cp_p_iq |  -.0000735   .0009379    -0.08   0.938    -.0019117    .0017647 
  cp_18under_1arr |    .045937   .0315037     1.46   0.145    -.0158092    .1076832 
           cp_apv |   .0856072   .0393633     2.17   0.030     .0084565    .1627579 
        stretches |      .0019    .004687     0.41   0.685    -.0072864    .0110865 
       r_time2rel |    .000028   .0000204     1.37   0.171    -.0000121    .0000681 
       r_staytime |  -.0000199   .0000249    -0.80   0.425    -.0000687    .0000289 
       tier_tt_fa |   .0345014   .0118931     2.90   0.004     .0111915    .0578114 
                k |  -.0375444   .0246888    -1.52   0.128    -.0859334    .0108447 
            _cons |   .7735668   .1336496     5.79   0.000     .5116185    1.035515 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Untreated         | 
      c_hasPriorI |   .0060109   .0186752     0.32   0.748    -.0305918    .0426136 
       r_pri_narr |   .0243097   .0021162    11.49   0.000      .020162    .0284574 
     rel_pri_narr |    .000393   .0014527     0.27   0.787    -.0024542    .0032402 
            r_age |  -.0101561   .0008523   -11.92   0.000    -.0118265   -.0084856 
          r_black |   .0659893   .0191706     3.44   0.001     .0284157     .103563 
        r_married |  -.0451237   .0145559    -3.10   0.002    -.0736527   -.0165947 
          r_islam |   .0688269     .02027     3.40   0.001     .0290984    .1085555 
          r_urban |   .0389257   .0177713     2.19   0.028     .0040946    .0737568 
        r_maxsent |   -.001674   .0003232    -5.18   0.000    -.0023074   -.0010405 
       r_cust_gt3 |   .0103348   .0215765     0.48   0.632    -.0319543    .0526239 
          r_misAB |   .0405267   .0260103     1.56   0.119    -.0104525     .091506 
          r_hadtc |   -.031245   .0540894    -0.58   0.563    -.1372583    .0747683 
    r_ever_ac_sol |   .0227589   .0310929     0.73   0.464    -.0381821       .0837 
        r_3charge |   .0078207   .0150537     0.52   0.603     -.021684    .0373254 
       r_p_medlim |  -.0002649   .0205586    -0.01   0.990     -.040559    .0400292 
       r_p_hsgrad |  -.0315499   .0165814    -1.90   0.057    -.0640488     .000949 
      r_p_had_job |   .0722955   .0152685     4.73   0.000     .0423697    .1022213 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |    .077479   .0219545     3.53   0.000     .0344489    .1205091 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0585139   .0147118     3.98   0.000     .0296793    .0873486 
        r_p_usvet |  -.0221632   .0279223    -0.79   0.427    -.0768899    .0325634 
           r_p_iq |   .0000437   .0005304     0.08   0.934    -.0009958    .0010832 
   r_18under_1arr |   .0705395   .0177743     3.97   0.000     .0357024    .1053765 
            c_age |  -.0009298    .000805    -1.16   0.248    -.0025076    .0006479 
          c_black |  -.0141476   .0194763    -0.73   0.468    -.0523205    .0240252 
        c_married |   .0067136    .020441     0.33   0.743    -.0333499    .0467772 
          c_islam |  -.0057274   .0188702    -0.30   0.761    -.0427123    .0312575 
          c_urban |  -.0197917   .0163827    -1.21   0.227    -.0519012    .0123179 
        c_maxsent |  -.0000744    .000045    -1.65   0.098    -.0001627    .0000138 
       c_cust_gt3 |   .0298636   .0188589     1.58   0.113    -.0070992    .0668264 
          c_misAB |  -.0062584   .0192208    -0.33   0.745    -.0439304    .0314136 
          c_hadtc |   .0689156   .0308596     2.23   0.026     .0084319    .1293994 
    c_ever_ac_sol |   .0087874   .0211158     0.42   0.677    -.0325988    .0501735 
        c_3charge |   .0057188   .0115269     0.50   0.620    -.0168735    .0283111 
       c_p_medlim |  -.0057775   .0148674    -0.39   0.698    -.0349172    .0233621 
       c_p_hsgrad |  -.0008512    .015727    -0.05   0.957    -.0316755    .0299731 
      c_p_had_job |   .0131016   .0111888     1.17   0.242    -.0088281    .0350313 
 c_p_prob_drugalc |   .0378366   .0258369     1.46   0.143    -.0128027    .0884759 
      c_p_prob_mh |   .0135556   .0129809     1.04   0.296    -.0118864    .0389977 
        c_p_usvet |  -.0122475   .0316621    -0.39   0.699    -.0743041    .0498091 
           c_p_iq |  -.0004174   .0004636    -0.90   0.368    -.0013259    .0004911 
   c_18under_1arr |   .0020716   .0147888     0.14   0.889    -.0269139    .0310571 
            c_apv |   .0193556   .0280459     0.69   0.490    -.0356133    .0743245 
           cp_age |  -.0054125   .0017522    -3.09   0.002    -.0088467   -.0019782 
         cp_black |  -.0636467   .0336347    -1.89   0.058    -.1295695     .002276 
423 
 
       cp_married |   .0660675   .0387329     1.71   0.088    -.0098476    .1419826 
         cp_islam |   .0838049    .044631     1.88   0.060    -.0036703    .1712802 
         cp_urban |   -.013968   .0323957    -0.43   0.666    -.0774624    .0495263 
       cp_maxsent |  -.0000461   .0000981    -0.47   0.638    -.0002384    .0001461 
      cp_pri_narr |   .0056013   .0029988     1.87   0.062    -.0002763    .0114789 
      cp_cust_gt3 |   .0239819   .0336088     0.71   0.475    -.0418902     .089854 
         cp_misAB |   .0011206   .0418073     0.03   0.979    -.0808201    .0830613 
         cp_hadtc |  -.0086469   .0719838    -0.12   0.904    -.1497325    .1324387 
     cp_hasPriorI |   .0518523   .0435744     1.19   0.234    -.0335519    .1372565 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |   .0232113   .0398279     0.58   0.560      -.05485    .1012725 
       cp_3charge |  -.0183468   .0273322    -0.67   0.502    -.0719169    .0352233 
      cp_p_medlim |  -.0226005   .0333816    -0.68   0.498    -.0880272    .0428262 
      cp_p_hsgrad |  -.0132253   .0309264    -0.43   0.669    -.0738398    .0473892 
     cp_p_had_job |  -.0249173    .024914    -1.00   0.317    -.0737478    .0239131 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |   -.010883   .0420232    -0.26   0.796     -.093247    .0714809 
     cp_p_prob_mh |  -.0087053   .0265053    -0.33   0.743    -.0606547    .0432442 
       cp_p_usvet |   .0724883   .0494917     1.46   0.143    -.0245136    .1694902 
          cp_p_iq |  -.0001533   .0009625    -0.16   0.873    -.0020398    .0017332 
  cp_18under_1arr |  -.0255872   .0338384    -0.76   0.450    -.0919092    .0407348 
           cp_apv |  -.0630316   .0512737    -1.23   0.219    -.1635262     .037463 
        stretches |  -.0152132   .0129061    -1.18   0.238    -.0405086    .0100822 
       r_time2rel |   .0000601   .0000474     1.27   0.205    -.0000329    .0001531 
       r_staytime |  -.0001034     .00005    -2.07   0.039    -.0002014   -5.40e-06 
       tier_tt_fa |   .0107196   .0136622     0.78   0.433    -.0160578    .0374971 
                k |   .0437358   .0183407     2.38   0.017     .0077886    .0796829 
            _cons |   .9335556   .1540355     6.06   0.000     .6316515     1.23546 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mills             | 
        rho1-rho0 |  -.0812801   .0291741    -2.79   0.005    -.1384604   -.0240999 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATE               | 
       E(Y1-Y0)@X |   .0291465   .0267003     1.09   0.275    -.0231852    .0814781 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(note: file mte_base_t120_posthas_postA.gph not found) 
(file mte_base_t120_posthas_postA.gph saved) 
(running parametric_polynomial on estimation sample) 
 
 
Bootstrap replications (50) 
----+--- 1 ---+--- 2 ---+--- 3 ---+--- 4 ---+--- 5  
..................................................    50 
 
Parametric Normal MTE Model                     Number of obs      =     10131 
Treatment Model: Probit                         Replications       =        50 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
        has_postA |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Treated           | 
      c_hasPriorI |   .0355436   .0228216     1.56   0.119     -.009186    .0802731 
       r_pri_narr |   .0257728   .0022719    11.34   0.000     .0213199    .0302257 
     rel_pri_narr |   .0005424   .0013904     0.39   0.696    -.0021827    .0032676 
            r_age |  -.0102214   .0010117   -10.10   0.000    -.0122043   -.0082384 
          r_black |   .0375353   .0296397     1.27   0.205    -.0205575    .0956281 
        r_married |   .0046441   .0208778     0.22   0.824    -.0362757    .0455638 
          r_islam |   .0610649   .0179179     3.41   0.001     .0259464    .0961834 
          r_urban |   .0319483    .017852     1.79   0.074    -.0030411    .0669376 
        r_maxsent |  -.0012912   .0001902    -6.79   0.000     -.001664   -.0009183 
       r_cust_gt3 |   .0529027   .0187316     2.82   0.005     .0161895    .0896159 
          r_misAB |   .0417614   .0160236     2.61   0.009     .0103557     .073167 
          r_hadtc |   .0425355    .027637     1.54   0.124     -.011632     .096703 
    r_ever_ac_sol |  -.0169758   .0181711    -0.93   0.350    -.0525905     .018639 
        r_3charge |   .0264627   .0114302     2.32   0.021     .0040599    .0488655 
       r_p_medlim |  -.0116489   .0175825    -0.66   0.508      -.04611    .0228122 
       r_p_hsgrad |  -.0119617   .0136802    -0.87   0.382    -.0387745    .0148511 
      r_p_had_job |   .0674082   .0135091     4.99   0.000     .0409308    .0938856 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |   .0747092   .0202985     3.68   0.000     .0349249    .1144935 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0216129    .015761     1.37   0.170     -.009278    .0525038 
        r_p_usvet |  -.0385353   .0293271    -1.31   0.189    -.0960154    .0189447 
           r_p_iq |  -.0001076    .000568    -0.19   0.850    -.0012208    .0010057 
   r_18under_1arr |   .0462428   .0159163     2.91   0.004     .0150473    .0774383 
            c_age |  -.0016948   .0009645    -1.76   0.079    -.0035851    .0001956 
          c_black |  -.0066638   .0192453    -0.35   0.729    -.0443839    .0310563 
        c_married |  -.0301988   .0197518    -1.53   0.126    -.0689117     .008514 
          c_islam |   .0215079   .0153791     1.40   0.162    -.0086345    .0516504 
          c_urban |   .0087057   .0167045     0.52   0.602    -.0240345    .0414458 
        c_maxsent |   -.000098   .0000455    -2.15   0.031    -.0001873   -8.80e-06 
       c_cust_gt3 |  -.0124904   .0143488    -0.87   0.384    -.0406135    .0156327 
          c_misAB |   .0087772   .0151984     0.58   0.564    -.0210111    .0385656 
          c_hadtc |  -.0595899   .0275079    -2.17   0.030    -.1135044   -.0056754 
    c_ever_ac_sol |   -.002573   .0163492    -0.16   0.875    -.0346168    .0294708 
        c_3charge |   -.009437   .0121111    -0.78   0.436    -.0331743    .0143004 
       c_p_medlim |   .0129499   .0165554     0.78   0.434    -.0194981    .0453979 
       c_p_hsgrad |  -.0115314   .0130383    -0.88   0.376     -.037086    .0140232 
      c_p_had_job |   .0175006   .0122717     1.43   0.154    -.0065514    .0415527 
 c_p_prob_drugalc |   -.029669   .0291285    -1.02   0.308    -.0867599    .0274219 
      c_p_prob_mh |  -.0229631    .013532    -1.70   0.090    -.0494854    .0035591 
        c_p_usvet |  -.0105445   .0375124    -0.28   0.779    -.0840675    .0629784 
           c_p_iq |  -.0002266   .0005209    -0.43   0.664    -.0012474    .0007943 
424 
 
   c_18under_1arr |   .0102663   .0148473     0.69   0.489    -.0188339    .0393666 
            c_apv |   .0122033   .0221427     0.55   0.582    -.0311956    .0556022 
           cp_age |  -.0007281   .0020911    -0.35   0.728    -.0048265    .0033703 
         cp_black |   .0295314   .0452317     0.65   0.514    -.0591211    .1181838 
       cp_married |  -.0174681   .0462937    -0.38   0.706    -.1082021    .0732658 
         cp_islam |   .0373234   .0442037     0.84   0.398    -.0493142     .123961 
         cp_urban |  -.0360188    .032001    -1.13   0.260    -.0987396     .026702 
       cp_maxsent |   .0001179   .0001089     1.08   0.279    -.0000955    .0003313 
      cp_pri_narr |  -.0007402   .0027763    -0.27   0.790    -.0061816    .0047012 
      cp_cust_gt3 |  -.0094236    .032229    -0.29   0.770    -.0725912     .053744 
         cp_misAB |  -.0519464     .03609    -1.44   0.150    -.1226816    .0187887 
         cp_hadtc |  -.0463427   .0664719    -0.70   0.486    -.1766252    .0839399 
     cp_hasPriorI |  -.0603852   .0506174    -1.19   0.233    -.1595934     .038823 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |   .0687524   .0379689     1.81   0.070    -.0056652      .14317 
       cp_3charge |   .0331923   .0282457     1.18   0.240    -.0221682    .0885528 
      cp_p_medlim |  -.0032747   .0310987    -0.11   0.916    -.0642271    .0576777 
      cp_p_hsgrad |  -.0280034   .0291245    -0.96   0.336    -.0850863    .0290795 
     cp_p_had_job |  -.0456752   .0277236    -1.65   0.099    -.1000124    .0086619 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0262075    .052286    -0.50   0.616    -.1286861    .0762711 
     cp_p_prob_mh |   .0471157   .0267226     1.76   0.078    -.0052596    .0994909 
       cp_p_usvet |    -.00128   .0664119    -0.02   0.985    -.1314449    .1288849 
          cp_p_iq |   .0003646   .0011401     0.32   0.749    -.0018699     .002599 
  cp_18under_1arr |   .0683465   .0366968     1.86   0.063    -.0035778    .1402709 
           cp_apv |   .0857291   .0552284     1.55   0.121    -.0225166    .1939749 
        stretches |   .0036872   .0051752     0.71   0.476    -.0064559    .0138303 
       r_time2rel |   .0000252   .0000236     1.07   0.286    -.0000211    .0000715 
       r_staytime |  -3.16e-06   .0000219    -0.14   0.885     -.000046    .0000397 
       tier_tt_fa |   .0373776    .011931     3.13   0.002     .0139932    .0607619 
                k |  -.0407878   .0239431    -1.70   0.088    -.0877154    .0061399 
            _cons |   .7046799   .1657616     4.25   0.000     .3797932    1.029567 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Untreated         | 
      c_hasPriorI |   .0164724    .020869     0.79   0.430    -.0244301    .0573749 
       r_pri_narr |   .0239208   .0017482    13.68   0.000     .0204944    .0273472 
     rel_pri_narr |   .0008417   .0011732     0.72   0.473    -.0014577    .0031412 
            r_age |  -.0104321   .0008674   -12.03   0.000    -.0121322    -.008732 
          r_black |   .0654629   .0159493     4.10   0.000     .0342029     .096723 
        r_married |  -.0571803   .0202115    -2.83   0.005    -.0967941   -.0175666 
          r_islam |     .06978   .0192167     3.63   0.000      .032116    .1074439 
          r_urban |   .0380516   .0134004     2.84   0.005     .0117872    .0643159 
        r_maxsent |  -.0015279   .0003178    -4.81   0.000    -.0021508    -.000905 
       r_cust_gt3 |     .01146    .018425     0.62   0.534    -.0246522    .0475723 
          r_misAB |   .0365343   .0213412     1.71   0.087    -.0052937    .0783623 
          r_hadtc |  -.0072139   .0505509    -0.14   0.887    -.1062918     .091864 
    r_ever_ac_sol |   .0364751   .0246143     1.48   0.138    -.0117681    .0847182 
        r_3charge |   .0114598   .0161619     0.71   0.478     -.020217    .0431366 
       r_p_medlim |  -.0048021   .0185175    -0.26   0.795    -.0410958    .0314916 
       r_p_hsgrad |  -.0322838   .0146833    -2.20   0.028    -.0610625   -.0035051 
      r_p_had_job |   .0724132   .0137454     5.27   0.000     .0454727    .0993537 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |   .0629996   .0249822     2.52   0.012     .0140353    .1119639 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0526099   .0143701     3.66   0.000      .024445    .0807748 
        r_p_usvet |   .0026382   .0267047     0.10   0.921     -.049702    .0549785 
           r_p_iq |   .0003268    .000405     0.81   0.420     -.000467    .0011205 
   r_18under_1arr |    .066662   .0147776     4.51   0.000     .0376984    .0956255 
            c_age |  -.0008113   .0007844    -1.03   0.301    -.0023487    .0007262 
          c_black |  -.0014575   .0158356    -0.09   0.927    -.0324948    .0295798 
        c_married |      .0168   .0202862     0.83   0.408    -.0229602    .0565603 
          c_islam |  -.0153367   .0166684    -0.92   0.358    -.0480062    .0173328 
          c_urban |  -.0225648   .0153685    -1.47   0.142    -.0526866    .0075569 
        c_maxsent |  -.0000716   .0000352    -2.03   0.042    -.0001405   -2.61e-06 
       c_cust_gt3 |   .0180855   .0153476     1.18   0.239    -.0119952    .0481663 
          c_misAB |   -.005747    .017125    -0.34   0.737    -.0393115    .0278175 
          c_hadtc |   .0681523    .028923     2.36   0.018     .0114642    .1248404 
    c_ever_ac_sol |   .0222915   .0177119     1.26   0.208    -.0124232    .0570062 
        c_3charge |    .004485   .0123694     0.36   0.717    -.0197585    .0287285 
       c_p_medlim |  -.0051595   .0180721    -0.29   0.775    -.0405802    .0302612 
       c_p_hsgrad |  -.0031849   .0115361    -0.28   0.782    -.0257953    .0194255 
      c_p_had_job |   .0132945   .0119063     1.12   0.264    -.0100415    .0366304 
 c_p_prob_drugalc |   .0380118   .0288345     1.32   0.187    -.0185028    .0945265 
      c_p_prob_mh |   .0104751   .0126113     0.83   0.406    -.0142426    .0351929 
        c_p_usvet |  -.0061351   .0239532    -0.26   0.798    -.0530826    .0408123 
           c_p_iq |  -.0003648   .0004547    -0.80   0.422    -.0012559    .0005264 
   c_18under_1arr |   .0109865    .014665     0.75   0.454    -.0177563    .0397294 
            c_apv |   .0060521   .0234978     0.26   0.797    -.0400028    .0521069 
           cp_age |  -.0049394   .0015422    -3.20   0.001     -.007962   -.0019168 
         cp_black |  -.0521749   .0259193    -2.01   0.044    -.1029758    -.001374 
       cp_married |   .0375994   .0397934     0.94   0.345    -.0403942    .1155931 
         cp_islam |   .0829387   .0421978     1.97   0.049     .0002325    .1656449 
         cp_urban |  -.0199092   .0315319    -0.63   0.528    -.0817105    .0418922 
       cp_maxsent |   1.80e-06   .0000754     0.02   0.981     -.000146    .0001497 
      cp_pri_narr |    .004065   .0027383     1.48   0.138     -.001302     .009432 
      cp_cust_gt3 |   .0320699   .0351077     0.91   0.361      -.03674    .1008798 
         cp_misAB |   .0046197   .0346149     0.13   0.894    -.0632243    .0724636 
         cp_hadtc |  -.0095717   .0694301    -0.14   0.890    -.1456521    .1265087 
     cp_hasPriorI |   .0414264   .0364974     1.14   0.256    -.0301073      .11296 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |   .0232569    .037668     0.62   0.537    -.0505711    .0970849 
       cp_3charge |   -.025794   .0254279    -1.01   0.310    -.0756318    .0240438 
      cp_p_medlim |   -.027227   .0369704    -0.74   0.461    -.0996877    .0452337 
      cp_p_hsgrad |  -.0108081   .0258697    -0.42   0.676    -.0615117    .0398955 
425 
 
     cp_p_had_job |  -.0012481   .0254513    -0.05   0.961    -.0511317    .0486354 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0205132    .046148    -0.44   0.657    -.1109616    .0699351 
     cp_p_prob_mh |  -.0070262   .0262715    -0.27   0.789    -.0585174     .044465 
       cp_p_usvet |   .0335383   .0449975     0.75   0.456    -.0546551    .1217318 
          cp_p_iq |  -.0002836   .0006513    -0.44   0.663    -.0015601    .0009929 
  cp_18under_1arr |  -.0263158   .0288101    -0.91   0.361    -.0827826     .030151 
           cp_apv |  -.0373002    .047519    -0.78   0.432    -.1304357    .0558353 
        stretches |  -.0171923   .0121481    -1.42   0.157    -.0410023    .0066176 
       r_time2rel |   .0000339   .0000445     0.76   0.447    -.0000534    .0001211 
       r_staytime |   -.000083   .0000463    -1.79   0.073    -.0001738    7.84e-06 
       tier_tt_fa |   .0144653   .0081864     1.77   0.077    -.0015798    .0305104 
                k |   .0409424   .0222549     1.84   0.066    -.0026763    .0845611 
            _cons |   .9318097    .127094     7.33   0.000     .6827099    1.180909 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mills             | 
        rho1-rho0 |  -.0817302   .0309232    -2.64   0.008    -.1423385   -.0211219 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATE               | 
       E(Y1-Y0)@X |  -.0010626   .0314647    -0.03   0.973    -.0627324    .0606072 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(note: file mte_base_t150_posthas_postA.gph not found) 
(file mte_base_t150_posthas_postA.gph saved) 
(running parametric_polynomial on estimation sample) 
 
Bootstrap replications (50) 
 
Bootstrap replications (50) 
----+--- 1 ---+--- 2 ---+--- 3 ---+--- 4 ---+--- 5  
..................................................    50 
 
Parametric Normal MTE Model                     Number of obs      =     10131 
Treatment Model: Probit                         Replications       =        50 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
        has_postA |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Treated           | 
      c_hasPriorI |   .0308928   .0207996     1.49   0.137    -.0098738    .0716593 
       r_pri_narr |   .0263447   .0021784    12.09   0.000     .0220752    .0306143 
     rel_pri_narr |    .001009    .001424     0.71   0.479    -.0017819    .0037999 
            r_age |  -.0106964   .0010273   -10.41   0.000    -.0127098    -.008683 
          r_black |   .0303002   .0358631     0.84   0.398    -.0399901    .1005906 
        r_married |  -.0014247   .0220318    -0.06   0.948    -.0446063    .0417569 
          r_islam |   .0606002   .0214867     2.82   0.005      .018487    .1027134 
          r_urban |   .0331253   .0196121     1.69   0.091    -.0053137    .0715644 
        r_maxsent |  -.0013578   .0002081    -6.53   0.000    -.0017657     -.00095 
       r_cust_gt3 |   .0593873   .0213108     2.79   0.005     .0176188    .1011557 
          r_misAB |   .0481901   .0145446     3.31   0.001     .0196832    .0766971 
          r_hadtc |   .0436734   .0342644     1.27   0.202    -.0234836    .1108303 
    r_ever_ac_sol |  -.0010036   .0213226    -0.05   0.962    -.0427951    .0407878 
        r_3charge |   .0453758   .0135213     3.36   0.001     .0188745     .071877 
       r_p_medlim |   .0039813   .0174007     0.23   0.819    -.0301234     .038086 
       r_p_hsgrad |   -.015316   .0172789    -0.89   0.375     -.049182      .01855 
      r_p_had_job |   .0706511   .0168546     4.19   0.000     .0376167    .1036854 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |   .0594389   .0290681     2.04   0.041     .0024664    .1164113 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0163535   .0161218     1.01   0.310    -.0152446    .0479516 
        r_p_usvet |  -.0256337   .0274279    -0.93   0.350    -.0793914    .0281241 
           r_p_iq |  -.0001567   .0006165    -0.25   0.799     -.001365    .0010516 
   r_18under_1arr |   .0508304   .0176892     2.87   0.004     .0161602    .0855006 
            c_age |  -.0022949   .0011364    -2.02   0.043    -.0045223   -.0000676 
          c_black |  -.0134873   .0235017    -0.57   0.566    -.0595498    .0325752 
        c_married |  -.0347124   .0219334    -1.58   0.114     -.077701    .0082762 
          c_islam |   .0198505   .0223085     0.89   0.374    -.0238733    .0635743 
          c_urban |   .0212668   .0203548     1.04   0.296    -.0186279    .0611614 
        c_maxsent |  -.0000302     .00004    -0.76   0.450    -.0001086    .0000482 
       c_cust_gt3 |  -.0122376   .0169993    -0.72   0.472    -.0455556    .0210804 
          c_misAB |   .0039935   .0174641     0.23   0.819    -.0302355    .0382225 
          c_hadtc |  -.0554598   .0314389    -1.76   0.078     -.117079    .0061594 
    c_ever_ac_sol |  -.0191135    .020332    -0.94   0.347    -.0589634    .0207364 
        c_3charge |  -.0035689    .016078    -0.22   0.824    -.0350813    .0279435 
       c_p_medlim |   .0087411   .0154775     0.56   0.572    -.0215944    .0390765 
       c_p_hsgrad |  -.0074633    .016199    -0.46   0.645    -.0392127    .0242862 
      c_p_had_job |   .0146619   .0170494     0.86   0.390    -.0187543     .048078 
 c_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0198782   .0251893    -0.79   0.430    -.0692484     .029492 
      c_p_prob_mh |  -.0089913   .0119332    -0.75   0.451    -.0323799    .0143973 
        c_p_usvet |  -.0114872   .0285582    -0.40   0.688    -.0674602    .0444858 
           c_p_iq |  -.0000951   .0006045    -0.16   0.875    -.0012799    .0010897 
   c_18under_1arr |  -.0043975   .0155112    -0.28   0.777    -.0347989    .0260039 
            c_apv |   .0039049   .0264841     0.15   0.883    -.0480029    .0558127 
           cp_age |  -.0001527   .0022136    -0.07   0.945    -.0044913    .0041859 
         cp_black |   .0320061   .0410581     0.78   0.436    -.0484663    .1124785 
       cp_married |  -.0325486   .0488271    -0.67   0.505     -.128248    .0631508 
         cp_islam |   .0554007   .0438925     1.26   0.207    -.0306271    .1414285 
         cp_urban |   -.038941   .0416558    -0.93   0.350    -.1205849    .0427029 
       cp_maxsent |   .0001797   .0001235     1.45   0.146    -.0000624    .0004218 
      cp_pri_narr |   .0006033   .0034473     0.17   0.861    -.0061534    .0073599 
      cp_cust_gt3 |  -.0217989    .040332    -0.54   0.589    -.1008481    .0572503 
         cp_misAB |  -.0430412   .0379935    -1.13   0.257     -.117507    .0314247 
         cp_hadtc |  -.0596267   .0652207    -0.91   0.361     -.187457    .0682036 
426 
 
     cp_hasPriorI |  -.0647362   .0491261    -1.32   0.188    -.1610216    .0315492 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |   .0649077   .0370786     1.75   0.080    -.0077649    .1375803 
       cp_3charge |   .0293867   .0323586     0.91   0.364     -.034035    .0928084 
      cp_p_medlim |  -.0160355    .034397    -0.47   0.641    -.0834523    .0513813 
      cp_p_hsgrad |  -.0242643    .034192    -0.71   0.478    -.0912793    .0427507 
     cp_p_had_job |  -.0479557   .0327757    -1.46   0.143    -.1121949    .0162835 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0536808   .0583074    -0.92   0.357    -.1679612    .0605996 
     cp_p_prob_mh |   .0484631   .0334885     1.45   0.148    -.0171733    .1140994 
       cp_p_usvet |   .0541863   .0604736     0.90   0.370    -.0643399    .1727124 
          cp_p_iq |   7.67e-06   .0013149     0.01   0.995    -.0025695    .0025849 
  cp_18under_1arr |   .0759888   .0363784     2.09   0.037     .0046886    .1472891 
           cp_apv |   .0711697   .0624639     1.14   0.255    -.0512572    .1935966 
        stretches |   .0015104   .0060936     0.25   0.804    -.0104328    .0134537 
       r_time2rel |   .0000297    .000022     1.35   0.177    -.0000135     .000073 
       r_staytime |  -3.01e-06   .0000255    -0.12   0.906    -.0000531     .000047 
       tier_tt_fa |   .0424039   .0126249     3.36   0.001     .0176595    .0671482 
                k |  -.0300693   .0263026    -1.14   0.253    -.0816216    .0214829 
            _cons |   .7290755   .1814755     4.02   0.000       .37339    1.084761 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Untreated         | 
      c_hasPriorI |   .0244773   .0202802     1.21   0.227    -.0152711    .0642257 
       r_pri_narr |   .0241361   .0022186    10.88   0.000     .0197877    .0284845 
     rel_pri_narr |   .0006144   .0012117     0.51   0.612    -.0017604    .0029893 
            r_age |  -.0102077   .0008792   -11.61   0.000    -.0119309   -.0084844 
          r_black |   .0676242   .0194185     3.48   0.000     .0295645    .1056838 
        r_married |  -.0406673    .017238    -2.36   0.018    -.0744533   -.0068814 
          r_islam |   .0676838   .0161311     4.20   0.000     .0360674    .0993002 
          r_urban |   .0333696   .0137319     2.43   0.015     .0064556    .0602836 
        r_maxsent |  -.0014466   .0002531    -5.72   0.000    -.0019426   -.0009506 
       r_cust_gt3 |   .0176983    .012622     1.40   0.161    -.0070403    .0424369 
          r_misAB |   .0281893   .0178974     1.58   0.115    -.0068889    .0632675 
          r_hadtc |  -.0105978   .0343323    -0.31   0.758     -.077888    .0566923 
    r_ever_ac_sol |   .0153247    .022752     0.67   0.501    -.0292683    .0599177 
        r_3charge |   .0005539   .0103477     0.05   0.957    -.0197273    .0208351 
       r_p_medlim |   -.016229   .0186346    -0.87   0.384    -.0527521    .0202941 
       r_p_hsgrad |  -.0276583   .0130896    -2.11   0.035    -.0533134   -.0020031 
      r_p_had_job |   .0707863    .012395     5.71   0.000     .0464925    .0950801 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |   .0761335   .0230016     3.31   0.001     .0310512    .1212158 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0528562   .0114073     4.63   0.000     .0304982    .0752142 
        r_p_usvet |  -.0110777   .0246429    -0.45   0.653     -.059377    .0372215 
           r_p_iq |   .0002521   .0004094     0.62   0.538    -.0005504    .0010545 
   r_18under_1arr |   .0607951    .016214     3.75   0.000     .0290162     .092574 
            c_age |  -.0006081   .0009487    -0.64   0.522    -.0024675    .0012513 
          c_black |   .0009803   .0126443     0.08   0.938    -.0238021    .0257627 
        c_married |   .0124098   .0164257     0.76   0.450     -.019784    .0446036 
          c_islam |  -.0086105    .013971    -0.62   0.538    -.0359933    .0187722 
          c_urban |  -.0245324   .0132993    -1.84   0.065    -.0505986    .0015339 
        c_maxsent |  -.0001274   .0000476    -2.68   0.007    -.0002206   -.0000342 
       c_cust_gt3 |   .0160073   .0124037     1.29   0.197    -.0083036    .0403182 
          c_misAB |  -.0013175   .0143761    -0.09   0.927    -.0294942    .0268591 
          c_hadtc |   .0372279   .0274509     1.36   0.175    -.0165749    .0910308 
    c_ever_ac_sol |   .0315816   .0164728     1.92   0.055    -.0007044    .0638676 
        c_3charge |  -.0015915   .0131966    -0.12   0.904    -.0274564    .0242734 
       c_p_medlim |   .0025717   .0131364     0.20   0.845    -.0231751    .0283186 
       c_p_hsgrad |  -.0041471   .0116734    -0.36   0.722    -.0270266    .0187325 
      c_p_had_job |   .0154837   .0119528     1.30   0.195    -.0079434    .0389108 
 c_p_prob_drugalc |   .0224291   .0220117     1.02   0.308    -.0207131    .0655712 
      c_p_prob_mh |  -.0040212   .0130266    -0.31   0.758    -.0295529    .0215104 
        c_p_usvet |  -.0077526   .0251915    -0.31   0.758     -.057127    .0416218 
           c_p_iq |  -.0004684   .0004118    -1.14   0.255    -.0012756    .0003387 
   c_18under_1arr |   .0195443   .0133239     1.47   0.142    -.0065701    .0456586 
            c_apv |   .0083032   .0167581     0.50   0.620    -.0245421    .0411484 
           cp_age |  -.0047088   .0013617    -3.46   0.001    -.0073777   -.0020398 
         cp_black |  -.0426132   .0356704    -1.19   0.232     -.112526    .0272996 
       cp_married |   .0350412    .028367     1.24   0.217     -.020557    .0906395 
         cp_islam |   .0646791   .0379554     1.70   0.088    -.0097121    .1390702 
         cp_urban |  -.0202706   .0308814    -0.66   0.512    -.0807971    .0402559 
       cp_maxsent |  -.0000281   .0000932    -0.30   0.763    -.0002107    .0001546 
      cp_pri_narr |   .0027838   .0021228     1.31   0.190    -.0013768    .0069443 
      cp_cust_gt3 |    .029733   .0259454     1.15   0.252    -.0211191    .0805851 
         cp_misAB |    -.01249   .0316269    -0.39   0.693    -.0744777    .0494977 
         cp_hadtc |   .0055286   .0586458     0.09   0.925    -.1094151    .1204723 
     cp_hasPriorI |   .0337271   .0383456     0.88   0.379    -.0414289    .1088832 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |   .0278742   .0283596     0.98   0.326    -.0277097     .083458 
       cp_3charge |  -.0176615   .0249401    -0.71   0.479    -.0665431    .0312201 
      cp_p_medlim |  -.0149185   .0306341    -0.49   0.626    -.0749602    .0451232 
      cp_p_hsgrad |   -.015186   .0251892    -0.60   0.547    -.0645559     .034184 
     cp_p_had_job |   .0003744   .0233112     0.02   0.987    -.0453146    .0460634 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0053015   .0411953    -0.13   0.898    -.0860428    .0754398 
     cp_p_prob_mh |  -.0037998   .0233129    -0.16   0.871    -.0494923    .0418926 
       cp_p_usvet |   .0051228   .0463349     0.11   0.912     -.085692    .0959376 
          cp_p_iq |  -.0000715   .0007818    -0.09   0.927    -.0016038    .0014607 
  cp_18under_1arr |  -.0175902   .0244643    -0.72   0.472    -.0655395     .030359 
           cp_apv |  -.0101072   .0469693    -0.22   0.830    -.1021654    .0819511 
        stretches |  -.0107871    .008976    -1.20   0.229    -.0283797    .0068056 
       r_time2rel |     .00003   .0000285     1.05   0.293    -.0000259    .0000859 
       r_staytime |  -.0000812   .0000344    -2.36   0.018    -.0001487   -.0000138 
       tier_tt_fa |    .013599   .0119581     1.14   0.255    -.0098384    .0370364 
                k |   .0621536   .0270078     2.30   0.021     .0092192     .115088 
427 
 
            _cons |   .9032531   .1406434     6.42   0.000     .6275971    1.178909 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mills             | 
        rho1-rho0 |  -.0922229   .0370261    -2.49   0.013    -.1647928   -.0196531 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATE               | 
       E(Y1-Y0)@X |  -.0109758   .0315665    -0.35   0.728     -.072845    .0508933 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(note: file mte_base_t180_posthas_postA.gph not found) 
(file mte_base_t180_posthas_postA.gph saved) 
(running parametric_polynomial on estimation sample) 
 
Outcome Model #1: An example of margte Output for Recidivism. 
 (running parametric_normal on estimation sample) 
 
Bootstrap replications (50) 
----+--- 1 ---+--- 2 ---+--- 3 ---+--- 4 ---+--- 5  
..................................................    50 
 
Parametric Normal MTE Model                     Number of obs      =     10131 
Treatment Model: Probit                         Replications       =        50 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
        has_postO |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Treated           | 
      c_hasPriorI |   .0271904      .0158     1.72   0.085    -.0037771    .0581579 
       r_pri_narr |   .0232926   .0015613    14.92   0.000     .0202325    .0263528 
     rel_pri_narr |   .0006598   .0010497     0.63   0.530    -.0013976    .0027171 
            r_age |  -.0103567   .0008709   -11.89   0.000    -.0120636   -.0086499 
          r_black |   .0267587   .0218598     1.22   0.221    -.0160857    .0696031 
        r_married |   -.011117   .0169838    -0.65   0.513    -.0444046    .0221705 
          r_islam |   .0663891   .0178204     3.73   0.000     .0314617    .1013166 
          r_urban |  -.0193001   .0149845    -1.29   0.198    -.0486691     .010069 
        r_maxsent |  -.0002347   .0002008    -1.17   0.243    -.0006283     .000159 
       r_cust_gt3 |   .0451502   .0152961     2.95   0.003     .0151703    .0751301 
          r_misAB |   .0266904   .0153076     1.74   0.081     -.003312    .0566927 
          r_hadtc |    .073114   .0256308     2.85   0.004     .0228785    .1233495 
    r_ever_ac_sol |   -.012348   .0179798    -0.69   0.492    -.0475877    .0228918 
        r_3charge |   .0143461   .0116043     1.24   0.216     -.008398    .0370902 
       r_p_medlim |  -.0191508    .013601    -1.41   0.159    -.0458084    .0075067 
       r_p_hsgrad |  -.0293052    .012328    -2.38   0.017    -.0534675   -.0051428 
      r_p_had_job |   .0254964   .0136914     1.86   0.063    -.0013382    .0523309 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |   .0775446   .0212054     3.66   0.000     .0359828    .1191065 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0634179   .0117565     5.39   0.000     .0403756    .0864602 
        r_p_usvet |  -.0244081   .0299796    -0.81   0.416    -.0831669    .0343508 
           r_p_iq |   .0004574   .0004568     1.00   0.317    -.0004378    .0013526 
   r_18under_1arr |   .0205043   .0131862     1.55   0.120    -.0053401    .0463487 
            c_age |  -.0009612   .0009435    -1.02   0.308    -.0028105    .0008881 
          c_black |   .0159131   .0189852     0.84   0.402    -.0212971    .0531234 
        c_married |  -.0154577   .0183384    -0.84   0.399    -.0514002    .0204848 
          c_islam |   -.010591   .0160909    -0.66   0.510    -.0421286    .0209466 
          c_urban |  -.0039638   .0136298    -0.29   0.771    -.0306776      .02275 
        c_maxsent |  -.0000843   .0000364    -2.32   0.020    -.0001556    -.000013 
       c_cust_gt3 |  -.0103409   .0130363    -0.79   0.428    -.0358915    .0152097 
          c_misAB |   .0137587   .0126518     1.09   0.277    -.0110383    .0385557 
          c_hadtc |  -.0563635   .0200643    -2.81   0.005    -.0956888   -.0170382 
    c_ever_ac_sol |   .0101756   .0110753     0.92   0.358    -.0115317    .0318828 
        c_3charge |   .0073526   .0104922     0.70   0.483    -.0132118     .027917 
       c_p_medlim |   -.000554   .0149487    -0.04   0.970    -.0298528    .0287449 
       c_p_hsgrad |   .0075631   .0131692     0.57   0.566     -.018248    .0333743 
      c_p_had_job |   .0082644   .0118935     0.69   0.487    -.0150465    .0315753 
 c_p_prob_drugalc |   .0072794   .0180501     0.40   0.687    -.0280982     .042657 
      c_p_prob_mh |  -.0080115   .0125683    -0.64   0.524    -.0326448    .0166219 
        c_p_usvet |   .0088094   .0239494     0.37   0.713    -.0381306    .0557495 
           c_p_iq |  -.0006358   .0004423    -1.44   0.151    -.0015027    .0002312 
   c_18under_1arr |   .0141633   .0118284     1.20   0.231    -.0090199    .0373465 
            c_apv |   -.000498   .0188692    -0.03   0.979     -.037481     .036485 
           cp_age |  -.0025304    .001934    -1.31   0.191    -.0063211    .0012602 
         cp_black |   .0235693   .0312955     0.75   0.451    -.0377688    .0849074 
       cp_married |  -.0460874   .0368618    -1.25   0.211    -.1183352    .0261604 
         cp_islam |   .0025674   .0371884     0.07   0.945    -.0703205    .0754552 
         cp_urban |  -.0199066    .028136    -0.71   0.479    -.0750522    .0352389 
       cp_maxsent |    .000084   .0000846     0.99   0.320    -.0000817    .0002498 
      cp_pri_narr |   .0001302   .0023663     0.06   0.956    -.0045077    .0047681 
      cp_cust_gt3 |     .04512   .0338458     1.33   0.182    -.0212166    .1114567 
         cp_misAB |  -.0347815   .0320605    -1.08   0.278    -.0976189     .028056 
         cp_hadtc |  -.0563145   .0547932    -1.03   0.304    -.1637071    .0510781 
     cp_hasPriorI |  -.0337687   .0397278    -0.85   0.395    -.1116337    .0440963 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |    .039217   .0369417     1.06   0.288    -.0331874    .1116213 
       cp_3charge |   .0392983   .0269219     1.46   0.144    -.0134675    .0920642 
      cp_p_medlim |   -.027603   .0341374    -0.81   0.419    -.0945111    .0393052 
      cp_p_hsgrad |  -.0049697   .0283356    -0.18   0.861    -.0605064     .050567 
     cp_p_had_job |   .0025727   .0258944     0.10   0.921    -.0481794    .0533248 
428 
 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0373831   .0419744    -0.89   0.373    -.1196514    .0448853 
     cp_p_prob_mh |   .0107806   .0262395     0.41   0.681    -.0406479     .062209 
       cp_p_usvet |  -.0616655   .0624821    -0.99   0.324     -.184128    .0607971 
          cp_p_iq |    .000118   .0010764     0.11   0.913    -.0019916    .0022276 
  cp_18under_1arr |   .0220452    .029714     0.74   0.458     -.036193    .0802835 
           cp_apv |    .071019   .0458583     1.55   0.121    -.0188617    .1608996 
        stretches |    -.00323   .0049787    -0.65   0.516    -.0129881    .0065281 
       r_time2rel |   3.91e-06   .0000219     0.18   0.858     -.000039    .0000468 
       r_staytime |    -.00005   .0000215    -2.32   0.020    -.0000921   -7.84e-06 
       tier_tt_fa |   .0253578   .0119361     2.12   0.034     .0019634    .0487522 
                k |  -.0118904   .0239777    -0.50   0.620    -.0588858     .035105 
            _cons |   .8807975   .1286447     6.85   0.000     .6286586    1.132936 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Untreated         | 
      c_hasPriorI |  -.0034097   .0191952    -0.18   0.859    -.0410315    .0342122 
       r_pri_narr |   .0225747   .0021339    10.58   0.000     .0183923    .0267571 
     rel_pri_narr |   .0015354   .0015119     1.02   0.310    -.0014278    .0044987 
            r_age |  -.0106924   .0009245   -11.57   0.000    -.0125043   -.0088805 
          r_black |   .0502477   .0187641     2.68   0.007     .0134709    .0870246 
        r_married |  -.0459967   .0181414    -2.54   0.011    -.0815531   -.0104403 
          r_islam |    .062805   .0205398     3.06   0.002     .0225477    .1030624 
          r_urban |  -.0044009   .0160398    -0.27   0.784    -.0358383    .0270365 
        r_maxsent |  -.0003058   .0003473    -0.88   0.379    -.0009866    .0003749 
       r_cust_gt3 |   .0157937   .0173295     0.91   0.362    -.0181715     .049759 
          r_misAB |   .0483608   .0249122     1.94   0.052    -.0004663    .0971878 
          r_hadtc |  -.0201925   .0497623    -0.41   0.685    -.1177247    .0773397 
    r_ever_ac_sol |   .0271702   .0267612     1.02   0.310    -.0252808    .0796213 
        r_3charge |   .0198073    .014179     1.40   0.162     -.007983    .0475976 
       r_p_medlim |   .0039153   .0197587     0.20   0.843     -.034811    .0426416 
       r_p_hsgrad |  -.0300653   .0108054    -2.78   0.005    -.0512435   -.0088872 
      r_p_had_job |   .0075603   .0151638     0.50   0.618    -.0221602    .0372808 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |   .0682165   .0296646     2.30   0.021     .0100749    .1263581 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0869203   .0168441     5.16   0.000     .0539063    .1199342 
        r_p_usvet |  -.0134395   .0374864    -0.36   0.720    -.0869115    .0600326 
           r_p_iq |  -.0002771   .0004392    -0.63   0.528     -.001138    .0005837 
   r_18under_1arr |   .0344619   .0188864     1.82   0.068    -.0025547    .0714785 
            c_age |  -.0013656   .0008656    -1.58   0.115    -.0030623     .000331 
          c_black |  -.0109756   .0223287    -0.49   0.623    -.0547389    .0327878 
        c_married |   .0004443   .0177753     0.02   0.980    -.0343947    .0352834 
          c_islam |   .0027278   .0245508     0.11   0.912     -.045391    .0508466 
          c_urban |  -.0086248   .0186351    -0.46   0.643    -.0451489    .0278992 
        c_maxsent |  -.0000351   .0000508    -0.69   0.489    -.0001347    .0000645 
       c_cust_gt3 |   .0129384   .0144486     0.90   0.371    -.0153803    .0412572 
          c_misAB |    -.01707   .0186542    -0.92   0.360    -.0536316    .0194916 
          c_hadtc |   .0302594   .0352453     0.86   0.391    -.0388202    .0993389 
    c_ever_ac_sol |   .0398687     .01711     2.33   0.020     .0063338    .0734037 
        c_3charge |   .0161555   .0127885     1.26   0.206    -.0089095    .0412205 
       c_p_medlim |   .0013244   .0183622     0.07   0.943    -.0346648    .0373136 
       c_p_hsgrad |  -.0092063   .0124995    -0.74   0.461    -.0337049    .0152922 
      c_p_had_job |   .0067537   .0137444     0.49   0.623    -.0201848    .0336922 
 c_p_prob_drugalc |   .0292767    .029622     0.99   0.323    -.0287814    .0873347 
      c_p_prob_mh |   .0112291   .0142995     0.79   0.432    -.0167973    .0392555 
        c_p_usvet |  -.0058098   .0262986    -0.22   0.825    -.0573541    .0457346 
           c_p_iq |   .0000436   .0003905     0.11   0.911    -.0007218     .000809 
   c_18under_1arr |  -.0041787    .014421    -0.29   0.772    -.0324434     .024086 
            c_apv |   .0214736   .0245828     0.87   0.382    -.0267079     .069655 
           cp_age |  -.0049372    .001459    -3.38   0.001    -.0077968   -.0020776 
         cp_black |  -.0478443   .0311987    -1.53   0.125    -.1089926     .013304 
       cp_married |   .0211809   .0443584     0.48   0.633      -.06576    .1081219 
         cp_islam |   .0463427   .0412987     1.12   0.262    -.0346014    .1272867 
         cp_urban |    -.04499   .0380424    -1.18   0.237    -.1195518    .0295718 
       cp_maxsent |  -.0000294   .0001119    -0.26   0.792    -.0002488    .0001899 
      cp_pri_narr |   .0059156   .0026026     2.27   0.023     .0008146    .0110166 
      cp_cust_gt3 |   .0334401   .0339656     0.98   0.325    -.0331312    .1000114 
         cp_misAB |    .001043   .0348398     0.03   0.976    -.0672418    .0693278 
         cp_hadtc |  -.0124065    .074617    -0.17   0.868     -.158653    .1338401 
     cp_hasPriorI |   .0254003   .0467423     0.54   0.587    -.0662129    .1170135 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |   .0412739   .0404123     1.02   0.307    -.0379328    .1204805 
       cp_3charge |   .0175712   .0264073     0.67   0.506    -.0341862    .0693286 
      cp_p_medlim |  -.0066554   .0360727    -0.18   0.854    -.0773565    .0640458 
      cp_p_hsgrad |   .0056358   .0262106     0.22   0.830    -.0457361    .0570077 
     cp_p_had_job |  -.0125788   .0262036    -0.48   0.631    -.0639369    .0387793 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |   -.018185   .0502381    -0.36   0.717      -.11665    .0802799 
     cp_p_prob_mh |   -.020015   .0289788    -0.69   0.490    -.0768125    .0367825 
       cp_p_usvet |   .0537729   .0561897     0.96   0.339    -.0563569    .1639026 
          cp_p_iq |  -.0005251   .0008975    -0.59   0.559    -.0022842    .0012341 
  cp_18under_1arr |   -.018829   .0327969    -0.57   0.566    -.0831097    .0454518 
           cp_apv |  -.0287774   .0434242    -0.66   0.508    -.1138872    .0563324 
        stretches |  -.0147949   .0131912    -1.12   0.262    -.0406492    .0110593 
       r_time2rel |   .0000349   .0000457     0.76   0.445    -.0000547    .0001245 
       r_staytime |  -.0001614   .0000496    -3.26   0.001    -.0002586   -.0000643 
       tier_tt_fa |  -.0005816    .012994    -0.04   0.964    -.0260494    .0248862 
                k |   .0588032   .0225574     2.61   0.009     .0145915    .1030148 
            _cons |   1.085893   .1624543     6.68   0.000     .7674888    1.404298 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mills             | 
        rho1-rho0 |  -.0706936   .0326862    -2.16   0.031    -.1347574   -.0066298 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATE               | 
429 
 
       E(Y1-Y0)@X |    .049589   .0278762     1.78   0.075    -.0050474    .1042254 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(note: file mte_base_t120_posthas_postO.gph not found) 
(file mte_base_t120_posthas_postO.gph saved) 
(running parametric_polynomial on estimation sample) 
 
 
Bootstrap replications (50) 
----+--- 1 ---+--- 2 ---+--- 3 ---+--- 4 ---+--- 5  
..................................................    50 
 
Parametric Normal MTE Model                     Number of obs      =     10131 
Treatment Model: Probit                         Replications       =        50 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
        has_postO |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Treated           | 
      c_hasPriorI |   .0197721   .0191563     1.03   0.302    -.0177736    .0573178 
       r_pri_narr |   .0247302   .0023382    10.58   0.000     .0201474     .029313 
     rel_pri_narr |   .0005542   .0014756     0.38   0.707    -.0023379    .0034463 
            r_age |  -.0103803   .0007942   -13.07   0.000    -.0119369   -.0088238 
          r_black |   .0379552    .032569     1.17   0.244    -.0258788    .1017892 
        r_married |  -.0054734   .0203552    -0.27   0.788    -.0453688     .034422 
          r_islam |   .0630396   .0158207     3.98   0.000     .0320316    .0940476 
          r_urban |  -.0183435   .0171573    -1.07   0.285    -.0519711    .0152841 
        r_maxsent |  -.0002941    .000208    -1.41   0.157    -.0007017    .0001135 
       r_cust_gt3 |   .0595702   .0129285     4.61   0.000     .0342309    .0849096 
          r_misAB |   .0224455   .0156463     1.43   0.151    -.0082207    .0531117 
          r_hadtc |   .0821848   .0305674     2.69   0.007     .0222739    .1420957 
    r_ever_ac_sol |  -.0273724   .0163202    -1.68   0.094    -.0593593    .0046146 
        r_3charge |   .0161112   .0125396     1.28   0.199     -.008466    .0406884 
       r_p_medlim |  -.0195792   .0188875    -1.04   0.300     -.056598    .0174395 
       r_p_hsgrad |  -.0223388   .0148395    -1.51   0.132    -.0514237    .0067461 
      r_p_had_job |   .0278388   .0153562     1.81   0.070    -.0022587    .0579363 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |    .074864   .0241361     3.10   0.002      .027558    .1221699 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0655683   .0139152     4.71   0.000     .0382951    .0928415 
        r_p_usvet |  -.0458312   .0266592    -1.72   0.086    -.0980822    .0064198 
           r_p_iq |    .000117   .0005201     0.23   0.822    -.0009023    .0011363 
   r_18under_1arr |   .0202263   .0133312     1.52   0.129    -.0059025     .046355 
            c_age |  -.0007463   .0009684    -0.77   0.441    -.0026443    .0011517 
          c_black |  -.0004097   .0191957    -0.02   0.983    -.0380325    .0372132 
        c_married |  -.0280046   .0179257    -1.56   0.118    -.0631383    .0071291 
          c_islam |   .0039681   .0183436     0.22   0.829    -.0319846    .0399208 
          c_urban |   .0040567   .0178035     0.23   0.820    -.0308376     .038951 
        c_maxsent |   -.000083   .0000477    -1.74   0.082    -.0001764    .0000105 
       c_cust_gt3 |  -.0049778   .0153225    -0.32   0.745    -.0350094    .0250539 
          c_misAB |   .0150113   .0121271     1.24   0.216    -.0087574    .0387799 
          c_hadtc |  -.0688434   .0322224    -2.14   0.033    -.1319981   -.0056888 
    c_ever_ac_sol |   .0060523   .0158483     0.38   0.703    -.0250098    .0371144 
        c_3charge |   .0045035    .013519     0.33   0.739    -.0219934    .0310003 
       c_p_medlim |   .0031302   .0125119     0.25   0.802    -.0213926     .027653 
       c_p_hsgrad |   .0033663   .0135997     0.25   0.804    -.0232885    .0300212 
      c_p_had_job |   .0129231   .0111662     1.16   0.247    -.0089623    .0348085 
 c_p_prob_drugalc |   .0049674   .0223059     0.22   0.824    -.0387514    .0486862 
      c_p_prob_mh |   -.008147    .013617    -0.60   0.550    -.0348358    .0185417 
        c_p_usvet |   .0085347   .0266834     0.32   0.749    -.0437638    .0608332 
           c_p_iq |  -.0005863   .0005263    -1.11   0.265    -.0016178    .0004452 
   c_18under_1arr |   .0074408   .0144571     0.51   0.607    -.0208946    .0357762 
            c_apv |   .0010462   .0194875     0.05   0.957    -.0371487     .039241 
           cp_age |  -.0025036   .0017708    -1.41   0.157    -.0059743    .0009671 
         cp_black |   .0121477   .0365893     0.33   0.740    -.0595661    .0838614 
       cp_married |    -.01767   .0369462    -0.48   0.632    -.0900832    .0547432 
         cp_islam |   .0045475   .0431984     0.11   0.916    -.0801198    .0892149 
         cp_urban |  -.0239555   .0329766    -0.73   0.468    -.0885886    .0406775 
       cp_maxsent |   .0000621   .0001381     0.45   0.653    -.0002086    .0003328 
      cp_pri_narr |   .0005835   .0029629     0.20   0.844    -.0052237    .0063907 
      cp_cust_gt3 |   .0270523   .0316888     0.85   0.393    -.0350566    .0891612 
         cp_misAB |  -.0556844   .0283627    -1.96   0.050    -.1112743   -.0000945 
         cp_hadtc |  -.0840764   .0601711    -1.40   0.162    -.2020097    .0338568 
     cp_hasPriorI |  -.0609041   .0452579    -1.35   0.178    -.1496079    .0277997 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |   .0650047   .0364172     1.79   0.074    -.0063717    .1363811 
       cp_3charge |   .0522011   .0267933     1.95   0.051    -.0003128     .104715 
      cp_p_medlim |  -.0189416   .0342021    -0.55   0.580    -.0859765    .0480934 
      cp_p_hsgrad |  -.0066349   .0323022    -0.21   0.837     -.069946    .0566762 
     cp_p_had_job |  -.0288697   .0269508    -1.07   0.284    -.0816922    .0239528 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0295955   .0556243    -0.53   0.595    -.1386171    .0794262 
     cp_p_prob_mh |   .0173432   .0297655     0.58   0.560    -.0409961    .0756825 
       cp_p_usvet |  -.0447005   .0579513    -0.77   0.441    -.1582829     .068882 
          cp_p_iq |   .0005122   .0010526     0.49   0.627    -.0015509    .0025753 
  cp_18under_1arr |    .038444   .0306988     1.25   0.210    -.0217244    .0986125 
           cp_apv |   .0860577   .0446645     1.93   0.054    -.0014831    .1735985 
        stretches |  -.0023641   .0047538    -0.50   0.619    -.0116813    .0069531 
       r_time2rel |  -4.85e-06   .0000253    -0.19   0.848    -.0000544    .0000447 
       r_staytime |  -.0000268   .0000227    -1.18   0.238    -.0000713    .0000177 
       tier_tt_fa |   .0291265   .0138661     2.10   0.036     .0019493    .0563036 
                k |  -.0192882   .0222433    -0.87   0.386    -.0628843    .0243078 




Untreated         | 
      c_hasPriorI |   .0113426   .0181058     0.63   0.531    -.0241441    .0468292 
       r_pri_narr |   .0217393   .0018897    11.50   0.000     .0180355    .0254431 
     rel_pri_narr |   .0014826   .0009866     1.50   0.133    -.0004512    .0034163 
            r_age |  -.0107542   .0008134   -13.22   0.000    -.0123485   -.0091599 
          r_black |   .0445805   .0177195     2.52   0.012     .0098509    .0793101 
        r_married |  -.0455246   .0159413    -2.86   0.004    -.0767691   -.0142802 
          r_islam |   .0668409   .0180197     3.71   0.000      .031523    .1021588 
          r_urban |  -.0059986   .0116788    -0.51   0.608    -.0288887    .0168915 
        r_maxsent |  -.0002023   .0002808    -0.72   0.471    -.0007526     .000348 
       r_cust_gt3 |   .0073767   .0176303     0.42   0.676    -.0271781    .0419316 
          r_misAB |   .0499372   .0173869     2.87   0.004     .0158595    .0840148 
          r_hadtc |   .0074447   .0507299     0.15   0.883    -.0919839    .1068734 
    r_ever_ac_sol |   .0362879   .0238467     1.52   0.128    -.0104508    .0830267 
        r_3charge |   .0183699   .0104509     1.76   0.079    -.0021135    .0388533 
       r_p_medlim |  -.0026012   .0165239    -0.16   0.875    -.0349874     .029785 
       r_p_hsgrad |  -.0363005    .012697    -2.86   0.004     -.061186   -.0114149 
      r_p_had_job |   .0083503   .0157742     0.53   0.597    -.0225666    .0392672 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |   .0702238   .0215042     3.27   0.001     .0280763    .1123713 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0806649   .0117066     6.89   0.000     .0577204    .1036094 
        r_p_usvet |   .0082836   .0315405     0.26   0.793    -.0535346    .0701018 
           r_p_iq |   .0001896   .0004771     0.40   0.691    -.0007455    .0011248 
   r_18under_1arr |   .0292449   .0148591     1.97   0.049     .0001216    .0583683 
            c_age |  -.0015329   .0008449    -1.81   0.070    -.0031888     .000123 
          c_black |    .005883   .0144737     0.41   0.684    -.0224849    .0342509 
        c_married |   .0110465    .015265     0.72   0.469    -.0188724    .0409653 
          c_islam |  -.0139548   .0188518    -0.74   0.459    -.0509037    .0229941 
          c_urban |  -.0140189   .0153498    -0.91   0.361     -.044104    .0160663 
        c_maxsent |  -.0000378   .0000478    -0.79   0.429    -.0001315    .0000559 
       c_cust_gt3 |   .0041774   .0147865     0.28   0.778    -.0248038    .0331585 
          c_misAB |  -.0088394   .0128135    -0.69   0.490    -.0339534    .0162745 
          c_hadtc |   .0276134   .0336532     0.82   0.412    -.0383458    .0935725 
    c_ever_ac_sol |   .0373025   .0150086     2.49   0.013     .0078863    .0667188 
        c_3charge |   .0161173   .0114457     1.41   0.159    -.0063158    .0385505 
       c_p_medlim |  -.0016163   .0163297    -0.10   0.921    -.0336218    .0303892 
       c_p_hsgrad |  -.0050154   .0106617    -0.47   0.638    -.0259118    .0158811 
      c_p_had_job |   .0008905   .0140502     0.06   0.949    -.0266474    .0284284 
 c_p_prob_drugalc |   .0299444   .0256051     1.17   0.242    -.0202407    .0801294 
      c_p_prob_mh |   .0064308   .0130221     0.49   0.621    -.0190921    .0319537 
        c_p_usvet |  -.0007046     .02922    -0.02   0.981    -.0579748    .0565655 
           c_p_iq |   -.000128   .0004193    -0.31   0.760    -.0009499    .0006938 
   c_18under_1arr |   .0043953   .0142605     0.31   0.758    -.0235548    .0323453 
            c_apv |   .0134572   .0233852     0.58   0.565    -.0323769    .0592913 
           cp_age |  -.0045538    .001391    -3.27   0.001    -.0072801   -.0018274 
         cp_black |  -.0288782   .0275513    -1.05   0.295    -.0828778    .0251214 
       cp_married |  -.0048587   .0427632    -0.11   0.910    -.0886731    .0789556 
         cp_islam |   .0364485   .0375146     0.97   0.331    -.0370788    .1099759 
         cp_urban |  -.0355324   .0271677    -1.31   0.191    -.0887802    .0177153 
       cp_maxsent |  -2.05e-06   .0000982    -0.02   0.983    -.0001945    .0001904 
      cp_pri_narr |   .0045614   .0024717     1.85   0.065    -.0002831    .0094059 
      cp_cust_gt3 |   .0527475   .0257603     2.05   0.041     .0022584    .1032367 
         cp_misAB |   .0150165   .0273912     0.55   0.584    -.0386693    .0687023 
         cp_hadtc |  -.0075125    .082215    -0.09   0.927    -.1686509    .1536259 
     cp_hasPriorI |   .0381792   .0418933     0.91   0.362    -.0439302    .1202885 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |   .0161398   .0367901     0.44   0.661    -.0559674    .0882471 
       cp_3charge |   .0075951    .026504     0.29   0.774    -.0443519     .059542 
      cp_p_medlim |  -.0108772   .0287055    -0.38   0.705    -.0671389    .0453845 
      cp_p_hsgrad |   .0062246   .0281449     0.22   0.825    -.0489384    .0613875 
     cp_p_had_job |   .0143696   .0274029     0.52   0.600    -.0393391    .0680783 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0258225   .0357487    -0.72   0.470    -.0958887    .0442437 
     cp_p_prob_mh |  -.0237511   .0253485    -0.94   0.349    -.0734333    .0259311 
       cp_p_usvet |    .022985   .0531394     0.43   0.665    -.0811663    .1271363 
          cp_p_iq |  -.0005397   .0008617    -0.63   0.531    -.0022285    .0011492 
  cp_18under_1arr |  -.0219095    .023556    -0.93   0.352    -.0680784    .0242595 
           cp_apv |  -.0241348   .0467696    -0.52   0.606    -.1158015    .0675319 
        stretches |  -.0164875   .0090765    -1.82   0.069    -.0342772    .0013022 
       r_time2rel |   .0000164   .0000375     0.44   0.663    -.0000571    .0000899 
       r_staytime |  -.0001451   .0000403    -3.60   0.000     -.000224   -.0000662 
       tier_tt_fa |   .0016745    .012601     0.13   0.894     -.023023     .026372 
                k |   .0518221   .0234131     2.21   0.027     .0059332     .097711 
            _cons |   1.063632   .1197695     8.88   0.000     .8288878    1.298376 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mills             | 
        rho1-rho0 |  -.0711104   .0343873    -2.07   0.039    -.1385083   -.0037124 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATE               | 
       E(Y1-Y0)@X |   .0220948   .0223642     0.99   0.323    -.0217383    .0659278 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(note: file mte_base_t150_posthas_postO.gph not found) 
(file mte_base_t150_posthas_postO.gph saved) 
(running parametric_polynomial on estimation sample) 
 
 
Bootstrap replications (50) 
----+--- 1 ---+--- 2 ---+--- 3 ---+--- 4 ---+--- 5  
..................................................    50 
 
Parametric Normal MTE Model                     Number of obs      =     10131 




                  |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
        has_postO |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Treated           | 
      c_hasPriorI |   .0108157   .0216769     0.50   0.618    -.0316703    .0533018 
       r_pri_narr |   .0247764    .002039    12.15   0.000       .02078    .0287728 
     rel_pri_narr |   .0006924   .0013606     0.51   0.611    -.0019743     .003359 
            r_age |   -.010586   .0011889    -8.90   0.000    -.0129163   -.0082558 
          r_black |   .0360348   .0361524     1.00   0.319    -.0348226    .1068922 
        r_married |   -.019848   .0227702    -0.87   0.383    -.0644766    .0247807 
          r_islam |   .0606079   .0190742     3.18   0.001     .0232232    .0979926 
          r_urban |  -.0173727   .0173367    -1.00   0.316    -.0513519    .0166066 
        r_maxsent |  -.0004315    .000204    -2.11   0.034    -.0008314   -.0000316 
       r_cust_gt3 |    .071822   .0134744     5.33   0.000     .0454127    .0982314 
          r_misAB |    .022952   .0150604     1.52   0.128    -.0065659    .0524699 
          r_hadtc |   .0799068   .0298309     2.68   0.007     .0214394    .1383743 
    r_ever_ac_sol |  -.0105353   .0220879    -0.48   0.633    -.0538268    .0327562 
        r_3charge |   .0294607   .0111979     2.63   0.009     .0075132    .0514082 
       r_p_medlim |  -.0108748   .0183744    -0.59   0.554     -.046888    .0251384 
       r_p_hsgrad |  -.0292302   .0129631    -2.25   0.024    -.0546374    -.003823 
      r_p_had_job |   .0333395   .0115972     2.87   0.004     .0106094    .0560696 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |   .0563299   .0213527     2.64   0.008     .0144794    .0981804 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0619451   .0155133     3.99   0.000     .0315396    .0923505 
        r_p_usvet |  -.0308302    .039049    -0.79   0.430     -.107365    .0457045 
           r_p_iq |  -.0001002   .0005633    -0.18   0.859    -.0012043    .0010038 
   r_18under_1arr |   .0241809   .0191607     1.26   0.207    -.0133734    .0617353 
            c_age |  -.0012514   .0009725    -1.29   0.198    -.0031573    .0006546 
          c_black |  -.0057967   .0234365    -0.25   0.805    -.0517313     .040138 
        c_married |  -.0301195   .0180684    -1.67   0.096     -.065533    .0052939 
          c_islam |  -.0074523   .0218408    -0.34   0.733    -.0502596     .035355 
          c_urban |   .0212824   .0213361     1.00   0.319    -.0205356    .0631004 
        c_maxsent |  -.0000448   .0000437    -1.03   0.305    -.0001304    .0000408 
       c_cust_gt3 |  -.0024862   .0195888    -0.13   0.899    -.0408795    .0359072 
          c_misAB |   .0114367   .0160969     0.71   0.477    -.0201127     .042986 
          c_hadtc |  -.0654552   .0252612    -2.59   0.010    -.1149663   -.0159442 
    c_ever_ac_sol |  -.0021939   .0161508    -0.14   0.892    -.0338489     .029461 
        c_3charge |   .0086205   .0141826     0.61   0.543    -.0191768    .0364179 
       c_p_medlim |  -.0033722   .0169537    -0.20   0.842    -.0366008    .0298564 
       c_p_hsgrad |  -.0007488    .014013    -0.05   0.957    -.0282137    .0267161 
      c_p_had_job |   .0119441   .0144765     0.83   0.409    -.0164294    .0403175 
 c_p_prob_drugalc |   .0109092   .0253548     0.43   0.667    -.0387853    .0606037 
      c_p_prob_mh |  -.0014587   .0148294    -0.10   0.922    -.0305237    .0276063 
        c_p_usvet |   .0067105   .0301108     0.22   0.824    -.0523055    .0657266 
           c_p_iq |  -.0004492   .0005696    -0.79   0.430    -.0015655    .0006672 
   c_18under_1arr |   -.000579     .01651    -0.04   0.972    -.0329379      .03178 
            c_apv |   .0103799   .0269367     0.39   0.700    -.0424151    .0631749 
           cp_age |  -.0026818   .0021984    -1.22   0.223    -.0069906     .001627 
         cp_black |   .0141047   .0437301     0.32   0.747    -.0716046    .0998141 
       cp_married |  -.0435488    .048239    -0.90   0.367    -.1380956     .050998 
         cp_islam |   .0214172   .0376728     0.57   0.570    -.0524202    .0952546 
         cp_urban |  -.0281262   .0357388    -0.79   0.431    -.0981729    .0419206 
       cp_maxsent |   .0001765    .000113     1.56   0.118    -.0000449    .0003979 
      cp_pri_narr |    .000702   .0036801     0.19   0.849    -.0065108    .0079148 
      cp_cust_gt3 |   .0270049    .027104     1.00   0.319     -.026118    .0801278 
         cp_misAB |   -.049903   .0324757    -1.54   0.124    -.1135541    .0137482 
         cp_hadtc |   -.081423    .065791    -1.24   0.216    -.2103709    .0475249 
     cp_hasPriorI |  -.0425534   .0484137    -0.88   0.379    -.1374424    .0523357 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |   .0369627   .0435852     0.85   0.396    -.0484627    .1223881 
       cp_3charge |   .0435059   .0323818     1.34   0.179    -.0199613    .1069732 
      cp_p_medlim |  -.0251009   .0386854    -0.65   0.516    -.1009228     .050721 
      cp_p_hsgrad |   .0074501    .033595     0.22   0.824    -.0583949    .0732952 
     cp_p_had_job |  -.0144203   .0378801    -0.38   0.703    -.0886639    .0598233 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0415575   .0627245    -0.66   0.508    -.1644953    .0813803 
     cp_p_prob_mh |   .0253484   .0337422     0.75   0.453    -.0407851    .0914819 
       cp_p_usvet |   .0223245   .0715762     0.31   0.755    -.1179623    .1626114 
          cp_p_iq |  -.0002897   .0011242    -0.26   0.797    -.0024931    .0019137 
  cp_18under_1arr |   .0385666   .0421438     0.92   0.360    -.0440337    .1211669 
           cp_apv |   .0636163   .0626196     1.02   0.310    -.0591159    .1863485 
        stretches |  -.0047941   .0054214    -0.88   0.377      -.01542    .0058317 
       r_time2rel |  -7.02e-06   .0000273    -0.26   0.797    -.0000606    .0000466 
       r_staytime |  -.0000182   .0000321    -0.57   0.571     -.000081    .0000447 
       tier_tt_fa |   .0358282   .0150902     2.37   0.018      .006252    .0654043 
                k |  -.0204386   .0280529    -0.73   0.466    -.0754212     .034544 
            _cons |   .9163652   .1814131     5.05   0.000     .5608021    1.271928 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Untreated         | 
      c_hasPriorI |   .0196808   .0177089     1.11   0.266     -.015028    .0543896 
       r_pri_narr |    .022381   .0016595    13.49   0.000     .0191284    .0256336 
     rel_pri_narr |   .0013911   .0009356     1.49   0.137    -.0004426    .0032249 
            r_age |  -.0105712   .0007958   -13.28   0.000     -.012131   -.0090114 
          r_black |   .0460923   .0157392     2.93   0.003      .015244    .0769406 
        r_married |  -.0287232   .0161251    -1.78   0.075    -.0603278    .0028815 
          r_islam |   .0685354   .0158357     4.33   0.000      .037498    .0995728 
          r_urban |  -.0103035   .0156159    -0.66   0.509      -.04091    .0203031 
        r_maxsent |  -.0000585   .0002219    -0.26   0.792    -.0004935    .0003764 
       r_cust_gt3 |   .0099027   .0143866     0.69   0.491    -.0182945    .0380998 
          r_misAB |   .0399674   .0118399     3.38   0.001     .0167617    .0631731 
          r_hadtc |   .0226415   .0376164     0.60   0.547    -.0510853    .0963683 
432 
 
    r_ever_ac_sol |   .0119195    .025889     0.46   0.645    -.0388219     .062661 
        r_3charge |   .0079274   .0101938     0.78   0.437    -.0120521     .027907 
       r_p_medlim |  -.0105481   .0145145    -0.73   0.467    -.0389959    .0178998 
       r_p_hsgrad |  -.0297967   .0133626    -2.23   0.026    -.0559869   -.0036066 
      r_p_had_job |   .0101188   .0134161     0.75   0.451    -.0161763    .0364138 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |   .0853939   .0224952     3.80   0.000     .0413041    .1294836 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0819671   .0113024     7.25   0.000     .0598148    .1041195 
        r_p_usvet |  -.0096983   .0255776    -0.38   0.705    -.0598294    .0404328 
           r_p_iq |   .0002963   .0004244     0.70   0.485    -.0005356    .0011282 
   r_18under_1arr |   .0268935   .0127653     2.11   0.035     .0018739    .0519132 
            c_age |  -.0011728    .000964    -1.22   0.224    -.0030623    .0007166 
          c_black |   .0073072   .0168386     0.43   0.664    -.0256958    .0403101 
        c_married |   .0067554   .0167777     0.40   0.687    -.0261283     .039639 
          c_islam |  -.0028416   .0186002    -0.15   0.879    -.0392974    .0336142 
          c_urban |  -.0218409   .0127103    -1.72   0.086    -.0467527    .0030708 
        c_maxsent |  -.0000766   .0000373    -2.05   0.040    -.0001498   -3.51e-06 
       c_cust_gt3 |   .0035786   .0172276     0.21   0.835    -.0301868    .0373441 
          c_misAB |  -.0021286   .0145156    -0.15   0.883    -.0305787    .0263215 
          c_hadtc |   .0015505   .0258181     0.06   0.952     -.049052     .052153 
    c_ever_ac_sol |   .0390075   .0165269     2.36   0.018     .0066153    .0713996 
        c_3charge |   .0112577   .0129992     0.87   0.386    -.0142202    .0367355 
       c_p_medlim |   .0044459   .0149019     0.30   0.765    -.0247613    .0336531 
       c_p_hsgrad |   .0009632   .0109864     0.09   0.930    -.0205698    .0224961 
      c_p_had_job |   .0024786   .0119664     0.21   0.836    -.0209751    .0259324 
 c_p_prob_drugalc |   .0224507   .0212751     1.06   0.291    -.0192478    .0641492 
      c_p_prob_mh |  -.0014173   .0096555    -0.15   0.883    -.0203418    .0175072 
        c_p_usvet |   .0003401   .0231345     0.01   0.988    -.0450027    .0456829 
           c_p_iq |  -.0003073   .0004208    -0.73   0.465     -.001132    .0005175 
   c_18under_1arr |   .0104988   .0124993     0.84   0.401    -.0139994     .034997 
            c_apv |    .000807   .0211642     0.04   0.970     -.040674     .042288 
           cp_age |  -.0042752   .0012948    -3.30   0.001     -.006813   -.0017374 
         cp_black |   -.025161   .0266248    -0.95   0.345    -.0773447    .0270226 
       cp_married |   .0010526   .0355489     0.03   0.976    -.0686219    .0707271 
         cp_islam |   .0214639   .0314284     0.68   0.495    -.0401346    .0830625 
         cp_urban |  -.0331903   .0247705    -1.34   0.180    -.0817395    .0153589 
       cp_maxsent |  -.0000506   .0000799    -0.63   0.526    -.0002072    .0001059 
      cp_pri_narr |    .004105    .002482     1.65   0.098    -.0007596    .0089697 
      cp_cust_gt3 |   .0475392   .0278456     1.71   0.088    -.0070371    .1021156 
         cp_misAB |  -.0036992   .0298389    -0.12   0.901    -.0621824     .054784 
         cp_hadtc |  -.0102188   .0714982    -0.14   0.886    -.1503526     .129915 
     cp_hasPriorI |   .0163448   .0369013     0.44   0.658    -.0559804      .08867 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |   .0410025   .0376289     1.09   0.276    -.0327488    .1147537 
       cp_3charge |   .0179831      .0234     0.77   0.442      -.02788    .0638462 
      cp_p_medlim |  -.0072755   .0317389    -0.23   0.819    -.0694826    .0549315 
      cp_p_hsgrad |    -.00213   .0261062    -0.08   0.935    -.0532973    .0490374 
     cp_p_had_job |   .0044091      .0231     0.19   0.849     -.040866    .0496842 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0169437   .0388412    -0.44   0.663    -.0930711    .0591837 
     cp_p_prob_mh |  -.0238095   .0245162    -0.97   0.331    -.0718604    .0242414 
       cp_p_usvet |  -.0136945    .048127    -0.28   0.776    -.1080216    .0806326 
          cp_p_iq |  -.0000588   .0007943    -0.07   0.941    -.0016155     .001498 
  cp_18under_1arr |  -.0111029   .0299644    -0.37   0.711     -.069832    .0476263 
           cp_apv |   .0038427   .0342001     0.11   0.911    -.0631884    .0708737 
        stretches |   -.010316   .0094718    -1.09   0.276    -.0288804    .0082483 
       r_time2rel |   .0000205   .0000274     0.75   0.455    -.0000332    .0000742 
       r_staytime |  -.0001498   .0000343    -4.37   0.000    -.0002169   -.0000827 
       tier_tt_fa |   .0003714   .0112196     0.03   0.974    -.0216185    .0223614 
                k |   .0852891   .0245061     3.48   0.001      .037258    .1333201 
            _cons |   .9831518    .120606     8.15   0.000     .7467684    1.219535 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mills             | 
        rho1-rho0 |  -.1057277   .0370873    -2.85   0.004    -.1784175   -.0330378 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATE               | 
       E(Y1-Y0)@X |   .0116342   .0331378     0.35   0.726    -.0533148    .0765832 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(note: file mte_base_t180_posthas_postO.gph not found) 
(file mte_base_t180_posthas_postO.gph saved) 




Outcome Model #2: An example of margte Output for Rearrest. 
 
Bootstrap replications (50) 
----+--- 1 ---+--- 2 ---+--- 3 ---+--- 4 ---+--- 5  
..................................................    50 
 
Parametric Normal MTE Model                     Number of obs      =     10131 
Treatment Model: Probit                         Replications       =        50 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
        has_postA |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Treated           | 
      c_hasPriorI |   .0400399   .0167251     2.39   0.017     .0072593    .0728205 
       r_pri_narr |   .0188266    .002113     8.91   0.000     .0146851    .0229681 
433 
 
     rel_pri_narr |   .0011789   .0012844     0.92   0.359    -.0013385    .0036963 
           r_rsth |   .0488856   .0131328     3.72   0.000     .0231458    .0746254 
         rel_rsth |  -.0059561   .0080598    -0.74   0.460    -.0217531    .0098409 
            r_age |  -.0075354   .0010447    -7.21   0.000    -.0095831   -.0054878 
          r_black |   .0380513   .0257053     1.48   0.139    -.0123301    .0884327 
        r_married |  -.0130539   .0152661    -0.86   0.393    -.0429748    .0168671 
          r_islam |   .0596777   .0183198     3.26   0.001     .0237715     .095584 
          r_urban |   .0286392   .0170432     1.68   0.093    -.0047648    .0620432 
        r_maxsent |  -.0012248    .000224    -5.47   0.000    -.0016638   -.0007859 
       r_cust_gt3 |   .0451404     .01162     3.88   0.000     .0223657    .0679152 
          r_misAB |  -.0181033   .0201893    -0.90   0.370    -.0576735    .0214669 
          r_hadtc |   .0329205   .0299923     1.10   0.272    -.0258632    .0917043 
    r_ever_ac_sol |  -.0008435   .0140028    -0.06   0.952    -.0282886    .0266015 
        r_3charge |   .0251724   .0130111     1.93   0.053    -.0003288    .0506736 
       r_p_medlim |   -.011244   .0132779    -0.85   0.397    -.0372682    .0147801 
       r_p_hsgrad |  -.0712275   .0176825    -4.03   0.000    -.1058845   -.0365706 
      r_p_had_job |    .070457   .0112373     6.27   0.000     .0484322    .0924818 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |   .0061062   .0250834     0.24   0.808    -.0430564    .0552687 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0223287      .0162     1.38   0.168    -.0094227    .0540801 
        r_p_usvet |  -.0155208   .0259291    -0.60   0.549    -.0663409    .0352994 
           r_p_iq |   .0002172   .0004855     0.45   0.655    -.0007345    .0011688 
   r_18under_1arr |  -.0227561   .0192407    -1.18   0.237    -.0604671    .0149549 
            c_age |  -.0016257   .0009497    -1.71   0.087    -.0034871    .0002358 
          c_black |   .0058662   .0200607     0.29   0.770    -.0334521    .0451845 
        c_married |  -.0158674   .0141582    -1.12   0.262     -.043617    .0118821 
          c_islam |   .0102872   .0180225     0.57   0.568    -.0250361    .0456106 
          c_urban |   .0021541   .0153866     0.14   0.889    -.0280031    .0323113 
        c_maxsent |  -.0001003    .000037    -2.71   0.007    -.0001728   -.0000277 
       c_cust_gt3 |  -.0165531   .0138883    -1.19   0.233    -.0437737    .0106674 
          c_misAB |   .0129754   .0148504     0.87   0.382    -.0161308    .0420817 
          c_hadtc |  -.0381337   .0255305    -1.49   0.135    -.0881725    .0119051 
    c_ever_ac_sol |   .0076457    .015398     0.50   0.620    -.0225338    .0378252 
        c_3charge |    -.00669   .0132386    -0.51   0.613    -.0326371    .0192571 
       c_p_medlim |   .0094511   .0148872     0.63   0.526    -.0197272    .0386294 
       c_p_hsgrad |  -.0056242   .0142567    -0.39   0.693    -.0335668    .0223184 
      c_p_had_job |   .0184381   .0115373     1.60   0.110    -.0041746    .0410508 
 c_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0127345   .0231609    -0.55   0.582    -.0581291    .0326602 
      c_p_prob_mh |  -.0191035   .0128958    -1.48   0.139    -.0443787    .0061717 
        c_p_usvet |  -.0060468   .0291397    -0.21   0.836    -.0631596    .0510659 
           c_p_iq |  -.0001442   .0003178    -0.45   0.650    -.0007671    .0004788 
   c_18under_1arr |   .0228437   .0176101     1.30   0.195    -.0116713    .0573588 
            c_apv |   .0090545   .0221667     0.41   0.683    -.0343915    .0525005 
           cp_age |  -.0027018   .0020853    -1.30   0.195    -.0067889    .0013854 
         cp_black |    .024351    .031521     0.77   0.440     -.037429     .086131 
       cp_married |  -.0416081   .0411238    -1.01   0.312    -.1222093    .0389931 
         cp_islam |   .0440427   .0329599     1.34   0.181    -.0205575     .108643 
         cp_urban |  -.0412991   .0333216    -1.24   0.215    -.1066082    .0240099 
       cp_maxsent |   .0001481   .0000784     1.89   0.059    -5.48e-06    .0003018 
      cp_pri_narr |   .0015291   .0035947     0.43   0.671    -.0055164    .0085747 
      cp_cust_gt3 |   .0001219   .0258164     0.00   0.996    -.0504773    .0507212 
         cp_misAB |  -.0075061   .0395972    -0.19   0.850    -.0851151     .070103 
         cp_hadtc |   -.022441    .057505    -0.39   0.696    -.1351487    .0902667 
     cp_hasPriorI |  -.0514832   .0440713    -1.17   0.243    -.1378613     .034895 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |    .060427   .0316739     1.91   0.056    -.0016528    .1225068 
       cp_3charge |   .0217124   .0248583     0.87   0.382     -.027009    .0704339 
          cp_rsth |  -.0299539   .0227345    -1.32   0.188    -.0745127    .0146049 
      cp_p_medlim |  -.0129214   .0357182    -0.36   0.718    -.0829278    .0570849 
      cp_p_hsgrad |   .0054602    .032959     0.17   0.868    -.0591383    .0700587 
     cp_p_had_job |  -.0204683   .0268545    -0.76   0.446    -.0731022    .0321656 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |   .0068152    .051547     0.13   0.895    -.0942151    .1078455 
     cp_p_prob_mh |   .0412048   .0268398     1.54   0.125    -.0114002    .0938098 
       cp_p_usvet |  -.0310338   .0494709    -0.63   0.530    -.1279949    .0659273 
          cp_p_iq |  -.0001542   .0009359    -0.16   0.869    -.0019885    .0016801 
  cp_18under_1arr |   .0831892   .0423753     1.96   0.050     .0001351    .1662433 
           cp_apv |   .1106539   .0423608     2.61   0.009     .0276283    .1936796 
        stretches |   .0021766   .0046157     0.47   0.637    -.0068701    .0112232 
       r_time2rel |   .0000263   .0000205     1.28   0.199    -.0000138    .0000664 
       r_staytime |  -.0000179   .0000251    -0.71   0.476     -.000067    .0000313 
       tier_tt_fa |   .0348688   .0119196     2.93   0.003     .0115067    .0582308 
                k |  -.0424946   .0249288    -1.70   0.088    -.0913541     .006365 
            _cons |    .703168   .1469881     4.78   0.000     .4150767    .9912594 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Untreated         | 
      c_hasPriorI |   .0066657   .0184975     0.36   0.719    -.0295887      .04292 
       r_pri_narr |   .0130008    .002525     5.15   0.000     .0080519    .0179496 
     rel_pri_narr |   .0007007    .001863     0.38   0.707    -.0029507    .0043521 
           r_rsth |   .0879721   .0152637     5.76   0.000     .0580558    .1178884 
         rel_rsth |  -.0038152   .0125222    -0.30   0.761    -.0283582    .0207278 
            r_age |   -.005544   .0009891    -5.61   0.000    -.0074825   -.0036054 
          r_black |   .0641104   .0191034     3.36   0.001     .0266683    .1015524 
        r_married |   -.039878   .0141823    -2.81   0.005    -.0676749   -.0120812 
          r_islam |   .0617002   .0193468     3.19   0.001     .0237812    .0996192 
          r_urban |   .0351453   .0173799     2.02   0.043     .0010814    .0692092 
        r_maxsent |   -.001702   .0003207    -5.31   0.000    -.0023305   -.0010735 
       r_cust_gt3 |   .0053009   .0217177     0.24   0.807    -.0372651    .0478669 
          r_misAB |  -.0480064   .0295923    -1.62   0.105    -.1060062    .0099935 
          r_hadtc |  -.0400989   .0551198    -0.73   0.467    -.1481317    .0679339 
    r_ever_ac_sol |   .0209035   .0302681     0.69   0.490    -.0384209    .0802279 
        r_3charge |   .0101194   .0148793     0.68   0.496    -.0190435    .0392823 
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       r_p_medlim |  -.0014679   .0200208    -0.07   0.942     -.040708    .0377722 
       r_p_hsgrad |  -.1222971   .0213131    -5.74   0.000      -.16407   -.0805242 
      r_p_had_job |   .0711259    .015135     4.70   0.000     .0414618    .1007899 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0296923    .024442    -1.21   0.224    -.0775977    .0182132 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0558105   .0143361     3.89   0.000     .0277123    .0839086 
        r_p_usvet |   -.029062   .0273181    -1.06   0.287    -.0826044    .0244805 
           r_p_iq |   .0001782   .0005341     0.33   0.739    -.0008686    .0012251 
   r_18under_1arr |  -.0569841   .0243568    -2.34   0.019    -.1047225   -.0092458 
            c_age |  -.0011978    .001122    -1.07   0.286    -.0033968    .0010013 
          c_black |  -.0144847   .0194156    -0.75   0.456    -.0525385    .0235692 
        c_married |   .0074342   .0201067     0.37   0.712    -.0319742    .0468426 
          c_islam |  -.0089664   .0187548    -0.48   0.633    -.0457252    .0277923 
          c_urban |  -.0164796   .0162783    -1.01   0.311    -.0483844    .0154253 
        c_maxsent |  -.0000664   .0000442    -1.50   0.133     -.000153    .0000203 
       c_cust_gt3 |   .0248231   .0189727     1.31   0.191    -.0123627    .0620089 
          c_misAB |   -.005036   .0220416    -0.23   0.819    -.0482368    .0381648 
          c_hadtc |   .0650106   .0306827     2.12   0.034     .0048737    .1251476 
    c_ever_ac_sol |   .0061112   .0207884     0.29   0.769    -.0346332    .0468556 
        c_3charge |   .0062643   .0116233     0.54   0.590     -.016517    .0290455 
       c_p_medlim |  -.0072966    .014364    -0.51   0.611    -.0354494    .0208563 
       c_p_hsgrad |   .0014066    .019476     0.07   0.942    -.0367657    .0395788 
      c_p_had_job |   .0120584   .0112666     1.07   0.284    -.0100237    .0341404 
 c_p_prob_drugalc |   .0462062   .0291188     1.59   0.113    -.0108656    .1032781 
      c_p_prob_mh |   .0137673   .0133008     1.04   0.301    -.0123018    .0398365 
        c_p_usvet |  -.0172207   .0315036    -0.55   0.585    -.0789666    .0445253 
           c_p_iq |   -.000568   .0004658    -1.22   0.223     -.001481     .000345 
   c_18under_1arr |   .0078227   .0178711     0.44   0.662     -.027204    .0428494 
            c_apv |   .0255369   .0302742     0.84   0.399    -.0337995    .0848732 
           cp_age |  -.0033261   .0021806    -1.53   0.127    -.0075999    .0009477 
         cp_black |  -.0590957   .0344487    -1.72   0.086    -.1266139    .0084224 
       cp_married |   .0721884   .0382301     1.89   0.059    -.0027412     .147118 
         cp_islam |   .0834001   .0429928     1.94   0.052    -.0008642    .1676645 
         cp_urban |  -.0132546   .0323847    -0.41   0.682    -.0767274    .0502183 
       cp_maxsent |  -.0000525   .0000995    -0.53   0.598    -.0002474    .0001425 
      cp_pri_narr |   .0019992    .003525     0.57   0.571    -.0049097     .008908 
      cp_cust_gt3 |    .020162   .0330307     0.61   0.542     -.044577     .084901 
         cp_misAB |  -.0335355   .0438997    -0.76   0.445    -.1195774    .0525063 
         cp_hadtc |  -.0090752   .0719343    -0.13   0.900    -.1500639    .1319135 
     cp_hasPriorI |     .04683   .0445215     1.05   0.293    -.0404306    .1340906 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |    .029276    .037529     0.78   0.435    -.0442795    .1028315 
       cp_3charge |  -.0141465   .0270505    -0.52   0.601    -.0671644    .0388715 
          cp_rsth |   .0397237   .0233744     1.70   0.089    -.0060893    .0855367 
      cp_p_medlim |  -.0198551   .0337222    -0.59   0.556    -.0859494    .0462392 
      cp_p_hsgrad |  -.0522645   .0352329    -1.48   0.138    -.1213198    .0167908 
     cp_p_had_job |  -.0191777   .0253153    -0.76   0.449    -.0687947    .0304393 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0471125   .0480469    -0.98   0.327    -.1412827    .0470577 
     cp_p_prob_mh |  -.0128689   .0263183    -0.49   0.625    -.0644519     .038714 
       cp_p_usvet |    .057688   .0504576     1.14   0.253    -.0412071    .1565831 
          cp_p_iq |    -.00033    .000958    -0.34   0.731    -.0022076    .0015476 
  cp_18under_1arr |  -.0799762   .0402527    -1.99   0.047      -.15887   -.0010824 
           cp_apv |  -.1067122   .0489691    -2.18   0.029    -.2026898   -.0107345 
        stretches |  -.0142943   .0125304    -1.14   0.254    -.0388535    .0102648 
       r_time2rel |   .0000638   .0000464     1.37   0.169    -.0000272    .0001548 
       r_staytime |  -.0000943   .0000484    -1.95   0.052    -.0001892    6.33e-07 
       tier_tt_fa |   .0105585   .0135954     0.78   0.437     -.016088    .0372051 
                k |   .0379571    .017845     2.13   0.033     .0029815    .0729327 
            _cons |   .5563183   .1747941     3.18   0.001      .213728    .8989085 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mills             | 
        rho1-rho0 |  -.0804516   .0293228    -2.74   0.006    -.1379234   -.0229799 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATE               | 
       E(Y1-Y0)@X |   .0190386   .0263585     0.72   0.470    -.0326231    .0707003 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(note: file mte_base_t120_has_postA.gph not found) 
(file mte_base_t120_has_postA.gph saved) 
(running parametric_polynomial on estimation sample) 
 
 
Bootstrap replications (50) 
----+--- 1 ---+--- 2 ---+--- 3 ---+--- 4 ---+--- 5  
..................................................    50 
 
Parametric Normal MTE Model                     Number of obs      =     10131 
Treatment Model: Probit                         Replications       =        50 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
        has_postA |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Treated           | 
      c_hasPriorI |   .0377682   .0224955     1.68   0.093    -.0063221    .0818585 
       r_pri_narr |   .0187364   .0028617     6.55   0.000     .0131276    .0243452 
     rel_pri_narr |   .0014709   .0013543     1.09   0.277    -.0011835    .0041254 
           r_rsth |   .0492776   .0152942     3.22   0.001     .0193015    .0792537 
         rel_rsth |  -.0124301   .0104291    -1.19   0.233    -.0328708    .0080106 
            r_age |  -.0068288   .0010147    -6.73   0.000    -.0088177   -.0048399 
          r_black |   .0375897    .028969     1.30   0.194    -.0191884    .0943678 
        r_married |   .0071042   .0202839     0.35   0.726    -.0326516    .0468599 
          r_islam |    .056257   .0178503     3.15   0.002     .0212711    .0912429 
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          r_urban |   .0296911   .0178826     1.66   0.097    -.0053582    .0647405 
        r_maxsent |   -.001259   .0001924    -6.54   0.000     -.001636   -.0008819 
       r_cust_gt3 |   .0502732   .0189288     2.66   0.008     .0131735    .0873729 
          r_misAB |  -.0207296   .0187902    -1.10   0.270    -.0575576    .0160985 
          r_hadtc |    .039427   .0275502     1.43   0.152    -.0145705    .0934244 
    r_ever_ac_sol |  -.0155058   .0182754    -0.85   0.396     -.051325    .0203134 
        r_3charge |   .0266802   .0112016     2.38   0.017     .0047255    .0486349 
       r_p_medlim |  -.0109953   .0175043    -0.63   0.530    -.0453032    .0233126 
       r_p_hsgrad |  -.0741633   .0178275    -4.16   0.000    -.1091046    -.039222 
      r_p_had_job |   .0685404   .0137024     5.00   0.000     .0416842    .0953966 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |    .007719   .0258653     0.30   0.765     -.042976     .058414 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0221179   .0159032     1.39   0.164    -.0090518    .0532877 
        r_p_usvet |  -.0388726   .0294711    -1.32   0.187    -.0966349    .0188898 
           r_p_iq |  -.0000319    .000563    -0.06   0.955    -.0011353    .0010716 
   r_18under_1arr |  -.0341396   .0214931    -1.59   0.112    -.0762652     .007986 
            c_age |  -.0023487   .0010157    -2.31   0.021    -.0043395   -.0003579 
          c_black |  -.0056958   .0193437    -0.29   0.768    -.0436086    .0322171 
        c_married |  -.0299687   .0198632    -1.51   0.131    -.0688998    .0089624 
          c_islam |   .0236229   .0151897     1.56   0.120    -.0061483    .0533941 
          c_urban |   .0125471   .0171633     0.73   0.465    -.0210924    .0461866 
        c_maxsent |  -.0001002   .0000454    -2.21   0.027    -.0001891   -.0000113 
       c_cust_gt3 |  -.0127726    .014373    -0.89   0.374    -.0409432     .015398 
          c_misAB |   .0223072   .0194409     1.15   0.251    -.0157963    .0604106 
          c_hadtc |   -.057535   .0276006    -2.08   0.037    -.1116312   -.0034388 
    c_ever_ac_sol |  -.0036626   .0163803    -0.22   0.823    -.0357673    .0284421 
        c_3charge |  -.0094213   .0122605    -0.77   0.442    -.0334515    .0146089 
       c_p_medlim |   .0135127   .0163118     0.83   0.407    -.0184579    .0454833 
       c_p_hsgrad |  -.0020459   .0173456    -0.12   0.906    -.0360428    .0319509 
      c_p_had_job |   .0186841   .0122184     1.53   0.126    -.0052636    .0426318 
 c_p_prob_drugalc |   -.014185   .0336524    -0.42   0.673    -.0801425    .0517724 
      c_p_prob_mh |  -.0225059   .0134816    -1.67   0.095    -.0489295    .0039176 
        c_p_usvet |  -.0083684    .036751    -0.23   0.820     -.080399    .0636622 
           c_p_iq |  -.0001468   .0005398    -0.27   0.786    -.0012048    .0009112 
   c_18under_1arr |   .0238616   .0192089     1.24   0.214    -.0137872    .0615104 
            c_apv |   .0240509   .0251321     0.96   0.339     -.025207    .0733089 
           cp_age |  -.0022445   .0024974    -0.90   0.369    -.0071394    .0026504 
         cp_black |    .029752   .0446037     0.67   0.505    -.0576696    .1171737 
       cp_married |  -.0158311   .0460002    -0.34   0.731    -.1059898    .0743277 
         cp_islam |   .0351864   .0448736     0.78   0.433    -.0527642    .1231371 
         cp_urban |   -.034502   .0316858    -1.09   0.276     -.096605    .0276009 
       cp_maxsent |   .0001338   .0001083     1.24   0.217    -.0000785    .0003461 
      cp_pri_narr |   .0017138   .0033459     0.51   0.608     -.004844    .0082716 
      cp_cust_gt3 |  -.0133389   .0317517    -0.42   0.674     -.075571    .0488933 
         cp_misAB |  -.0274063   .0434858    -0.63   0.529    -.1126369    .0578244 
         cp_hadtc |  -.0441584   .0657503    -0.67   0.502    -.1730266    .0847098 
     cp_hasPriorI |  -.0560433   .0503308    -1.11   0.265    -.1546898    .0426033 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |   .0696981   .0377563     1.85   0.065     -.004303    .1436992 
       cp_3charge |   .0328083   .0285733     1.15   0.251    -.0231943     .088811 
          cp_rsth |  -.0246192   .0226099    -1.09   0.276    -.0689338    .0196953 
      cp_p_medlim |  -.0025219   .0311941    -0.08   0.936    -.0636613    .0586175 
      cp_p_hsgrad |  -.0041781   .0364437    -0.11   0.909    -.0756064    .0672502 
     cp_p_had_job |   -.049752   .0273278    -1.82   0.069    -.1033134    .0038095 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |   .0097101   .0622185     0.16   0.876    -.1122359    .1316562 
     cp_p_prob_mh |   .0468768   .0267154     1.75   0.079    -.0054844     .099238 
       cp_p_usvet |   .0029355   .0665522     0.04   0.965    -.1275044    .1333754 
          cp_p_iq |   .0003334   .0011489     0.29   0.772    -.0019184    .0025853 
  cp_18under_1arr |   .0996932   .0491012     2.03   0.042     .0034567    .1959298 
           cp_apv |   .1023686    .052789     1.94   0.052     -.001096    .2058331 
        stretches |   .0038431   .0051263     0.75   0.453    -.0062042    .0138905 
       r_time2rel |   .0000238   .0000234     1.02   0.310    -.0000221    .0000697 
       r_staytime |  -6.69e-07   .0000216    -0.03   0.975    -.0000431    .0000417 
       tier_tt_fa |   .0379666   .0118782     3.20   0.001     .0146858    .0612474 
                k |  -.0451633   .0232721    -1.94   0.052    -.0907758    .0004491 
            _cons |   .6089833   .1772564     3.44   0.001      .261567    .9563995 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Untreated         | 
      c_hasPriorI |   .0182874    .020136     0.91   0.364    -.0211784    .0577531 
       r_pri_narr |   .0142907   .0024189     5.91   0.000     .0095498    .0190316 
     rel_pri_narr |   .0006464   .0014841     0.44   0.663    -.0022623    .0035551 
           r_rsth |   .0788854   .0143631     5.49   0.000     .0507343    .1070364 
         rel_rsth |   .0008521   .0087638     0.10   0.923    -.0163247    .0180289 
            r_age |   -.006538   .0011028    -5.93   0.000    -.0086994   -.0043766 
          r_black |   .0651322   .0160739     4.05   0.000     .0336279    .0966366 
        r_married |    -.05148   .0202174    -2.55   0.011    -.0911054   -.0118547 
          r_islam |   .0635036   .0184295     3.45   0.001     .0273824    .0996247 
          r_urban |     .03496   .0134293     2.60   0.009      .008639    .0612809 
        r_maxsent |  -.0015056   .0003166    -4.76   0.000     -.002126   -.0008851 
       r_cust_gt3 |    .008414   .0183813     0.46   0.647    -.0276125    .0444406 
          r_misAB |  -.0416154   .0228412    -1.82   0.068    -.0863834    .0031526 
          r_hadtc |  -.0082441   .0500686    -0.16   0.869    -.1063768    .0898886 
    r_ever_ac_sol |   .0359748   .0239708     1.50   0.133    -.0110071    .0829567 
        r_3charge |   .0131731   .0161258     0.82   0.414     -.018433    .0447791 
       r_p_medlim |  -.0060593   .0181516    -0.33   0.739    -.0416357    .0295171 
       r_p_hsgrad |   -.110225     .01952    -5.65   0.000    -.1484835   -.0719666 
      r_p_had_job |   .0714911   .0139212     5.14   0.000     .0442061    .0987762 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0291086    .029363    -0.99   0.322    -.0866589    .0284418 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0512748   .0143141     3.58   0.000     .0232196    .0793299 
        r_p_usvet |  -.0018442   .0270096    -0.07   0.946    -.0547821    .0510936 
           r_p_iq |   .0004394   .0004056     1.08   0.279    -.0003556    .0012343 
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   r_18under_1arr |   -.040357   .0208241    -1.94   0.053    -.0811714    .0004574 
            c_age |  -.0007898   .0010079    -0.78   0.433    -.0027653    .0011856 
          c_black |  -.0021201   .0158665    -0.13   0.894    -.0332179    .0289776 
        c_married |   .0189263   .0203093     0.93   0.351    -.0208792    .0587319 
          c_islam |  -.0168687   .0166452    -1.01   0.311    -.0494928    .0157553 
          c_urban |  -.0214737   .0151121    -1.42   0.155    -.0510929    .0081454 
        c_maxsent |  -.0000646   .0000353    -1.83   0.067    -.0001338    4.59e-06 
       c_cust_gt3 |   .0156272   .0147499     1.06   0.289     -.013282    .0445364 
          c_misAB |  -.0082432   .0190753    -0.43   0.666    -.0456301    .0291438 
          c_hadtc |   .0658986   .0285399     2.31   0.021     .0099614    .1218358 
    c_ever_ac_sol |   .0220235   .0177632     1.24   0.215    -.0127918    .0568387 
        c_3charge |   .0051804   .0121361     0.43   0.669    -.0186058    .0289667 
       c_p_medlim |   -.006397    .018243    -0.35   0.726    -.0421527    .0293586 
       c_p_hsgrad |  -.0060873   .0153466    -0.40   0.692    -.0361661    .0239914 
      c_p_had_job |   .0113236   .0117862     0.96   0.337    -.0117768    .0344241 
 c_p_prob_drugalc |   .0390363   .0300447     1.30   0.194    -.0198501    .0979228 
      c_p_prob_mh |   .0101347   .0124544     0.81   0.416    -.0142754    .0345448 
        c_p_usvet |  -.0084584   .0246589    -0.34   0.732    -.0567889    .0398721 
           c_p_iq |  -.0004116   .0004549    -0.90   0.366    -.0013031      .00048 
   c_18under_1arr |   .0093924   .0189212     0.50   0.620    -.0276925    .0464774 
            c_apv |   .0043359   .0236303     0.18   0.854    -.0419787    .0506505 
           cp_age |  -.0035852   .0017275    -2.08   0.038    -.0069711   -.0001993 
         cp_black |  -.0502185   .0257332    -1.95   0.051    -.1006547    .0002177 
       cp_married |     .04069   .0400029     1.02   0.309    -.0377141    .1190942 
         cp_islam |   .0846701    .040655     2.08   0.037     .0049877    .1643524 
         cp_urban |  -.0191006   .0308765    -0.62   0.536    -.0796174    .0414161 
       cp_maxsent |   7.15e-07   .0000776     0.01   0.993    -.0001513    .0001527 
      cp_pri_narr |   .0013968   .0028489     0.49   0.624    -.0041869    .0069804 
      cp_cust_gt3 |   .0273669    .035713     0.77   0.443    -.0426292    .0973631 
         cp_misAB |  -.0166676   .0411729    -0.40   0.686    -.0973649    .0640298 
         cp_hadtc |    -.01169   .0680099    -0.17   0.864    -.1449871     .121607 
     cp_hasPriorI |   .0355854   .0363951     0.98   0.328    -.0357478    .1069186 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |   .0265007   .0373814     0.71   0.478    -.0467654    .0997669 
       cp_3charge |  -.0234387   .0254897    -0.92   0.358    -.0733975    .0265201 
          cp_rsth |   .0250435   .0186558     1.34   0.179    -.0115212    .0616082 
      cp_p_medlim |  -.0267408   .0369303    -0.72   0.469    -.0991228    .0456411 
      cp_p_hsgrad |  -.0354247   .0334896    -1.06   0.290    -.1010632    .0302138 
     cp_p_had_job |   .0011407   .0253718     0.04   0.964    -.0485871    .0508686 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0396971   .0485665    -0.82   0.414    -.1348857    .0554915 
     cp_p_prob_mh |  -.0093342   .0254206    -0.37   0.713    -.0591576    .0404892 
       cp_p_usvet |    .023622   .0438566     0.54   0.590    -.0623354    .1095794 
          cp_p_iq |  -.0004461   .0006408    -0.70   0.486    -.0017019    .0008098 
  cp_18under_1arr |  -.0633458   .0384243    -1.65   0.099    -.1386562    .0119645 
           cp_apv |  -.0629792   .0496652    -1.27   0.205    -.1603212    .0343629 
        stretches |  -.0148058   .0123664    -1.20   0.231    -.0390436    .0094319 
       r_time2rel |   .0000366   .0000449     0.82   0.415    -.0000514    .0001245 
       r_staytime |  -.0000756   .0000465    -1.62   0.104    -.0001669    .0000156 
       tier_tt_fa |   .0148698   .0083065     1.79   0.073    -.0014107    .0311503 
                k |     .03238   .0232702     1.39   0.164    -.0132288    .0779887 
            _cons |   .6202317   .1466619     4.23   0.000     .3327796    .9076837 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mills             | 
        rho1-rho0 |  -.0775433   .0308707    -2.51   0.012    -.1380488   -.0170378 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATE               | 
       E(Y1-Y0)@X |   -.012829   .0315857    -0.41   0.685    -.0747359    .0490779 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(note: file mte_base_t150_has_postA.gph not found) 
(file mte_base_t150_has_postA.gph saved) 
(running parametric_polynomial on estimation sample) 
 
 
Bootstrap replications (50) 
----+--- 1 ---+--- 2 ---+--- 3 ---+--- 4 ---+--- 5  
..................................................    50 
 
Parametric Normal MTE Model                     Number of obs      =     10131 
Treatment Model: Probit                         Replications       =        50 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
        has_postA |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Treated           | 
      c_hasPriorI |   .0329786   .0207818     1.59   0.113     -.007753    .0737103 
       r_pri_narr |   .0182384   .0025306     7.21   0.000     .0132785    .0231983 
     rel_pri_narr |   .0011282   .0014194     0.79   0.427    -.0016538    .0039101 
           r_rsth |    .060606   .0151102     4.01   0.000     .0309905    .0902215 
         rel_rsth |  -.0035661   .0105953    -0.34   0.736    -.0243325    .0172004 
            r_age |  -.0071387   .0011336    -6.30   0.000    -.0093604   -.0049169 
          r_black |   .0308282   .0357723     0.86   0.389    -.0392843    .1009407 
        r_married |   .0007371   .0221374     0.03   0.973    -.0426513    .0441256 
          r_islam |   .0545872   .0211412     2.58   0.010     .0131511    .0960232 
          r_urban |   .0313237   .0199736     1.57   0.117    -.0078238    .0704712 
        r_maxsent |  -.0013276   .0002111    -6.29   0.000    -.0017413   -.0009138 
       r_cust_gt3 |    .056284   .0211094     2.67   0.008     .0149103    .0976576 
          r_misAB |   -.016815   .0185584    -0.91   0.365    -.0531889    .0195588 
          r_hadtc |   .0406022   .0347164     1.17   0.242    -.0274407    .1086451 
    r_ever_ac_sol |  -.0004126   .0217193    -0.02   0.985    -.0429817    .0421565 
        r_3charge |   .0454742     .01355     3.36   0.001     .0189166    .0720318 
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       r_p_medlim |   .0053752   .0173565     0.31   0.757    -.0286429    .0393932 
       r_p_hsgrad |  -.0805923   .0210204    -3.83   0.000    -.1217916    -.039393 
      r_p_had_job |   .0728623   .0169419     4.30   0.000     .0396567    .1060678 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0097174   .0329375    -0.30   0.768    -.0742738    .0548389 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0168908   .0157645     1.07   0.284     -.014007    .0477886 
        r_p_usvet |  -.0264733   .0275554    -0.96   0.337    -.0804808    .0275342 
           r_p_iq |  -.0000561   .0006192    -0.09   0.928    -.0012698    .0011576 
   r_18under_1arr |  -.0329714   .0239559    -1.38   0.169    -.0799241    .0139812 
            c_age |   -.002501   .0012606    -1.98   0.047    -.0049718   -.0000303 
          c_black |   -.012753   .0235481    -0.54   0.588    -.0589063    .0334003 
        c_married |  -.0343474   .0216643    -1.59   0.113    -.0768086    .0081137 
          c_islam |   .0221952    .021875     1.01   0.310    -.0206791    .0650695 
          c_urban |   .0246102   .0204819     1.20   0.230    -.0155337     .064754 
        c_maxsent |  -.0000315   .0000407    -0.77   0.440    -.0001113    .0000484 
       c_cust_gt3 |  -.0126162   .0174221    -0.72   0.469    -.0467629    .0215306 
          c_misAB |   .0074022   .0201013     0.37   0.713    -.0319957    .0468001 
          c_hadtc |  -.0526421   .0312918    -1.68   0.093    -.1139729    .0086887 
    c_ever_ac_sol |  -.0213947   .0204108    -1.05   0.295    -.0613991    .0186097 
        c_3charge |  -.0024744   .0159199    -0.16   0.876    -.0336767     .028728 
       c_p_medlim |    .011195   .0156466     0.72   0.474    -.0194719    .0418618 
       c_p_hsgrad |  -.0065636    .020214    -0.32   0.745    -.0461824    .0330552 
      c_p_had_job |   .0163628   .0170064     0.96   0.336    -.0169691    .0496948 
 c_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0148078   .0267822    -0.55   0.580    -.0672999    .0376843 
      c_p_prob_mh |  -.0101926   .0123239    -0.83   0.408    -.0343471    .0139618 
        c_p_usvet |  -.0093634   .0285517    -0.33   0.743    -.0653236    .0465969 
           c_p_iq |  -4.92e-06   .0006163    -0.01   0.994    -.0012128    .0012029 
   c_18under_1arr |  -.0020006   .0211696    -0.09   0.925    -.0434922    .0394911 
            c_apv |   .0070089    .028719     0.24   0.807    -.0492792    .0632971 
           cp_age |  -.0030855   .0025376    -1.22   0.224    -.0080591    .0018881 
         cp_black |   .0301023   .0403042     0.75   0.455    -.0488924     .109097 
       cp_married |  -.0341274   .0483832    -0.71   0.481    -.1289567    .0607018 
         cp_islam |    .056471   .0442067     1.28   0.201    -.0301726    .1431146 
         cp_urban |  -.0340524   .0418979    -0.81   0.416    -.1161709     .048066 
       cp_maxsent |    .000198   .0001211     1.63   0.102    -.0000395    .0004354 
      cp_pri_narr |   .0057853   .0039476     1.47   0.143     -.001952    .0135225 
      cp_cust_gt3 |  -.0264047   .0396416    -0.67   0.505    -.1041009    .0512915 
         cp_misAB |   .0091471   .0484928     0.19   0.850    -.0858972    .1041913 
         cp_hadtc |  -.0579486   .0658138    -0.88   0.379    -.1869413     .071044 
     cp_hasPriorI |  -.0610645   .0483357    -1.26   0.206    -.1558007    .0336717 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |       .067   .0374402     1.79   0.074    -.0063815    .1403816 
       cp_3charge |   .0281539   .0315693     0.89   0.372    -.0337207    .0900286 
          cp_rsth |  -.0525018   .0227142    -2.31   0.021    -.0970208   -.0079829 
      cp_p_medlim |  -.0180857   .0346025    -0.52   0.601    -.0859054     .049734 
      cp_p_hsgrad |   .0250371   .0426833     0.59   0.557    -.0586207    .1086948 
     cp_p_had_job |  -.0505169   .0332658    -1.52   0.129    -.1157166    .0146828 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |   .0118763   .0665756     0.18   0.858    -.1186095    .1423622 
     cp_p_prob_mh |   .0479986   .0327317     1.47   0.143    -.0161542    .1121515 
       cp_p_usvet |   .0568098   .0604416     0.94   0.347    -.0616534    .1752731 
          cp_p_iq |  -.0000688   .0013074    -0.05   0.958    -.0026313    .0024937 
  cp_18under_1arr |   .1442559   .0468001     3.08   0.002     .0525295    .2359823 
           cp_apv |    .116216   .0639204     1.82   0.069    -.0090656    .2414976 
        stretches |   .0018195   .0061571     0.30   0.768    -.0102482    .0138871 
       r_time2rel |   .0000274   .0000222     1.23   0.217    -.0000161    .0000708 
       r_staytime |  -1.86e-08   .0000256    -0.00   0.999    -.0000502    .0000501 
       tier_tt_fa |   .0428389   .0123377     3.47   0.001     .0186574    .0670204 
                k |  -.0333208   .0265755    -1.25   0.210    -.0854077    .0187662 
            _cons |   .6874466    .208479     3.30   0.001     .2788352    1.096058 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Untreated         | 
      c_hasPriorI |   .0271708   .0204236     1.33   0.183    -.0128587    .0672003 
       r_pri_narr |   .0153922    .002557     6.02   0.000     .0103806    .0204038 
     rel_pri_narr |   .0010337   .0014574     0.71   0.478    -.0018229    .0038902 
           r_rsth |   .0677782   .0130785     5.18   0.000     .0421449    .0934115 
         rel_rsth |  -.0068195   .0090264    -0.76   0.450    -.0245108    .0108718 
            r_age |  -.0064421   .0008858    -7.27   0.000    -.0081781    -.004706 
          r_black |   .0675514   .0192754     3.50   0.000     .0297723    .1053305 
        r_married |  -.0358911   .0166581    -2.15   0.031    -.0685403   -.0032419 
          r_islam |   .0625755   .0158596     3.95   0.000     .0314913    .0936597 
          r_urban |   .0299392   .0137048     2.18   0.029     .0030783       .0568 
        r_maxsent |  -.0014199   .0002582    -5.50   0.000    -.0019261   -.0009138 
       r_cust_gt3 |   .0150438   .0122631     1.23   0.220    -.0089915    .0390791 
          r_misAB |  -.0467325   .0200116    -2.34   0.020    -.0859544   -.0075105 
          r_hadtc |   -.014161   .0339916    -0.42   0.677    -.0807834    .0524614 
    r_ever_ac_sol |     .01623   .0223956     0.72   0.469    -.0276647    .0601246 
        r_3charge |   .0025872   .0102431     0.25   0.801     -.017489    .0226634 
       r_p_medlim |  -.0179558   .0179814    -1.00   0.318    -.0531987    .0172871 
       r_p_hsgrad |  -.1016212   .0161606    -6.29   0.000    -.1332955    -.069947 
      r_p_had_job |   .0701901   .0128826     5.45   0.000     .0449407    .0954396 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0102385    .025918    -0.40   0.693    -.0610368    .0405597 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0516283   .0110863     4.66   0.000     .0298995    .0733572 
        r_p_usvet |  -.0147306   .0247545    -0.60   0.552    -.0632484    .0337873 
           r_p_iq |   .0003448   .0004078     0.85   0.398    -.0004545     .001144 
   r_18under_1arr |  -.0404492   .0205868    -1.96   0.049    -.0807987   -.0000998 
            c_age |  -.0009593   .0010325    -0.93   0.353    -.0029829    .0010644 
          c_black |   .0007571    .012679     0.06   0.952    -.0240933    .0256075 
        c_married |   .0142135   .0159837     0.89   0.374    -.0171139     .045541 
          c_islam |  -.0097394   .0142571    -0.68   0.495    -.0376829    .0182041 
          c_urban |  -.0228364   .0133214    -1.71   0.086    -.0489459    .0032731 
        c_maxsent |  -.0001217   .0000475    -2.56   0.010    -.0002148   -.0000286 
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       c_cust_gt3 |   .0133578   .0124284     1.07   0.282    -.0110015    .0377171 
          c_misAB |   .0053677   .0182824     0.29   0.769    -.0304652    .0412006 
          c_hadtc |   .0364177   .0263504     1.38   0.167    -.0152281    .0880635 
    c_ever_ac_sol |   .0309127     .01632     1.89   0.058    -.0010738    .0628993 
        c_3charge |  -.0016137   .0131629    -0.12   0.902    -.0274126    .0241851 
       c_p_medlim |    .000802   .0132138     0.06   0.952    -.0250966    .0267006 
       c_p_hsgrad |   .0005997   .0153747     0.04   0.969    -.0295342    .0307336 
      c_p_had_job |   .0139026   .0118244     1.18   0.240    -.0092729     .037078 
 c_p_prob_drugalc |   .0324677   .0247869     1.31   0.190    -.0161137    .0810492 
      c_p_prob_mh |  -.0029726    .012919    -0.23   0.818    -.0282935    .0223483 
        c_p_usvet |  -.0099508   .0249296    -0.40   0.690     -.058812    .0389105 
           c_p_iq |  -.0004894   .0004117    -1.19   0.235    -.0012962    .0003175 
   c_18under_1arr |   .0283664   .0169829     1.67   0.095    -.0049195    .0616523 
            c_apv |   .0141899    .019098     0.74   0.457    -.0232415    .0516213 
           cp_age |  -.0030691   .0014623    -2.10   0.036    -.0059352   -.0002031 
         cp_black |  -.0398956   .0351677    -1.13   0.257    -.1088231    .0290319 
       cp_married |   .0385389   .0285967     1.35   0.178    -.0175096    .0945875 
         cp_islam |    .062998   .0371914     1.69   0.090    -.0098958    .1358919 
         cp_urban |  -.0212732   .0307889    -0.69   0.490    -.0816183    .0390718 
       cp_maxsent |  -.0000238   .0000941    -0.25   0.801    -.0002081    .0001606 
      cp_pri_narr |  -.0004305   .0025981    -0.17   0.868    -.0055228    .0046617 
      cp_cust_gt3 |   .0250386   .0259798     0.96   0.335    -.0258809    .0759581 
         cp_misAB |  -.0428452   .0371118    -1.15   0.248     -.115583    .0298926 
         cp_hadtc |    .006993   .0588969     0.12   0.905    -.1084428    .1224289 
     cp_hasPriorI |    .029969   .0381666     0.79   0.432    -.0448362    .1047743 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |    .029775   .0278262     1.07   0.285    -.0247633    .0843133 
       cp_3charge |  -.0161464   .0245468    -0.66   0.511    -.0642572    .0319644 
          cp_rsth |    .032276   .0196059     1.65   0.100    -.0061509    .0707029 
      cp_p_medlim |  -.0128722   .0302948    -0.42   0.671    -.0722489    .0465045 
      cp_p_hsgrad |  -.0475792   .0322371    -1.48   0.140    -.1107628    .0156044 
     cp_p_had_job |   .0017759    .023104     0.08   0.939    -.0435071    .0470588 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |    -.03418   .0502955    -0.68   0.497    -.1327573    .0643973 
     cp_p_prob_mh |  -.0058931   .0229453    -0.26   0.797     -.050865    .0390787 
       cp_p_usvet |  -.0016024   .0449611    -0.04   0.972    -.0897245    .0865198 
          cp_p_iq |  -.0001858   .0007623    -0.24   0.807    -.0016799    .0013083 
  cp_18under_1arr |  -.0635647   .0384577    -1.65   0.098    -.1389405     .011811 
           cp_apv |  -.0441763   .0507805    -0.87   0.384    -.1437044    .0553517 
        stretches |  -.0091764   .0089576    -1.02   0.306     -.026733    .0083802 
       r_time2rel |   .0000327   .0000285     1.15   0.250    -.0000231    .0000885 
       r_staytime |  -.0000739   .0000345    -2.14   0.032    -.0001415   -6.36e-06 
       tier_tt_fa |    .013782   .0123344     1.12   0.264    -.0103929    .0379569 
                k |   .0495105   .0274148     1.81   0.071    -.0042214    .1032424 
            _cons |    .599387   .1332322     4.50   0.000     .3382568    .8605173 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mills             | 
        rho1-rho0 |  -.0828313   .0384575    -2.15   0.031    -.1582066    -.007456 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATE               | 
       E(Y1-Y0)@X |  -.0222557   .0310893    -0.72   0.474    -.0831896    .0386781 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(note: file mte_base_t180_has_postA.gph not found) 
(file mte_base_t180_has_postA.gph saved) 
(running parametric_polynomial on estimation sample) 
 
Outcome Model #2: An example of margte Output for Recidivism. 
 
Bootstrap replications (50) 
----+--- 1 ---+--- 2 ---+--- 3 ---+--- 4 ---+--- 5  
..................................................    50 
 
Parametric Normal MTE Model                     Number of obs      =     10131 
Treatment Model: Probit                         Replications       =        50 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
        has_postO |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Treated           | 
      c_hasPriorI |    .028913   .0156611     1.85   0.065    -.0017822    .0596083 
       r_pri_narr |   .0154265    .001831     8.43   0.000     .0118378    .0190153 
     rel_pri_narr |   .0000344   .0013257     0.03   0.979    -.0025639    .0026327 
           r_rsth |   .0620925   .0112046     5.54   0.000     .0401319    .0840531 
         rel_rsth |   .0036203   .0076715     0.47   0.637    -.0114156    .0186561 
            r_age |  -.0071681   .0010227    -7.01   0.000    -.0091727   -.0051636 
          r_black |   .0279548   .0219691     1.27   0.203    -.0151038    .0710135 
        r_married |  -.0091492   .0168723    -0.54   0.588    -.0422184      .02392 
          r_islam |   .0614632   .0179309     3.43   0.001     .0263194    .0966071 
          r_urban |  -.0206128   .0148434    -1.39   0.165    -.0497052    .0084797 
        r_maxsent |  -.0001941   .0002013    -0.96   0.335    -.0005886    .0002004 
       r_cust_gt3 |   .0434974   .0151569     2.87   0.004     .0137903    .0732044 
          r_misAB |  -.0323351   .0209164    -1.55   0.122    -.0733305    .0086603 
          r_hadtc |   .0719526   .0256729     2.80   0.005     .0216346    .1222706 
    r_ever_ac_sol |  -.0119599    .018001    -0.66   0.506    -.0472411    .0233213 
        r_3charge |   .0149584   .0114587     1.31   0.192    -.0075002    .0374171 
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       r_p_medlim |  -.0186877   .0137839    -1.36   0.175    -.0457037    .0083283 
       r_p_hsgrad |  -.0880585   .0160449    -5.49   0.000    -.1195059   -.0566111 
      r_p_had_job |   .0269436   .0137639     1.96   0.050    -.0000331    .0539203 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |   .0130367   .0232835     0.56   0.576    -.0325982    .0586716 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0644291   .0117151     5.50   0.000      .041468    .0873903 
        r_p_usvet |  -.0253462   .0302892    -0.84   0.403    -.0847119    .0340196 
           r_p_iq |   .0005291   .0004539     1.17   0.244    -.0003606    .0014188 
   r_18under_1arr |   -.056087   .0182028    -3.08   0.002    -.0917638   -.0204102 
            c_age |   -.000742   .0009437    -0.79   0.432    -.0025916    .0011076 
          c_black |   .0167276    .019479     0.86   0.390    -.0214504    .0549057 
        c_married |   -.013691   .0179484    -0.76   0.446    -.0488691    .0214872 
          c_islam |  -.0093486   .0161653    -0.58   0.563    -.0410319    .0223347 
          c_urban |  -.0020642   .0135358    -0.15   0.879     -.028594    .0244656 
        c_maxsent |  -.0000847   .0000364    -2.33   0.020    -.0001561   -.0000134 
       c_cust_gt3 |  -.0113921   .0131178    -0.87   0.385    -.0371024    .0143182 
          c_misAB |   .0107365   .0133972     0.80   0.423    -.0155216    .0369946 
          c_hadtc |  -.0557084   .0199824    -2.79   0.005    -.0948731   -.0165437 
    c_ever_ac_sol |   .0097991   .0111422     0.88   0.379    -.0120393    .0316374 
        c_3charge |   .0075835   .0105308     0.72   0.471    -.0130564    .0282235 
       c_p_medlim |    .000241    .014799     0.02   0.987    -.0287645    .0292465 
       c_p_hsgrad |   .0010954    .015611     0.07   0.944    -.0295017    .0316924 
      c_p_had_job |    .008539   .0117961     0.72   0.469     -.014581     .031659 
 c_p_prob_drugalc |   .0030671   .0193442     0.16   0.874    -.0348469    .0409812 
      c_p_prob_mh |  -.0083276   .0126805    -0.66   0.511    -.0331809    .0165258 
        c_p_usvet |    .010665   .0236883     0.45   0.653    -.0357632    .0570931 
           c_p_iq |  -.0005422   .0004411    -1.23   0.219    -.0014067    .0003223 
   c_18under_1arr |   .0073819   .0168448     0.44   0.661    -.0256333    .0403971 
            c_apv |  -.0050657   .0187156    -0.27   0.787    -.0417476    .0316161 
           cp_age |  -.0040109   .0022413    -1.79   0.074    -.0084038    .0003819 
         cp_black |   .0213391   .0319124     0.67   0.504     -.041208    .0838861 
       cp_married |  -.0460766   .0360956    -1.28   0.202    -.1168226    .0246694 
         cp_islam |   .0035186   .0371983     0.09   0.925    -.0693888    .0764259 
         cp_urban |  -.0187659   .0282029    -0.67   0.506    -.0740426    .0365108 
       cp_maxsent |   .0000991   .0000835     1.19   0.235    -.0000645    .0002628 
      cp_pri_narr |   .0022712    .003131     0.73   0.468    -.0038655    .0084079 
      cp_cust_gt3 |   .0413539   .0331545     1.25   0.212    -.0236278    .1063355 
         cp_misAB |  -.0096793    .044531    -0.22   0.828    -.0969584    .0775998 
         cp_hadtc |  -.0549571   .0548348    -1.00   0.316    -.1624313    .0525171 
     cp_hasPriorI |  -.0331093   .0396981    -0.83   0.404    -.1109162    .0446977 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |    .040574   .0367674     1.10   0.270    -.0314887    .1126367 
       cp_3charge |   .0382399   .0270854     1.41   0.158    -.0148465    .0913262 
          cp_rsth |  -.0250824    .022728    -1.10   0.270    -.0696284    .0194636 
      cp_p_medlim |  -.0282949   .0335198    -0.84   0.399    -.0939925    .0374027 
      cp_p_hsgrad |   .0199641   .0353193     0.57   0.572    -.0492604    .0891887 
     cp_p_had_job |  -.0010438   .0264525    -0.04   0.969    -.0528897     .050802 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0030689   .0423329    -0.07   0.942    -.0860398     .079902 
     cp_p_prob_mh |   .0102191   .0260928     0.39   0.695    -.0409218      .06136 
       cp_p_usvet |  -.0570882   .0620861    -0.92   0.358    -.1787746    .0645983 
          cp_p_iq |   .0000491   .0010525     0.05   0.963    -.0020137     .002112 
  cp_18under_1arr |   .0534426   .0452631     1.18   0.238    -.0352713    .1421566 
           cp_apv |   .0919411    .050867     1.81   0.071    -.0077564    .1916385 
        stretches |  -.0026757   .0050448    -0.53   0.596    -.0125634    .0072119 
       r_time2rel |   2.31e-06   .0000223     0.10   0.917    -.0000413     .000046 
       r_staytime |  -.0000474   .0000219    -2.17   0.030    -.0000903   -4.53e-06 
       tier_tt_fa |   .0254073   .0119755     2.12   0.034     .0019358    .0488788 
                k |  -.0184361   .0238829    -0.77   0.440    -.0652456    .0283735 
            _cons |   .7525316   .1560228     4.82   0.000     .4467325    1.058331 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Untreated         | 
      c_hasPriorI |   -.003381   .0194064    -0.17   0.862    -.0414169    .0346548 
       r_pri_narr |   .0118089   .0028158     4.19   0.000     .0062901    .0173277 
     rel_pri_narr |   .0011456   .0019815     0.58   0.563    -.0027381    .0050294 
           r_rsth |   .0859918   .0154977     5.55   0.000     .0556168    .1163668 
         rel_rsth |    .004204   .0110365     0.38   0.703    -.0174271    .0258351 
            r_age |  -.0065711   .0012155    -5.41   0.000    -.0089535   -.0041887 
          r_black |   .0485316   .0187975     2.58   0.010     .0116891    .0853741 
        r_married |  -.0412124   .0179496    -2.30   0.022    -.0763931   -.0060318 
          r_islam |   .0563769   .0202661     2.78   0.005     .0166561    .0960978 
          r_urban |  -.0076699   .0160518    -0.48   0.633    -.0391308     .023791 
        r_maxsent |  -.0003323   .0003465    -0.96   0.338    -.0010113    .0003468 
       r_cust_gt3 |   .0111354   .0178961     0.62   0.534    -.0239404    .0462112 
          r_misAB |  -.0304151   .0259928    -1.17   0.242    -.0813601    .0205299 
          r_hadtc |   -.026803   .0489844    -0.55   0.584    -.1228107    .0692046 
    r_ever_ac_sol |   .0255799   .0271053     0.94   0.345    -.0275455    .0787053 
        r_3charge |   .0220275   .0140787     1.56   0.118    -.0055662    .0496211 
       r_p_medlim |   .0030144   .0196732     0.15   0.878    -.0355443    .0415731 
       r_p_hsgrad |  -.1110414   .0147063    -7.55   0.000    -.1398652   -.0822177 
      r_p_had_job |   .0065133   .0155318     0.42   0.675    -.0239284    .0369551 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0269391   .0307901    -0.87   0.382    -.0872866    .0334084 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0847424   .0170112     4.98   0.000     .0514012    .1180837 
        r_p_usvet |  -.0196382   .0368344    -0.53   0.594    -.0918322    .0525558 
           r_p_iq |  -.0001643   .0004466    -0.37   0.713    -.0010396    .0007109 
   r_18under_1arr |  -.0790928   .0222124    -3.56   0.000    -.1226283   -.0355573 
            c_age |  -.0012238    .001043    -1.17   0.241     -.003268    .0008205 
          c_black |  -.0115068   .0225515    -0.51   0.610     -.055707    .0326933 
        c_married |   .0014066   .0176961     0.08   0.937    -.0332772    .0360903 
          c_islam |  -.0009284   .0250695    -0.04   0.970    -.0500637    .0482069 
          c_urban |   -.005842   .0186882    -0.31   0.755    -.0424701    .0307861 
        c_maxsent |   -.000027   .0000507    -0.53   0.594    -.0001263    .0000723 
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       c_cust_gt3 |    .008266   .0151463     0.55   0.585    -.0214203    .0379522 
          c_misAB |    -.02366   .0214309    -1.10   0.270    -.0656638    .0183438 
          c_hadtc |   .0264611   .0359352     0.74   0.462    -.0439706    .0968929 
    c_ever_ac_sol |   .0378529   .0166331     2.28   0.023     .0052526    .0704532 
        c_3charge |   .0168477   .0127109     1.33   0.185    -.0080651    .0417605 
       c_p_medlim |   .0001677   .0182364     0.01   0.993     -.035575    .0359103 
       c_p_hsgrad |  -.0150418   .0168728    -0.89   0.373    -.0481118    .0180282 
      c_p_had_job |   .0057463    .014225     0.40   0.686    -.0221341    .0336268 
 c_p_prob_drugalc |   .0276335   .0327098     0.84   0.398    -.0364765    .0917435 
      c_p_prob_mh |   .0112581   .0141858     0.79   0.427    -.0165455    .0390617 
        c_p_usvet |  -.0104614   .0254914    -0.41   0.682    -.0604236    .0395008 
           c_p_iq |  -.0000893    .000383    -0.23   0.816    -.0008399    .0006612 
   c_18under_1arr |  -.0090331   .0199902    -0.45   0.651    -.0482133    .0301471 
            c_apv |   .0197811   .0254891     0.78   0.438    -.0301767    .0697389 
           cp_age |  -.0031074   .0017608    -1.76   0.078    -.0065586    .0003438 
         cp_black |  -.0435452   .0302509    -1.44   0.150     -.102836    .0157455 
       cp_married |   .0266155   .0441083     0.60   0.546    -.0598353    .1130662 
         cp_islam |   .0456647   .0405536     1.13   0.260     -.033819    .1251483 
         cp_urban |  -.0445164   .0368644    -1.21   0.227    -.1167692    .0277364 
       cp_maxsent |  -.0000361    .000112    -0.32   0.747    -.0002557    .0001834 
      cp_pri_narr |    .002705   .0031846     0.85   0.396    -.0035368    .0089467 
      cp_cust_gt3 |   .0303384   .0342753     0.89   0.376      -.03684    .0975168 
         cp_misAB |  -.0289734   .0426827    -0.68   0.497    -.1126299    .0546831 
         cp_hadtc |  -.0138788   .0724075    -0.19   0.848    -.1557949    .1280373 
     cp_hasPriorI |   .0210644   .0455812     0.46   0.644    -.0682731    .1104019 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |    .046005   .0383696     1.20   0.231     -.029198     .121208 
       cp_3charge |   .0216302     .02518     0.86   0.390    -.0277217     .070982 
          cp_rsth |   .0349012    .021327     1.64   0.102    -.0068989    .0767013 
      cp_p_medlim |  -.0046864   .0368961    -0.13   0.899    -.0770015    .0676287 
      cp_p_hsgrad |  -.0286359    .034199    -0.84   0.402    -.0956647    .0383929 
     cp_p_had_job |  -.0079373   .0257461    -0.31   0.758    -.0583987    .0425241 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0492445   .0612557    -0.80   0.421    -.1693035    .0708145 
     cp_p_prob_mh |  -.0236532   .0289934    -0.82   0.415    -.0804792    .0331728 
       cp_p_usvet |   .0400679   .0539387     0.74   0.458    -.0656501    .1457858 
          cp_p_iq |  -.0006841   .0008959    -0.76   0.445    -.0024401    .0010719 
  cp_18under_1arr |  -.0665253   .0451289    -1.47   0.140    -.1549763    .0219257 
           cp_apv |  -.0675966    .048551    -1.39   0.164    -.1627549    .0275617 
        stretches |  -.0137384   .0126701    -1.08   0.278    -.0385714    .0110945 
       r_time2rel |   .0000393   .0000458     0.86   0.391    -.0000505    .0001291 
       r_staytime |  -.0001543   .0000492    -3.14   0.002    -.0002507    -.000058 
       tier_tt_fa |  -.0007112    .012963    -0.05   0.956    -.0261182    .0246958 
                k |   .0533753   .0222577     2.40   0.016     .0097511    .0969995 
            _cons |   .7281429   .1861438     3.91   0.000     .3633077    1.092978 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mills             | 
        rho1-rho0 |  -.0718113   .0320574    -2.24   0.025    -.1346427     -.00898 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATE               | 
       E(Y1-Y0)@X |   .0392658   .0279424     1.41   0.160    -.0155003    .0940319 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(note: file mte_base_t120_has_postO.gph not found) 
(file mte_base_t120_has_postO.gph saved) 
(running parametric_polynomial on estimation sample) 
 
Bootstrap replications (50) 
----+--- 1 ---+--- 2 ---+--- 3 ---+--- 4 ---+--- 5  
..................................................    50 
 
Parametric Normal MTE Model                     Number of obs      =     10131 
Treatment Model: Probit                         Replications       =        50 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
        has_postO |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Treated           | 
      c_hasPriorI |    .021173   .0189066     1.12   0.263    -.0158832    .0582292 
       r_pri_narr |   .0160466   .0026627     6.03   0.000     .0108278    .0212654 
     rel_pri_narr |   .0002759   .0019436     0.14   0.887    -.0035335    .0040854 
           r_rsth |   .0642891   .0168769     3.81   0.000     .0312109    .0973672 
         rel_rsth |  -.0001773   .0109259    -0.02   0.987    -.0215916     .021237 
            r_age |  -.0068159    .000972    -7.01   0.000    -.0087209   -.0049109 
          r_black |   .0384029   .0324446     1.18   0.237    -.0251874    .1019932 
        r_married |   -.003389   .0200436    -0.17   0.866    -.0426738    .0358958 
          r_islam |   .0579052   .0159101     3.64   0.000     .0267219    .0890884 
          r_urban |  -.0200424    .017197    -1.17   0.244    -.0537479    .0136631 
        r_maxsent |  -.0002608    .000204    -1.28   0.201    -.0006606     .000139 
       r_cust_gt3 |   .0566148   .0127154     4.45   0.000     .0316932    .0815365 
          r_misAB |  -.0422695   .0177778    -2.38   0.017    -.0771133   -.0074257 
          r_hadtc |   .0803803   .0309604     2.60   0.009      .019699    .1410615 
    r_ever_ac_sol |  -.0265767   .0165184    -1.61   0.108    -.0589522    .0057988 
        r_3charge |   .0164285   .0125971     1.30   0.192    -.0082614    .0411184 
       r_p_medlim |  -.0190234   .0190882    -1.00   0.319    -.0564355    .0183888 
       r_p_hsgrad |    -.08696   .0201364    -4.32   0.000    -.1264267   -.0474933 
      r_p_had_job |   .0293948   .0152278     1.93   0.054    -.0004511    .0592407 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |   .0048438   .0239312     0.20   0.840    -.0420606    .0517481 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0661975   .0136235     4.86   0.000      .039496     .092899 
        r_p_usvet |  -.0467454   .0266394    -1.75   0.079    -.0989576    .0054669 
           r_p_iq |   .0002012   .0005234     0.38   0.701    -.0008247    .0012272 
   r_18under_1arr |  -.0646008   .0238671    -2.71   0.007    -.1113795   -.0178221 
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            c_age |  -.0007539    .001249    -0.60   0.546    -.0032018     .001694 
          c_black |   .0009691   .0191729     0.05   0.960    -.0366091    .0385472 
        c_married |  -.0274921   .0179565    -1.53   0.126    -.0626862     .007702 
          c_islam |   .0052431   .0184923     0.28   0.777    -.0310011    .0414874 
          c_urban |   .0080004   .0177595     0.45   0.652    -.0268076    .0428084 
        c_maxsent |  -.0000843   .0000472    -1.79   0.074    -.0001768    8.23e-06 
       c_cust_gt3 |  -.0066065   .0153352    -0.43   0.667     -.036663    .0234499 
          c_misAB |   .0161496   .0158393     1.02   0.308    -.0148949    .0471941 
          c_hadtc |  -.0684482   .0322151    -2.12   0.034    -.1315886   -.0053078 
    c_ever_ac_sol |   .0052466   .0156779     0.33   0.738    -.0254814    .0359747 
        c_3charge |   .0048023   .0132318     0.36   0.717    -.0211315    .0307362 
       c_p_medlim |   .0040712   .0124504     0.33   0.744    -.0203312    .0284736 
       c_p_hsgrad |   .0005899    .018364     0.03   0.974    -.0354028    .0365827 
      c_p_had_job |   .0140461   .0113434     1.24   0.216    -.0081865    .0362788 
 c_p_prob_drugalc |   .0054151   .0258608     0.21   0.834     -.045271    .0561013 
      c_p_prob_mh |  -.0077159   .0132338    -0.58   0.560    -.0336538    .0182219 
        c_p_usvet |   .0099322   .0262878     0.38   0.706    -.0415909    .0614553 
           c_p_iq |  -.0005046   .0005262    -0.96   0.338    -.0015359    .0005268 
   c_18under_1arr |   .0055544   .0181463     0.31   0.760    -.0300117    .0411206 
            c_apv |   .0014535   .0193479     0.08   0.940    -.0364677    .0393747 
           cp_age |  -.0034908   .0022551    -1.55   0.122    -.0079108    .0009292 
         cp_black |   .0120855   .0355291     0.34   0.734    -.0575502    .0817212 
       cp_married |  -.0154306   .0363069    -0.43   0.671    -.0865908    .0557295 
         cp_islam |   .0019231   .0426475     0.05   0.964    -.0816645    .0855107 
         cp_urban |  -.0231416   .0330181    -0.70   0.483     -.087856    .0415728 
       cp_maxsent |   .0000834    .000139     0.60   0.548     -.000189    .0003559 
      cp_pri_narr |   .0020324   .0038004     0.53   0.593    -.0054162     .009481 
      cp_cust_gt3 |   .0220707   .0313575     0.70   0.482    -.0393888    .0835303 
         cp_misAB |  -.0425794    .040532    -1.05   0.293    -.1220207    .0368619 
         cp_hadtc |  -.0825073   .0607349    -1.36   0.174    -.2015455    .0365309 
     cp_hasPriorI |  -.0575658   .0447697    -1.29   0.199    -.1453128    .0301812 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |   .0674209   .0366823     1.84   0.066    -.0044751    .1393168 
       cp_3charge |   .0518731   .0272584     1.90   0.057    -.0015524    .1052986 
          cp_rsth |  -.0142093   .0261963    -0.54   0.588    -.0655531    .0371344 
      cp_p_medlim |  -.0187583   .0343216    -0.55   0.585    -.0860274    .0485108 
      cp_p_hsgrad |   .0060842   .0415968     0.15   0.884    -.0754441    .0876124 
     cp_p_had_job |  -.0320843   .0265492    -1.21   0.227    -.0841197    .0199511 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0090056   .0669063    -0.13   0.893    -.1401396    .1221284 
     cp_p_prob_mh |   .0172748   .0295725     0.58   0.559    -.0406862    .0752357 
       cp_p_usvet |  -.0380228   .0585835    -0.65   0.516    -.1528444    .0767988 
          cp_p_iq |   .0005038   .0010525     0.48   0.632     -.001559    .0025666 
  cp_18under_1arr |   .0576242   .0408516     1.41   0.158    -.0224434    .1376919 
           cp_apv |   .0936572   .0526017     1.78   0.075    -.0094403    .1967548 
        stretches |   -.001764   .0048067    -0.37   0.714     -.011185    .0076569 
       r_time2rel |  -6.28e-06   .0000254    -0.25   0.805    -.0000562    .0000436 
       r_staytime |  -.0000232   .0000226    -1.02   0.306    -.0000676    .0000212 
       tier_tt_fa |   .0292808   .0138356     2.12   0.034     .0021635    .0563981 
                k |  -.0259293   .0223631    -1.16   0.246    -.0697601    .0179016 
            _cons |   .6559535   .1883922     3.48   0.000     .2867116    1.025195 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Untreated         | 
      c_hasPriorI |   .0124825    .018039     0.69   0.489    -.0228733    .0478384 
       r_pri_narr |   .0122971   .0020212     6.08   0.000     .0083356    .0162585 
     rel_pri_narr |    .000702   .0014095     0.50   0.618    -.0020605    .0034645 
           r_rsth |   .0791452   .0112522     7.03   0.000     .0570912    .1011991 
         rel_rsth |   .0077361   .0088262     0.88   0.381     -.009563    .0250353 
            r_age |  -.0071785   .0009886    -7.26   0.000    -.0091161   -.0052408 
          r_black |   .0443221   .0179987     2.46   0.014     .0090453    .0795988 
        r_married |  -.0404313   .0153787    -2.63   0.009     -.070573   -.0102896 
          r_islam |   .0609182   .0183271     3.32   0.001     .0249979    .0968386 
          r_urban |  -.0087669   .0119277    -0.74   0.462    -.0321448     .014611 
        r_maxsent |  -.0001807   .0002767    -0.65   0.514     -.000723    .0003617 
       r_cust_gt3 |   .0046241   .0175616     0.26   0.792     -.029796    .0390442 
          r_misAB |   -.021297   .0205767    -1.04   0.301    -.0616266    .0190326 
          r_hadtc |   .0077256   .0494317     0.16   0.876    -.0891587    .1046099 
    r_ever_ac_sol |   .0359484   .0230566     1.56   0.119    -.0092416    .0811385 
        r_3charge |   .0199451   .0105217     1.90   0.058    -.0006771    .0405673 
       r_p_medlim |  -.0036103   .0165316    -0.22   0.827    -.0360116    .0287911 
       r_p_hsgrad |  -.1076189   .0167349    -6.43   0.000    -.1404188   -.0748191 
      r_p_had_job |   .0073484   .0158349     0.46   0.643    -.0236874    .0383842 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |    -.01386   .0257339    -0.54   0.590    -.0642975    .0365774 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0796266   .0117446     6.78   0.000     .0566077    .1026456 
        r_p_usvet |   .0038599   .0312182     0.12   0.902    -.0573267    .0650465 
           r_p_iq |   .0002878    .000474     0.61   0.544    -.0006413    .0012168 
   r_18under_1arr |  -.0685571   .0196098    -3.50   0.000    -.1069915   -.0301227 
            c_age |  -.0011623    .000972    -1.20   0.232    -.0030673    .0007428 
          c_black |   .0052128   .0145994     0.36   0.721    -.0234015    .0338271 
        c_married |   .0131469    .015643     0.84   0.401    -.0175129    .0438067 
          c_islam |  -.0158125   .0188895    -0.84   0.403    -.0528351    .0212102 
          c_urban |  -.0132318   .0154053    -0.86   0.390    -.0434257     .016962 
        c_maxsent |  -.0000307   .0000466    -0.66   0.511    -.0001221    .0000608 
       c_cust_gt3 |   .0018267   .0146804     0.12   0.901    -.0269463    .0305997 
          c_misAB |  -.0181906    .016719    -1.09   0.277    -.0509592     .014578 
          c_hadtc |   .0251271    .033595     0.75   0.454     -.040718    .0909721 
    c_ever_ac_sol |   .0372348   .0150924     2.47   0.014     .0076542    .0668155 
        c_3charge |   .0169609   .0116436     1.46   0.145      -.00586    .0397819 
       c_p_medlim |  -.0024093   .0162653    -0.15   0.882    -.0342887    .0294702 
       c_p_hsgrad |  -.0146843   .0118743    -1.24   0.216    -.0379575    .0085888 
      c_p_had_job |  -.0010798   .0141964    -0.08   0.939    -.0289043    .0267446 
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 c_p_prob_drugalc |   .0224779   .0274072     0.82   0.412    -.0312393     .076195 
      c_p_prob_mh |   .0059805   .0129782     0.46   0.645    -.0194563    .0314173 
        c_p_usvet |  -.0027641   .0290227    -0.10   0.924    -.0596476    .0541193 
           c_p_iq |  -.0001672   .0004112    -0.41   0.684    -.0009731    .0006388 
   c_18under_1arr |  -.0061623   .0165303    -0.37   0.709    -.0385612    .0262365 
            c_apv |   .0054105   .0231504     0.23   0.815    -.0399634    .0507845 
           cp_age |  -.0036103   .0014892    -2.42   0.015    -.0065291   -.0006914 
         cp_black |  -.0272057   .0274009    -0.99   0.321    -.0809104    .0264991 
       cp_married |  -.0021985    .042716    -0.05   0.959    -.0859204    .0815234 
         cp_islam |   .0385546   .0377203     1.02   0.307    -.0353757     .112485 
         cp_urban |   -.034942   .0273699    -1.28   0.202     -.088586    .0187019 
       cp_maxsent |  -4.29e-06   .0000952    -0.05   0.964    -.0001908    .0001822 
      cp_pri_narr |   .0025695   .0027304     0.94   0.347     -.002782     .007921 
      cp_cust_gt3 |   .0490449   .0256161     1.91   0.056    -.0011617    .0992515 
         cp_misAB |   .0016583   .0289876     0.06   0.954    -.0551563    .0584729 
         cp_hadtc |  -.0103481   .0799638    -0.13   0.897    -.1670743    .1463781 
     cp_hasPriorI |   .0334286    .040834     0.82   0.413    -.0466046    .1134617 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |   .0185126   .0364885     0.51   0.612    -.0530035    .0900287 
       cp_3charge |   .0097203   .0262456     0.37   0.711    -.0417201    .0611608 
          cp_rsth |   .0172536   .0151243     1.14   0.254    -.0123895    .0468967 
      cp_p_medlim |  -.0108352   .0293137    -0.37   0.712    -.0682889    .0466185 
      cp_p_hsgrad |   -.010445   .0311855    -0.33   0.738    -.0715674    .0506774 
     cp_p_had_job |   .0159035   .0272213     0.58   0.559    -.0374493    .0692563 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0362996   .0422567    -0.86   0.390    -.1191212     .046522 
     cp_p_prob_mh |  -.0255962    .025538    -1.00   0.316    -.0756497    .0244573 
       cp_p_usvet |   .0135122   .0521152     0.26   0.795    -.0886318    .1156561 
          cp_p_iq |  -.0006891   .0008662    -0.80   0.426    -.0023868    .0010086 
  cp_18under_1arr |  -.0484854   .0324757    -1.49   0.135    -.1121366    .0151658 
           cp_apv |  -.0426032   .0460709    -0.92   0.355    -.1329004    .0476941 
        stretches |  -.0143292   .0090504    -1.58   0.113    -.0320677    .0034093 
       r_time2rel |   .0000201   .0000369     0.55   0.586    -.0000522    .0000925 
       r_staytime |  -.0001396     .00004    -3.49   0.000     -.000218   -.0000611 
       tier_tt_fa |   .0019808    .012604     0.16   0.875    -.0227227    .0266842 
                k |   .0438113   .0233888     1.87   0.061    -.0020298    .0896525 
            _cons |   .7752169   .1309258     5.92   0.000     .5186071    1.031827 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mills             | 
        rho1-rho0 |  -.0697406   .0343076    -2.03   0.042    -.1369822    -.002499 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATE               | 
       E(Y1-Y0)@X |   .0093557   .0228201     0.41   0.682    -.0353709    .0540822 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(note: file mte_base_t150_has_postO.gph not found) 
(file mte_base_t150_has_postO.gph saved) 
(running parametric_polynomial on estimation sample) 
 
 
Bootstrap replications (50) 
----+--- 1 ---+--- 2 ---+--- 3 ---+--- 4 ---+--- 5  
..................................................    50 
 
Parametric Normal MTE Model                     Number of obs      =     10131 
Treatment Model: Probit                         Replications       =        50 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  |   Observed   Bootstrap                         Normal-based 
        has_postO |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Treated           | 
      c_hasPriorI |   .0121651   .0218267     0.56   0.577    -.0306145    .0549447 
       r_pri_narr |   .0155668   .0024446     6.37   0.000     .0107753    .0203582 
     rel_pri_narr |   .0000965   .0018236     0.05   0.958    -.0034776    .0036706 
           r_rsth |   .0700382   .0161775     4.33   0.000     .0383309    .1017454 
         rel_rsth |    .003403   .0118507     0.29   0.774     -.019824      .02663 
            r_age |  -.0068869   .0012912    -5.33   0.000    -.0094176   -.0043562 
          r_black |   .0366714    .036104     1.02   0.310    -.0340912    .1074339 
        r_married |  -.0175876   .0226706    -0.78   0.438    -.0620211    .0268459 
          r_islam |   .0544862   .0189523     2.87   0.004     .0173404    .0916319 
          r_urban |  -.0187866   .0171933    -1.09   0.275     -.052485    .0149117 
        r_maxsent |  -.0003992   .0002054    -1.94   0.052    -.0008018    3.35e-06 
       r_cust_gt3 |   .0684537    .013346     5.13   0.000      .042296    .0946114 
          r_misAB |  -.0443084   .0169884    -2.61   0.009     -.077605   -.0110119 
          r_hadtc |   .0780865   .0301424     2.59   0.010     .0190085    .1371645 
    r_ever_ac_sol |    -.01045   .0220748    -0.47   0.636    -.0537159    .0328158 
        r_3charge |   .0296483   .0111742     2.65   0.008     .0077472    .0515494 
       r_p_medlim |  -.0095457   .0186518    -0.51   0.609    -.0461025    .0270111 
       r_p_hsgrad |  -.0966286   .0160416    -6.02   0.000    -.1280695   -.0651877 
      r_p_had_job |   .0356864   .0112414     3.17   0.002     .0136536    .0577193 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0160127   .0243777    -0.66   0.511    -.0637922    .0317668 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0625979   .0156265     4.01   0.000     .0319706    .0932252 
        r_p_usvet |  -.0318052   .0389254    -0.82   0.414    -.1080976    .0444873 
           r_p_iq |   6.01e-06   .0005639     0.01   0.991    -.0010993    .0011113 
   r_18under_1arr |  -.0636009   .0226435    -2.81   0.005    -.1079814   -.0192203 
            c_age |  -.0010867   .0010977    -0.99   0.322    -.0032382    .0010648 
          c_black |  -.0047169   .0235831    -0.20   0.841     -.050939    .0415052 
        c_married |  -.0297288   .0177892    -1.67   0.095    -.0645949    .0051373 
          c_islam |   -.005965   .0222132    -0.27   0.788    -.0495022    .0375721 
          c_urban |   .0252401    .021221     1.19   0.234    -.0163523    .0668325 
        c_maxsent |  -.0000449   .0000438    -1.03   0.304    -.0001307    .0000408 
       c_cust_gt3 |  -.0037436   .0194411    -0.19   0.847    -.0418475    .0343603 
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          c_misAB |   .0077209   .0209436     0.37   0.712    -.0333278    .0487696 
          c_hadtc |  -.0642478   .0258003    -2.49   0.013    -.1148154   -.0136801 
    c_ever_ac_sol |  -.0040827    .016219    -0.25   0.801    -.0358715     .027706 
        c_3charge |    .009897   .0140626     0.70   0.482    -.0176653    .0374593 
       c_p_medlim |  -.0008889   .0170992    -0.05   0.959    -.0344026    .0326249 
       c_p_hsgrad |  -.0068218   .0181749    -0.38   0.707    -.0424439    .0288003 
      c_p_had_job |   .0135656   .0145884     0.93   0.352    -.0150271    .0421583 
 c_p_prob_drugalc |    .007154   .0308927     0.23   0.817    -.0533946    .0677026 
      c_p_prob_mh |   -.002518   .0142891    -0.18   0.860    -.0305241    .0254881 
        c_p_usvet |   .0081567   .0298279     0.27   0.785    -.0503049    .0666182 
           c_p_iq |  -.0003532   .0005607    -0.63   0.529     -.001452    .0007457 
   c_18under_1arr |  -.0069863   .0234197    -0.30   0.765    -.0528881    .0389155 
            c_apv |   .0074662   .0280605     0.27   0.790    -.0475313    .0624637 
           cp_age |  -.0047015   .0024983    -1.88   0.060     -.009598     .000195 
         cp_black |   .0128043   .0437561     0.29   0.770    -.0729561    .0985646 
       cp_married |  -.0438297    .047553    -0.92   0.357    -.1370318    .0493724 
         cp_islam |   .0216448   .0390671     0.55   0.580    -.0549253    .0982149 
         cp_urban |  -.0239538   .0350821    -0.68   0.495    -.0927134    .0448057 
       cp_maxsent |   .0001979   .0001122     1.76   0.078    -.0000219    .0004178 
      cp_pri_narr |   .0042454   .0041952     1.01   0.312     -.003977    .0124677 
      cp_cust_gt3 |   .0208057   .0262493     0.79   0.428     -.030642    .0722534 
         cp_misAB |  -.0158691   .0413346    -0.38   0.701    -.0968834    .0651452 
         cp_hadtc |  -.0810373   .0659133    -1.23   0.219     -.210225    .0481505 
     cp_hasPriorI |   -.040007   .0482166    -0.83   0.407    -.1345097    .0544958 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |   .0409425   .0437729     0.94   0.350    -.0448509    .1267358 
       cp_3charge |   .0427453    .032114     1.33   0.183    -.0201969    .1056875 
          cp_rsth |  -.0353027   .0231719    -1.52   0.128    -.0807188    .0101135 
      cp_p_medlim |  -.0272452   .0385791    -0.71   0.480    -.1028589    .0483686 
      cp_p_hsgrad |   .0392892   .0410221     0.96   0.338    -.0411127    .1196911 
     cp_p_had_job |  -.0167772   .0377816    -0.44   0.657    -.0908278    .0572734 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |    .002299   .0682837     0.03   0.973    -.1315347    .1361327 
     cp_p_prob_mh |   .0252743   .0342215     0.74   0.460    -.0417986    .0923472 
       cp_p_usvet |   .0266857   .0723862     0.37   0.712    -.1151887    .1685602 
          cp_p_iq |  -.0003321   .0011076    -0.30   0.764    -.0025029    .0018386 
  cp_18under_1arr |   .0852268   .0497782     1.71   0.087    -.0123367    .1827903 
           cp_apv |   .0926251   .0684982     1.35   0.176    -.0416288    .2268791 
        stretches |  -.0040786   .0052659    -0.77   0.439    -.0143996    .0062424 
       r_time2rel |  -9.66e-06   .0000267    -0.36   0.718    -.0000621    .0000427 
       r_staytime |   -.000014   .0000311    -0.45   0.653    -.0000749     .000047 
       tier_tt_fa |   .0361013    .014906     2.42   0.015     .0068861    .0653165 
                k |   -.025693   .0276723    -0.93   0.353    -.0799297    .0285437 
            _cons |   .7842553   .1855676     4.23   0.000     .4205494    1.147961 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Untreated         | 
      c_hasPriorI |   .0214424   .0175767     1.22   0.222    -.0130073    .0558922 
       r_pri_narr |   .0134105   .0016488     8.13   0.000     .0101789    .0166422 
     rel_pri_narr |    .000934   .0010314     0.91   0.365    -.0010875    .0029555 
           r_rsth |   .0723526   .0102771     7.04   0.000     .0522099    .0924953 
         rel_rsth |   .0033341    .007057     0.47   0.637    -.0104974    .0171656 
            r_age |  -.0070661   .0009895    -7.14   0.000    -.0090056   -.0051267 
          r_black |   .0460885   .0160074     2.88   0.004     .0147144    .0774625 
        r_married |  -.0245843     .01577    -1.56   0.119    -.0554929    .0063243 
          r_islam |   .0634383   .0157086     4.04   0.000       .03265    .0942267 
          r_urban |  -.0133902   .0154121    -0.87   0.385    -.0435972    .0168169 
        r_maxsent |   -.000034   .0002209    -0.15   0.878    -.0004668    .0003989 
       r_cust_gt3 |   .0073534   .0145624     0.50   0.614    -.0211884    .0358952 
          r_misAB |  -.0288302   .0135627    -2.13   0.034    -.0554126   -.0022478 
          r_hadtc |   .0206354   .0377861     0.55   0.585     -.053424    .0946947 
    r_ever_ac_sol |   .0128734    .026502     0.49   0.627    -.0390696    .0648163 
        r_3charge |   .0097503   .0104284     0.93   0.350    -.0106889    .0301896 
       r_p_medlim |  -.0120969   .0142669    -0.85   0.396    -.0400595    .0158657 
       r_p_hsgrad |   -.098308   .0169413    -5.80   0.000    -.1315123   -.0651037 
      r_p_had_job |   .0094691   .0130565     0.73   0.468    -.0161212    .0350593 
 r_p_prob_drugalc |   .0057383   .0245518     0.23   0.815    -.0423825     .053859 
      r_p_prob_mh |   .0810487   .0110233     7.35   0.000     .0594433     .102654 
        r_p_usvet |  -.0135174   .0253031    -0.53   0.593    -.0631105    .0360758 
           r_p_iq |   .0003787   .0004252     0.89   0.373    -.0004547    .0012121 
   r_18under_1arr |  -.0666495   .0144409    -4.62   0.000    -.0949531   -.0383459 
            c_age |   -.001009   .0010553    -0.96   0.339    -.0030773    .0010593 
          c_black |   .0070798   .0165429     0.43   0.669    -.0253436    .0395032 
        c_married |   .0087691   .0161805     0.54   0.588    -.0229441    .0404823 
          c_islam |  -.0044646   .0188075    -0.24   0.812    -.0413267    .0323974 
          c_urban |  -.0206005    .012957    -1.59   0.112    -.0459957    .0047947 
        c_maxsent |  -.0000705   .0000364    -1.94   0.053    -.0001419    8.90e-07 
       c_cust_gt3 |   .0008296    .017385     0.05   0.962    -.0332443    .0349036 
          c_misAB |  -.0056996   .0161849    -0.35   0.725    -.0374214    .0260223 
          c_hadtc |    .000077   .0261838     0.00   0.998    -.0512423    .0513963 
    c_ever_ac_sol |   .0386978    .016362     2.37   0.018     .0066289    .0707667 
        c_3charge |   .0115362   .0129827     0.89   0.374    -.0139094    .0369818 
       c_p_medlim |    .003246   .0145632     0.22   0.824    -.0252973    .0317894 
       c_p_hsgrad |  -.0043757    .012474    -0.35   0.726    -.0288243    .0200729 
      c_p_had_job |   .0007842   .0116143     0.07   0.946    -.0219793    .0235477 
 c_p_prob_drugalc |   .0202249   .0243244     0.83   0.406    -.0274501       .0679 
      c_p_prob_mh |   -.000755   .0099771    -0.08   0.940    -.0203099    .0187998 
        c_p_usvet |  -.0017082   .0234978    -0.07   0.942    -.0477631    .0443467 
           c_p_iq |  -.0003276   .0004217    -0.78   0.437    -.0011541    .0004989 
   c_18under_1arr |   .0059163    .015249     0.39   0.698    -.0239711    .0358037 
            c_apv |  -.0029043   .0209732    -0.14   0.890     -.044011    .0382023 
           cp_age |  -.0030652   .0016535    -1.85   0.064    -.0063059    .0001756 
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         cp_black |  -.0230063   .0266228    -0.86   0.388     -.075186    .0291734 
       cp_married |   .0043164   .0355903     0.12   0.903    -.0654393    .0740722 
         cp_islam |   .0205401   .0323779     0.63   0.526    -.0429194    .0839995 
         cp_urban |  -.0342143   .0244563    -1.40   0.162    -.0821476    .0137191 
       cp_maxsent |  -.0000473   .0000787    -0.60   0.548    -.0002014    .0001069 
      cp_pri_narr |    .001568   .0030991     0.51   0.613    -.0045062    .0076422 
      cp_cust_gt3 |   .0439232    .027654     1.59   0.112    -.0102777     .098124 
         cp_misAB |  -.0255816    .036497    -0.70   0.483    -.0971145    .0459512 
         cp_hadtc |  -.0097168   .0710757    -0.14   0.891    -.1490225     .129589 
     cp_hasPriorI |   .0135357   .0365037     0.37   0.711    -.0580103    .0850816 
   cp_ever_ac_sol |   .0420698   .0367979     1.14   0.253    -.0300527    .1141923 
       cp_3charge |   .0192885   .0230366     0.84   0.402    -.0258624    .0644394 
          cp_rsth |   .0242539   .0164719     1.47   0.141    -.0080305    .0565382 
      cp_p_medlim |  -.0059291   .0320513    -0.18   0.853    -.0687485    .0568903 
      cp_p_hsgrad |  -.0262224   .0286986    -0.91   0.361    -.0824706    .0300258 
     cp_p_had_job |   .0050219   .0227494     0.22   0.825    -.0395661      .04961 
cp_p_prob_drugalc |  -.0366481   .0411061    -0.89   0.373    -.1172147    .0439184 
     cp_p_prob_mh |  -.0256594   .0245203    -1.05   0.295    -.0737183    .0223996 
       cp_p_usvet |  -.0201867   .0474858    -0.43   0.671    -.1132572    .0728838 
          cp_p_iq |  -.0001706   .0007879    -0.22   0.829    -.0017148    .0013737 
  cp_18under_1arr |  -.0462138   .0358646    -1.29   0.198     -.116507    .0240795 
           cp_apv |  -.0227991   .0388972    -0.59   0.558    -.0990361     .053438 
        stretches |  -.0086822   .0096214    -0.90   0.367    -.0275398    .0101754 
       r_time2rel |   .0000245   .0000267     0.92   0.359    -.0000278    .0000769 
       r_staytime |   -.000144   .0000335    -4.30   0.000    -.0002096   -.0000785 
       tier_tt_fa |   .0003604    .010948     0.03   0.974    -.0210973    .0218181 
                k |   .0729725   .0248391     2.94   0.003     .0242888    .1216563 
            _cons |   .6910948   .1440772     4.80   0.000     .4087087    .9734809 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mills             | 
        rho1-rho0 |  -.0986655   .0367373    -2.69   0.007    -.1706693   -.0266617 
------------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
ATE               | 
       E(Y1-Y0)@X |  -.0010905   .0332066    -0.03   0.974    -.0661742    .0639933 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
(note: file mte_base_t180_has_postO.gph not found) 
(file mte_base_t180_has_postO.gph saved) 







Chapter 10 Appendix 
Cross-tabulations of the relative risk score versus the fourth, seventh, and 
tenth deciles of the propensity scores at the 150-day threshold. 
 
 
rel_pri_na |        p_150_4 
        rr |         0          1 |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
       -45 |         1          0 |         1  
       -41 |         1          0 |         1  
       -39 |         1          0 |         1  
       -38 |         1          0 |         1  
       -37 |         1          0 |         1  
       -33 |         1          0 |         1  
       -29 |         3          0 |         3  
       -27 |         2          0 |         2  
       -26 |         2          0 |         2  
       -25 |         3          0 |         3  
       -24 |         7          0 |         7  
       -23 |         2          0 |         2  
       -22 |         5          0 |         5  
       -21 |        10          1 |        11  
       -20 |         9          1 |        10  
       -19 |         9          1 |        10  
       -18 |        10          3 |        13  
       -17 |        14          2 |        16  
       -16 |        25          1 |        26  
       -15 |        25          2 |        27  
       -14 |        28          3 |        31  
       -13 |        44          4 |        48  
       -12 |        47          9 |        56  
       -11 |        45         13 |        58  
       -10 |        85          7 |        92  
        -9 |       117         13 |       130  
        -8 |       155         14 |       169  
        -7 |       190         21 |       211  
        -6 |       258         35 |       293  
        -5 |       336         33 |       369  
        -4 |       425         42 |       467  
        -3 |       553         60 |       613  
        -2 |       633         86 |       719  
        -1 |       718         83 |       801  
         0 |       909         97 |     1,006  
         1 |       767         86 |       853  
         2 |       672         70 |       742  
         3 |       530         66 |       596  
         4 |       471         49 |       520  
         5 |       352         32 |       384  
         6 |       298         26 |       324  
         7 |       219         36 |       255  
         8 |       208         23 |       231  
         9 |       166         20 |       186  
        10 |       129         11 |       140  
        11 |       101         13 |       114  
        12 |        90          8 |        98  
        13 |        70          6 |        76  
        14 |        58          6 |        64  
        15 |        46          2 |        48  
        16 |        40          6 |        46  
        17 |        35          4 |        39  
        18 |        22          7 |        29  
        19 |        21          6 |        27  
        20 |        26          1 |        27  
        21 |        16          1 |        17  
        22 |        16          3 |        19  
        23 |        11          1 |        12  
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        24 |         7          3 |        10  
        25 |         5          1 |         6  
        26 |         7          3 |        10  
        27 |         9          2 |        11  
        28 |         0          2 |         2  
        29 |         1          0 |         1  
        30 |         2          0 |         2  
        31 |         2          0 |         2  
        32 |         3          2 |         5  
        33 |         2          0 |         2  
        34 |         3          0 |         3  
        35 |         2          0 |         2  
        36 |         3          0 |         3  
        37 |         2          1 |         3  
        38 |         1          0 |         1  
        39 |         1          0 |         1  
        40 |         0          3 |         3  
        41 |         2          0 |         2  
        42 |         2          0 |         2  
        43 |         2          0 |         2  
        46 |         3          0 |         3  
        63 |         1          0 |         1  
        71 |         1          0 |         1  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 




rel_pri_na |        p_150_7 
        rr |         0          1 |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
       -45 |         1          0 |         1  
       -41 |         0          1 |         1  
       -39 |         1          0 |         1  
       -38 |         1          0 |         1  
       -37 |         1          0 |         1  
       -33 |         0          1 |         1  
       -29 |         1          2 |         3  
       -27 |         2          0 |         2  
       -26 |         2          0 |         2  
       -25 |         3          0 |         3  
       -24 |         6          1 |         7  
       -23 |         2          0 |         2  
       -22 |         5          0 |         5  
       -21 |        10          1 |        11  
       -20 |         7          3 |        10  
       -19 |        10          0 |        10  
       -18 |        13          0 |        13  
       -17 |        16          0 |        16  
       -16 |        22          4 |        26  
       -15 |        24          3 |        27  
       -14 |        27          4 |        31  
       -13 |        44          4 |        48  
       -12 |        53          3 |        56  
       -11 |        54          4 |        58  
       -10 |        82         10 |        92  
        -9 |       116         14 |       130  
        -8 |       157         12 |       169  
        -7 |       193         18 |       211  
        -6 |       264         29 |       293  
        -5 |       336         33 |       369  
        -4 |       415         52 |       467  
        -3 |       561         52 |       613  
        -2 |       670         49 |       719  
        -1 |       731         70 |       801  
         0 |       931         75 |     1,006  
         1 |       786         67 |       853  
         2 |       676         66 |       742  
         3 |       538         58 |       596  
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         4 |       462         58 |       520  
         5 |       351         33 |       384  
         6 |       291         33 |       324  
         7 |       229         26 |       255  
         8 |       216         15 |       231  
         9 |       171         15 |       186  
        10 |       132          8 |       140  
        11 |       106          8 |       114  
        12 |        97          1 |        98  
        13 |        71          5 |        76  
        14 |        60          4 |        64  
        15 |        43          5 |        48  
        16 |        43          3 |        46  
        17 |        34          5 |        39  
        18 |        28          1 |        29  
        19 |        26          1 |        27  
        20 |        25          2 |        27  
        21 |        12          5 |        17  
        22 |        16          3 |        19  
        23 |        12          0 |        12  
        24 |        10          0 |        10  
        25 |         5          1 |         6  
        26 |        10          0 |        10  
        27 |        11          0 |        11  
        28 |         2          0 |         2  
        29 |         1          0 |         1  
        30 |         2          0 |         2  
        31 |         1          1 |         2  
        32 |         5          0 |         5  
        33 |         2          0 |         2  
        34 |         2          1 |         3  
        35 |         1          1 |         2  
        36 |         2          1 |         3  
        37 |         3          0 |         3  
        38 |         1          0 |         1  
        39 |         1          0 |         1  
        40 |         3          0 |         3  
        41 |         2          0 |         2  
        42 |         1          1 |         2  
        43 |         2          0 |         2  
        46 |         2          1 |         3  
        63 |         1          0 |         1  
        71 |         1          0 |         1  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 




rel_pri_na |        p_150_10 
        rr |         0          1 |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
       -45 |         1          0 |         1  
       -41 |         1          0 |         1  
       -39 |         1          0 |         1  
       -38 |         1          0 |         1  
       -37 |         1          0 |         1  
       -33 |         1          0 |         1  
       -29 |         3          0 |         3  
       -27 |         1          1 |         2  
       -26 |         1          1 |         2  
       -25 |         2          1 |         3  
       -24 |         6          1 |         7  
       -23 |         2          0 |         2  
       -22 |         4          1 |         5  
       -21 |         8          3 |        11  
       -20 |        10          0 |        10  
       -19 |         9          1 |        10  
       -18 |         9          4 |        13  
       -17 |        15          1 |        16  
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       -16 |        21          5 |        26  
       -15 |        24          3 |        27  
       -14 |        29          2 |        31  
       -13 |        44          4 |        48  
       -12 |        48          8 |        56  
       -11 |        54          4 |        58  
       -10 |        80         12 |        92  
        -9 |       117         13 |       130  
        -8 |       146         23 |       169  
        -7 |       179         32 |       211  
        -6 |       265         28 |       293  
        -5 |       319         50 |       369  
        -4 |       399         68 |       467  
        -3 |       525         88 |       613  
        -2 |       625         94 |       719  
        -1 |       694        107 |       801  
         0 |       881        125 |     1,006  
         1 |       736        117 |       853  
         2 |       654         88 |       742  
         3 |       530         66 |       596  
         4 |       442         78 |       520  
         5 |       330         54 |       384  
         6 |       279         45 |       324  
         7 |       231         24 |       255  
         8 |       203         28 |       231  
         9 |       167         19 |       186  
        10 |       117         23 |       140  
        11 |        99         15 |       114  
        12 |        76         22 |        98  
        13 |        63         13 |        76  
        14 |        58          6 |        64  
        15 |        42          6 |        48  
        16 |        37          9 |        46  
        17 |        36          3 |        39  
        18 |        23          6 |        29  
        19 |        22          5 |        27  
        20 |        22          5 |        27  
        21 |        17          0 |        17  
        22 |        17          2 |        19  
        23 |        12          0 |        12  
        24 |        10          0 |        10  
        25 |         5          1 |         6  
        26 |         8          2 |        10  
        27 |         9          2 |        11  
        28 |         2          0 |         2  
        29 |         1          0 |         1  
        30 |         2          0 |         2  
        31 |         2          0 |         2  
        32 |         5          0 |         5  
        33 |         2          0 |         2  
        34 |         3          0 |         3  
        35 |         2          0 |         2  
        36 |         3          0 |         3  
        37 |         3          0 |         3  
        38 |         1          0 |         1  
        39 |         1          0 |         1  
        40 |         3          0 |         3  
        41 |         2          0 |         2  
        42 |         2          0 |         2  
        43 |         1          1 |         2  
        46 |         1          2 |         3  
        63 |         1          0 |         1  
        71 |         1          0 |         1  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 





Cross-tabulations of the relative risk score versus the fourth, seventh, and 
tenth deciles of the propensity scores at the 150-day threshold. 
 
           |        p_150_4 
  rel_rsth |         0          1 |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
        -7 |         2          0 |         2  
        -6 |         8          2 |        10  
        -5 |        48          3 |        51  
        -4 |       169         22 |       191  
        -3 |       480         52 |       532  
        -2 |       946        107 |     1,053  
        -1 |     1,454        142 |     1,596  
         0 |     1,900        205 |     2,105  
         1 |     1,763        198 |     1,961  
         2 |     1,176        139 |     1,315  
         3 |       724        108 |       832  
         4 |       309         37 |       346  
         5 |       104         16 |       120  
         6 |        16          0 |        16  
         7 |         1          0 |         1  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 




           |        p_150_7 
  rel_rsth |         0          1 |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
        -7 |         1          1 |         2  
        -6 |         9          1 |        10  
        -5 |        44          7 |        51  
        -4 |       181         10 |       191  
        -3 |       493         39 |       532  
        -2 |       953        100 |     1,053  
        -1 |     1,455        141 |     1,596  
         0 |     1,916        189 |     2,105  
         1 |     1,795        166 |     1,961  
         2 |     1,209        106 |     1,315  
         3 |       760         72 |       832  
         4 |       313         33 |       346  
         5 |       112          8 |       120  
         6 |        15          1 |        16  
         7 |         1          0 |         1  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
     Total |     9,257        874 |    10,131  
 
 
           |        p_150_10 
  rel_rsth |         0          1 |     Total 
-----------+----------------------+---------- 
        -7 |         1          1 |         2  
        -6 |         9          1 |        10  
        -5 |        42          9 |        51  
        -4 |       167         24 |       191  
        -3 |       462         70 |       532  
        -2 |       903        150 |     1,053  
        -1 |     1,353        243 |     1,596  
         0 |     1,811        294 |     2,105  
         1 |     1,722        239 |     1,961  
         2 |     1,170        145 |     1,315  
         3 |       734         98 |       832  
         4 |       313         33 |       346  
         5 |       108         12 |       120  
         6 |        14          2 |        16  
         7 |         0          1 |         1  
-----------+----------------------+---------- 





Rearrest offenses for releasees: drug crimes. 
 
                                 offlit |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
    ACQ OR OBT POSS OF CONTR SUBS MISRE |         32        0.37        0.37 
       ADMIN ETC OF CONT SUBST BY PRACT |          4        0.05        0.41 
                  ADULT/MUTI/DEST LABEL |          4        0.05        0.46 
   ADULTE MISBRAND ANY CONTROLLED SUBST |          5        0.06        0.52 
             COUNTER SIMULAT MARK STAMP |          3        0.03        0.55 
        DELIVER/INTENT TO DEL DRUG PARA |         18        0.21        0.76 
        DISSEM/PUB OF FALSE/MISLEAD ADV |          1        0.01        0.77 
    INT POSS CONTR SUBST BY PER NOT REG |      3,360       38.71       39.48 
    KNOWING/IN MFTR/DIST OF DESIGN DRUG |          2        0.02       39.50 
         MANUF ETC CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE |          9        0.10       39.60 
      MANUF/DEL/POSS/W INT MANUF OR DEL |      2,143       24.69       64.29 
            MISBRANDING / DETERIORATION |          1        0.01       64.30 
        OPERATING A METHAMPHETAMINE LAB |          7        0.08       64.38 
                      POSS OF MARIJUANA |      1,059       12.20       76.58 
  POSS W/INT TO DISTR NC SUBS RES CONTR |         28        0.32       76.90 
POSSESS RED PHOS, ETC W/ INTENT TO MA.. |          1        0.01       76.92 
PROCURE FOR SELF/OTHER DRUG BY CONC M.. |          5        0.06       76.97 
    PURC/REC OF CONT SUBSTBY UNAUTH PER |        180        2.07       79.05 
     SALE GIVE CONTR SUBS TO DEP PERSON |         15        0.17       79.22 
           SALE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE |          6        0.07       79.29 
  SALE RETAIL OF DRUG EXCEPT PHARMACIST |          2        0.02       79.31 
         SELL ETC CONTR SUBST W/KNOW TM |          1        0.01       79.32 
                USE/POSS OF DRUG PARAPH |      1,795       20.68      100.00 
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                                  Total |      8,681      100.00 
 
 
Rearrest offenses for releasees: violent crimes. 
 
                                 offlit |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
ACC INVOLVING DEATH/INJURY-NOT PROPER.. |          4        0.05        0.05 
               ACCIDENT INV DEATH-ATTEM |          6        0.07        0.12 
 ACCIDENTS INVOLV.DEATH/PERSONAL INJURY |         24        0.29        0.41 
                  AGG ASSAULT WHILE DUI |          5        0.06        0.47 
                AGG INDECENT ASST-SOLIC |         15        0.18        0.64 
           AGG. ASSAULT OF UNBORN CHILD |          6        0.07        0.72 
AGG. IND. ASSAULT - COMP. LESS THAN 1.. |          3        0.04        0.75 
 AGG. IND. ASSAULT - COMP. LESS THAN 16 |          4        0.05        0.80 
AGG. IND. ASSAULT - FORCIBLE COMPULSION |          5        0.06        0.86 
AGG. IND. ASSAULT - THREAT OF FORCIBL.. |          3        0.04        0.89 
             AGG. IND. ASSAULT OF CHILD |          2        0.02        0.92 
          AGG. IND. ASSAULT W/O CONSENT |         24        0.29        1.20 
            AGGRAV INDEC ASSLT-W/O CONS |          6        0.07        1.28 
                     AGGRAVATED ASSAULT |      1,027       12.25       13.52 
     AGGRAVATED ASSAULT OF UNBORN CHILD |          2        0.02       13.55 
      AGGRAVATED HARASSMENT BY PRISONER |         17        0.20       13.75 
                    ASSAULT BY PRISONER |         17        0.20       13.95 
                   ATTEMPTED KIDNAPPING |         11        0.13       14.08 
               ATTEMPTED SEXUAL ASSAULT |         55        0.66       14.74 
           CONCEAL WHEREABOUTS OF CHILD |          3        0.04       14.78 
  CONCEALMENT OF WHEREABOUTS OF A CHILD |          1        0.01       14.79 
                      CRIMINAL HOMICIDE |         47        0.56       15.35 
                   DISCHARGE OF FIREARM |         17        0.20       15.55 
                      ETHNIC INTIMIDATE |          3        0.04       15.59 
                     FALSE IMPRISONMENT |         92        1.10       16.68 
               FALSE IMPRISONMENT-ATTEM |         51        0.61       17.29 
    FIRST DEGREE MURDER OF UNBORN CHILD |          1        0.01       17.30 
                             HARASSMENT |        155        1.85       19.15 
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HARASSMENT - COMM. LEWD, THREATENING,.. |        113        1.35       20.50 
HARASSMENT - COMM. REPEATEDLY IN ANON.. |         16        0.19       20.69 
HARASSMENT - COMM. REPEATEDLY IN ANOT.. |         17        0.20       20.89 
    HARASSMENT - FOLLOW IN PUBLIC PLACE |         10        0.12       21.01 
HARASSMENT - SUBJECT OTHER TO PHYSICA.. |        547        6.52       27.54 
  HARASSMENT-PHYSICALLY STRIKE KICK ETC |         37        0.44       27.98 
    HOMI BY VEH WHILE DR UNDER THE INFL |          1        0.01       27.99 
                               HOMICIDE |         17        0.20       28.19 
                    HOMICIDE BY VEHICLE |          5        0.06       28.25 
HOMICIDE BY VEHICLE/ DRIV UNDER INFLU.. |          1        0.01       28.26 
               IDSI FORCIBLE COMPULSION |         34        0.41       28.67 
       IDSI PERSON LESS THAN 13 YRS AGE |          4        0.05       28.72 
       IDSI PERSON LESS THAN 16 YRS AGE |         11        0.13       28.85 
                IDSI PERSON UNCONSCIOUS |          2        0.02       28.87 
        IDSI THREAT FORCIBLE COMPULSION |          6        0.07       28.94 
            IND ASSAULT VICTIM MENT DEF |          1        0.01       28.96 
       IND ASSLT PERSON LESS 13 YRS AGE |         35        0.42       29.37 
       IND ASSLT PERSON LESS 16 YRS AGE |         21        0.25       29.62 
            INDEC ASSL-CUST OF LAW/HOSP |          1        0.01       29.64 
              INDEC ASSL-SUBST'L IMPAIR |          8        0.10       29.73 
      INDEC ASSLT-MENTAL DISEASE/DEFECT |         27        0.32       30.05 
              INDEC ASSLT-OTHER UNAWARE |          8        0.10       30.15 
          INDEC ASSLT-W/O CONS OF OTHER |         72        0.86       31.01 
                 INDECENT ASSAULT-CONSP |         18        0.21       31.22 
                      INDECENT EXPOSURE |         50        0.60       31.82 
                INDECENT EXPOSURE-CONSP |         24        0.29       32.10 
                INTERFERENCE W/CHILD-CC |          5        0.06       32.16 
     INTERFERENCE W/CUSTODY OF CHILDREN |         14        0.17       32.33 
INVOL. DEVIATE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE W/C.. |          3        0.04       32.37 
               INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER |          5        0.06       32.43 
          KIDNAP TO FACILITATE A FELONY |          8        0.10       32.52 
           KIDNAP TO INFLICT INJ/TERROR |          8        0.10       32.62 
                  KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM |         16        0.19       32.81 
 KIDNAPPING-INTERFERE W/PUBLIC OFFICIAL |          1        0.01       32.82 
          LURE CHILD INTO MOTOR VEHICLE |          7        0.08       32.90 
                LURE CHILD INTO VEH-ATT |          2        0.02       32.93 
             MURDER OF THE FIRST DEGREE |         45        0.54       33.46 
            MURDER OF THE SECOND DEGREE |          7        0.08       33.55 
             MURDER OF THE THIRD DEGREE |         23        0.27       33.82 
                      MURDER-CONSPIRACY |         99        1.18       35.00 
       PROPEL MISSILE INTO OCC VEHICLES |          7        0.08       35.09 
PROPELLING MISSILES INTO OCCUPIED VEH.. |          4        0.05       35.13 
               RAPE FORCIBLE COMPULSION |         10        0.12       35.25 
                          RAPE OF CHILD |         10        0.12       35.37 
     RAPE PERSON LESS THAN 13 YEARS OLD |          1        0.01       35.38 
     RAPE SUBSTANTIALLY IMPAIRED PERSON |          2        0.02       35.41 
     RAPE THREAT OF FORCIBLE COMPULSION |         12        0.14       35.55 
                RAPE UNCONSCIOUS VICTIM |          5        0.06       35.61 
                        RAPE-CONSPIRACY |         18        0.21       35.83 
                         RAPE-STATUTORY |          2        0.02       35.85 
                                   REAP |      1,535       18.31       54.16 
                         SIMPLE ASSAULT |      2,152       25.66       79.82 
  SIMPLE ASSAULT - MUTUAL CONSENT FIGHT |         10        0.12       79.94 
                   SIMPLE ASSAULT-CONSP |        364        4.34       84.28 
                                 SODOMY |         12        0.14       84.42 
                               STALKING |          1        0.01       84.44 
STALKING - REPEATEDLY COMMIT ACTS TO .. |         56        0.67       85.10 
                       STALKING-SOLICIT |         68        0.81       85.92 
               STATUTORY SEX ASST-CONSP |         36        0.43       86.34 
TERRORISTIC THREATS CAUSE EVACUATION .. |          3        0.04       86.38 
TERRORISTIC THREATS CAUSE SERIOUS PUB.. |         11        0.13       86.51 
TERRORISTIC THREATS W/ INT TO TERRORI.. |        555        6.62       93.13 
                TERRORISTIC THREATS-SOL |        379        4.52       97.65 
        UNLAW RESTRAINT/INVOL SERVITUDE |          3        0.04       97.69 
        UNLAW RESTRAINT/RISK SER INJURY |         10        0.12       97.81 
               UNLAWFUL RESTRAINT-CONSP |        177        2.11       99.92 
UNLAWFUL RESTRAINT/ SERIOUS BODILY IN.. |          2        0.02       99.94 
VOL.MANSLAUGHTER UNBORN CHILD/MOTHER .. |          1        0.01       99.95 
VOLUNTARY MANS - PROVOCATION FROM IND.. |          2        0.02       99.98 
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   VOLUNTARY MANS - UNREASONABLE BELIEF |          1        0.01       99.99 
             WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION |          1        0.01      100.00 
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                                  Total |      8,385      100.00 
 
 
Rearrest offenses for releasees: property crimes. 
 
                                 offlit |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
----------------------------------------+----------------------------------- 
                 AGRICULTURAL VANDALISM |          2        0.02        0.02 
          ARSON - PERSON PROP EXC $5000 |          5        0.06        0.08 
  ARSON - RECKLESS PLACE PERSONS DANGER |          5        0.06        0.13 
ARSON AND DANGER OF DEATH OR BODILY I.. |         10        0.11        0.24 
             ARSON ENDANGERING PROPERTY |          5        0.06        0.30 
            ARSON, ENDANGERING PROPERTY |          1        0.01        0.31 
      ATT THEFT BY EXTORTION LEGAL HARM |          1        0.01        0.32 
                     ATTEMPTED BURGLARY |        133        1.48        1.80 
                             BAD CHECKS |         85        0.94        2.74 
                               BURGLARY |        661        7.33       10.07 
     BURGLARY-BLDG W/O OVERNIGHT ACCOM. |         12        0.13       10.21 
         BURGLARY-FROM ANY TYPE VEHICLE |        184        2.04       12.25 
                    CAUSING CATASTROPHE |          6        0.07       12.31 
            CAUSING/RISKING CATASTROPHE |         11        0.12       12.44 
                       COPYING; DEVICES |          3        0.03       12.47 
CREDIT CARD USED TO OBT OR ATT OBT PR.. |         55        0.61       13.08 
                           CREDIT CARDS |          1        0.01       13.09 
CRIM MISCH/DMG PROP INTENT, RECKLESS,.. |        123        1.36       14.46 
        CRIM'L MISCH-ANOTHER PECUN LOSS |          4        0.04       14.50 
         CRIM'L MISCH-TAMPER W/PROPERTY |        112        1.24       15.74 
                      CRIMINAL MISCHIEF |        369        4.09       19.84 
CRIMINAL MISCHIEF - DAMAGE PROPERTY -.. |        207        2.30       22.13 
                      CRIMINAL TRESPASS |         12        0.13       22.27 
   DEC BUS PRACT - FALSE/MIS STATE CRED |          1        0.01       22.28 
   DEC BUS PRACT - SALE LESS THAN QUANT |          4        0.04       22.32 
                DECEPTIVE PRACTICES-ATT |          3        0.03       22.35 
      FAIL TO FURN INFO/RET FALSE INFOR |          1        0.01       22.37 
FALSE STMT TO INDUCE AGENT FOR HOME I.. |          1        0.01       22.38 
     FALSE/FRAUD/INCOMP INSURANCE CLAIM |          4        0.04       22.42 
FALSELY IMPERSONATING PERSONS PRIVATE.. |          1        0.01       22.43 
                FORGERY - ALTER WRITING |         61        0.68       23.11 
        FORGERY - UTTERS FORGED WRITING |         58        0.64       23.75 
                   FORGERY-SOLICITATION |         21        0.23       23.98 
    FORGERY-UNAUTHORIZED ACT IN WRITING |        111        1.23       25.22 
 FRAUD ALTER/FORG/COUNTER TITLE REG INS |         14        0.16       25.37 
        FRAUD OBT FOODSTAMPS/ASSISTANCE |          1        0.01       25.38 
FRAUDULENT CERTIF OF TITLE-STOLEN VEH.. |          3        0.03       25.42 
FRAUDULENT USE OF CREDIT CARD UNDER 5.. |         21        0.23       25.65 
                 IDENTIFY THEFT - CONSP |         19        0.21       25.86 
                         IDENTITY THEFT |         63        0.70       26.56 
                          ILLEGAL SALES |          1        0.01       26.57 
INJURING OR TAMPERING WITH FIRE APPAR.. |          3        0.03       26.60 
               INSTIT VANDALISM-ATTEMPT |          5        0.06       26.66 
         INSTITUT'L VAND'ISM EDUC FACIL |          9        0.10       26.76 
                        INSURANCE FRAUD |          1        0.01       26.77 
                    LARCENY BY EMPLOYEE |        147        1.63       28.40 
                  LIBRARY THEFT-SOLICIT |          2        0.02       28.42 
                   MAKE CHECK W/O FUNDS |         18        0.20       28.62 
         MAKE FALSE APPLI FOR TITLE REG |          3        0.03       28.66 
OBTAIN PROPERTY OR CREDIT BY FALSE ST.. |         37        0.41       29.07 
OWNING, OPERATING OR CONDUCTING A CHO.. |          5        0.06       29.12 
POSS SOLV FOR RELEAS TOXIC VAPORS/FUMES |          1        0.01       29.13 
POSSES ACCESS DEVICE KNOWING COUNTERF.. |         18        0.20       29.33 
       POSSESS EXPLOSIVE/INCEN MATERIAL |          1        0.01       29.34 
PUBL, MAKE, SELL, ETC CREDIT CARD ALT.. |          8        0.09       29.43 
              RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY |      1,625       18.03       47.46 
                 RETAIL RECORDED DEVICE |          4        0.04       47.50 
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                           RETAIL THEFT |          5        0.06       47.56 
               RETAIL THEFT - TAKE MDSE |        829        9.20       56.76 
      RETAIL THEFT - TRANS MDSE FR CONT |          9        0.10       56.86 
 RETAIL THEFT-ALTER LABEL/PRICE MARKING |         10        0.11       56.97 
                RETAIL THEFT-UNDER-RING |          4        0.04       57.01 
                    RISKING CATASTROPHE |          8        0.09       57.10 
                                ROBBERY |        147        1.63       58.73 
ROBBERY (PHYSICALLY TAKES OR REMOVES .. |          9        0.10       58.83 
ROBBERY (THREATENS OR INFLICTS BODILY.. |          3        0.03       58.86 
               ROBBERY OF MOTOR VEHICLE |         26        0.29       59.15 
                     ROBBERY-CONSPIRACY |        210        2.33       61.48 
  ROBBERY-INFLICT SERIOUS BODILY INJURY |        116        1.29       62.77 
   SECURING EXEC DOCUMENTS BY DECEPTION |         32        0.36       63.12 
 SIMULATING OBJ OF ANTIQUITY,RARITY,ETC |          3        0.03       63.16 
SMELL/INHALE TOXIC RELEASING SUBSTANCES |          1        0.01       63.17 
           TAMPER RECORDS OR ID-WRITING |         24        0.27       63.43 
        THEFT BY DECEP-FALSE IMPRESSION |        204        2.26       65.70 
   THEFT BY DECEPT-PREVENT ACQU OF INFO |         18        0.20       65.90 
                     THEFT BY DECEPTION |          4        0.04       65.94 
     THEFT BY DECEPTION-FAIL TO CORRECT |         17        0.19       66.13 
   THEFT BY FAIL TO MAKE REQ DISP FUNDS |          7        0.08       66.21 
     THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY |        357        3.96       70.17 
   THEFT BY UNLAW TAKING-IMMOVABLE PROP |         12        0.13       70.30 
     THEFT BY UNLAW TAKING-MOVABLE PROP |      1,534       17.02       87.32 
             THEFT FROM A MOTOR VEHICLE |          5        0.06       87.38 
               THEFT OF LEASED PROPERTY |          9        0.10       87.48 
                 THEFT OF LOST PROPERTY |         18        0.20       87.67 
                 THEFT OF MOTOR VEHICLE |         61        0.68       88.35 
                      THEFT OF SERVICES |          2        0.02       88.37 
    THEFT OF SERVICES-ACQUIS OF SERVICE |          6        0.07       88.44 
THEFT OF SERVICES-ACQUISITION OF SERV.. |          3        0.03       88.47 
               THEFT-FAIL TO MAKE-CONSP |          1        0.01       88.48 
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